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This thesis presents an analysis of the spectacular rise of political Islam in Turkey. It 
has two aims: first to understand the underlying causes of the rise of the Welfare Party 
which -later became the Virtue Party- throughout the 1990s, and second to analyse 
how grassroots activism influenced this process. 
The thesis reviews the previous literature on the Islamic fundamentalist movements, 
political parties, political party systems and concentrates on the local party 
organisations and their effects on the party's electoral performance. It questions the 
categorisation of Islamic fundamentalism as an appropriate label for this movement. 
An exploration of such movements is particularly important in light of the event of 
11`x' September. After exploring existing theoretical and case studies into political 
Islam and party activism, I present my qualitative case study. I have used 
ethnographic methodology, and done participatory observations among grassroots 
activists in Ankara's two sub-districts covering 105 neighbourhoods. 
I examined the Turkish party system and the reasons for its collapse. It was observed 
that as a result of party fragmentation, electoral volatility and organisational decline 
and decline in the party identification among the citizens the Turkish party system has 
declined. However, the WP/VP profited from this trend enormously and emerged as 
the main beneficiary of this process. Empirical data is analysed in four chapters, 
dealing with the different aspects of the Virtue Party's local organisations and 
grassroots activists. They deal with change and continuity in the party, the patterns of 
participation, the routes and motives for becoming a party activist, the profile of party 
activists and the local party organisations. I explore what they do and how they do it. 
The analysis reveals that the categorisation of Islamic fundamentalism is misplaced 
and the rise of political Islam in Turkey cannot be explained as religious revivalism or 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. It is a political force that drives its strength from 
the urban poor which has been harshly affected by the IMF directed neoliberal 
economy policies. In conclusion it is shown that the WP/VP's electoral chances were 
significantly improved by its very efficient and effective party organisations, and 
highly committed grassroots activists. 
I 
CHAPTER ONE 
POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: GRASSROOTS 
ACTIVISTS AND THEIR AFFECTS ON THE RISE 
OF THE WPIVP IN THE 1990s 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is two-fold, first of all, to grasp what were the underlying causes 
of the unprecedented rise of political Islam in Turkey throughout the 1990s. In other 
words to throw light onto why and how the pro-Islamist Welfare Party tripled its share 
of votes between 1987 and 1995 from 7% to 21 % at general elections. And secondly 
to find out what are the effects of grassroots organisations and activism on the 
WP/VPs unprecedented electoral success in the 1990s. 
There is no doubt that one of the most important developments of the 1990s is the 
emergence of fundamentalist movements around the world. As expected Turkey, a 
predominantly Muslim country has not been an exception to this religious revivalist 
trend. Since the early 1980s political Islam had an increasingly influential role in 
socio-economic, political and cultural life (Ayata, 1993, p. 65). It seems that this 
revival of Islamic fundamentalism will change Turkish society in the near future 
($aylan, 1992 p. 127). In fact all of this development contradicted all predictions of 
the modernist, secularist paradigm that envisaged secularisation as imminent and the 
role of religion in politics diminished forever. What was more mysterious for many 
was that political Islam became one of the main political forces in Turkey despite one 
and a half' centuries of modernisation, westernisation, and strictly guided 
secularisation policies. 
The pro-Islamist Refah (Welfare) party (WP) become the biggest mass political party 
within a relatively short period. The Welfare party increased its share of the vote from 
2 
9.8 percent in 1989 to 19.1 percent in the 1994 local elections, a turning point in 
Turkish political history. For the first time in over seventy years of the secular 
republic, many of Turkey's major cities including Istanbul and Ankara the capital of' 
the secularist republic faced the reality of having Islamist mayors. This was a 
devastating shock for the militant secularist elites -chiefly the military and 
bureaucratic elite- liberals, social democrats, westernised strata of society, and 
minority Alevi population. 
It created a siege atmosphere for modernized, westernised and secular strata of the 
Turkish society. They felt threatened by Islamic fundamentalism, which is often 
coupled with `extremism' `irrationality', `intolerant' and `religious bigotry'. Some 
argued for an immediate segregation of men and women in the public sphere and the 
confinement of women in the home. Others saw the rise of the WP as heralding an 
approaching irtica (Sharia) while others were concerned about the loss of freedom, 
democracy, and respect for human rights as if they really existed at all. 
The fear and anxiety took the wildest forms. Soon, there were media reports of 
incidences where young women being assaulted verbally or physically. Women who 
wore short skirts or jeans had their flesh slashed, some others were bitten for similar 
reasons. 
In the meantime it led to a very significant development in the opposite camp as well. 
The official ideology made tremendous gains by capitalising on this widespread fear 
and anxiety. The unprecedented election results in 1994 and 1995 of the WP 
contributed significantly to the startling revival of Kemalism, the official ideology of 
republic. After decades of decline in popularity it made a come back to haunt its 
historical enemy beaten to death at the turn of 20`x' century. 
The results of the general elections held one year later on 24th December 1995 
showed that the Refah's success increasingly continued. The WP attained 21.4 per 
cent of total the vote and gained more seats (158 out of 550) than any mainstream 
secularist parties. ' This time the general election heightened the tension between 
laicists (secularists) and Islamists (fundamentalists) to a degree where the Islamic led 
1 Scrim Sonuclan 24.12.1995 - ResuIts of Elections of Representatives- State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division. 
November 1996, Ankara 
3 
, government was 
forced to resign after just 11 months in office. However, the 
resignation of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the WP following what some 
commentators has been called a postmodern coup in 28 February 1997, was not the 
end but the beginning of another chapter in a long and exhausting battle between 
secularist military and bureaucratic elites and the Islamic WP. 2 Not only was the 
Welfare the largest party in the country being closed down by the supreme court its 
leader Necmettin Erbakan and six other MPs were banned from politics. 
In response to the rise of political Islam, the military elite that dominated the National 
Security Council, needed to redefine its `security concept'. After fifteen years fighting 
the PKK, political Islam was elevated to the number one internal threat to the 
secularist republic. Since then virtually all of the monthly NSC meetings, designated 
the ýeriat tehdidi - the threat of Islamic fundamentalism-assess the latest irticai - 
fundamentalist- activities of various Islamic groups, and action plans for the 
eradication of them. `If necessary, our fight against the fundamentalist threat will 
continue one thousand year' declared one of the leading general in the army.; The 
process of 28 February continues. It has laid the foundations of the pacification of 
political Islam. Leading figures such as N. Erbakan the creator and leader of the 
Welfare party, Tayyip Erdogan the ex-mayor of Istanbul (for many the future leader 
of political Islam), S. Kazan, H. Mezarci, Sukru Karatepe ex-mayor of Kayseri, and 
many others have been banned from politics. 
In addition to internal concerns, the rise of political Islam in Turkey caused a 
considerable degree of concern in the capital cities of Turkey's Western allies. New 
York Times journalist John Darnton (1995) wrote: 
For years a strategic ally in the containment of Soviet Communism, Turkey 
has now become a bulwark against dictators, terrorists and Islamic radicals... 
Now, with conflicts multiplying in Azerbaijan and elsewhere, the east conjures 
up danger as well as riches. Turkey is recasting itself as a buffer state and as a 
bulwark, only this time against revolutionary Islam. 
2 For the term 'postmodern coup' see daily Radikal, 15 Ocak 2001, 'Özkasnak: 28 $ubat post modern 
darb, *-di (Ö<kasnak: 28 February was postmodern coup)'(15 January 2001). 
3 See Milliyet, 29 June 2000, 'Komutandan Sava Uyarisi' (Warning of War from Commandant) and 
30-06-2000 'Askerden Iknici Cikis' (Military's Second Warning). 
4 
After noting Turkey's strategic position during the Cold War as a buffer state against 
Soviet Communism lie points out the new threat to the West by referring to Willy 
Claes' (ex-secretary general of NATO) comment that "fundamentalism posed as big 
a threat to the West as Communism once did. "4 There is nothing new in Willye 
Claes' point of view. It has been widely shared by many influential Western 
intellectuals but the importance of his view comes when NATO is taken into account. 
When NATO began to view Islamic fundamentalism as the biggest threat to the West, 
Turkey, as one of the key NATO members, had a new role as a buffer state against 
Political Islam. Richard Holbrooke (Assistant Secretary of State at that time), another 
high-ranking diplomat in the US administration in the 1990's, assessed the regional 
situation as "the most volatile portion of the world today. " And than lie added We 
haven't paid enough attention to Turkey". 5 Returning to the situation in Turkey 
Darnton argued that: "The fundamentalist rise is already very real. The Welfare 
Party, a militant Islamic group, has taken control of local governments in Ankara, 
Istanbul and other municipalities". 
In this article Darnton highlights three important points: first, Islamic fundamentalism 
is the new threat to the West, second, Turkey as a bulwark was and will continue to be 
crucial for the Western interests and thirdly Islamic fundamentalism is a real threat in 
Turkey. Therefore it is a security concern for the west as well. 
Why is the rise of political Islam so important? First of all, the embedded tension 
between the modernist, secularist elite representing the `centre' and anti-secular 
Islamic groups represent the `periphery'. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country 
established from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 as a modern and secular 
republic. The Turkish revolution led by modernist, secularist elites changed 
everything from the alphabet to the dress code. The most challenging task was the 
abolishment of the Sultanate and Caliphate, the supreme religious authority of Islam. 
This was a daunting task opposed by the conservative religious elite and various 
sections of society. Since the 1920s the secularist elite have always seen Islam as a 
major obstacle to Turkey's modernisation and a serious threat to political authority 
(Toprak, 1987, p. 218; see also Göle 2000, pp. 63-64). 
4 Quoted in Dranton, 1995. 
S See ibid. 
5 
The importance of the rise of political Islam in Turkey partly comes from the nature 
of the main political cleavage in Turkey. Mardin, $ (1973, pp. 169-191) argued that: 
"centre-periphery" relations provide a good explanatory scheme to comprehend 
Turkish politics. " Nur Yalman points out that during the `beneficent period of 1838- 
1877, Ottoman society was divided into two kulturkumps. (1973, p. 152). This duality 
continued until the 1960s. Since than there have been new elements added to the 
equation like class and ethnic dimensions. But the divide of secular/anti-secular is still 
one of the most important aspects of the Turkish polity. For this reason the 
unprecedented rise of political Islam has caused sharp polarisation, a deep political 
crisis, widespread panic, anxiety and fear as well as escalating the tension between the 
modernist secularists and the Islamists camps in Turkey. 6 
In many ways no other problem, since the 1920s, has challenged the Turkish secular 
establishment as political Islam has done. The Kurdish nationalist movement from 
1984 is perhaps the only other fundamental challenge that Turkey faced throughout 
the 1990s. 
Throughout the 1990s the sudden rise of religious movements in general and political 
Islam in particular was one of the most commonly discussed subjects in the mass 
media and various academic disciplines. (Sidahmed, and Ehtesharni 1996, p. 2; 
Munson, 1995, pp. 151-166; Benin and Stork, 1997, p. 8). This extraordinary interest 
is on the one hand due to dramatic changes that came about with the end of Cold War 
and the proclamation of the New World Order. The collapse of the former socialist 
bloc and the diminishment of its mighty military machinery left the US as the single 
Super Power. This was a major shift in the international politics, a power vacuum 
that had to be filled. In this historical conjunction Islam, with its one billion adherents 
spread out across the globe, appeared to constitute the most pervasive and powerful 
transactional force in the world (Esposito, 1995,4). On the other hand, there has been 
an increasing politicisation of Islam as an assertive alternative politics across the 
6 Following the WP's electoral success in general elections in 1995 there was an atmosphere of 
widespread anxiety and fear. This was reflected by several commentators and news articles. See: 
Atabek, 1996 "Refah Sendromurur Acinak... " (Overcoming the Syndrome of Welfare), Istanbul Daily 
Cumhuriyet 8 January 1996; Ate4,1996 "Refalr Korkusu" ( Fear of Welfare), Cumhuriyet 4 January 
1996; Cetinkaya, 1996 " RP den Korkulurmu" (Should we Scared of WP), Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet 
30 January 1996. 
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Muslim world. Furthermore there have been a series of events, such as attacks on 
Western embassies, hijackings and hostage takings, and violent acts by some Islamist 
groups. Most importantly the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the 
very latest unprecedented terrorist attacks and collapse of the New York's World 
Trade Centre and part of Pentagon by three airplane crashes has triggered massive 
media attention of Islamic fundamentalism. 7 
However the rise of political Islam cannot be investigated in isolation as a regional or 
localised phenomenon because it is closely connected with the political and socio- 
economic developments taking place on a global scale (Bina C, 1994, p. 3). This is 
true in the case of the WP in Turkey as well. The rise of the WP/VP from a movement 
to a mass political party has been closely connected with globalisation of neoliberal 
economy policies and the implementation of restructuring policies of the IMF and the 
World Bank in Turkey. 
1.2 Problems With the Categorisation of Islamic 
Fundamentalism 
The categorisation of political Islam as Islamic fundamentalism has been, by and 
large, one of the results of the end of Cold War. Is there a new phenomenon called 
fundamentalism or rather a shift in sociology's conceptualisation? It appears that the 
conceptualisation of fundamentalism has been heavily influenced by the discourse of 
the New World Order, a socio-political trend that dominated the 1990s. Many of these 
extremist forms of politics today called fundamentalism could have been called 
extremism, fanaticism, Buddhism, or Islamism in the past but today are called 
fundamentalism only because of ideological shifts taking place on a global scale. The 
proclamation of `the end of history' and claims about `the universalisation of western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government' explicitly excluded many 
non-liberal or non-western ideologies and government types. 8 It is this presumption 
that allowed the labelling of non-western or non-liberal politics or ideologies as 
fundamentalist. 
7 Esposito, J 1995: 4; See also "A declaration of war" The Guardian 12 Sep. 2001. 
8 See Fukuyama, 1989, pp. 3-18 and Fukuyama , 1992, p. 66. 
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Like many other sociological concepts, the concept of fundamentalism has been rather 
problematic. Its application to Islam has generated wide criticism among scholars. It 
is argued that the concept of fundamentalism is neither descriptive nor explanatory. 
(Campo, 1995, p. 167-194). The concept originated with the American Protestant 
fundamentalist movement that emerged in the 1920s. Fred Halliday (1995b, p. 399) 
points out that there are some problems with applying the term `fundamentalism' to 
Muslim movements. Also, Nikki Keddie (1986, cited in Halliday 1995b, p. 399) 
suggested that `Islamist' instead of Islamic fundamentalist' is probably the most 
accurate concept for this movement'. 
The discourses of Islamic fundamentalism are diverse. The most permanent 
discourses shaped by Western commentators tend to view these socio-political 
movements as religiously fanatic groups with a unique and rigid agenda of restoring a 
seventh century type Islamic society in the twenty first century. 
Political Islam is often regarded as a major threat to the stability of the Middle East, 
and therefore, to Western interests in the region (Esposito, 1995, p. 4). For some 
writers like Huntington (1994) and Lewis (1990) Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to 
Western interests and civilisation. It is the Green Menace that replaced the Red 
Menace of the Cold War area. 9 
The discourse of political Islam among Western commentators and academics has 
some parallels with the discourse of political Islam in Turkey. The one exception is 
the emphasis given to secularism/anti-secularism and modernity/anti-modernity, 
which are well-known elements of western discourse. In fact the vast majority of the 
debate revolves around the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, as in the West, to the 
modern, secular, democratic republic and the principles of Ataturk. (See cetinkaya, 
1996, p. 80; Ekýi, 1995, p. 9; Kongar, 2000, p. 40). 
Furthermore, "Islamic fundamentalism" for many scholars is equated with 
"terrorism", "extremism", "intolerance", "irrationality", "the Green Menace" etc. (See 
9 Esposito, 1995, p. 5. 
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Huntington, 1994, pp. 22 - 49; Lewis, 1990, pp. 47 - 60; Miller, 1993, pp. 43 - 56; 
Munson, 1995, pp. 151 - 166). These claims are not all unjustified exaggeration or 
accusations and the product of imaginative minds of external/western observers. It is 
true that Islamic groups have committed some of the worst terrorist attacks such as 
attacks on the World Trade centre in New York City, numbers of plane hijackings, the 
Dahran bombing in Saudi Arabia and many others. These have conjured up the idea 
of a global "fundamentalist" jihad (holy war) against the west in the eyes of western 
public. But the issue of terrorism is something that cannot be confined to a particular 
religion or region. There are groups, from all religions, nationalities, ethnic 
backgrounds or political persuasions that chose terrorism as a way of doing politics. 
In other word there is nothing in terrorism exclusive to Islam. 
In addition there are many other problems with the categorisation of Islamic 
fundamentalism. The problem with labelling political Islam as "extremism", 
"fanaticism" "fundamentalism", "intolerant" or "irrational" does not help sociologists 
grasp the conditions in which these movements emerge and develop. On the contrary 
it has led sociologists and many other social scientists, public policy makers and 
politicians to a false perspective. Viewing them as "irrational" "fundamentalist" 
"intolerant" etc. is not always accurate definition. More importantly these are the 
symptoms, but the prime objective of sociologists is to find out the root causes, the 
driving forces of these movements rather than simply looking at the bare symptoms. 
According to Campo (1995, p. 172) the use of the term fundamentalism can be 
criticised for four serious defects: taxonomic error, taxonomical imprecision, 
polemical distortion and ideological mobilisation. Its usage is arbitrary in many ways. 
It is often accusatory, especially in the media; Jurgensmeyer (1993, p. 4) has said the 
term is "pejorative". It implies these movements are "an intolerant, self-righteous and 
narrowly dogmatic religious literalism. " He points out that `the term reflects our 
attitude toward other people more than it describes them... To call someone a 
fundamentalist suggests that he or she is motivated solely by religious beliefs rather 
than by broad concerns about the nature of society and the World"(ibid, p. 4). 
Edward Said and Eduardo Campo are sharply opposed to the employment of 
fundamentalism in relation to Islamic movements. "Fundamentalism" as employed in 
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the description and explanation of developments in contemporary Muslim societies... 
contends that rather than referring to an objective set of phenomena, this concept has 
been created to serve as a key element in European and American hegemony 
discourses about these societies in order to subordinate and control them. This means 
that it is of little explanatory value; does not facilitate rendering modern 
amalgamation of religion and politics more intelligible... " (Campo 1995, p. 165; also 
see Said, 1993, p. 310). 
Campo's and Said's concerns with the term fundamentalism are two-fold; firstly they 
question the objectivity of the concept. Secondly the conceptualisation of Islamist 
movements as fundamentalist is a deliberate attempt by the West to subordinate and 
control Muslim societies. 
Frank Furedi (1995, pp. 18-19) approaches the problem from a different perspective. 
He argues on the one hand that the uncritical acceptance of the term fundamentalism 
by western conservative, liberal and radical commentators is indicative of an erosion 
of intellectual criticism among the western elite. On the other hand, the 
fundamentalist label provides a moral and cultural condemnation of millions of 
people in one part of the world. 
The categorisation of Islamic fundamentalism indicates a value judgment rather than 
an objective definition of this phenomenon. For this reason instead of using Islamic 
fundamentalism I prefer to use other terms like political Islam. 
1.3 Existing Research and Background 
There is very little research into the grassroots organisations and grassroots activism 
in Turkey. The Turkish literature on political parties and the party system is weak but 
on the party organisations and membership it is almost non-existent. One of the first 
empirical studies on political participation and local party organisation was 
undertaken by Ayse Günes Ayata (1984). She studied the local party organisations of 
the Republican People's Party in the early 1980s in two Turkish towns. Another 
empirical study was done by Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Elik ler Vakfi TESEV 
(Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) in 2000. The survey was carried 
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out among 782 of what they called `effective party workers' of all six parties who are 
active in the parties' executive committees in 36 district capitals. Despite its 
empirical chapter on `effective party workers, ' clue to its broad scope (e. g. covering 
all political parties) and sampling problems it falls short in providing a detailed 
analysis of party activism in Turkey. 
There is another study by the T ürkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Ara. yfirmalar Vakfi 
Veri Araytirma TOSES (Turkish Social Economic Political Research Foundation 
(1999) which focused on the social structure and the voters of political parties in 
Turkey. This study is not directly concerned with party activists but the voters. Also, 
Ergun Özbudun's (2000) latest book contains a chapter in which he deals with parties 
and party systems in Turkey. There are heand full other literatur on Turkish political 
parties and party system but most lack the aspects of party organisations and 
membership. 
There is a limited body of literature on grassroots politics. I use I-Ialliday's (1995a) 
`contingent' 10 approach in my study and taking grassroots activism as an independent 
variable. Among limited studies on grassroots activism, the focal point of this study, I 
have benefited considrably from Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and Whitey, Seyd and 
Richardson, (1994) both studies on grassroots which provided a model for my 
research. II 
As stated before across the Muslim world Islamic movements have been on the 
increase. Since the early 1980s the apparent rise of Islamic fundamentalism has been 
one of the most debated phenomenon in media and academic circles. It appears there 
have been different approaches developed to explain what they are and why they have 
been rising. Through an extensive literature review I have identified four different 
'()According to Fred Halliday (1995a, p. 48) "contingent" approach emphasises modernity and 
contingency in these 'fundamentalist' movements. He argues that the rise of 'fundamentalisms' in 
many Third World countries originates as it reaction against the failures of the modernizing, secular 
state. 
It In the area of political participation I must mention studies like: Deutsch (1970), Di Palma (1970 
Duverger (1964), Verba and Nie (1972), Barnes and Kaase (1979), Ashford (1972), Marsh (1990), 
Milbrath and Goel (1977). On the party organisations I found these studies useful: Crotty (1971), 
Crotty and Jacobson (1980). Herrnson (1986), Huckshorn (1984), Katz and Mair (1995), Parry, Moyser 
and Day (1992) and Scarrow (1996). 
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approaches among Western scholars. The Turkish literature also confirmed that this 
pattern occurred among Turkish students of political sciences 
1.4 The Main Approaches to Political Islam 
1.4.1 Political Islam As a Threat to the West 
Undoubtedly, the most common view among Western scholars regards political Islam 
as a threat to the west. The most important proponents of this approach are S. 
Huntington (1994) and B. Lewis (1990). Both scholars are very influential in 
American intellectual and policy circles and have determined the parameters of the 
discourse on Islamic fundamentalism. 12 It is assumed that Islam poses a three 
dimensional threat: political, civilisational and demographic. Huntington in his 
famous article and the book "Clash of Civilisations? " argued that most important 
conflicts will occur between cultures: "The fault lines between civilisations are 
replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points 
for crisis and bloodshed" (1994: 22). For him, today, the differences between 
civilisations are more profound than differences between ideologies and political 
regimes. He says that increased interactions between civilisations, increased 
consciousness of civilisations and awareness of civilisational differences have 
increased the possibility of a clash between them (1994, p. 25). Huntington argues 
that one of the consequences of modernisation is that local identities disappear but 
that gap has been filled by religion. Islamic fundamentalism emerges as a process of 
"re-Islamisation" of the Middle East (ibid, p. 26). For him this re-Islamisation or 
Islamic fundamentalism, and many other non-western cultures present a great 
challenge with their ambition, and resources to shape the world in non-western way. 
He specified a rather bizarre `Confucian-Islamic' alliance that "... emerged to 
challenge Western interests, values and power". He concludes, "... a central focus of 
conflict for the immediate future will be between West and several Islamic-Confucian 
states" (ibid; 45-48). Given the influence of Professor Samuel Huntington his article 
provided a solid ideological base for many commentators. 13 
12 Esposito, J (1995: 195). 
13 See for example an article in The Economist titled "Islam and The West" (6th August 1996). This 
article took Huntington's ideas as an intellectual framework. 
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In a similar vein, B. Lewis views the Islamic world as an entity that has `deeply 
rooted rage' towards the West, especially to the US as the leader of the Western world 
(1990, p. 195). Lewis begins by saying that "there is no Cuba, no Vietnam, in the 
Muslim world, but there is a Libya, an Iran and a Lebanon and an increase of hostility 
raises alarm bells for the Americans" (ibid). For him the hostility of Muslims towards 
the West becomes "rejection of Western civilisation" and because Islamic revivalist 
leaders describe their enemies as the enemies of God, this hostility and rejection of 
Western civilisation will persist for a long time. 
The common point that both very influential intellectuals make is an immediate 
conflict between Islam and the West. Both view this conflict through a historical lens 
as a continuity of aggression, hatred, violence or irrationality of Islamic 
fundamentalism toward the west or Christianity. 
1.4.1.1 As A Threat to the Modernisation and Secularisation in Turkey 
There are many parallels between the `threat to the west' approach in the west and 
some of the Turkish approaches to the political Islam in Turkey. They share some of 
the common elements like the Islamic fundamentalist threat, fear, anxiety and panic. 
The rise of the WP in the mid 1990's generated a shock wave across the political 
spectrum; from extreme leftists to liberals, from ordinary folk to high society it was a 
shock that Turkish society had ever experienced. The panic, fear and anxiety were 
coupled with disbelief and dismay that an Islamic party could gather so much 
popularity in a strictly guided secular society in such a short time. It was a devastating 
blow that has shattered the 70 years dream of a truly modernized, westernised and 
secularised Turkish society. 
The majority of Turkish radical secularist intellectuals view political Islam as a threat 
to the Kemalist project of modernisation, westernisation and secularisation. They 
argue that Islamic fundamentalists are the biggest threat to Ataturk's laik (secularist) 
republic, democracy, nationalism and the enlightenment of Turkish society (See 
cetinkaya, 1996, p. 80; Kongar, 2000, p. 40; Poyraz, 1996, p. 85; Selcuk, Cumhuriyet, 
20 January 1996; Tanilli, 1996, p. 212). According to cetinkaya (1996, p. 117) 
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"Islamic fundamentalists] wants to put dynamite on the foundations of the secular 
and democratic republic. The most visible characteristic of [Islamic] movements is 
that they seek to change the life style of women completely. In many Muslim 
countries like in Afghanistan, Egypt and Algeria women are forced to cover 
themselves, to wear highab. Even the rights that were given thirty, forty years ago 
have been taken away from them. "(Ekýi, 1995, p. 9). 14 The extent of the panic and 
fear felt by the radical secularists and some of the liberals were best illustrated by 
Erbil Tqalp a political commentator. He wrote that: 
Will they really exterminate those unbelievers; will they force women to wear 
the veil? Will they flog and lash those who are not fasting, praying and, will 
they amputate the hands of those who are stealing? Will they kill those who 
committed adultery by stoning? If the answers of those questions are "no" 
what then have the life in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and Saudi Arabia shown us? 
(Tuýalp, 1994, p. 16). 
Clearly, Tuplp and many other commentators believe that the fundamentalist threat is 
an imminent one and the answer for all of these questions is "yes". The examples of 
many Muslim countries suggest they will not tolerate anything other than Islamic 
sharia law. 
1.4.2 Islamic Fundamentalism Against Modernity 
This approach views political Islam as an atavism, a rejection of modernity and the 
Western way of life (Seyyed Vali 1995: 121-139). The main theme of this approach 
is `rejection of modernity'. It is widely believed that Islamic fundamentalism is an 
ideology and movement based on fundamental principles of Islam extracted from the 
`secret text' of the Koran. In other words it is seen as an ideology shaped around 700 
AD and cannot be compatible with the needs of contemporary society. Islamists are 
often viewed as "fossilised relics, insulated from and oblivious to their surroundings, 
living perpetually in a bygone age" (Caplan, 1987, p. 5). Abrahamian (1991, p. 102) 
argues that "for radicals, [Islamic fundamentalism] conjures up the image of 
theological obscurantism, political atavism, and the rejection of science, history, 
modernity, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution". It is in fact a mistake 
to see these movements as anti modernist, backward looking or reactionary because 
14 Also see Tu$alp, 1994 ; Poyraz, 1996, p. 85. 
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they are far more modern than the image presented by liberals and radical 
commentators. There are some ideological elements that conflict with a modernist, 
rational outlook but it does not mean that they are not as modern as any other 
contemporary social/political movements. As Larry Ray (1999, p. 205) points out 
"... rather than being implacable enemies of modernity, Islamic revolutionary 
movements share important aspects of rhetoric and organizational style with the 
modernist, Jacobin, social imagination". 
Turkish anti modernist discourse has a similar approach to political Islam. 
According to Emre Kongar (2000, pp. 240-241), a leading sociologist in Turkey, 
political Islam developed as a counter movement against the modernisation project 
from the early days of the Kemalist revolution. The republic banned religion in 
politics in a Muslim society therefore, he says, it was a direct act against political 
Islam. As the antithesis of republican ideology, political Islam has been the main 
opposition to the Kemalist regime. For Islamists, the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire 
represented the divine order transmitted through the Caliphate but the nationalist 
movement lacked such legitimacy. 
Tekeli, (1997, p. 423) on the other hand analyses the rise of political Islam in a 
dialectical relation with a modernisation project that started far before the Kemalist 
revolution. For him the 1980s and afterwards is the era of the decline of the project of 
modernisation and the rise of political Islam (Cited in Kongar, E 2000: 240). 
Ahmet Yücekök (1997, p. 41) another student of Islam also took an evolutionary 
approach. From the time of the Patrona riots in the eighteenth century (1730) to 1950 
all opposition movements had religious characteristics and developed against western 
influence. However, he argued, from the early 1950s the social characteristics of the 
religious groups changed. They became petit bourgeois and entered in to a 
confrontation with Istanbul's big bourgeoisie ( p. 41). 
Server Tanilli views these movements as resistance to modernity and progress. They 
have been aiming to turn the clock backward (1996, p. 173). The real agenda of 
Islamic fundamentalism is not freedom of belief' or religious practices that should be 
kept in the private sphere, but rather to destroy the democratic and secular republic, 
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modern legal system, abolish women rights and all of the gains of the 150 years of the 
Enlightenment movement in Turkey (1996, p. 181). The majority of modernist, 
secularist writers, commentators and academics view political Islam as against 
modernity, secularisation and the contemporary way of life. 
However, as mentioned above it is a great mistake to classify these Islamist 
movements as anti-modernist. On the contrary they are modern movements using 
traditional or classical themes for contemporary causes and borrowing from modern 
secular ideologies as well (See Halliday, 1995a, p. 49 and Ray, 1999, p. 205). They 
are modernist in terms of ideology, political strategy and tactics and organisational 
structure. For example according to Özbudun E (2000, p. 80) the WP is the only 
modern mass political party in Turkey. 
In fact rather then being anti-modernist these movements react against the failures of 
the modernising, secular states in many Third Word Muslim countries. There are 
many reasons for this. Although many of these countries have been independent for 
more than half a century, so far none of them managed to solve the economic and 
social problems they face (Halliday, 1995a, p. 48). Very visible foreign domination 
since the Gulf War and a lack of democracy have also legitimatised Islamic 
movements, faced with foreign domination Islam turns into a nationalist ideology. 
Contrary to the common modernist view the WP/VP in Turkey pursues modern 
worldly objectives. As Oliver Roy (1994, p. 4) points out, its political cadres are 
mostly graduates of modern universities and grass roots members were educated in 
modern state schools too. 16 It will be seen in chapters 5,6 and 7 that the grassroots 
activists of the VP are modern in every sense. They are educated in modern Turkish 
schools, better skilled, better earning, middle aged and occupying higher status. They 
are no different from the rest of society in appearance and are not mullas (clerics) or 
hocas (priest). The VP itself is not based as some may think in Mosques or religious 
Brotherhoods but on a modern political party structure. Similarly the Turkish Islamist 
movement as in many other countries borrowed socialist and Marxist rhetoric, and 
15 See Whiteley and Seyd, 1999. 
16 A portrait of the grassroots activists of the VP will be illustrated in chapter 6. 
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slogans reinterpreting them successfully. e. g. the WP's Adil Düzen (Just Society) (see 
chapter 3). 
1.4.3 Postmodernist Approach 
There are writers like Ahmed Akbar 1992 and Haldun Gülalp 1995 who argued that 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is a direct consequence of the failure of the 
modernits project in the postcolonial area. It is argued that it was the modernist vision 
of the future societies that attracted revolutionary elite in many Muslim countries (See 
Ray, L 1999: 198) but with the failure of the modernist development strategy 
modernity lost its credibility. 
Gülalp in his article "Islamism and Postmodernism" argues that there is a similarity 
between the criticism of modernity by Turkish Islamist writers and the post modernist 
critique of modernity. He examines the most representative writings of two prominent 
Islamic scholars: All Bulac and Ismet Ozel. Both of them accuse modernism and 
secular philosophy, which promise "paradise on earth", of failing to deliver (Gülalp, 
1995, pp. 58-73). However these Islamist writers do not share the postmodernist 
outlook even though they also criticise modernity, materialist values and 
secularisation. 
1.4.4 Contingent Approaches 
The fourth interpretation would be non-religious but based on a causal explanation or 
what Fred Halliday (I995a, p. 48) called a "contingent" approach. This approach 
emphasises modernity and contingency in these 'fundamentalist' movements. He 
argues that the rise of `fundamental isms' in many Third World countries originates as 
a reaction against the failures of the modernizing, secular state, which is perceived as 
corrupt, unable to solve economic and social problems and mostly undemocratic. 
They are responses to underlying issues facing these countries most importantly such 
as mass urbanisation, unemployment and foreign domination (Halliday, F I995a, p. 
48). 
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Fred Halliday (1995a) uses the term "contingent" in an article entitled 
"Fundamentalism and the Contemporary World". He specifics two alternative 
explanations: "scriptural" and "contingent". By contrast to the "scriptural" approach 
the "contingent" approach emphasises the modernity and contingency in the 
fundamentalist movements. It begins by drawing attention to the contemporary causes 
of these movements. (1995a, p. 48). There are several scholars whose interpretation of 
fundamentalist movements focuses on the relationship between the rise of the Islamic 
movements and the socio-economic, demographic and political conditions in which 
these movements emerged. 
Contrary to the previous three approaches there are several commentators and 
academics who agree that fundamentalist movements are not simply engaging with 
re-Islamisation or restoring religious fundamentalism. Rather they are rising as a 
response to the economic and social crisis: unemployment, income dispersion among 
the lower and middle lower classes, the growing gap between poor and rich, rapid 
urbanisation and inadequate government services. In addition, these countries are 
infamous for their oppressive, corrupt, anti - democratic nature and bad human right 
records. ( See Caplan, 1987, p. 5; Halliday, 1995a, p. 49; Keddie, 1981, pp. 244 - 
245; Bulliet, 1993, p. 39; Salt, 1995, p. 24; Roy, 1994, pp. 48-53). 
Since the 1970's, especially following the oil crisis the socio-economic problems of 
many Third World Muslim countries have deepened. The majority of these countries 
experienced rapid population growth and urbanisation due to "pushing factors" in 
rural areas. For example Tehran's population has tripled from three to nine million 
between 1970 and 1990, as has been the case for many other great Muslim 
metropolises in the past twenty years (Roy, 0 1994: 53-54). Perhaps, one of the best 
examples is the Turkish case. The rapid urbanisation accelerated by the restructuring 
policies of IMF has been one of the most important factors in relation the 
unprecedented rise of the WP in elections in the mid 1990s. The major Turkish cities 
have been encircled by gecekondu (shantytowns) where the WP/VP gets most of its 
electoral support. 17 According to Gokce (1994: 286) gecekondu population is more 
17 The term of Gecekondlu , translated as 
"Houses which land in the night", has been used to describe a 
type of housing which is hastily erected in a single night if possible with, usually, low quality 
materials, and they were grouped together for security reasons. (Danielson and Keles, 1985 pp. 162166). 
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or les homogenous and unique. Majority of its population is consists of the low- 
income groups. The material conditions of living space (housing) and living standards 
are not good. Social mobility and the level of education in the gecekondu areas are 
low. They spend most of their income for food, which is a sign of poverty. Another 
distinct social characteristic of life in the gecekondus is they live in a close 
community, in where the family ties are strong and the solidarity is high (1994, pp. 
286-287). 
The issue of social justice has always been an important issue in these communities. 
According to World Bank figures the level of inequalities has increased. Islamist 
movements continuously exploit the demand for social justice and equality and the 
feeling of being let down by the system among the masses across the Muslim world. 
Particularly the decline of prestige of progressive ideologies and the failure of the 
"Arab Socialist" model have left the arena open to new forms of protest ideologies 
(Roy, 1994, pp. 51-52). Due to the decline of the left across the world the Islamist 
movements emerged as the only vibrant major opposition to the New World Order 
and its neoliberal economic policies in the 1990s. Today, the Islamist movements are 
the most significant opponents of injustice in society. No wonder the Welfare party in 
Turkey adopted social democratic rhetoric to express the grievances of the millions in 
the cities. Its social policies, like the Adil Duzen (Just Society) slogan, did indeed 
attract many urban poor votes from the gecekondus (squatters). Turkey has been 
experiencing mass migration, a very high level of inflation (over 70 percent per year 
in the last two decades), high unemployment, a very sharp fall in income of working 
classes, deteriorating living standards and rampant corruption since the 1980s. The 
socio-economic problems were followed by the political problems of increased party 
fragmentation, high electoral volatility and organisational decline (See Özbudun, 
2000, pp. 75-79). The WP and after its closure the VP were the most vociferous 
critics of growing inequalities, widespread corruption, unemployment, poverty and 
lack of basic services in the gccekondus. Not surprisingly, Halliday (1995a) and 
Keddie (1981, p. 243) observed very similar symptoms prevalent in Iranian society 
just before the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
The growth of an explosive situation in the cities, with mass migration, 
rampant corruption, and inflation; the failure of the regime to allow for 
legitimate forms of political discontent, and prior suppression of the mass 
secular forces, nationalists and communists, the success of Khomeini in 
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leading and organising a mass political movement, focused on a set of simple, 
and wide goals -the ousting of the Shah and the ending of western particularly 
American, influence in the country. (Halliday, 1995a, p. 52). 
There is no doubt that increased foreign/Western influence over the Middle East, 
especially after the Gulf War, and the process of globalisation and increased 
interference of the IMF and the World Bank along with internal socio-economic and 
political matters in Third World Countries has provoked growing anti-imperialist 
feeling in many Muslim societies. In Turkey and elsewhere Islamist movements have 
been equated with fundamentalism. It is a problematic approach for several reasons as 
argued above. 
1.5 How Can The Rise Of Political Islam Be Explained? 
Unlike mainstream students of political Islam I examine the causes of the rise of these 
movements rather than dealing with appearances. My approach is different because 
the main aim of this study is to grasp the dynamics of the rise of political Islam in 
Turkey, and in particular to find out the effects of grassroots activism on the rise of 
the WP/VP in the mid 1990s. It is not my goal to judge, condemn or defend the 
Islamists' worldview. 
The central research questions can be formulated as: 
1) What were the reasons behind the unprecedented rise of political Islam in Turkey 
in the 1990s? In other words why and how did the pro-Islamist Welfare Party triple its 
share of the vote in less then ten years between 1987 (7 per cent) and 1995 (21 per 
cent)? 
2) What was the role of the WP/VP's grassroots organisations and grassroots activism 
in this unprecedented electoral success? 
1.5.1 The Hypothesis 
The rise of political Islam throughout the 1990s in Turkey cannot be explained on the 
basis of its anti West, anti-modernist attitude or as a postmodern condition nor as a 
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simple religious/ Islamic revivalism. There are a series of socio-economic and 
political preconditions, `worldly reasons', for its emergence and sudden rise. I shall 
argue that besides the fundamental changes in the socio-economic and political 
conditions (e. g. the neoliberal re-structuring program that took effect from the early 
1980s, rapid urbanisation and expansion of political participation), it was the 
WP/VP's very well-organised, militant grassroots activists who played the crucial role 
in increasing its share of the vote and public support, leading to the unprecedented 
rise of political Islam in Turkey. 
1.5.2 Main Objectives 
1. To find out the underlying shifts in the social-economic and political spheres 
that caused the ascendancy of political Islam in Turkey. 
2. To examine political party organisations and party activism in Turkey: 
Especially the VP in perspective. In this section the party effort and its impact 
on voting will be examined. 
3. To examine the socioeconomic and political background such as demographic 
characteristics, educational, occupational, income level, age, marital status and 
residential characteristics of the VP's grassroots activists. 
4. To study their motives, aspirations, ideological and political attitudes and the 
major incentives to become political activist in the VP 
5. To determine the main activities of grassroots activists and how they are 
influencing the VP's electoral outcomes 
6. To look into the relationship between the VP's activists and its 
supporters/voters. 
7. To examine the type of organisation and organisational structure. How it is 
organised and operated in a particular local party branch? 
8. To further develop the existing theoretical framework as a method for a 
sociological investigation of the pro-Islamic political parties in Turkey. 
1.5.3 Turkish Contingent Approach 
Unlike the previous three approaches and very much like the `Western contingent 
approach' the Turkish contingent approach admits the contingency and modern 
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characteristics of political Islam in Turkey. There are many Turkish political scientists 
who give priority to the socio-economic and political conditions in which the Islamic 
movements emerged and rose. In this context we see scholars who have been 
studying different aspects of political Islam. They have been seeking answers to 
questions like why and how the pro-Islamic WP/VP has been gained popularity in 
Turkey in the 1990's. One of the first studies in the 1990's was done by Gencay 
$aylan (1992) who found that disaffection had been growing, especially among 
unemployed university graduates who favoured the WP more than other age groups 
(1992, pp. 127-129). These writers examine the socio-economic conditions and 
increasingly emphasise the class dimension of this Islamist trend. For many of them 
the pro-Islamic WP was supported mainly by the urban poor, which constitute more 
than half of the population in the major cities. They are the main inhabitants of the 
gecekondus that circle all the big cities in Turkey. This is, primarily, due to the second 
phase of rapid urbanisation the country faced from the early 1980's. As students of 
Turkish urban studies all familiar with the fact that the rapid urbanization in Turkey is 
a phenomenon that was started much earlier in the 1950s but due to the restructuring 
policies of 1980s migration from rural to urban centres was accelerated at a level that 
was unseen before the 1980s. So, throughout this study, I will call this period as the 
second phase of rapid urbanization. )s Millions of people piled into the cities with no 
regular employment, no secure income and housing or basic services. The lower 
middle and lower classes saw their salaries and incomes fall more than fifty percent 
between 1980 and 1990. Craftsmen, artisans, small merchants and shopkeepers whose 
existence was undermined by the neoliberal policies implemented since the 1980s, 
and by globalisation also supported the WP. Traditional religious circles and the 
Kurdish population disillusioned with current mainstream political parties were also 
drawn to the WP (See Ayata, 1993, pp. 51-67; Kalaycioglu, 1996, pp. 403 424; 
Ögütcu, 1994, p. 826; Öni§, 1997, pp. 751-752; Sanbay, 1985, p. 45). 
Binnaz Toprak (1987: 227) argued that: 
... what has been depicted as the "resurgence" of Islam 
in contemporary 
Turkey is, at one level, the reassertion of a historic/cultural consciousness by 
individuals who are unassimilated into the modernist centre, and for whom the 
new "palace culture" is an anomaly.... At a second level, the apparent revival 
18 This issue will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 4. 
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of Islam in contemporary Turkey is a reflection of social structural differences. 
Here again it is less a question of purely religious concerns than the expression 
of economic discontent through religion. 
For her the apparent revival of political Islam in Turkey should be analysed on two 
levels. On the first level what we see is an attempt to reassert a historical/cultural 
consciousness by some "unassimilated" individuals. This point is similar to those 
western and Turkish `modernist approaches', but at the second level Toprak adopts a 
contingent approach where she points to social structural differences and socio- 
economic reasons rather than purely religious concerns. 
The rise of political Islam in Turkey therefore has been by and large a direct 
consequence of the neoliberal restructuring policies implemented since the early 
1980s. These policies led to a huge income gap between rich and poor. Although 
Turkey is classified as an 'emerging market' with a dynamic, fast growing market 
economy, it currently has one of the worst gini coefficients- for 1994 estimated as 
0.50 in terms of income distribution (Öni,, 1997, p. 751). While the neoliberal 
restructuring policies led to a process of intensified income disparities, its political 
implications caused a process of party convergence. As a result the policy differences 
between centres left parties and centre right parties dissipated. The left moved to the 
centre right to such an extent they became a bad copy of the conservative or centre 
right parties leaving a vacuum in the political spectrum. In many ways, as Öni, (1997) 
points out, the WP/VP has been filling this vacuum left by the decline of the social 
democratic politics. 
In other words, it emerges as a political movement expressing the grievances 
of the poor and the disadvantaged in both rural and urban areas in a social 
democratic guise. The appeal of political Islam as a viable alternative to 
secular social democracy arises not only from the strength of its moral 
argument in favour of equity but also from specific and concrete anti-poverty 
projects designed to improve the material conditions of the disadvantaged, 
albeit on a highly target-oriented, selective and visible basis. (6ni,, 1997, p. 
748). 
These movements were supported by a variety of social groups and classes for a 
variety of reasons: economic deprivation, cultural alienation or political 
disillusionment with the mainstream political parties. The best example for this is the 
pro Islamist WP/VP in Turkey. According to a survey conducted amongst Islamist 
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Welfare Party voters in Turkey only a third of WP voters voted for the party primarily 
because it was an Islamic party (Heper, 1997, p. 35). This clearly indicates that the 
majority of the people associated with political Islam are not religiously orientated 
jihad fighters as they are often portrayed, but in many ways merely those disaffected 
with current party policies. The weekly Nokia magazine suggested that: 
In the December 1995 elections, not all who voted for the Islamist Welfare 
Party did so because they wanted to replace Turkey's secular democracy with 
a theocracy based on shari ' a. The "hard core" of Islamists who voted for the 
RP in 1995 has been estimated at around seven per cent of the total 
electorate. 19 
Another survey by Necdet Erder challenges Nokta's findings and puts the figure at 
around 10 percent of the total voters in Turkey. 20 Contrary to common belief political 
Islam has not got a monolithic or homogenous social basis but rather a coalition of 
different groups and strata that one way or another is disaffected with the centre right 
and centre left parties. This coalition itself is not permanent but rather loosely 
connected and changes in time. 
In conclusion, among the various approaches, the 'contingent approach' offers a 
sociologically coherent and analytical explanation for the emergence and rise of 
political Islam. This approach emphasises the modern characteristics and above all the 
contemporary causes of the rise of political Islam. However it does not address all of 
the essential problems. Firstly, there are problems with the definition of the concept. 
Secondly, the diversity of the Islamic movements has not been addressed. Thirdly and 
most importantly, the peculiar role of the grassroots activism within these movements 
has not been properly acknowledged. The affects of grassroots activism on the 
electoral process are the focal point of this research. 
1.6 Why Grassroots Activism? 
Party membership and local party organisations have been one of the least studied 
aspects of political parties and party systems. In recent years, however, there has been 
a renewed interest in the role and influence of party organisation and grassroots 
19 See for detailed account see weekly Nokia, 26 June -2 July 1994. 
20 For detail see Erder, 1999, pp. 25-25). 
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activism on the electoral fortunes of the political parties. (See Clarke et al, 2000; 
Frendreis, et al 1990; Huckfeldt, and Sprague, 1992; Whiteley, and Seyd, 1994 and 
1999). The importance of local party organisation and grassroots activism is closely 
connected to the functions of political parties in general. Political parties with their 
large memberships have been one of the most successful forms of political 
organisations in twentieth century in the western democracies. (Scarrow, 1996, p. 1). 
Political parties are the key components of a representative democracy. They are the 
bridges between politics, governments and society. 
According to Neumann, S (1963 p. 352) political parties are the articulate 
organisations of an active group of people who jointly seek access to governmental 
power. The control of governmental power involves electoral processes therefore 
access requires popular support. A political party links social forces and ideologies to 
governmental institutions. If the main purpose of political parties is to contest 
elections in order to gain control of public offices and organise the governments 
(Huckshorn, 1984, p. 21), then winning elections becomes the first and most important 
condition that every aspiring party must achieve. To do this, the party must elect 
candidates to compete and organise election campaigning to mobilise the voters 
around the candidates. 
In this case a well-organised party organisation must be the first condition for any 
kind of electoral achievement. Political parties have a variety of functions such as 
informing the electorate about the party's policies and goals, creating an identity and 
unity, strengthening party attachment and commitment among grassroots activists and 
finally, campaigning to influence the electoral outcome (See Pattie, et al, 1995, p. 
969). Elections are about obtaining sufficient electoral support. This is where the 
vitality of the election campaigns and crucial role of the party activism comes in. 
Parties need to go out to mobilise their constituencies. Local party organisations and 
their activism have proven to be significantly influential in the electoral process. 
Until the mid 1990's neither party membership nor local party organisations were 
considered significant in Turkish political literature. It appears that, many students of 
politics in Turkey under-estimated the militant characteristics of the WP/VP's 
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grassroots activists and very effective, well organised party organisations. 
Nonetheless, with the unprecedented rise of the pro Islamic WP in the local elections 
(1994) and in general elections (1995) the influence of grassroots activism and local 
party organisations began to appear in the writings of Turkish commentators. The 
WP is the only modern mass party with nationwide local party organisations and 
militant grassroots activism. Before it was banned it claimed to have over 4 million 
registered members. It was Turkey's largest political party in terms of membership 
(See Berkey, 1996,45; cakir, 1994, pp. 216-232; Darnton, 1995; Kalaycioglu, 1994; 
Margulies and Ergin, 1997, p. 151; Özbudun, 2000, pp. 73-93; Sen, 1995, pp. 82-91). 
The following section briefly examines a sample of Turkish commentators' views 
about the rapid rise of the WP throughout the 1990s and the role of party 
organisations and grassroots activism in this process. 
According to Sayari (1996) WP's dedicated grassroots activists are one of the most 
important elements in Refah's growing popularity. He pointed out that: 
Refah owes its increasing electoral support to an efficient, disciplined, highly 
motivated, and well-financed organisation. The Islamists have the largest 
number of party workers among all Turkish political parties. Refah's 
grassroots organisations are staffed with dedicated cadres, male and female, 
who work with a missionary zeal and benefit from advanced technology, such 
as computers with voter registration data. Tightly organized in cell like units 
in each neighbourhood, Refah relies less on the media for disseminating its 
views and more on face-to-face contacts with the voters. (1996, p. 36). 
Sayari highlights the key connection between the unprecedented rise of the Welfare 
Party and the efficient, highly motivated, well financed party organisations and highly 
dedicated, missionary-like grassroots activists utilising advanced technology in their 
daily activities in the neighbourhoods. 
Sencer Ayata (1997) also notes the positive correlation between the rise of the pro- 
Islamic WP in the 1990s and highly motivated, well disciplined and dedicated 
grassroots organisations and their distinctive activities. 
As a matter of fact, the party owes its strength to its responsive and well- 
organized grass roots membership. The highly motivated, well disciplined, and 
strongly committed activists believe in their political cause as a mission 
ordained by God. They function at the community level, visiting every single 
quarter, street, and family separately, evaluating the data, and finding solutions 
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for each problem. To penetrate small communities, the young activists, 
including an army of women who can arrange home visit at any time of the 
day, have emerged as the party's major assets. (1997, p. 52) 
Similarly Ersin Kalaycioglu (1997) gives some examples of what the Welfare's 
activists were doing during the election campaign in 1995 when the WP became the 
largest party in the parliament. He argues that: 
On the eve of the 1995 elections, numerous party activists, at the grass roots 
level, kept track of every voter deemed critical to the party's victory. They 
visited each voter before the elections, and, on election day, provided 
transportation to and from the polling stations for those who needed it. (1997, 
p. 36). 
More than any other mainstream political party, the WP has always maintained face- 
to-face relations as the communication model at the grassroots level ($en, 1995, p. 
83). The WP grassroots activists organise charity work, set up community help 
centres in the neighbourhood, and make regular door-to-door visits to transmit the 
party messages and policies. They can also listen to the comments of their potential 
voters rather then rely only upon mass communication as the mainstream parties do 
(ibid, p. 83). It is this approach that gave the Welfare Party the upper hand. 
The main strategy of the WP's grassroots organisation is focused on the elections. The 
party aims to mobilise all of its members for the election campaigning and to recruit 
as many new members as the party's votes at the last elections. Refah's model of 
organisation is unique; it is called tesbih (rosary) and it appoints representative to 
every single neighbourhood. These representatives appoint representatives to every 
street, quarter and every apartment block. Right after an election, the WP's highly 
motivated grassroots organisations starts to campaign for the next election as if it 
were going to be held tomorrow (cakºr, 1994, pp. 51-59). 
The way that a party organises itself is very important for effective and successful 
election campaigning. Beside the youth and neighbourhood committees, the VP's 
Hanim Konimisyonlari (ladies commissions) turned out to be very effective 
campaigners. They go street-to-street in their respective neighbourhoods, canvassing 
building-to-building, door-to-door and meet people, mostly women in their private 
living spaces in a friendly manner. They organise house meetings where a hatip - 
good speaker or agitator- would speak to 30 to 50 people at once. 
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Özbudun, (2000, p. 84) on the other hand looks at the changing nature of campaign 
strategies and argues that through local branches door-to-door canvassing Turkish 
parties traditionally used to play an important role in securing votes. This has 
changed in recent years and labour intensive campaigning techniques are increasingly 
abandoned in favour of media led `capital intensive' election campaigns ultimately 
requiring large financial resources. He argues, however that, because of changes in 
the way the Turkish economy is run it is very difficult for political parties to generate 
enough spoils to distribute to their followers, "which in the absence of strong 
ideological motivations is important in sapping their organizational strength"(ibid, p. 
84). What has happened from the early 1980s is that the Turkish political parties have 
increasingly abandoned the traditional election campaigns run by local party 
organisations and adopted the `capital intensive' election campaigns. But the problem 
with this new style is the lack of sufficient resources. In short what we see is that the 
old system had been abandoned without an alternative in its place restored. 
There are Western commentators such as Berkey (1996 p. 45) Darnton (1995) and 
Zubaida (1996 p. 11) who emphasise the outstanding role of grass roots activists in 
facilitating the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Henri Barkey in his article "Turkey, 
Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question", points out that the success of the Islamist 
party in the 1995 elections was due to the party's efficient utilisation of their 
capabilities and a complete failure of the mainstream parties to maintain consistent 
messages. For him the Welfare Party is the only mass-based political organisation. 
The local cadres throughout the country work street-by-street, building-by-building, 
offering material benefits to the urban poor (Berkey, 1996, p. 45). 
Zubaida (1996 p. 11) highlights the very effective tactic used by the WP/VP activists 
of combining community work -which is what the most of the VP activist do- with 
the year round election campaigning in their respective neighbourhoods. Similarly 
John Darnton argued that: 
No political machine can beat the Welfare Party when it comes to grass-roots 
organisation. Women wearing headscarves go door to door in the slums 
proselytising and meet intercity buses to take new arrivals in hand. (1995) 
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These comments suggest the WP/VP has emerged as a distinct political party. It is the 
very well organised, highly active and committed grassroots activism, which made the 
WP/VP distinguishable from other parties. As noted earlier, however, the literature 
on this subject has so far been speculative. It lacks empirical evidence. One of the 
major aims in this study therefore is to test these hypotheses. 
1.6.1 The Debate On Grassroots Activism 
It appears that no matter how advanced the communication technology or highly 
sophisticated election campaigning expertise has become, political parties need active 
party members ready to spend their time, energy and resources for the party's goals 
within a well organised, highly motivated, highly committed, missionary like 
grassroots organisations. 
Seyd and Whiteley (1992, pp. 219-220) note that political parties still need and will 
continue to need members for the traditional electioneering functions of canvassing 
and leafleting voters and persuading supporters to go out and vote. Grassroots 
activists are the elected representatives of the party in the neighbourhoods and carry 
out electioneering. Furthermore, they have a key role in their constituencies as 
opinion-formers. They are often the bridges between the political party and the wider 
society. In this sense they are also the voice of community and set the local agenda. 
In Chapter two, there will be a literature review of the grassroots organisation and the 
effects of grassroots activism on the political process. Not all students of electoral 
studies agree on the benefits of grassroots activism (see Butler, 1952; Butler, and 
Kavanagh, 1992; Mair, 1994; Sacarrow, 1996). For example Nuffield election studies 
have consistently denied the benefits of local campaigning (see Whiteley and Seyd 
1999, pp. 2-3). 
For many scholars the effects of the local party organisations and grassroots activism 
have been significantly diminished. Undoubtedly, the most commonly viewed reason 
for this is developments in communication technologies and campaigning techniques 
whereby party organisations lost their importance as an exclusive means of 
campaigning. Consequently, new technologies such as TV, computers, mailing 
systems increasingly enable leaders to get their message across voters without the 
f 
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assistance of party members and grassroots organisations. In other words 
development of new and faster communication technologies provide the tool party 
leaders needed for direct contact with the voters (Scat-row, 1996,6). 21 
However, there is a growing body of literature contradicting this view. Although not 
all students of electoral politics agree about the effects of party organisations on the 
electoral process, there is compelling evidence from case studies that grassroots 
activism is very influential on the parties' electoral fortunes. (See Clarke, D. Harold et 
al 2000; Crotty, 1971; Frendreis, P., John, et al, 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; 
Kramer, 1970; Seyd and Whitely 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994 and 1999). Croty 
(1971, p. 447) observed that party activity made a difference, often-substantial 
difference in terms of increasing the votes. 
A well-organised party that extends itself to campaigning for its candidates 
can have a decided impact on increasing its proportionate share of the vote. 
Put more directly, organisation, as the professionals have so long been 
contending, does appear important in achieving party objectives. Party 
activities, and those conducted during the campaign period in particular, are 
important influences affecting the vote. 
In a similar vein Pattie, C., Johnston, R., and Fieldhouse, E (1995) pointed out that 
"... the local campaign, while not as widely publicised or as glamorous as its national 
counterpart, still plays an important function in shaping the outcomes of British 
general elections. " 
A recent case study from Britain showed that local party activism before the general 
election made a significant contribution to Labour's unprecedented election victory in 
1997 (Whiteley and Seyd, 1998, p. 4). They emphasised three important factors 
combined with local party activism. These were the declining partisan attachments 
among electorates, increased electoral swings due to party dealignments in the 1990's 
and the transformation of the Labour party to `New Labour' that included 40 percent 
of the grassroots party from 1994 to 1997. (1998, pp. 4-8). The declining partisan 
attachment and electoral swings play the role of a catalyst making it easier to 
influence voters in campaigns both at national and local levels. It is obvious that when 
partisan attachments have weakened in this way electoral canvassing becomes 
21 Also sec Butler, D and Kavanagh, D 1992; Crotty, W and Jacobson, G 1980; Kavanagh, D and Jones 
B 1998; Herrnson, P. S., 1986; Huckshorn, R. J., 1984; Jones, B., et al., 1998. 
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relatively easier for party activists. The increased ratio of party dealignment allows 
party activists to convince or persuade new voters, supporters and even recruits new 
members more easily. The third factor however is very important because the 
grassroots party is a product of an active party organisation as well as the maker of it. 
If we return to the Turkish political party system, Özbudun, (2000, p. 73) argued that 
`Turkish parties and the party system have been facing a long-term process of 
institutional decline, growing fragmentation, ideological polarisation, and electoral 
volatility in the party system. Also individual parties have been experiencing decline 
in the organisational capacity, party identification and declined public support for the 
parties among the citizens since the 1970s. ' In general Turkish politics is seen to be 
experiencing an impasse and the state of Turkish political parties is extremely 
important for this situation. 
Over the last fifteen years, with the exception of the WP/VP, Turkish parties suffered 
a decline in their party organisations and a weakening of party identification. In 
general the decline of party identification has been a problem that occurred in 
developed countries and new democracies (see Corrty 1973; Özbudun 2000, p. 79 and 
TESEV, 2000). Nonetheless, the Turkish case is significantly different in many ways 
to the general global trend. It has been distinct because the electoral volatility has 
been very high. As large sections of the electorate are disillusioned with their parties 
more than one in five vote for a different party from one election to the next. 
Consequently a different party won in each of the last four elections. Yet the situation 
has been deteriorating. Recent surveys show that on the whole no party seems to 
appeal to more than 10 percent of voters in the country. 
Organisational decline has been another characteristic of Turkish political parties. 
Apart from the VP none of them are mass membership parties but mostly cadre or 
catchall parties with widespread clientilistic characteristics. Therefore they failed to 
establish and maintain nationwide party organisations throughout the country. Instead 
of developing well organised horizontal party networks their organisational network 
are based on vertical, clientlistic ties. Consequently, they are undergoing a period of 
political impasse in which political parties create more problems then they solve. 
31 
The WP/VP appears as the one exception among Turkish political parties. Despite this 
general downwards trend, WP/VP increased its share of votes and became the largest 
party in parliament coming to power following the general election in 1995. The 
WP/VP escaped this trend of increasing fragmentation, electoral volatility, party 
realignment, and declining party identification, party loyalty and local party 
organisations. The WP/VP has emerged as a beneficiary of this process. How did the 
WP/VP buck the trend, and why did it become the largest party while other political 
parties disintegrated and lost electoral support? 
What are the underlying causes of the collapse of the Turkish party system? How did 
the WP/VP prosper while the rest of the parties lost their popularity? This thesis will 
address these questions particularly in light of a more detailed analysis of grassroots 
activism in chapters 2,3 and 7. 
1.7 The Location of The Research: The Social Environment 
and Voting Behaviour 
From the early 1950s onwards there have been a number of studies primarily 
concerned with the relationship between the socio-economic conditions and voting 
tendencies in Western Europe and Northern America. These studies particularly 
focused on the relationship between social and economic neighbourhood factors and 
social and political participation. For example one of the earliest empirical studies of 
American voting behaviour concentrates on the 'social bases of American 
partisanship'. This study found that "an Index of Political Predispositions based on 
social classes, religion, and rural/urban residence was a strong determinant of voting 
choice" (Dalton, 1988, p. 152). Bell and Boat's (1956) study, in San Francisco, 
showed that family and socioeconomic neighbourhood characteristics influence the 
development of informal group relations between friends, relatives, neighbours and 
co-workers'. Series of similar studies carried out in Britain discovered a strong 
correlation between socioeconomic class characteristics in a neighbourhood and 
voting behaviour (Berry, 1970, p. 34; McAllister, I., Johnston, R. Pattie, J., Tunstall, 
H. Doi-ling, L and Rossiter, J., 2001, pp. 41-59). 
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With the transition to the multi- party system in 1946 similar voting patterns were 
noted Turkey. During my fieldwork in Ankara I observed that the social bases of 
party support in certain areas were determined by socioeconomic characteristics 
(income level, type of occupation, sector of employment and level of education etc. ) 
in a community in the studied areas. In other words class cleavages, which had not 
been sufficiently credited by some observers, play a decisive role on voting choice in 
Turkey. We will not discus this issue at length here but it seems that class cleavages 
and party support in Turkey were neglected in favour of alternative approaches like 
new political cleavages and new politics'. 22 
1.7.1 Ankara 
Since the 1940's rapid urbanisation has become one of the most common 
characteristics of developing countries. In Latin America and the Middle East the 
peasant societies of the 1940s and 1950s became urban societies in the 1970s. (See 
Roberts, 1995, pp. 1-27). In many ways political Islam has been the product of this 
rapid urbanisation process in many Muslim countries. 
Contrary to the mainstream Western approaches considered above the Islamist 
movements are urban based and modern in many respects. From the pre-1979 Shah's 
Iran to the FLN in Algeria or the Congress Party in India in many Third World 
countries "the rise of fundamentalism originates as a reaction against the failures of 
the modernising, secular state, which has been perceived as corrupted, unable to solve 
economic and social problems, and, often, dictatorial". In addition to that, 
fundamentalist movements are responses to the very deep problems of these countries 
such as mass urbanisation, unemployment and former or existing foreign domination 
(Halliday, 1995a, p. 48). 
It has been argued by several scholars that these movements are the product of the 
modern world. The young militants educated in modern schools; raised in recently 
22 For an analysis of 'old politics' and new politics' see Dalton & Kuechlcr, 1990, Challenging the 
Political Order; Pakulski, J. 1991, Social Movements, pp. 25-51; Russell J. Dalton, 1988, Citizen 
Politics in Western Democracies, pp. 151-176. 
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urbanised families often come from an impoverished middle class, and in contrast to 
the common beliefs, they are rarely mullahs. They borrowed Marxist terminology 
and tactics from socialists. Nor the masses who support and follow these Islamic 
movements are not "traditional" or "traditionalist". By and large, they live with the 
values of the modern city adopting the current trend of consumerism (Roy, 1994, pp. 
3-4). 
The Islamist movement in Turkey has many similar characteristics with other Islamic 
movements elsewhere highlighted by writers like Halliday (1995) and Roy (1994). It 
can be argued that with the exception of Afghanistan most Islamist movements are a 
product of rapid urbanisation and the subsequent social problems. For this reason the 
best location for the study of political Islam in Turkey has to be an urban area. 
Among the Turkish metropolitan cities Ankara has several advantages as a candidate 
for this study. First of all it has geographical centrality. The main cities are located in 
the Marmara region (Istanbul, Kocaeli), Egan region (Izmir), or southwest (Adana) 
regions. They are all either on the fringes or Western cost of Turkey relatively far 
from the Anatolian heartland. Ankara is right in the centre from East to West, from 
South to North. This position makes Ankara geographically easier to reach from 
around the country and therefore has a much more diverse migrant population than 
other metropolitan cities. The empirical evidence from my fieldwork shows that: a) 
the vast majority (76.20 percent) of VP's grassroots activists are born outside Ankara, 
and, b) they come from every part of the country. 23 
Second, it is a modern city. It was a small town when chosen as the capital city of the 
Turkish republic. It has no significant traditional, cultural or historical past to 
influence the political preferences of its inhabitants. It is a city where the vast 
majority of inhabitants are migrants from around the country. This diversity qualifies 
as one of the most representative of the general population in Turkey. 
Thirdly, Ankara as the capital city of the staunchly secular Turkish republic was one 
of two (Istanbul and Ankara) metropolitans cities where the WP won the municipality 
23 
For some elaboration, see Chapter, 6. 
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in 1994 local elections. 24 The election results indicated the effective, well-organised 
and highly committed grassroots activism of the WP/VP in Ankara. 
Nevertheless, there can be problems with representation. It is true that there are big 
differences between regions and regional variations relating to the motives, 
aspirations of the grassroots activists. This is true for voter behaviour as well, but this 
gap can be narrowed since the bulk of the Islamic WP 's votes come mainly from 
poor, unurbanised gecekondus (slums) and, secondly from the traditional middle- 
class; small craftsmen, the shopkeepers, small artisans and small industrialists (Ayata, 
1993, pp. 57-58; Kalaycioglu, 1994, pp. 402-425) whose existence has been 
threatened by the neoliberal market economy policies. 
The results of the March 1994 local elections revealed that the pro-Islamist WP is an 
urban-based movement (See cakir, 1994, p. 223). This trend continued in the 24 
December 1995 general election. Since the Welfare Party has been increasing its 
support in the city centres it was appropriate to choose the samples from one of those 
metropolitan areas in Turkey. 
Before Atatiirk the founder of the Turkish republic chose it as the capital city, Ankara 
was a small, dusty Anatolian town. From this historical moment Ankara has had a 
massive, planed and deliberate transformation in every sense. It was the only planned 
town reflecting the ambition of the new Kemalist elites to create a modern capital city 
with wide streets, long boulevards, picturesque monuments, modern theatres and art 
buildings. However from the early 1950s rapid migration exhausted its planned 
development. As all the governmental offices are concentrated in Ankara its 
development is predominantly driven by public employment mainly office jobs and 
public and private services sectors. Although there has been growth in the industrial 
sector, it is relatively small compared to Istanbul and the rest of the Marmara region. 
In this study I have chosen two local party organisations of the WP/VP in two 
different administrative ilfes (counties/sub-districts) of Ankara in the sub-districts of 
24 See Shmuelevitz, 1996, p. 175 
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Keciören and Marnak. They both have many similarities and differences. 2-5 Although 
both have a substantial gecekondu population Kegiören has a large population of 
traditional middle classes (artisans, merchants, shopkeepers, tradesmen). In terms of 
types of housing both districts contain a large proportion of gecekondu (squatter) 
settlements. This means both districts are home to thousands of poor, lower and lower 
middle class residents. Mamak however, has a larger proportion of gecekondu 
population than Kegiören. 
1.7.2 County of Keciören 
Keciören is one of the five main administrative districts of Ankara. According to the 
latest 1997 population census, its population is 615,448 people. It is located in the 
northern part of the city and covers 199 square km of land. 2 More then half of (See 
Özdemir, N 1998: 138) its population (55 per cent) is currently living in the 
gecekondus. The ratio of gecekondu population in Kegiören is slightly lower than the 
average (58.4 per cent) in Ankara in 1993. This means, on the whole, Keciören is a 
district which is home to a large lower middle and middle class population. 
1.7.3 County of Mamak 
Mamak is one of the poorest administrative districts of Ankara. The social and 
economic gap between cankaya, a prosperous district, and Mamak is like the divide 
of the rich North and the poor South. cankaya with its luxurious apartments, villas, 
shopping and leisure centres, green areas and parks and above all its wealthy upper 
middle class residents is indistinguishable from prosperous urban suburbs of a west 
European city. Unlike cankaya Mamak is poverty-stricken. Some of its 
neighbourhoods are very poor the housing conditions are inappropriate, income per 
family is very low and unemployment is higher than the national average. 
25 The term of Gecekondu, translated as "Houses which land in the night", has been used to describe a 
type of housing which is hastily erected in a single night if possible with, usually, low quality materials 
and they were built as together for security reasons. Danielson and Keleý, 1985 The Politics of Rapid 
Urbanisation, pp. 162-166. 
26 See the State Statistical Institute's web pages: http: /hvww. die. gov. tr 
/7'URKIS/SONIST/NUFUS/ankara. gif 
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Mamak is located on the East of Ankara towards Elmadag alongside the Samsun Yolu 
(Samsun Highway) and Nato yolu (Nato Highway) and covers a large area (254 
square km) compared to the other four administrative districts of Ankara. According 
to the latest population census Mamak has 405,066 people within its territory (in 
1997) and its population density is 1,616 people per square km (in 1990). 
The majority of Mamak's neighbourhoods are gecekondu (squatter) areas and are 
occupied by urban poor. There are a very few neighbourhoods that are occupied by 
traditional middle classes or new middle class professionals like doctors, lawyers, 
etc., Those non gecekondu areas are mainly in central Marnak and developed 
alongside the main road called Tip Fakultesi Caddesi. The rest of Mamak sub district 
mainly consists of gecekondu (squatter) settlements. It has at least 79 per cent 
gecekondu housing. In Mamak there are 95000 houses in total and 75000 of them 
gecekondus (squatters). 27 
The choice of these two counties provides an opportunity to examine the diversity in 
terms of the WP/VP's electoral support. The WP/VP has enjoyed the electoral support 
from the traditional middle classes, some sections of the new middle classes the urban 
poor and from much of the mainly Kurdish Southeast region. Each of these social 
groups has different issues to represent, different expectations and attitudes yet they 
all support the WP/VP. The diversity of its electoral base makes an interesting case 
for examining why and how the party has attracted support. Nonetheless, we should 
remember that the vast bulk of its electoral support comes from the urban poor of the 
gecekondus (slums) of the big cities. 
1.7.4 Varoýlar (Shantytowns) Seize the City 
Despite the differences between Keciören and Mamak counties the similarities are 
great, both having large gecekondu populations. 
As is evident from socioeconomic 
indicators for the vast majority of new migrants, cities did not provide better living 
conditions at all. For the majority the vicious circle of the poverty trap, inequality, 
27These figures given by Gazi Sahin the candidate mayor (presently mayor of Mamak) from Virtue 
Party during his interview in a local TV canal called Kanal A, 8 April 1999. 
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uncertainty, and unemployment has continued. The socio-economic conditions of the 
gecekondu areas are one of an aspect of this study. Since the gecekondus make up 
more then one third (8,750,000 people, 33.9 per cent of the urban population) of the 
urban population in 1990 and the pro Islamist Virtue party have a broader support in 
these areas. It is essential to pay particular attention to the varo. slur. 28 One third of the 
whole urban population live in the varoslar (gecekondus) and their political action 
can be profound as happened with the 1994 local and 1995 general elections. It had 
earth-shaking effects long before the actual earthquake that shook Turkey-in Izmit on 
17 August 1999. 
The political significance of the varoclar (gecekondus) as they are often referred to 
by Turkish commentators, was swiftly recognised in the elections in 1994. The WP's 
unprecedented election success in local elections (1994) led to close scrutiny of 
political reality of the gecekondu (slum) areas. In the 1994 local elections Welfare 
Party (WP) gained, for the first time, control of many metropolitan municipalities 
including Istanbul and Ankara, and many provincial capitals as well as hundreds of 
towns and village municipalities. It has been argued this success was by and large 
due to the rapid urbanisation throughout the 1980s and 90s that increased the 
gecekondu population significantly. (See Shmuelevitz, 1996, p. 175). 
1.8 Methodology, Scope And Sampling 
The main research method in this study is qualitative. Qualitative methods have 
played a major role in political science: from the study of individuals and groups 
inside the formal political arena, to the political attitudes and behaviour of people 
(Devine, 1995, p. 137). Qualitative methods are a major research tool in social 
sciences and have long been used in a number of sub-fields of political sciences. 
28 The word varo$ (plural form varoclar) is another term for gecekondus (squatters/slums) and has 
been widely used by Turkish writers. Its literal meaning is 'destination' as the gecekondus have been 
the first destination of millions of migrant workers since the 1950s. 
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... since participants 
in the world of politics have been willing to talk about 
their involvement in groups, their role in formal positions of power, their 
views about the political system and so on. Political scientists studying policy 
communities, for example, have interviewed pressure group activists, widely. 
... 
Party officials and Members of Parliament have been interviewed for their 
views on the internal politics of political parties... Qualitative methods have 
been used extensively in the study of local politics in Britain. (Devine, pp. 138- 
39). 
Among qualitative methods, I have given priority to ethnography, a form of 
qualitative research that combines several methods. 29 I undertook ethnographic 
research in Ankara from January to May 1999 and have had two follow up visits and 
additional interviews in April-May 2000. At this time I had the opportunity to 
participate in the First General Congress of the Virtue Party on 18 May 2000. The 
bulk of the interviews were carried out on my first visit to Turkey before and after the 
local and general elections of 18`h April 1999. As part of the ethnographic study I 
employed different methods and techniques wherever appropriate. In this study I 
chose two party organisations in the two counties in Ankara: Kegiörcn and Mamak. 
An important aspect of this ethnographic study involved participatory observations of 
various occasions among the VP's party activists. Part of my field research took place 
during the general election campaign of March-April, 1999.30 The election 
campaigns started two months after my ethnographic research commenced. 
Consequently I had a much better opportunity to observe the local party organisations 
and the activities of the grassroots activists in action and was also able to compare the 
grassroots activism in both situations: during the election campaign and in `normal' 
daily/weekly activities. I participated in all sorts of party activism from house and 
coffee house meetings, to visiting individual shops and households, street meetings, 
29 I am using the term ethnographic in the same way as Paul Atkinson, P and Hammersley, M (1994: 
248) used. See also Fielding, N 1994: 154-157). 
30 The fact that part of my field research took place during the general election campaign. It was by and 
large a coincidence because it was an early general as well as local election that was called after I 
planned my field research. I have planned my research action plan before the parliament took a 
surprising decision to call early elections in 18 April 1999.1 have started two months earlier (in 
January 1999) than the campaign started in March 1999. And had already collected considerable 
amount of date, made participatory observations, conducted some interviews, collected printed 
materials and so on. The election campaign in fact provided a rear opportunity for my study to observe 
the party activists in a real situation, in their day-by-day party activities. It gave me another opportunity 
to compare the activities of grassroots activists during an election campaign. Not surprisingly the 
political activities increased considerably as my informants (lid also acknowledge it Its impacts on data 
collection I can say was positive: much opportunities to observe, much opportunity to attend political 
gatherings, house/teahouse meetings, street parties etc., It gave me opportunity to compare grassroots 
activists and their activities in `normal times' and during the election campaign. 
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leafleting, hanging the party flags and posters in the neighbourhoods, distributing the 
campaigning materials to the election bureaus in the neighbourhoods, organising 
charity works for the needy in the neighbourhoods as well as saloon meetings, street 
rallies and car convoys. I have combined participatory observations with interviews 
with neighbourhood representatives or members of the neighbourhood committee, 
ordinary party activists, party supporters, local party administrators and party 
candidates. I also analysed party documents, election manifestos, and candidates' 
speeches and recorded and later decoded various forums, discussions, and conferences 
attended by the VP's leaders or candidates with opposing party leaders. I have 
gathered a considerable amount of printed material, news articles and commentary on 
the election campaigning and the VP in particular. I had regular daily contacts and 
meetings with all sorts of VP people from the upper echelons of the party to the 
ordinary party supporter in the mainly gecekondu neighbourhoods. In this process I 
observed various aspects of the Virtue party. Not just the grassroots party 
organisations and their activities but also the workings of the party machinery as it 
whole. I observed the relationship between the leadership and the rank-and-file 
members from neighbourhood committees. 
As ethnographic research requires I utilised various techniques to acquire a better 
understanding of the party activists and how they contribute the WP/VP's electoral 
fortunes. I did a great deal of informal interviewing with those who visit the party 
organisations in the sub-district branches and in the neighbourhood branches. 
I used an in depth, open ended, semi-structured interviewing technique. In social 
sciences interviewing is one of the most commonly used research methods. (Fielding, 
1994, p. 135). In broader terms interviews are classified as structured interviewing 
and unstructured interviewing (Fontana and Frey, 1994, pp. 363-365). Fontana and 
Frey (1994, pp. 365-366) pointed out that unstructured interviewing provides a greater 
benefit than other types of interviewing techniques. Structured interviews are used to 
capture exact data that can be coded in order to explain behaviour within 
preestablished categories. Contrary to this the unstructured interviewing method is 
employed in order to grasp the complex behaviour of members of society without 
suggesting or imposing predefined classifications or any categorization that may 
restrict or limit the field of investigation. Two other terms `open ended ethnographic' 
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and `in-depth interview' have also been used interchangeably with the `unstructured 
interview'. 
Nigel Fielding (1994) categorised three types of interviewing: standardised or 
structured interviews, semi-standardised interview and, non-standardised or 
unstructured/focused interviews. The key measure of differentiating types of 
interviews was the degree of structure imposed on its format (pp. 135-136). I have 
used in my ethnography the form defined as the semi-structured interviewing method. 
I have 35 mostly open ended questions asked in the same order but felt free to ask for 
more information wherever it was necessary. 
1.8.1 Why in-depth interviews? 
Besides hundreds of informal interviews and conversations I made 42 formal 
interviews, some of them were fully recorded. The length of interviews varied from 
45 minutes to two hours. I chose the in depth interviewing method with mostly open- 
ended questions because I wanted to let my informants express themselves freely. I 
wanted to understand their reasons for becoming members of the Virtue party, what 
made them choose to become party activists, how they first got involved, was there 
anyone from their family or friends or was it the party (the VP) who first approached 
on? I wanted to grasp the reasons for my informants' participation in politics 
generally, then with the VP specifically. 
I aimed to understand the strategy and tactics of the VP's grassroots activists, what 
they mostly do as political activism, how they approach potential voters, party 
supporters, where they usually meet with supporters/voters, what they usually talk 
about, what kinds of demands, problems and queries they face and how they react to 
these queries? I wanted to get an insight into their own perceptions of their grassroots 
activism, and if they thought that their activity has any influence on the electoral 
performance of the WP/VP. I wanted to learn about the political and ideological 
persuasions of the grassroots activists, and what they think about the principle of 
secularism in Turkey, -can a state be secular? is it possible to separate religion from 
the state affairs totally? Also I wanted to learn grassroots activists' own perception on 
the question of why political Islam has been rising in Turkey and what makes people 
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vote for it. In this study I have attempted to understand some of these complex 
questions and behaviours of the VP's grassroots activists. That is why the in-depth, 
semi-structured interviewing method seemed the most suitable method to use. 
1.8.2 Data Collecting and Observation 
No social event or phenomenon can be understood without analysing the 
preconditions in which this particular social event or phenomenon has occurred. In 
other words to understand and explain a social event or phenomenon one must be 
analysing historical and materialistic conditions. Following the golden rule of 
sociology I shall apply the analytical investigation methods in this study of grassroots 
activists of pro-Islamic Fazilet (Virtue) Party. 
Until now no comprehensive study of either party membership or grassroots activists 
of Pro-Islamic Fazilet (Virtue) party has ever been conducted. Therefore there is no 
profile of the party membership with which to compare the findings of this study. We 
are well aware that this study will be the first ever study of a party membership in a 
Turkish context and therefore will fill the long-standing gap in this area. 
The data used in this study was collected during my fieldwork in Turkey. During this 
field research every effort was made to collect adequate, consistent and relevant first 
hand information. Through formal and informal interviews, attending many various 
meetings, group discussions, grassroots activities, election campaign, participatory 
observations etc., I have managed to collect a sizable amount of data. The majority of 
these interviews proved very productive and informative. As well as formal and 
informal interviews there were numerous occasions for informal discussion groups, 
which I was able to attend in the sub-district party buildings. Also, I was able to 
make observations and even sometimes turn those informal meetings into focus group 
discussions. 
House and Coffee House Meetings 
By the first week of the February 1999, right before the local and general elections of 
18 April 1999, the election campaign had entered into a new stage, it became more 
active and fierce. As the election campaign gathered speed it provided countless 
opportunities to attend several house and coffee house meetings in different 
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neighbourhoods. These meetings were especially valuable for my study because they 
allowed me to observe grassroots activists in action as they were interacting with the 
people that were mostly in gecekondu neighbourhoods. 
Car Convoys: 
There were regular 'car convoys' as they were called, at the weekends organised by 
the grassroots activists in the sub district level. I was able to take part in some of 
these car convoys, and, in fact I recorded a whole car convoy, which took more than 
five and half an hours in the sub district of Mamak. There were about 250 cars, mostly 
privately owned cars, vans, minibuses, buses and approximately 2000 -2500 people 
on the move. It covered all 63 neighbourhoods of Mamak, every street, boulevard, 
and square was visited in a festive mood. The convoy was led by a specially 
converted election bus, equipped with audio systems to make announcements, play 
party propaganda tapes and music. 
1.8.3 Problems and Usefulness of the Focus Group 
Interviews 
Before going to the field I planned to use focus group interviews as a supplementary 
method because they are extremely useful tools for social research. According to 
Steward and Shamdasanin (1990) 'Focus groups may be useful at virtually any point 
in a research program, but they are particularly useful for exploratory research where 
rather little is known about the phenomenon of interest'. Despite their prestige and 
popularity my research experience showed that they are not easy to organise. 
However because I was doing participatory observation among the supporters and 
grassroots activists of the VP, I visited the party branches in Mamak and Kegiören 
everyday. Sonic days there were up to 8 or 10 people who discussed a wide range of 
topics such as general political issues, the performance of the first Islamist led 
coalition government, its failures, the use of violence in politics, should Muslims use 
force against the state or any particular group that confronted them. During these 
discussions I had the chance to convert some of these discussions into focus group 
interviews by asking questions and occasionally directing them without contributing 
too much. I wrote down these discussions into my research diary in the evenings. I 
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found these occasions extremely useful and informative in order to understand the 
ideas, perceptions, and attitudes of the VP's grassroots activists and the 
supporters/voters as well. 
1.8.4 Gaining Access and Building Trust 
I would like to thank to all those who kindly took part in my interviews. As I 
promised, I have changed all the names of my informants to protect the anonymity of 
them. So the names appears in this study are not the real names. 
Gaining access to grassroots activists on the ground was the most daunting task of my 
study. I had the challenge of gaining both access and trust in a poisoned and 
extremely tense political atmosphere in Turkey. The general atmosphere was 
extremely nervous, the WP's closure exactly one year before and the consequences of 
the process of 28 February made the people around the WP and VP extremely anxious 
and reserved. They felt political pressure on them. In fact most felt heavily scrutinised 
by the authorities. 
In time I overcame this extremely delicate problem. By visiting the party branches on 
a daily basis and hanging around, talking to people, listening to them carefully slowly 
and painstakingly I managed to gain the trust of a few key, party activists and local 
party administrators. They then served as gatekeepers to other groups. 
There were a few very important factors that provided me access and trust of my 
informants. The first was that although the general atmosphere was hectic and people 
were scared to be seen politically as overactive and were suspicious of strangers; I 
visited the party headquarters in Ankara. There I talked with one of the deputy leaders 
Mr. Ismail Alptekin (MP) who is also responsible for the local party organisations 
nationally. The meeting was very positive; I explained who I was and what I intended 
with the letters from my supervisor and the department. He issued a letter to local 
party leaders asking for their cooperation with my study. In the meantime, I soon 
realised that despite the political atmosphere the fact that I was doing the study from 
the UK seemed a nutter of prestige for them. After all someone from a British 
university was showing an interest in their party. This point was very important. 
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In this meeting there was another happy coincidence, a meeting with one of Mr. 
Alptekin's aides Mr. Metin Karadag who himself is a Ph. D. student in the 
Cumhuriyet University from the department from which 1 graduated. Even though it 
was the first time we had met we had much in common to talk about and it provided a 
kind of bridge. He helped me a lot, providing party documents, printed materials and 
personally introduced me to the branch administrators and all the right people that I 
needed to meet. 
On the ground however gaining trust and having access was further helped by the 
commencement of the election campaigning itself. Besides having a far greater 
opportunity to participate and observe grassroots activism in action, having an 
election campaign made people feel relaxed and they started to talk openly. This 
atmosphere created a social-psychological effect, since everything seemed political 
there was not much point being reserved or cautious or being suspicious of who I was. 
Sometimes I was just another potential voter, other times I was someone they would 
introduce to their clients/constituencies as someone from Britain studying their party 
showing the importance and the superiority of their party (the VP). 
Above all, I tried to develop a good, intimate and open relationship with my 
informants. I always patiently explained who I was and what I was doing and the 
possible benefits of such a study. I was not a total stranger either. I lived in Mamak 
for two years in the early 1990's and my parents still have a house there where I lived 
after my graduation and part of my uncompleted Master's decree in the METU in 
Ankara. This allowed me to provide some sort of identity and belonging to Mamak. 
1.8.5 Scope of the Research 
This study is all about offering a scientific explanation for the unprecedented rise of 
the pro-Islamist Welfare Party in the (1994) local elections and (1995) general 
elections. This extraordinary development in Turkish politics caused a series of very 
serious consequences that lasted long and has probably shaped internal politics for 
coming decades. They range from a `post modern coup' by Turkey's strong military 
forces in 1997, to the ousting of the Islamist led government, to the closure of the WP, 
the main actor in this political turmoil and the subject matter of this study. The party 
reopened under a different name the Virtue Party in 1997 and was quick to adopt all 
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the strategies and tactics of the WP. It inherited from the WP the same grassroots 
organisations and grassroots activism and is the only modern and mass political party 
in the country. 
No doubt there have been a number of factors that played an important role in the 
ascension of political Islam in Turkey but like every other study this study has its 
limitations and I have had to draw clear boundaries. The scope of this study has been 
bound by the main hypothesis that the grassroots organisations and grassroots 
activists of the WP/VP have been crucial to electoral successes of this party. 
Therefore it is a study of the grassroots activists of the Virtue Party in Turkey. 
1.8 6 The Sampling 
I chose two sub-districts of Ankara to conduct my fieldwork the reason fro this is 
those sub districts are very different yet in some ways very similar. Both the 
similarities and differences are essential for my empirical study because by studying 
such two counties and different neighbourhoods I wanted to collect data across 
various social classes, different social and cultural backgrounds and to examine why 
despite this difference social background they support the WP/VP. First of all the 
WP/VP has got a strong present in both counties. Both municipalities governed by 
mayor from the VP. Secondly Kegiören and Mamak provide a well-balanced universe 
for my study. Also it seems both counties would be a representative of the whole 
process of rapid urbanisation since the 1950s in Turkey. Keciören is much older 
county compared to Mamak and represents the first phase of rapid urbanisation that 
begun from the 1950s. For this reason it consists more (45 %) non-gecekondu housing 
and middle and lower middle class compared to Mamak (20%). Mamak on the other 
hand made municipality in 1980 and it represents the second phase of the rapid 
urbanisation that begun from the 1980s. Mamak is predominantly urban poor whereas 
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Keciören has got sizable middle and lower middle class areas. On the whole both sub 
districts provided a well-balanced representation of the population of Ankara. 3 1 
31 The socio-economic and behavioural differences between informants from Kecioren and Mamak; 
The environmental condition and differences are been described in chapters 1 and 6, for this reason 
now I shall briefly describe the socio-economic, and demographic backgrounds, and behavioural 
differences and similarities of my informants from Mamak and Kegiören. I will also compare their 
motives, aspirations, ideological and political attitudes and the major incentives for then to become 
political activists. The first difference between my informants is concerning the place of birth although 
in both group the migrants are majority, one-third of Kegiörenlis were horn in Ankara compare to only 
one-sixth of Mamaklis. Again the average years that spend in Ankara are higher in Ke4iören than 
Mamak. Both group tending to have similar number of children. In terms of the educational 
qualifications, on average both groups are better-educated compare to population in Ankara. 
Informants from Keqi6ren are better-educated one-six of them university educated while only one in 
twenty four in Mamak. Fifty percent of Mamaklis have finished high school more than half of these are 
graduated from religious high schools while one-six graduated from elementary and around one-fifth 
finished primary schools. In Keqi6ren there is a big gap between upper end and lower end of 
educational qualifications. The largest group among Keciörenlis (33 percent) finished elementary 
schools and one-sixth of them graduated from high schools. On average activists from Keqi6ren seems 
older than those from Mamak. In terms of occupational qualification there is more self-employed 
professionals in Keqi6ren 22 percent than in Mamak (8 percent) while the ratio of blue-collar workers 
higher (33 percent) in Keqi6ren than in Mamak (29 percent). The ratio of shopkeepers is higher in 
Keciören (22 percent) than in Mamak (12 percent) the ratio of routine with collar workers is higher in 
Mamak (20 percent). There are also more retired activists in Mamak. Income levels are also vary 
according to the occupational pattern. On average those informants from Kegiören have higher income 
148.660.000 TL ($ 388.45) per month than in Mamak 129 180 000'FL ($ 338.58) per month. 
In terms of joining the party there is substantial difference between two groups: some 44 percent of 
Kegiörenlis are `self starters'. They decided themselves and joined the party whereas only one-quarter 
(25 percent) of Mamaklis are self-starters. Party's and friends role is not equal among them. In Mamak 
party requited one-third (33 percent) of the activists while only one-quarter (25 percent) of Kegkirenlis. 
It seems friend and close relatives are more influential and played grater role in Mamak. Over one-fifth 
(21 percent) of Mamaklis joined the VP because someone from family asked while 17 percent of 
Keciürenlis did so. The most outstanding difference between two groups occurs in terms of loyalty and 
admiration for the party leader when joined the VP. More then one-quarter (29 percent) of Mamaklis 
indicated that loyalty and admiration for the leader played an important role for their membership while 
non of Kegiürenlis did say so. The time of membership is another important indication between these 
two groups. On average KegUirenlis have been members for 16 years compared to 8 years of 
membership of Mamaklis. 
What was the most important reason for them to become members of the WP/VP'? It seem religious 
reasons are higher among Ke4iörenlis compared to Mamaklis. Religious reasons were the most 
important reason for almost one-half (47 percent) of Ke4iörenlis and 33 percent of Mamaklis. 
Ideological reasons on the other hand were high among Mamaklis (25 percent) compared to 
Ke4iörenlis (17 percent). More than one-fifth (21 percent) of Mamaklis gave other reasons 
trustworthiness, cleanness and loyalty for the leader as the most important reason while 13 percent of 
Ke4iörenlis did so. Around one-six (15.5 percent) of Keciörenlis said the WP/VP is the best for country 
and can solve the socio-economic problems while 12.5 percent of Mamaklis said so. Around 8 percent 
of Mamaklis and 6 percent of Ke4iörenlis joined the party as a reaction to other parties. 
As pointed out in chapter 5 that the majority of my informants were migrated to Ankara. Looking at the 
districts they come from there is a different pattern. Around 37.5 percent of Mamaklis comes from 
Yozgat one of the conservative central Anatolian town; some 17 percent coming from cankin equal 
numbers (17 percent) were born in Ankara and 12 percent comes from Corum. One-third (33 percent) 
of Ke4iörenlis were born in Ankara one in ten (I I percent) came from Yozgat equal numbers from 
Erzurum and Bolu. 
According to our data 83 percent of Ke4iörenlis have at least one person in their family who is also 
member, supporter or voter of the WP/VP while 75 percent of Mamaklis said so. 
47 
My main research method is a census of party leaders in each neighbourhood. 
Sampling is particularly important to have a well-balanced representation of any 
group. True representation of the sample of the population is the prime concern of 
sampling. There are total 105 neighbourhoods in two counties 63 in Mamak and 42 in 
Keciören and each of neighbourhoods has its neighbourhood executive committees 
and their leaders. I wanted to interview 42 of those local party leaders out of 105 in 
total. In order to have an accurate representation I have used a `systematic selection' 
technique one of random sampling methods (See Arber, 1994, pp. 65-80). Since I had 
the list of neighbourhoods in two counties of Ankara I used systematic sampling by 
choosing every second name from the list of total 105 neighbourhoods altogether. 
In the field I interviewed 42 local party leaders from 42 different neighbourhoods of 
Ankara's sub districts Keriören and Mamak. The sub-district of Mamak has got 63 
neighbourhoods and Keciören 42 neighbourhoods. These committees organise 
themselves exactly the same way as a sub-district committee does in the sub-district 
centres. I interviewed active representatives of these 42 neighbourhoods. In most 
cases they were the head of the neighbourhood committee but if this were not possible 
for any reason I chose his deputy instead. 
All informants interviewed were male. There are a few reasons for this. First of all 
despite the fact that hanim komisyonlari (Commissions of ladies), as they are called 
within the WP/ VP, have often been acknowledged for their important contribution to 
electioneering, they usually remain inactive once elections are held. In other words 
while they rightly deserve acknowledgement for their impressive role in terms of 
door-to-door vote canvassing, grassroots activism needs consistency and long-term 
commitment. Secondly, whatever their contribution may be, ladies tend to not take 
full initiative but rely on the directive and advice from district branches via 
neighbourhood organisation which are totally dominated by the male activists. And 
the third reason is entirely based on concerns with problems of fieldwork. Given the 
boundaries of gender relations in this particular group, especially being an outsider, at 
least from the beginning, I anticipated some problems regarding accessibility for 
observation and making interviews, I decided to concentrate on mainstream grassroots 
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activists who constitute the majority (96 percent) and dominate the grassroots 
activism of the VP. According to a recent survey woman comprise only 4 percent of 
all party membership in Turkey. (See TESEV 2000, p. 23). This is not an attempt to deny 
or underestimate the existence and importance of hanimlar konºisyonu (women's 
committees) within the grassroots organisation but rather reflects the fact that 
grassroots activism is still a predominantly male issue. 
1.9 The Major Changes Since This Study Began 
Since I started to do my research on political Islam in Turkey in 1997 there have been 
some major changes in the Turkish political scenery. These are as follows: 
I) Firstly, there has been an experience of pro- Islamic government in Turkey. 
2) Secondly, this Islamist led coalition government was forced to step down. 
3) Thirdly, the Welfare Party, the largest in the country was closed down by the 
Supreme Court on 16 th January 1998. The court argued that the WP had violated the 
principle of secularism in the constitution. Also the court banned the leader of the 
WP Necmettin Erbakan with six other MPs from politics but did not rule against the 
WP's more than a hundred and fifty other MPs. The cort has announced its written 
verdict on 23 February 1998. 
4) Fourthly, a new Islamist party called Virtue Party has been established in 17 
November 1997. As way of preparation against the court's decision to close the WP 
down the VP was established a year earlier and replaced it in 25 February 1998. 
Almost all (150 out of 158) of WP's MPs in the parliament and mayors across the 
country have joined the VP so the VP became the largest political party in parliament. 
5) Fifthly, the parliament voted for early elections. According to parliamentary 
decision the local and general elections were held on the 18 April 1999. 
6) In the elections of 18 April 1999: the VP passed its first hurdle with minor losses. It 
lost 6 percent of its electoral support since 1995. Its share of the vote eroded from 
21.4 per cent in 1995 to 15.41 per cent (109 seats in the assembly) in 1999. The VP 
did better locally than nationally. At the local level it took 17 per cent of votes and 
more importantly the VP retained the Istanbul and Ankara municipalities. 32 This 
32 For detailed results of local and general elections (1999) see daily Mü(ipet , 20 April 1999. 
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means that by and large voters have been happy with the VP's municipalities but at 
the national level voters wanted to avoid any further confrontation with the secular 
establishment. 33 
7) The leader of the WP, ex-prime minister N. Erbakan is being charged with making 
anti-secular speeches and could be sent to prison for one year. 
8) The Virtue Party has also been closed down by the constitutional court (on 18 June 
2001), accused of being the focus of anti-secularist activities. 
9) This closure has further increased the division within the VP between so called 
`traditionalists' or' grey-haired' and `progressives' that have been there for some 
time. The division emerged before the WP closed down but it became most visible in 
the first and the last general party congress of the VP on 18 May 2000. In that 
congress for the first time ever there were two candidates for the leadership. R. Kutan 
the acting leader who had been appointed by N. Erbakan and challenging him the 
Abdullah Gül the representative of the `progressives' group. To the surprise of many 
Mr. Gul received 42 percent of the vote from party delegates. After that congress the 
split grew and with the court's decision this group started to establish their party 
under the leadership of ex Istanbul Mayor T. Erdogan. 
10) The split within the Islamist movement finally happened. Out of the Virtue Party 
has came two different parties under different leaderships: the Saadet Partisi (SP) (the 
Happiness Party (HP) founded by the `traditionalist' conservative wino of the 
National View movement. The HP has 48 MPs in parliament. The second party is 
called Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or (AK parti) (the Justice and Development Party( 
JDP) was founded by the `progressive' wing, a new generation of Islamist politicians 
under the leadership of Tyyip Erdogan the ex-mayor of Istanbul from the WP. 
Currently the JDP has 52 MPs in parliament. 
All of the above developments have been very important for my research 
programme. In the first instance it must be said that I initially proposed my research 
on the WP, which has since discontinued. This situation, undoubtedly raised 
questions about the future scope of my research. However as I mentioned above the 
Fazilet (Virtue) Party was established before the closure of the WP and provided a 
33 See Alpay, S, 1999. 
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natural successor. The Fazilet (Virtue) Party is a true copy of the Refah (Welfare) 
Party, both being set by the same political cadres within the Islamist movement. Of 
course there are some differences between the WP and the VP but these are in the 
higher offices. Mostly the grassroots organisations consist of the same people so 
there is no obstacle in studying the grassroots activists of the VP. 34 
1.10 A Short Summary of Content of the Thesis 
I began this chapter by introducing some background to the research itself. I try to 
understand what happened in the early 1990's in Turkish politics. In other words what 
sort of conditions created a need for this study in political sociology. Then I 
examined the problems with the categorisation of Islamic fundamentalism. This was 
followed by a brief summary of the major approaches to studying political Islam and 
their critiques. I then formulated my hypothesis and reviewed the Turkish contingent 
approach. The contingent approach provides a viable and useful explanation. 
Considering socioeconomic conditions of the phenomenon is the first objective of my 
research. I have reviewed the different views about the effects of grassroots activism 
on the electoral process, which is the second objective of this research. The last 
section of chapter one was devoted to the methodology, the location and sampling 
questions that I used throughout the study. In conclusion I provide a short summary 
of the content of each chapters in the thesis 
Chapter two analyses the present socioeconomic and political situation in Turkey. 
Then the functions of the political parties in general and the origins of Turkish 
political cleavages will be briefly discussed. The next section looks at the Turkish 
political party system with the post-1980 parties in perspective. Turkish political 
history presents political parties as being prominent figures in Turkish politics from 
the late nineteenth century. However, the pre-1980 parties are mostly defined as 
having `vertical loyalties' being patron-client based rather than developing `horizontal 
loyalties'. 3.5 
34 For continuity and discontinuity see chapter 3, especially table 3.2. 
35 For detail see Chapter 2. 
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The bulk of chapter 2 is devoted to the post-1980 area. In this section the long term 
political consequences of the military coup of 1980 are examined and its ambitious 
plans for reshaping politics and its `unintended' consequences will be highlighted. 
Turkish politics has been undergoing political impasse whereby political parties 
created more problems then they actually solved. This process did not occur in one or 
two years, but took more than three decades. In the economic sphere, the problems of 
the late 1970s have been worsened by the neoliberal restructuring policies of the 
1980s and 1990s. In a sense what was intended to be a solution turned out to cause 
more problems. The high rate of inflation, unemployment, social inequalities and 
poverty has been far more prevalent since the 1980s when the implementation of IMF 
backed neoliberal restructuring programs started. 
Long term high rates of inflation, increasing foreign and domestic public debt, the 
widening gap between the rich and the poor, the abandonment of most social policies 
and widespread political corruption have created deep pessimism and disillusionment 
among voters. Hence plitical parties experienced organisational weakening as well as 
a sharp decline in the party identification ties. 36 As a result the Turkish party system 
has collapsed. 
However, there has been an exception to this current trend. Although all of the 
mainstream Turkish political parties experienced fragmentation, volatility, and 
organisational decay, the pro- Islamic Welfare Party and after its closure the Virtue 
Party, emerged as the major winner of this process. With its vast, well-organised 
grassroots organisations the WP/VP managed to turn this process upside down and 
became the largest party in the country in less than a decade. In this chapter I seek to 
answer the following questions: Why did the party system collapse? What are the 
underlying causes of the party decline in Turkey? And how did the WP/VP grow so 
distinctively while the rest of the parties lost their popularity? 
In chapter three 1 explore the process of the transition of the Islamic movement to a 
very successful political party in Turkey. In this chapter I shall briefly look at the 
emergence of Islamic ideology in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, then 
moving to the first half of the twentieth century. In 1970 the Islamic movement was 
36 See Öibudun, 2000, p. 79. 
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transformed into a political party. This development was closely related to changes in 
Turkish capitalism. The 1960s marked the beginning of a transition from commercial 
to industrial capitalism. The mass production of industrial goods started to threaten 
traditional artisans, merchants and tradesmen. Islamism was an available opposition 
ideology they could turn to, for protection and to allow them to pursue their own 
interests as the Anatolian petty bourgeois class through an organised political party. 
The surprising ascendancy of the WP in the mid 1990's is examined in the next 
section of chapter three. In this section I outline the factors that made the WP so 
successful. In less than ten years it became the largest political party in the parliament. 
In the 1994 local election the WP managed to capture hundreds of municipalities 
across the country including two metropolitan cities, Istanbul and Ankara. This trend 
continued in the general elections (1995) when the WP emerged as the largest party in 
parliament and formed a coalition government. In this chapter I ask how the WP 
succeeded, and examine the underlying causes. What were the strategies and tactics, 
and above all what were the role and influence of the WP's very well organised, 
highly committed grassroots activists? Another major theme of chapter 3 is the key 
policies of all Islamic parties from the NOP to the VP. The reason for this is that I 
wanted to see the change and continuity in this party through time. The last section of 
course will be devoted to the Virtue Party, established when the constitutional court 
closed down the WP. I shall also be looking at the changes and continuities from WP 
to the VP. 
In chapter 41 examine the urban roots of political Islam in Turkey. I argue that 
contrary to common belief the Islamic movements in many Muslim countries are 
urban-based movements. They are not, as many believed, confined within in the pre- 
modern conditions of backward, illiterate, traditional and conservative communities in 
the rural areas, but rather flourished in the urban areas where rapid urbanisation 
created tremendous socio-economic problems. 
I then look specifically at the relationship between the [MF backed neoliberal 
restructuring policies of the post 1980s, rapid urbanisation and the rise of the WP/VP. 
In this section I analyse the economic and political consequences of the restructuring 
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policies. As a result of these policies the population balance between urban and rural 
areas changed dramatically. Since the mid-1980s 65 percent (40 million) of the 
population lives in cities. Half of this population lives in five mega-cities: Istanbul, 
Ankara, Izmir, Adana and Bursa. Following this section I examined the political 
consequences of rapid urbanisation, especially its effects on political participation in 
Turkey. 
In chapter 51 investigate the process of participation in order to discern the patterns of 
participation among the VP's grassroots activists. In other words, to find out how and 
why the VP's members joined the party in the first place. Examining the mechanics of 
how members join a political party is one of the key aspects to understand why people 
join them in the first place.;? The process of membership is one of the less studied but 
important aspects of political participation. In fact, the way in which an individual 
joins a party, association or an interest group reveals a great deal about the 
organisation and the individual. I then explore patterns of participation of the WP/VP 
members. 
Chapter six first discusses the conceptual definitions such as the mass party, party 
membership and grassroots activism and the emergence and development of the mass 
political parties in Europe will be discussed from a historical point of view. Then I 
review the literature on party membership and grassroots activism. The following part 
of chapter six is devoted to the grassroots activists of the WP/VP. The socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics of the VP's activists are considered. I attempt to 
build a profile of the VP's grassroots activists in Turkey. I examine patterns that 
might help explain party membership and the rationale behind becoming a political 
activist. It is an area in politics that so far has not been accurately understood 
Chapter 7 is entitled `not like any other party'. It looks at the effects of grassroots 
activism on the electoral process. This chapter is divided into two sections. In the 
first section is the question of whether or not party organisations matter is discussed. 
The `counter argument' contests whether local party organisations have any impact on 
electoral performance. For these writers party organisations lost their functions as 
37 Sec Whiteley, P., Seyd, P. and Richardson (1994, p. 77). 
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campaigning machines and politics moved from `party centred' to `candidate 
centred'. This means that candidates not organisations organise and execute the 
election campaigns. However a growing body of literature suggests this is not the case 
at all. `The pro-argument', as I call it, challenges this view. Despite a declining image 
in recent years mass membership parties are more likely to influence the electoral 
outcome. This section is followed by the discourse on grassroots activism of the 
Turkish students of politics. 
In the second half of chapter 7I analyse the empirical data collected during fieldwork 
in Ankara. The aim of this section is to describe all aspects of grassroots activism in 
Ankara: how often activists meet potential voters, how much time is spent on 
activism, where they meet with the people they canvass, what are their perspectives 
on their activities and how the party activists improve their party's electoral fortunes? 
This section is concluded with an analysis of the main points. The next part of chapter 
seven is dedicated to finding out what party activists do and how they do it. In this 
section different dimensions and methods of VP's activists are examined using 
empirical data from ethnographic research. 
Chapter 8 presents my general conclusions and analysis of all empirical findings. 
Here, the original hypothesis will be re-evaluated in light of empirical findings and 
my analysis of them. In other words to test the original hypothesis evaluate whether I 
have reached my objectives, satisfy my objectives. Finally, the theoretical 
implications and possible contributions of this study to sociology in general and study 
of political parties and political Islam in particular will be assessed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DECLINE OF THE TURKISH POLITICAL 
PARTY SYSTEM, 1980-2000: 
THE FAILURE OF THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES 
AND RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
2.1 Introduction 
Turkish politics has been undergoing a period of political impasse. 38 The reason for 
this stalemate has been long term economic deterioration: high rate of inflation, huge 
foreign and domestic public debt, increased gap between rich and poor, abandonment 
of most social policies, and widespread political corruption have created deep 
pessimism and disillusionment among voters. As a result of political parties have 
experienced increased fragmentation, electoral volatility and organisational 
weakening as well as a sharp decline in party identification ties. (See Özbudun, 2000, 
p. 79). However, there has been an exception to this down turn trend. The WP/VP has 
emerged as the major winner of this process. 
In this chapter I will mainly be seeking to answer the following questions: Why has 
the party system collapsed, how did it happen? What are the underlying causes of 
party decline in Turkey? As well as, how did the WP/VP thrive while the rest of the 
parties were losing their popularity? 
2.2 The Roots of the Current Political Impasse: Politics In 
An Extremely Restrained Circus 
It could be said that Turkey has never fully recovered from the big oil crisis of the 
mid-1970s. The economic crisis of the seventies soon coupled with a political crisis 
deepened by the provocations of extreme right wing groups. Gradually this economic 
38 TESEV, 2000, p. I. 
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and political crisis led the country towards an impasse. In this extremely polarized and 
politicised atmosphere came the military intervention of 12 September 1980. 
It was the military coup of the 1980s that caused another interregnum in multi-party 
politics. All of the existing political parties were banned from politics and a 10 per 
cent nationwide threshold introduced into the electoral system (Kalaycioglu, E 1998). 
The military coup of 1980 had an immense impact on Turkish political life and 
parties. (See Ergüder, 1991, p. 5 1). Two decades later its effects are still detectable. 
The implementation of military rule from September 1980 to November 1983 left a 
deep impression on the Turkish political party system. It led to further political 
polarisation and a de-politicisation of society. Perhaps, from the political perspective, 
one of the unintended consequences of the intervention was the increased 
fragmentation of the political parties. Due to this further polarisation none of the 
political parties have been able to secure a majority in the parliament since 1980. 
It can be said that the post-1980 political party system was the product of an 
extremely undemocratic, oppressive and restrictive regime. In one sense the coup of 
September 1980 was staged to suppress the awakening of the masses. The military 
elite believed that the social awakening was too far ahead the economic development 
of the country. Evidently, this development was seen as a threat to the social and 
political order so it was believed that this situation needed to be `corrected'. Of course 
this kind of `correction', as elsewhere, would only be done by undemocratic means. 
When the military intervened the existing political parties and their leaders alongside 
the university students and progressive sections of the working class were blamed for 
the social unrest. Having this perception in mind the military elite wanted to 
discourage the pre-1980 party leaders from politics by closing down all the parties. 
With the coup all the political leaders Demirel (JP), Ecevit (RPP), Erbakan (NSP), 
Türke (NAP) and high ranking cadres, MPs, and the districts' leaders of the parties 
were interrogated and imprisoned. Following the prison sentences the leaders were 
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banned from politics until 1987. They were even prevented from engaging in 
journal ism. 39 
The military regime had three major policies to reorganise the political party system. 
These were: first, to establish a two party system, second, to impose a programme of 
de-politicisation which included associations of the civil society and third, to close 
down all existing political parties and ban all of their leaders and high ranking cadres 
from politics. 40 These policies aimed to redefine the boundaries of the Turkish 
politics. 
The policy of de-politicisation was very successful indeed. To materialise this policy 
political activity was limited to a very small section of the population. The 1982 
constitution and the law of political parties restricted the political participation of 
public sector workers, civil servants, members of trade unions, students, teachers, 
soldiers, and others. 
The third leg of the policy achieved a complete departure from the pre-1980 political 
system. By allowing the new political parties and new agents the military elite 
wanted to create a new political style. 
2.3 Two Decades On: The Current Situation 
Turkey has been experiencing the worst ever economic and political crisis of its 
modern history. Economically as well as politically the country is on the verge of total 
bankruptcy. According to recent media reports (lie treasury is no longer able to 
continue interest repayments, which mounted to billions of dollars from external and 
internal debt. It is estimated that total debts have reached a staggering level of around 
80 to 90 percent of the country's GDP. 
In a recent briefing the treasury announced that all the income (TL 16.561 trillion) 
generated from tax, during the first six months of' this year, went towards interest 
39 See Tekeli $, 1990: 261 
40 See Sakallioglu, Ü in Tosun, T 1999: 150. 
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repayments (TL 15.741 trillion) and left a budget deficit of TL 8.104 trillion. 41 Many 
commentators and economists agree that this situation is no longer sustainable. As 
one daily put it "the hurting picture" of all tax revenues going to interest repayments 
for now but the next half year it won't be enough. 42 The declaration of a moratorium 
even has been considered. 43 
For more then two decades the Turkish economy has been crippled by a very high rate 
of inflation. This long-term trend of high inflation has caused extreme poverty and a 
huge gulf of income between the richest and poorest sections of society. 44 However, 
the real roots of the country's problems, wrote the Economist, lay in politics not in 
economics. 45 This trend has worsened since then. The current economic (February 
2001) crisis appears to be the worst ever in the country with its all-destructive 
dimensions. Various surveys indicate that in terms of income inequalities Turkey has 
one of the worst records for income distribution. 46 
41 Sec Istanbul Daily Sabah (17 Temmuz, 2001) 'Vegit gelirinin hepsi faize girt? ' (All tax revenues 
went to interest repayments) Sabah, 17 July 2001. 
42 Istanbul Daily Milliyet, 19 Temmuz 2001 "Act tablo" (Hurting picture), Milliyetl9 July, 2001. 
43 A comparative study would be more insightful about the ratio of total debt and the GDP of a 
country. However this is not the place for a detailed financial analysis of Turkeys debt problem, 
nevertheless one can argue that the condition that borrowing required, the interest rates that money 
borrowed, where and what the money will be used, the political and financial conditions that attached 
with and above all the capability of debt repayment of an economy are as much important as the 
amount of debt that a particular country have. It can be argued that two countries may be having 
similar ratio of debt to their GDPs but they may not be borrowing from the same conditions. The 
interest rates are varies very much according to the countries outlook of 'credit ratings' that 
international financial institution such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's grades. This credibility rates 
depends on many financial, political fiscal variables.; According to a Standard & Poor's (20-Aug- 
2001) report " Turkeys public sector debt burden approaching 1 10% of GNP ... In addition, Turkey has 
the highest rates of inflation and real interest rates recorded in recent years among its peers. This puts 
Turkey's high public sector debt burden on an explosive spiralling course. " As the above report 
indicates because of the ad economic and financial outlook Turkey faces difficulty to borrow and when 
she does she has to pay higher interest rates than normally some other countries do. For example 
because of its higher credibility rate the US treasury can barrow at a much lower interest rate compare 
to Turkish treasury that can hardly barrow at a much higher interest rate of 8.5 % per annum (see 
Milliyet 24 Mayis 2002). Also Turkish treasury mainly borrows for serving the interest repayments. 
According to a recent study Turkish treasury paid 190 billion dollars as interest repayments in the last 
12 years (Yeni Safak, 26 Mayis 2002). 
44 According to TESEV (2000, p. 6) in 1994 the richest 20 percent of population received 54,9 percent 
of the GDP while the poorest 20 percent received only 4,9 percent of the GDP. The economic crisis of 
1994 was this crisis that heralded the demise of the TTP/SDPP coalition government and ended the 
electoral chances of the SDPP and TPP ever since. 
45 The Economist, 16 May 2001, "Turkey's real crisis". 
`'c' For the latest statistics on income distribution, see Istanbul daily, Milliyet (24 July 2001), "Beý 
ki. idea birinin karat doynuuyor... " (One in five goes hungry). According to this research, the income 
gulf has been widened enormously. The richest 5 percent of population earns S 32 000 a year while the 
f 
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The political side of this current crisis reveals itself in a much cruder, more expressive 
way. The economic and political crisis reached a stage where the country is no longer 
governed by the elected governments but by the IMF via Kemal Derviý who was the 
vice chairman of the World Bank until March 2001.47 The current government, 
which is a three party coalition, has been left with no alternative, no power and no 
initiative to make any economic or political decisions but merely to assist Kemal 
Dervish who has been appointed as minister of the economy to implement the IMF's 
structural adjustment policies. 48 
It seems that the beginning of the twenty first century brought a new phase in 
relations between the IMF and recipient countries. The IMF pushed aside the national 
governments in countries like Turkey and Argentina by appointing someone from 
either the IMF or the World Bank as a `governor' who overrides the governments' 
capacities and implements further restructuring policies: a sharp drop in the national 
currency against the dollar. Thus a sharp drop in income levels and a steep rise in 
unemployment and poverty. 49 
Socio-economic consequences of this current crisis have been extremely brutal. The 
Turkish Lira has devalued over 100 percent: going down from TL 680,000 per dollar 
in February 2001 to TL 1.5m per dollar in 17 July 2001.50 Unemployment has been 
soaring rapidly, with around 580.000 workers losing their jobs in first 6 months. 
In the face of this, it seems the government has totally surrendered to the demands of 
international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and international markets. (Sec 
poorest 5 percent which is 7 million people earns around $481 in a year. It concludes the gap between 
rich and poor is as wide as 66 times. 
47 Birand, M. Ali (2001) " Washington, Ankara' nrn gü,. ýa, ýrncr bakanyor' (Washington, does not pity 
Ankara's shading tears" in Istanbul daily Milliyet 21 Temmur_ 2001 (21 July 2001). 
48 I am using the term `structural adjustment' as Walden Bello defined this concept in his book called: 
Dark Victory (1994: 140). 
49 According to some economists the IMF is primarily responsible for this crisis by insisting on wrong 
policies. See Ercan Kumcu, "The IMF's blunder in Turkey" Financial Times, March 12 2001b. Also 
see another recent article by economist Mustafa Sonmez who points out that due to IMF's wrong 
policies Turkish economy has lost 120 bn dollars since 1999. See Sünmez, M Hiirriyet (daily) "IMF 
bite ki. i ba4rua 1500 dolar hor4lu" (IMF ows $ 1500 to each of us) 28 July 2001. 
50 Istanbul daily Sabah, 18-07-2001, "Piyasalar cildirmis olmali" (Markets must be craze). 
60 
Kumcu, 2001) So far no government in Turkey's history has experienced such 
humiliation by surrendering its capacity to foreign powers and their local 
collaborators to this extent. 5 1 
What we have witnessed is the once the proud, dignified and self confident Anatolian 
nation, `the lords of the horizons' being brought to its knees by the international 
institutions and its ruling elites who are corrupt, dishonest and incompetent. 52 As 
public support for these mainstream politicians and their parties began to disappear 
they increasingly sought external support. Obviously, this process also heralded the 
end of politics, as we knew it. 
Although the current situation may look like an economic crisis, it has been closely 
connected with the impasse that the Turkish political party system has experienced. 
Turkish political parties have not been able to produce policies to undo this political 
impasse for a long time. All of them, with the exception of the WP/VP, have been 
declining under the hegemony of sultan-like leadership. According to a recent poll, 
they all score under 10 percent of the vote. Not surprisingly, the largest block of 
votes (40 per cent) is the undecided group that consists of those who have been 
disillusioned with the existing parties and are looking for an alternative. There is a 
feeling among the people that none of existing political parties are convincing the 
voters (Hasan, Milliyet, 21 July 2001). 53 
2.3.1 Political Parties and Representative Democracy 
51 See for sonic of the media reports from following daily papers : Hurriyct: 7 July 2001, "Ecevit: 
'IMF ile cok duvarlr bit- dünemdepiz" (Ecevit: we are in a deficit position with the IMF ); Torgut, S 13 
Temmuz 2001 "Ara dünem hükiimeti gerekivor" (Turkey needs a transition government); Sabah: 8 July 
2001 " LFte IMF nin son uyarrsi' (Here is the last warning of the IMF); 12 July 2001 "Bit kafavia cok 
ti"ol ala"rz' (We won't go far with this mentality); Milliyet: 6 Temmuz. 2001, 'Ecevit IMF , 
vardunr 
keserse haya/ kerrklrgr olur" (Ecevit: It will be dissepointing if IMF stops the credit" 12 July 2001; 
Sabah, 13 July 2001.1 Cihan, S, 2001, "ßorflu degil ALACAKLISINl7_' (You are not debtor but the 
CREDITORS), Yeni Evrensel, (daily) Istanbu (12 Temmuz. 2001); Yeni Evrensel, (Istanbu daily) 13 
July 2001 "Kriz tacirleri krizde" (Crisis' traders are in crisis); caralan, I (14 Temmuz 2001); Yeni 
Evrensel, (Istanbu daily) "Piyasa Illiizyonrr "(The Illusion of the Market); 18 July 2001 "Serrnave ülken"i 
kaosa siirüklüyor" (The Finance Capital Drags the Country into Caos) 
52 The phrase `lords of the horizons' is coming from Jason Goodwill's book (1998) Lords of the 
horizons: a history of the Ottoman Empire, Chatto &Windus, London. 
53 Notice that these polls were carried out after the closure of the Virtue party on June 23,2001. 
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Political parties are the key components of representative democracy. They help to 
run the election machinery and serve as the vehicles for political campaigns. They 
stimulate public discussion on important issues, and most importantly they serve as a 
bridge between the people and their governments (Huckshorn, 1984, p. 7). Also, they 
function as: agents of elite recruitment, as agents of interest aggregation, serve as a 
point of reference for voters and they offer direction to government (Hague, Harrop 
and Breslin, 1998, p131). There is no doubt that political parties are one of the most 
distinctive and most successful forms of political organisations (Sacarrow, 1996, p. 1), 
They are the major facilitators of representative democracy. 
Sigmund Neumann (1963, p. 352) defined the political party as: 
The articulate organisation of society's active political agents, those who are 
concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for 
popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views. As 
such it is the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to 
official governmental institutions and relates them to political action with the 
large political community. (1963, p. 352). 
Obviously, the control of governmental power involves an electoral process that needs 
popular support behind this organisation that links social forces and ideologies to 
governmental institutions. However, in Turkey this link between the social forces and 
ideologies to governmental institutions has gone missing for sometimes. Parties are 
often viewed as a bridge between the society and the government (Huckshorn 1984, 
p. 7). Due to the collapse of this `bridge' -the Turkish party system- there is a 
problem of representation. Parties have become organisations that serve their 
organisational interests more than they do the wider public interests. 
2.4 The Causes of Decline: Party Fragmentation, 
Organisational Decline and Volatility 
The post 1983 era began when the new political party law went into effect on 24 
April 1983 and the following day the National Security Council (NSC) lifted the ban 
on politics. Within a week or so there were 17 parties formed (Ahmad, 1993, p. 188). 
Since all of the pre-1980 parties were closed down by the coup these parties were 
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established by a new political elite. The majority of them were either new to politics 
or were the lower ranking elites from pre 1980 parties. Not all parties were new, 
however, for example the Great Turkey Party (GTP), was Demirel's Justice Party in 
disguise and the Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP) was the continuation of the 
RPP. The generals closed down the GTP immediately; the SDPP was not but was not 
allowed to take part in the first elections in 1983 either. (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 188- 
189). 54 In the end three parties were allowed to take part in elections. They were the 
Table: 2.1 Volatility and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System (1961- 
1995) 
Fragmentation Fragmentation Effective 
Of of Disproportionality Number 
Elections Volatility a Votesb Seatsh Indexc of Partiesdt 
196 - 0.71 0.70 1.0 3.3 
1965 24.5 0.63 0.63 0.75 2.6 
1969 11.4 0.70 0.59 7.4 2.3 
1973 28.4 0.77 0.70 5.6 3.3 
1977 (8.3 0.68 0.60 5.5 2.5 
1983 - 0.66 0.61 4.5 2.5 
1987 - 0.75 0.51 15.7 2.0 
1991 16.6 0.79 0.71 7.1 3.5 
1995 23.0 0.83 0.77 5.8 4.3 
Source: Özbudun, 2000, p. 77. 
Notes: a. Total volatility is the sum of the absulute value of all changes in the percentages of votes cast 
for each party since the previous election divided by two. The 1961 elections are omitted because the 
DP was dissolved by the ruling military council (NUC), and two entirely new parties (the JP and the 
NTP ) competed for its votes. Likewise, the 1983 elections are omitted because the military 
government (NSC) closed down all existing parties; thus, the three parties that competed in this 
elections were new. The 1987 elections are ommited because two of the three parties authorized by the 
NSC (the PP and NDP) were relatively artificial parties that soon disappeared after the return to 
competitive politics. Had these three elections been included, the avarage volatility score would have 
been much higher. In calculating the volatility scores, only parties that gained representation in 
parliment in at least one of 
the two consecutive elections were taken into account. For the 1991 elections, which the WP contested 
in an alliance with the NAP and the small Reformist Democracy Party, percentages of votes in the 
1998 local elections were taken as a close approximation. Compiled by author. 
b Based on Douglas W. Rea's index of fractionalisation; The Political Consequences of Electoral 
Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 56. 
54 I have briefly examined all Turkish political parties of the centre left and centre right and smaller 
parties as well. See Appendix VI. 
63 
C Based on Arend Lijphart's index of disproportionality, which is "the average vote-seat deviation of 
the two largest parties in each election"; Democracies: Patterns of Majoriterian and Consensus 
Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 163. 
d Based on Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera's formula: Pe = 
Y, m2 
,I 
"Effective numbers of parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe", Comparative. Political 
Studies 12 (April 1979): 3-27. (Ozbudun, 2000, p. 77). 
The Key for table 2.1: 
a) Electoral volatility is one of the signs of electoral change. The simplest measure of electoral change 
is the volatility of party vote shares between elections (Dalton R., McAllister, I. and Wattenberg M, 
2000, p 39). Electoral volatility is according to Crewe, 1 (1985, p. 9) defined as "the net change within 
the electoral party system resulting from individuals vote transfer and is measured by summing the 
percentage point change in each party's share of vote compared with the presiding election and 
dividing by 2. Net volatility refers to changes in the share of votes obtained by each party". However 
measurement of net volatility and overall volatility is subject to some problems. In the main time the 
number, size and the age of parties all affect the volatility level (ibid. P. 10). Theoretically the rate of 
volatility can be between zero in a one party system where every voter votes the same party and a 
hundred in a hyper multiple party system but everyone votes to a different party in each election which 
is an unlikely situation. In other words there is no defined upper or lover rang that we can compare our 
table 2.1. However the literature review shows that there is an established pattern of electoral volatility 
in European party systems. For example Pedersen M (1979) analysed the 13 European party systems 
for their electoral volatility and found out that the average electoral volatility between 1948 and 1977 
was 8.1 per cent (1979, p. 7). Another study depicts similar index of volatility. Dalton, R., Beck A., P 
and Flanagan, S. C (1984, pp. 9-10) found out that average volatility was 9.7 % immediately after post 
war years (1948 and 1959), In the 1960s, party alignments stabilized, and party volatility decreased to 
7.6 percent. This trend reversed in the 1970s, it increased to 8.7 percent. Recent studies indicate a slight 
increase in the party volatility (Drummond, A 2002). The average volatility score for the OECD 
countries has increased from below 9 percent in the 1970s to 12.6 percent by the 1990s (Dalton, R, 
McAllister, I and Wattenberg, M. P., 2000, P. 40). Perhaps now we can compare the electoral volatility 
in Turkey with the existing date from OECD countries. As table 2.1 shows, the volatility index has 
been much higher in Turkey then the average in European countries. It was 24.5 percent in 1965 and 
had a dramatic decrease in the following election (1 1.4 percent). In the 1973 election it increased 28.4 
percent and fallen to 18.3 percent in 1977 elections. It continued to fall in 1991 elections (16.6 percent) 
and then increased to 23.0 percent in the 1995 general elections. 
b) Fragmentation of votes: Is based on Douglas W. Rae's (1967, p. 56) index of fractionalisation: 
The model is derived from a simple probability statistics. The chance that our two voters will have 
chosen the same party is approximated by the sum of the squared decimal shares of the vote obtained 
by all parties: 
11 
Probability of Dyadic Agreement =ýTi2 (Where Ti= any party's decimal share of 
the vote) 
It follows that the probability of dyadic disagreement (here labelled Fe) is the complement of 
11 
this quantity: Fe =- Ti 
2 
The resulting values are used here to indicate the extent of party system fractionalisation. 
According to Rae the fractionalisation values occupy a continuum, running from non-fractionalisation 
in perfect one-party system (Fe equals zero) to complete fractionalisation- an event never occurs. 
Under a perfect one-party regime, there is no fractionalisation, and no two voters could have chosen 
different parties (hence, Fe equals zero). Under a perfect-two party (i. e. 50-50 split) system, an 
intermediate form of fractionalisation exists. 
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The values of party fragmentation index are range between the limits of zero and one. The party 
fragmentation valued as none if it is near or around the zero, intermediate if the value around 0.50 and 
extreme if towards value of 1. Rae (ibid, pp. 55-58) identified three different levels for party 
fractionalisation. They are: none....... intermediate....... extreme. None is indicating the 
fractionalisation value around zero, intermediate refers value of 0.50 or around and extreme is around 
value of 1. 
We can now interpret table 2.1 in particular column b. It shows that the party fragmentation since 
1960s in Turkey has always been over the intermediate level. The fragmentation value was 0.71 in 
1960 election. By the 1965 election party alignment seemed stabilized and fragmentation decreased to 
0.63. However this trend reversed in 1969 election and it vent up to 0.70. This trend did continue, 
fragmentation value increased to 0.77 in 1973 elections. It slides down to 0.68 in 1977 election and 
further decreased (0.66) in the 1983 election. Since the late 1980s it has been over the value of 0.75 (in 
1987 elections), 0.79 in the 1991 elections and it was its highest (0.83) by the 1995 elections. By using 
Rae's valuation we can say that the party fractionalisation has been high since the late I980s. 
Fragmentation of the Seats Rae used the same formula to calculate the fractionalisation of seat shares 
(Fp). As the election systems varies country to country but not all parties that compete elections are 
represented or equally represented in the parliament. For example any party competes election has to 
gather above the 10 percent of national threshold to be able to represented in the parliament. Other wise 
the votes distributed among other bigger parties. So there is always a difference between the rate vote 
and numbers of seats. It is calculated as: 
I! 
Fp= I -( Sit) 
c): Disproportional Index: was calculated based on Arend Lijphart's index of disproportionality. He 
argued that except unusual conditions, it is impossible for any electoral system to yield exactly 
proportional results. After assessing the formulas -for disproportionality of vote-seat -that developed by 
Douglas Rae's (1984) and Loosemore and Hanby (1971) Lijphart suggested that we should calculate 
the average of the vote-seat share differences of the two larger parties only. He used an index that 
showed the average vote-seat share deviation of the two largest parties in each election. How these 
large parties fare is a good reflection of the overall proportionality of an election result (1984, p. 163). 
He calculated the degree of disproportional in 22 European countries from 1945 to 1980. The degree of 
disproportional ranged from a low average of only 0.9 in Denmark to a very high average of 12.3 
percent in France. However the average indexes of disproportional for the six pluralities and majority 
system is 7.4 per cent and for the four plurality systems 6.6 percent (ibid, p. 163). Comparing the table 
2.1 with Lijphart's findings it seems the disproportional index in Turkish party system is lower in 
general. A part from the 1987 elections that disproportional index was 15.7 percent the average 
disproportional index between 1960 and 1995 is 4.7 percent. However as he pointed out the average 
index of disproportional are changes with the number of parties in a party system. On the whole a 
comparing table 2.1 with Lijphart's (1984, p. 160) data shows that the average index of disproportional 
is much higher in Turkish party system than in those European countries where proportional 
representation is applied. 
d) Effective Number of Parties: Lijphart (19ä4, p. 165) argued that the disproportional characteristic of 
all electoral systems tends to favour the larger parties and to discriminate against the smaller ones. 
Therefore all electoral systems tend to reduce the effective number of parties. Than how to calculate 
the effective number of parties. The effective number of parties in table 2. I was calculated on the based 
on Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera's formula: Pe = by Özbudun (2000, p. 77). The effective 
, -I 
number of parties is the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect 
on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of unequal size. (Laakso and Taagepera 
1984, p. 4) 
The index of effective number of parties has been changing in Western European countries and in 
Turkey since the 1970s. For example in 15 European countries the average effective party number was 
3.7 for 15 (1953 to 1967). It increased in the early 1970s to 4.2 effective parties. In Turkey the average 
of effective number of parties (2.9 effective parties) were much lower- between 1960 to 1987 - 
compared to above data. However the early 1990s saw it sudden steep rise to 3.9 effective parties. 
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People's Party (PP) later merged with the SDPP represented the left, the National 
Democracy Party (NDP) established by a retired general and supported by the military 
rule representing the centre-right and the Motherland Party (MP) founded by Turgut 
Özal. 
Due to the high rate of electoral volatility and fragmentation the Turkish party system 
has been unstable. For various reasons the fragmentation and volatility has been 
much higher in Turkey compared with Europe. According to the TESEV's study 
(2000, p. 12) the avarage volatility between 1954 and 1999 was 21 percent. 55 This 
means that one in every five electors changed his/her vote from one party in this 
election to another in the next election. In the post 1980 period the first important 
signs of the fragmentation came with the elections of 1989. 
Although the military elite wanted to create a two party system, the post 1983 era 
turned out to be much more fragmented than before. The reason for this was the 
duplication of political parties in the centre-right as well as in the centre-left. The 
military government left office with the elections in 1983. But only 3 parties out of 17 
were permitted to take part in elections (1983). In reality this plan soon created the 
opposite effect, because despite being closed clown by the coup almost all the pre 
1980 parties were re-established by either emanetcies (leader's puppets) or some low 
ranking party officials. By the time the pre-1980 leaders' ban was lifted (in 1987) 
these parties were already established under these new leaders, some of who did not 
want to leave the post or the party. So these pre 1980 leaders had to establish their 
own parties or reopen them as the court allowed. This situation not only helped the 
creation of extra parties in an already crowded political arena, but also caused an 
inflation of the political elite, it new of class politicians on all sides of the political 
spectrum. 
The Motherland Party (MP) had won an unprecedented election victory and received 
45 percent of the votes and 52.7 per cent of the total seats in the parliament. The PP 
55 Compare to the the average volatility score for the OECD countries which is 12.6 percent by the 
1990s (Dalton, R, MaCallister, I and Wattenberg, M. P., 20(X), P. 40) 21 percent volatility is can be 
classified as high volatility. 
66 
received 29.2 and the NDP 17.7 per cent of the votes. The fragmentation index was 
measured as 0.61 in 1983 for the Assembly seats (See table 2.1). 
It would not be wrong to say that the most important event affecting the fragmentation 
polarisation in the post 1983 era was the return of the pre 1980 leaders (Demirel, 
Ecevit, Erbakan and Türkq) to politics. After four years of transition to democracy a 
referendum was finally called to decide the political fate of these banned leaders. The 
referendum hold on 6 September 1987 was a narrow yes (50.3 per cent) for the lifting 
of the ban. 
Table 2.2 Election results from 1983 to 1999 
PERCENTAGES OF VOTES IN TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY AND LOCAL ELECTIONS 




















MP 5.2 41.5 36.3 1.8 24.0 21.0 19.7 13.0 13.3 
PP 30.5 8.8 - - -- - -- - -- 
DP 23.3 .1 - - - 
DPP -- 23.4 24.7 28.7 20.8 13.6 -- --- -- 
PP - 13.3 19.1 25.1 27.0 21.4 19.2 7.0 12.1 
WP/VP* 4.4 7.2 .8 
16.9" 19.1 21.4 17.0 15.5 
LP -- - 8.5 .0 10.8 
8.8 14.6 10.0 22.3 
NAP - - 2.9 .1 -- 
8.0 8.2 20.0 18.1 
RPP - -- - - .6 10.7 -- 8.9 
Source: Election results years 1983 to 1995 taken from Ozbudun, (1996, P. 128). The 1999 election 
results taken from Milliyet (20 April 1999). State Institute of Statistics. 56 
The local elections of 1989 gave an especially strong indication of the fragmentation 
and polarisation on both sides of the political spectrum. This time the MP received 
only 21 percent of the vote while its rival, Demirel's True Path Party (TPP) received 
25 percent, the SDPP 28.7 percent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DLP) gained 9 per 
cent, ant the WP 9.8 per cent (See Table 2.2). 
56 MP, Motherland Party; PP, Populist Party; NDP, Nationalist Democracy Party; SDPP, Social 
Democratic Populist Party; TPP, True Path Party; WP, Refah (Welfare) Party; DLP, Democratic Left 
Party; NAP. Nationalist Action Party; RPP, Republican People's Party. 
In alliance with the NAP and the Reformist Democracy Party. 
* VP, Virtue Party is the continuation of the WP. 
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In 1991 the trend continued, with the index of fragmentation going up to 0.71 (see 
table 2.1). The MP received 24, and the TPP 27.0 percent of the votes. This time the 
electoral centre moved further toward the extreme right. The reason for this was the 
pre-election alliance between the WP and NAP to get into parliament, which both did 
by winning 16.9 percent votes. In fact when compared with the 1987 general 
elections, both centre-right (4.4 %) and centre-left (1.9 %) parties lost vote to this 
alliance. 
These election results showed that the centre right was fragmented so profoundly that 
it could not be reversed in the foreseeable future. The subsequent elections in 1995 
and 1999 confirmed this tendency (see table 2.1) and the situation was almost the 
same for the centre-left parties too. From the early 1990s the Turkish party system 
returned to the high fragmentation and electoral volatility experienced in the 1970s. 
It seems Turkish party system had found a healthy balance, a stability in the 1950s 
and 60s but it did not last long enough to enter a process of high fragmentation and 
ideological polarisation from the 1970s. As Kalaycroglu, E (1998: 12) Pointed out: 
"Turkey has moved from a two-party format that functioned more like a predominant 
party system in the 1950s to moderate pluralism of the 1960-1980 era, and eventually 
towards extreme pluralism in the 1990s". 
By the 1970s there were new elements that contributed fragmentation. Islamic 
movement transformed into a political party the National Order Party (NOP) in 1970. 
It later became the NSP, which was one of the key players in the endless bargains of 
the coalition governments in the 1970s. The establishment of ultra nationalist- 
Nationalist Action Party (NAP)- marked the era of extreme or polarised multipartism 
in the Turkish party system. (Özbudun, 2000, p. 75) The 1970s saw a steep rise in 
trade union activism and student movements all over the country. 
By the mid-1990's the fragmentation in the Turkish party system increased more 
then ever before. The WP bacame the largest party in the parliament but it recived just 
21.4 per cent of the vote (Özbudun, 2000, p. 76; Kalaycioglu, 1998, p. 12 see also 
figure 2.1). The signs of further fragmentation came with the local elections in 1994 
and a year later in 1995. From the early 1990s the political centre entered a process of 
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rapid decline. In this election the WP become the largest party, won 21 per cent of the 
votes and 158 seats out of 550. This result indicated the degree of the fragmentation 
index which was at a record level, 0.77 As the trend continued the MP continued to 
lose votes from 24 per cent in 1991 to 19.7 per cent in 1995. The TPP also lost votes 
from 27 to 19.2 per cent in 1995. 
Yet the 1999 general elections proved to he the worst result for the mainstream centre 
parties of the right and left. As figure 2. I shows, the fragmentation index was at 0.88, 
the highest ever in Turkish political history. Both parties of the centre-right have lost 
a considerable amount of votes. The NIP only received 13.3 percent and the TPP 12.1 
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percent while the ultra nationalist NAP doubled its share of the vote to 18.1 percent. 
The fourth party on the right of the political spectrum, the Virtue Party, however, lost 
some of its previous share of the vote (from 21.4 to 15.5 percent). This loses by and 
large caused by the disruption that carne with the closure of the WP just a year ago. 
The 1999 elections were held just a year after than the closure of the WP. Therefore 
there was not enough time for the VP to reorganise as the WP did. Although many of 
its local branches changed the name from Welfare to Virtue party, still the closure 
caused organisational disruption and diysfunctionalities. The second explanation that 
can be suggested is that the intervention that came with the process of 28 February 
sent a clear message to the supporters and the potential voters of the WP/VP that the 
party will not be allowed to come to power regardless of its electoral strength. This 
theory infect has been confirmed by the results of the local elections that held in the 
same time with the general elections in 18 April 1999. In local elections the VP did 
not lose as much support (17.0 % in 1999 and 19.1 % in 1994) compared to 1994 
local elections. This result indicates that the voter supported the VP in local elections 
but in case of the general elections because of the confrontation with the military the 
voter wanted to avoid further escalation of the tension. 
On the left of the political spectrum there were two surprises: the first was the DLP 
making a very unexpected gain and becoming the largest vote gathering party by 22.3 
percent, while the RPP failed to enter parliament because it scored less then ten 
percent (8.9 %) national threshold. So the oldest of all, the founder party of the 
republic was ejected from parliament by the voters that illustrates the extent of 
fragmentation and electoral volatility in the Turkish party system. 
In addition to the fragmentation and the volatility of the Turkish electorate the party 
system seems to have been badly affected by a realignment of votes in the 1990s. 
(Kalaycioblu, 1998, p. 12). The high level of volatility and fragmentation in the 
Turkish political party system has been followed by increased ideological polarisation 
as well. It has been estimated that approximately 10 percent of the electorate have 
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been swinging from one ideological group to other from one election to the next. (See 
figure 2.1) 57 
There are two reasons for this fragmentation and electoral volatility. Firstly military 
interventions: 's the interventions and party closures destroyed the social bases of the 
parties, and never allowed subsequent development of strong party identification, 
party organisations and party loyalties. The second reason is that the political parties 
in Turkey are not deeply rooted in civil society (Özbudun, E 2000, p. 78). Unless 
parties are organised deep down in society they do not have much electoral stability. 
Organisational weakness is another malaise of Turkish party system. Throughout the 
1990s parties faced a real problem with the erosion of public confidence. According 
to a survey, political parties are the least trusted institutions in Turkey. -19 Over the last 
fifteen years most of the parties suffered a decline in their party organisations and 
weakening of party identification (Özbudun, E 2000, p. 79 and TESEV 2000). Since 
the return to democracy in 1983, the majority of voters experienced great 
disappointment with the political parties due to the failure of consecutive 
governments to solve the country's mounting economic problems. 
In contrast the mainstream Turkish parties, the WP/VP gave first priority to the 
strengthening of its local party organisations. It has the largest membership. It is the 
only party that actively engages in increasing its membership. The party with its 
active engagement strategy gives a role and voice to every one of its members in the 
local party branches. 
The organisations engage in year round campaigning that is geared to electoral 
purposes but also acts as charitable organisations; distributing fuel in the winters, 
food, overcoats, shoes or grants for the school children. They establish and maintain a 
very intimate relationship with the neighbourhood residents and so on. All of these 
activities are only possible through existence of a strong, well organised and 
57 See also TESEV, 2000, p. 6. 
58 Sec TESEV 2000, p. 11; Özbudun, 2000, p. 76. 
59 See Strateji MORI 1998: 35 (cited in TESEV (2000: 16). 
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effectively working party organisation that only the WP/VP has acquired and enjoyed 
the benefit of it. 
2.4.1 Concluding remarks 
Turkish politics has been shaken by a series of factors in recent decades. This shake 
up has not helped to install a stable, powerful and functional party system but instead 
has led to a further destabilisation of Turkish politics. As a result the Turkish party 
system has collapsed. According to Özbudun (2000: 73) `Turkish parties and the 
party system have been facing a long-term process of institutional decline, growing 
fragmentation, ideological polarisation, and electoral volatility in the party system. 
Also individual parties have been experiencing decline in organisational capacity, 
party identification and declined public support for the parties among citizens since 
the 1970s. ' In general it is agreed that Turkish politics have reached an impasse due 
to the state of the Turkish political parties. 
Before I move on to the explanatory reasons and the processes of the party 
fragmentation, electoral volatility and organisational decay throughout the 1980s and 
the 1990s, it is necessary to examine the organisational structure of the Turkish 
political parties. I believe that the organisational structure is equally important to 
understanding the party decline in general and rise of the WP/VP in the recent 
decades. 
2.5 Organisational Characteristics of Turkish Political 
Parties 
As far as the organizational characteristics are concerned all Turkish parties show 
similar features because the political party laws impose a standard organizational 
model, which consists of party congresses and elected executive committees at the 
national and local level. 60 This prevents political elites from developing a structure 
that is more suitable to their own needs, or indeed reflects the local conditions. 
There has been very little change in the organisational structure of Turkish political 
parties since the mid-1940s. The majority of them are described as cadre or catchall 
60 See Ozbudun, 2000. 
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parties with strong clientilistic characteristics. The WP, however, is the only 
exception to this generalisation. The WP has mass party features (Özbudun, 2000, 
p. 80). The Virtue Party (VP), the heir of the WP, was also founded on the same 
principles of a mass political party. 
The contemporary party models have been classified as 1) Cadre/Elite Party; 2) 
Mass/Branch Party; 3) Catch-All Party and 4) Cartel Party (See Maor, 1997, p. 100). 
61 The cadre/elite parties, catchall parties or cartel parties are all characterised by 
marginalized party membership. In most cases membership is maintained but not 
cultivated (ibid: 101). 
There is an agreement among many students of politics that the local party 
organisations and party activists do make a significant contribution in terms of 
increasing parties' share of votes in the elections. '- From this point it can be claimed 
that those parties that have large membership and nationwide party organisations do 
get better electoral results. However as mostly cadre or catchall parties with strong 
leadership tendencies the majority of Turkish political parties are clearly losing out on 
these benefits. Although party membership is increasingly seen as a burden or costly 
for the party leaders to maintain, it still has many benefits for political parties. 63 If the 
parties were defined as the bridge between the people and government, then members 
are the bridge between parties and people. 
According to Scarrow (1994, pp. 42-46), party members provide several benefits for 
their parties such as legitimacy benefits; direct electoral benefits, outreach benefits, 
financial, labour, linkage, and innovation and personnel benefits. Some have argued 
that due to the technological developments (communication technology: TV, 
computers, etc., ) and social inventions (emergence of some expertise: PR experts, 
campaign managers, fund raisers, etc., ) party leaders increasingly became 
autonomous from party members and organisations. They argued that the large 
grassroots organisations were once necessary and constituted the only way of 
61 Also, for a brief review of models of party organisations (mass, cadre, catchall and cartel party) and 
their defining characteristics, see Maor, M (1997: 96-113). 
62 The positive influence of the local party organisations and grassroots activism on the electoral 
process will be explored in Chapter 7. 
63 See Sacarrow, 1996. 
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electioneering but not any more. Now they say, the leaders have the means of direct 
contact with the electorate. This claim is true up to a point but the party organisations 
remain an asset for leaders. In many Western European countries the party 
organisations and membership are still valued for their role. 64 
At present, except for the WP none of the Turkish political parties have active 
membership organisations, or widespread membership activities. A 1996 survey 
showed that 12.1 per cent of the voters are party members, however, due to the nature 
of party registers and the loose link between parties and members, it suggests that in 
effect membership in Turkey often consists of little more then party supporters 
(Özbudun, 2000, p. 80). 
In 1993 the WP was the fourth largest party with over 1.1 million members while the 
MP had just under 2,4 million the TPP just under 22.9 million and the SDPP just 
under 1.4 million members. 65 It seems the WP was fourth largest, however, as 
mentioned the nature of the party registers are questionable, the figures may not be 
accurate. Even it' they are accurate the nature of membership of the cadre or catchall 
parties is different from mass party membership. In 1994 the WP started the local 
election campaign with a massive membership registration campaign and reached 4.5 
million members before its closure in 1998 (cakir, 1994, pp. 51-52). 
With the exception of the WP/VP, mainstream parties in Turkey are deprived of a 
crucial bridge, an important organic connection between the party and the people on 
the ground. This is not only important for expounding the party's policies, ideas, key 
issues, strategies or strengthening the party identity but also parties with large 
memberships tend to have more stability and continuity in difficult times. 
Membership is especially important in a political atmosphere where the ideological 
differences between political parties are disappearing, or ideological commitments are 
declining. III such an atmosphere membership provides an anchor for stability and 
continuity. 06 
64 For a detailed discussion on the party members and party organisations, see Chapters 6 and 7. 
65 Schülcr, 1998, p. 63; and Cakir, 1994, p. 51. 
66 See Chapter 5. 
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Due to the lack of grassroots organisations and mass membership, the majority of 
Turkish parties became overly dependent on state resources: financial as well as other 
kind. This problem is made worse by the problem of under institutionalisation of the 
post 1983 political parties. For a variety of reasons, many of them have not been 
institutionalised. 
This lack of institutionalisation is aggravated by the lack of membership support, in 
terms of financing, labour for day -to-day tasks in the organisations, election 
campaigning, etc., hence the need to use capital intensive media led campaigning 
methods which are very expensive. To do that, they must rely on state resources. 
Although they are entitled to receive some state aid according to their representation 
in parliament, it is often not enough to run expensive election campaigns. Therefore 
they have to find other ways to subsidise their election expenses. This need pushes 
them to become overly dependent on governmental power to create resources while in 
office. 
2.5.1 The Genesis of The Turkish Party System and Clientilism 
The first quarter of the twentieth century was marked by the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish republic. Following this period the 
revolution of the 1923 shaped the direction and characteristic of the modern Turkish 
political system. 67 However, the genesis of the Turkish parties goes back to the 
nineteenth century. Since then Rustow (1991, p. 10) argued Turkish political parties 
have reflected both the profound changes and underlying continuity in the country's 
political history. Among the major developing countries Turkey's party system was 
the earliest to develop. In the 1950s Fredric Frey (1965) argued that: 
Turkish politics are party politics. ... With the power structure of Turkish 
society, the political party is the main unofficial link between the government 
and the larger, extra governmental groups of people.... It is perhaps in this 
respect above all- the existence of extensive, powerful, highly organised, grass 
roots parties... 68 
Similarly Heper, M (1991: 3) pointed out that: 
67 Ahmad Feroz, 1977, p. 2. 
68 Fredrick , W. Frey, 1965: 301-303, The Turkish Political Elite, MIT Press Cambridge. 
Quoted in 
Ozbudun, E, 2(XX): 73. 
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As compared with the situation in many Third World contexts, with their 
fairly well developed and distinct party platforms, relatively complex 
organisations highly differentiated from traditional social structures as well as 
from the military and Church, and with their active role in government, the 
Turkish political parties have had a significant impact on politics. As 
compared to their counterparts in the Western industrialised countries, too, 
political parties have figured prominently in the Turkish polity. 
As both students of Turkish politics describe political parties have been prominent 
figure in Turkish politics as early as the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Again 
the establishment of the Republican People's Party in the early years of the republic 
shows that parties were given a significant role in politics. In this respect the RPP was 
a true grassroots party made of the small resistance groups in Anatolia. As Heper 
(1991) noticed above Turkish political parties played an important role in politics 
from the early years of twentieth century. 
Dodd, C. H. (1969, p. 162) too described the general characteristics of Turkish 
political parties in a similar vain: 
In the first place, they are not a sham. They are not the tools of a narrow elite 
group. The political parties are not mere fiction. Universal adult franchise, real 
competition for nomination and election to party electoral list, well-developed 
local party organisation- these are characteristics of a viable political system. 
In brief, Turkish society is deeply permeated by political organisation. 
There are many students of Turkish political parties who argued that Turkish political 
parties could be compared, in many ways, with western European parties. Even, in 
sonic respect, Turkish party system and representative, parliamentarian democracy is 
older than some of EU members e. g. Spain and Greece. Again since the 1950s the 
Turkish politics was centred on party politics, parties were the main channels between 
large sections of society and the government. This is the role that western European 
parties playing in politics. 
From 1946 to 1960, the Turkish party system was dominated by a typical two-party 
system. The Republican People's Party (RPP) was representing the centre, and the 
Democratic Party (DP) that represented the periphery. The military coup on 27 May 
1960 put an end to the DP government. 69 
69 For an account of the military coup of 27 May 1960 see Ahmad, F 1977: 147-177; Hale, W 1990: 53- 
79; Tosun, T 1999: 87-92; Kongar, E 1998: 154-156. 
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The Turkish party system changed from single party to two-party system with the 
establishment of the Democrat Party in 7 January 1946.70 The two- party system 
inevitably introduced much political activity and competition into Turkish politics. 
The change of power via the electoral process not only strengthened the chance for 
democracy in the 1950s in Turkey but also strengthened the public perception of 
political parties and party organisations enormously. 
Towards the end of the 1960s the RPP began recovering from its hopeless electoral 
performance and gave the sign of becoming a serious challenger to the Democrat 
government (Tachau, 1991, p. 99). After the 1955 the RPP started to renew its cadres. 
With the young cadres bringing new blood and activity to the party organisation. In 
time they became effective in the party management and after 1965 this young 
generation started to determine the direction of the party (Kabasakal, 1984,211 ). 
The JP established in February 22,1961 and it was a party of the new commercial and 
industrial middle c lasses, traditional landowners and the religious sector (Dodd, 1969, 
pp. 140-141). For some students of Turkish politics the JP was the only real grassroots 
party in the Middle East. 71 Levi, (1991, pp. 146-47) argued that the organisation of 
the JP was the strongest among all Turkish parties in the 1960s and 1970s. The JP's 
local branches were stronger and their chairman was well respected by the district's 
branches. Unlike other parties, the JP's parliamentarians were natives of these 
districts they were representing in the Assembly. Compared to the RPP more women 
and workers entered the parliament through the JP at that time. It was more inclusive 
than any other party and through its organisations many of the new rural-to-urban 
migrants integrated into the social life in the urban centres (ibid, p. 148). 
It is true that the JP have had well-organised and strong grassroots organisations 
across the country but it was based on the what Özbudun (2000) calls "vertical 
70 Kongar, 1998, p. 146; Also fir DP see Saribay, 1991, pp. 1 19-133; Dodd, 1969, Chapter IX. 
71 Sherwood, W. B (1967/8: 54-65) cited in Levi, A (1991: 148). 
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loyalties" rather then "horizontal loyalties. 72 Also, the patron-client relationship was 
one of the defining, characteristics of the RPP until its closure in 1980.73 The historic 
alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite and local notables was a prime reason 
for this clientelistic aspect of the RPP. 74 The notables were patrons who secured 
through their client relations electoral support for the RPP, in return they benefited 
generously from the state's facilities. Sayari (1971, p. 125 quoted by Özbudun, p. 82) 
pointed out that: 
Parties concentrated their efforts in securing the allegiance of faction leaders 
and local patrons who were then entrusted with the task of mobilising electoral 
support. In either case, vertical networks of personal followings proved to he a 
major base for political loyalties. 
The emergence of the working class was helped by the rapid urbanisation that started 
from the early i'il'tics and as it orew in size its political influence expanded too. This 
expansion brought class politics into Turkish politics. The RPP moved its position to 
the centre-left by abandoning some of its traditional allies. As a result throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s the electoral support for the JP and RPP was reversing 
dramatically. 75 
The modernisation of the sixties and seventies brought a party system change. A 
degree of socio-cconomic modernisation after the elections of 1969 marked the 
beginning of realignment in the Turkish Party system (Ozbudun, 1976, p. 151; Tachau, 
199, pp. 108-9). The JP lost its traditional support. The reason For this was the shift in 
gecekondus' (squatters) voting pattern. 
From 1965 to 1972 the RP P adapted a new ideology and organisational structure. The 
new ideology that the RPP adopted was the rising ideology of the social democracy. 76 
Ecevit the new leader of the RPP had the strong support of the provincial party 
organisations and tried to give new role and initiative to the local party branches. 
72 According to Oi. hudun. (2((X). p. 2(2) the I)P, when it carte to power in 1950, built an effective rural 
machine based on the distribution of patronage and pork barrel benefits. "thus. the original two-party 
system %%as based on Vertical rather Then horizontal loyalties.... Later, with increasing rural-to-urban 
migration, similar' party machines appealed in the larger cities and were used effectively by the DP and 
its successor, the . 
1P. " When the I)P came to power in 195( 
73 See Ayata-Gihtc. 1990. pp. 159-185. 
74 See Sayari. 1975, p. 1 25. 
75 I or example see ()ihudun. 1976. pp. 134-136, see also Tachau, F 1991. pp. I OS-109. 
76 Sec Ayala-Gunes. 199O. p. I6. 
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However. despite all of these reformation efforts the dominant characteristic of the 
RPP; political patronage was not eliminated at all. The membership support was not 
reliable. There were very few due paying members. But the provincial delegates had a 
much power and they were appointed rather then elected. 77 It appeared that despite 
all the changes at the organisational and ideological level clientelism continued to 
exist in the RPP. 
Since the early 1980s Turkish political parties have been moving away from 
organisation centred politics to candidate centred politics. In the process they have 
disbursed the organisations and neglected the party membership. Historically, argues 
Özhudun, (2(X)). p. 84) Turkish parties played an important role in electoral 
mobilisation via local party branches, door-to-door canvassing by party activists, 
various grassroots activities to influence voter turnout and party preferences. 
However. this has reversed with parties heavily reliant on media led, high tech 
campaigning methods (ibid: 84). It seems this shift from organisation to 
candidate/leader centred politics did work for a brief period in the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, due to the state's decreased role in the economy and privatisation of 
many public companies, the state revenues that government parties benefited from 
have fallen sharply as has their high tech, media led election campaigning ability. 
Widespread clientilism among Turkish parties is another problem that causes 
fragmentation, volatility and organisational declinc. 7 Since the beginning of 
multiparty democracy in the 1945, the Turkish political elite has approached 
socioeconomic problems with a political patronage attitude (Heper and Keyman, 
1998, p. 258). Over the decades very few governments have made any efforts to 
77 See Ibid.. p. 163. 
79 We are not suggesting that clientilism in a party system would inevitably and under any condition 
would lead fragmentation, electoral volatility or organisational decline. On the contrary clientilism is a 
very conrnxm form of political participation across the world and would not necessarily cause 
fragmentation or organizational decline. But what has happened in Turkey since the late 1980S has 
changed the basic mechanism that clientilism emerged from and fed on. Especially as a result of IMF 
directed neoliberal restructuring policies the state have been withdrawn from much of economic 
activities. In other words this shift has severely undermined the ability of governmental parties to 
create spoils to distribute to its supporters. It is clear that any clientilist party can only retain its clients 
with provision of spoils and the less the spoil the less loyalty from the client or even diminishment of 
it. The decline in the spoil generating mechanism meant a decline of party attachment. identification 




develop coherent socioeconomic policies to solve the country's problems but have 
instead. responded over sensitively to the demands of particular groups and particular 
socioeconomic issues. ''`' 
What passed. as 'policies' on such matters were, on the whole, no more than 
slipshod decisions essentially motivated by a desire to garner votes.... Thus 
politics have not revolved essentially around the pros and cons of socio- 
economic policies: political patronage has become the basic strategy of 
obtaining votes... Heper and Keynian, 1998, p. 258. 
According to the 'l'ESEV's (20(X), p. 2) study, the working of the Turkish Party 
System reflects the relationship between the people and the state in a patron-client 
relationship. Party organisations work on the basis of creation and distribution of 
patronage. Instead of allowing internal democracy, a small elite group or the leader 
plays it significant role in every stage of party activity. 
The post-1980 parties also adopted patron-client relationship instead of developing 
modern party organisations throughout the country. Even those new parties like the 
Motherland Party failed to develop vertical grassroots organisations. As Güne$-Ayata, 
(1994. P. 57) argued: 
The Motherland Party (MP) ... refrained 
from establishing an elaborate 
organisational network. Even while in power, it did not attempt big campaigns 
for membership and developed it style of clientilism that was radically 
different from that of its predecessors. The MP applied pork-barrel distribution 
of spoils as party-directed patronage in the rural areas... However, it avoided 
creating vertical networks based on party cadres, preferring to concentrate on a 
few leaders in the big cities who later became financiers and vigorous 
supporters. 
Perhaps. the reason for this was the leader Özal himself. He was an engineer and 
believed in the infinite power of technology. 1-Ie was a new right-winger and an 
enginccr. The 'social' did not matter for him. Like Margaret Thatcher he did not 
believe in 'society' at all: he was the chief proponent of liberal capitalism and 
individualism in Turkey. So with this perspective, plainly, he did not value party 
membership or the importance (e. g. vote canvassing, found raising, running election 
campaigning) of the local party organisations. 
79 Sec (ýüncy Ayata. It)()d: Kal; iyriuRlu, lo)tl}i and Ozbudun. 2(1<H). 
SO 
He adopted American style expensive, high-tech, media-lead election campaigns. 
He 
even brought some expertise from America to help him campaign for a second term 
in 
office. As the NIP has never set up an elaborate party network, and has not organised 
deeply in the society it had to offer a kind of clientalism that would secure sufficient 
electoral support. The support that generated through this kind of clientilism, 
however, disappears very quickly it' the clients are not satisfied with what they 
receive. Perhaps this situation explains why the MP lost its electoral popularity so 
drastically from 45.2 percent in 1983 to 13.3 percent in 1999. 
In the case of the i'PP and SDPP, as descendants of pre-1980 parties they 
both 
inherited an elaborate party organisation networks. 80 From the moment of 
its 
establishment the TPP was able to set up its local organisations very quickly because 
it could make use of the former JP organisations with their former staff. In 1988 the 
TPP officials anounced that around 70 percent of the local party heads were former JP 
members. The TPP inherited clientclistic relations and party-patronage from its 
predecessor the DP and the JP (Acar, 1991, p. 190). 
It was noticed that patronage politics further increased 
in the post-1991 period and 
reached its peak in 1996-97.81 However, it is not always easy to satisfy 
large client 
groups, especially in the case of slow economic growth and reduced state role 
in 
economy. Ozbudun (2(x)0, p. 84) observed that except for the WP, the majority of 
Turkish parties experienced a decline in their organisational strength. The reason for 
this he says was the slowing of economic growth and restructuring policies, which 
resulted in it decline in the state's role in the economy. 
"These changes mean that there is a limit to spoils parties can distribute to 
their followers, which in the absence of strong ideological motivations is 
important in sapping their organisational strength.... The WP is the only party 
that has avoided this decline. (20(0: 84). 
It can be argued that clientilism is the overriding characteristics of the 
Turkish party 
system. Political paties, in general, emerged as it product of the social conflicts and 
cleavages and always reflected the interests of certain groups or classes. But 
in 
Turkey especially since 19,90s political parties resembles rather like the cooperation 
81) See Gincy-Ayal; t. 58s. 
81 licixr anii Kryin; in. I1)()S, p. 26S. 
ý-+..... G'K --__- . 
ýýý. 
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of creating and distributing of the spoils from public resources in order to maintain 
public support. If they are out of power they promise to do so. As a result they lost 
the perspective of long term planning and investment, approaching problems with 
strategic lone term, broad, visionary planes rather then narrow, daily, palliative 
solutions. 't'hat in return further destabilises the whole economic and political system. 
Since the most common characteristic of the patron-client relationship is on the basis 
of the provision of sonic kind of benefits, goods and services by a patron to a client in 
return for loyalty or political support, either side can easily change this relationship. If 
a client were not happy with what he gets then he would look to patrons to maximise 
his hcncfit. That is what has happened to many of the major Turkish parties. They 
are hased on the clientlistic relations and those relations can be very unstable in times 
of big economic crises as Turkey witnessed several times since 1983. The clientlistic 
nature of the Turkish party system has fed the widespread corruption in Turkey as 
well. 
As a result of restructuring policies implemented since the 1980s, the creation of new 
resources (spoils) that parties can distribute to their followers has been limited to a 
degree Where parties could not sustain their clientilist networks. This situation has 
caused an eventual decline in their electoral support. This situation was also partly 
responsible for high electoral volatility. 
The majority of the "Turkish parties have lost touch with the people. They have no 
means of setting and maintaining direct contact with their potential voters. The only 
exception to this is the WP/VP that has robust local organisations to carry out year 
round party activity. Majority of the other mainstream parties have not been organised 
as mass party. they lack staff, have very little active membership, above all lacking 
ideological conviction and enthusiasm which is very important to maintain the party 
support. Because they are not ideological parties members lack any meaningful 
reasoning to join in the first place or later become party activists. The empirical 
evidence shows that there is a high level of religious and ideological reasoning among 
the WP/VP's grassroots activists. (See chapter 5). But there is little evidence of 
ideological reasoning among members' of other mainstream parties. It seems they act 
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with the instinct of maximising their interests, receiving some sort of benefit either 
material or otherwise such as finding a, job, receiving services, etc. 
As the party of the periphery the pro-Islamist WP/VP had to relay on grassroots 
organisations and parry membership for election campaigning and carrying out day- 
to-clay rutine at the local organisations. The WP/VP has set an example to other 
parties to look and learn from its successful experience with the grassroots 
organ isat ions. 
As I discussed above the WP as the only mass political party has got the means of 
mobilising millions of people by direct, face-to-face contacts. However the WP/VP is 
not all free of patron-client relations. There are up to some extent clientilistic attitude 
among its members and upper echelons of the party leadership. For example this 
relations would occur at the city level more often in the form of provision of services 
e. g. asphalting the roads that supporter or the local party leader lives, improving other 
infrastructure, or in some cases providing jobs in the municipalities and connected 
corporations etc. But the patron client relations are not in any way the defining 
characteristic of the WP/VP. 
Despite fact that the WP/VP is lacking intra party democracy, it is the only mass party 
in 'Turkey (Ozbudun 20X)0). Because of that it does not need to develop an extensive 
network of patron client relations. It can easily mobilise millions of supporters 
without relaying on clicntilistic relations. Another evidence for this is the high level of 
religious and ideological reasoning among its members. This means the majority (61 
percent) of its members joined the party for religious and ideological reasons si rather 
than expectations of any sort of material benefit that patron client relations provide. 
It can be said that having large membership organisations is not only valuable for 
their efforts for election campaigning but also for many other vital aspects that benefit 
M2 P<, r example plitir: ýl conm, entator I-lasan Cenr. tl in his recent tour of Shout East Turkey describes 
how I IAI)EF works: "here the HADI: P has been canvassing one-to-one, house-to-house like the WP 
did. Other parties needs to come and work like this ... (Millieyct 
14 June 2(K)I ). Also for more detailed 
about the grassroots activism of the WIVVP see chapters 5,6, and 7. 
81 Sec table 5.7 
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the Party-1.1 For example, in a political atmosphere in which high electoral volatility 
and political party Ira`gmentation is persistent, large membership organisations 
provide strength. stability and continuity for political parties. This is where exactly 
the WP/VP had superiority over its rivals. 
2.6 The Economipolitics of Party Decline 
The election results from the late 1980s onwards have shown that the Turkish party 
system has been experiencingg a high level of fragmentation, electoral volatility and 
wekaning of party or-anisations. 85 However the ultimate questions of why it has 
happened. the underlying causes of this process, and also, the rise of the WP/VP, and 
simultaneous decline of other parties remain to be answered. 
Sonic answers to those questions may come from party policy performancess in 
government since 1983. Grievances, either individual or social, are one of the first 
and most important conditions and social bases of political action. This action could 
take place in either conventional politics or in protest politics. It has been suggested 
that people protest because shay are fed up or because they experience a sub}ectively- 
Halliday sense of dissatisfaction (Marsh, 1990, p. 109). The concept of disstisfaction 
could he experienced at a personal or political level (see Barnes, S et al 1979; Farah, 
B et at 1979). According to Russell Dalton (1988, p. 50). policy dissatisfaction is 
one of the six main factores that influence a citizen's decision to participate in politics 
Political action could take various forms and might take place at the individual or 
collective level. 
In terms of electoral politics. policy dissatisfaction is evaluated in relation to the 
party's Performance while they are in government. In fact one of the best way of 
testing a political party is the performance that this party shows while in power. As 
has been discussed widely in political literature there is a positive correlation between 
ws Scarruw. S (19')(,: "12-2S) poises cwt the following henelit.. that members would bring to their 
parties: legiiilnacy benefits. direct electoral benefits. outreach benefits, financial benefits, labour 
IksrCu ts. innssýation, and iwr:. onnel benefits. Also see Chapter 3 for a debate over the value of 
memlxrship. 
x5 See tahle 2.1 and figure 2.1. 
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political action and dissatisfaction at the personal as well as political level. Also 
political action and dissatisfaction have been greatly influenced by the concept of 
relative deprivation (Barnes, S et al 1979, p. 382). 86 
Politics can be described as `interest aggregation' through political parties. The 
interests either individually or collectively are reflected as issues by the political 
parties in return for public support. In a functioning democracy, citizens control and 
evaluate the governments' policy performance with legitimate means, e. g. elections. 
The outcome of such evaluations determines the stability of politics in general and 
specifically the continuation of public support for governments. As Farah, B. et a] 
(1979, p. 409) pointed out: 
It is the responsibility of the elected officials to translate these demands into 
public policy; their performance is subsequantly evaluated by the constituency 
and if rated positively, ceteris paribus, they continue to be supported. On the 
other hand, when performance is viewed negatively, either the electoral option 
of "voting the rascals out" or other methods are used to express dissatisfaction. 
It is the job of elected politicians to put into practice the issues raised or demanded by 
citizens, as they are constant watched and evaluated on the basis of their performance. 
In this process government performance is the key for political stablity and continuity. 
If governmental outcomes are viewed negatively by a majority of citizens, they will 
use the legitimize control mechanisms such as the electoral process. In Turkey in the 
last three dacedes the performance of the majority of the governments has been 
viewed as negative. Governments have changed frequently which has led to instability 
and an increased political impasse. 
As the number of the political parties and the possible versions of the coalition 
governments are limited, this constant dissatisfaction with consecutive governments' 
performances led to a political stalemate. It seems that all options have been tried in 
the post 1983 epoch. 
There has been a high level of party fragmentation, electoral volatlity and 
organisational decay. One cannot, however, explain the entire process by the 
structural problems of the political parties alone. Their performance in office was also 
86 For definitions of the concept of relative deprivation, see Barnes, Set at (1979: 381-383). 
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very important in determinating the continuity of public support. It has been observed 
that due to a lack of major or outstanding positive governmental performance none of 
the political parties have been able to secure long term electoral support. 
2.6.1 The 1980s: The Özal Governments 
The Motherland Party can be described as a free market oriented party. Its economic 
orientation was not so different from many western right-of-centre parties of the 
1980s. 87 Perhaps the most important aspect of the MP was its adoption of a clientalism 
that was radically different from its predecessors. 88 Throughout the 1980s the MP 
was in government and was very influential in Turkish politics. 
Ozal's economic policies were predominantly inspired by the thriving ideology of the 
1980's, the new right Thatcherite/Reaganite policies. New right neoliberal policies 
were implemented in the Turkish context where the industrial capitalism was not as 
developed as those countries where the neoliberal capitaism emerged from. Therefore 
the restructuring program combined with the MP's clientelistic attitude soon become 
a means of getting richer for small sections of the bourgeoisie close to the MP 
government in a very short time. They used public resources while millions 
experienced significant reductions in their income and living standards. According to 
Emre Kongar (2000) Ozal's inheritance can be collected under four headings: 
1) The economic inheritance: Transformation from an import substitution economy to 
an export oriented economy open to international competition. In this era the 
inequalities, income distribution worsened at the expense of the majority of the 
people. A huge gulf between rich and poor occurred and this trend continued. Chronic 
high inflation was another characteristic of this era and was actually used as a means 
of shifting resources. 
2) Political inheritance: The attitude of the secular, democratic and social state was 
undermined. Instead political Islam was allowed to flourish. The principles of the 
social state, rule of law and democracy were replaced by authoritarian and closed state 
87 See Ergider, 1991, p. 154. 
88 See Günq-Ayata, 1994, pp. 49-65. 
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structures. By using this authoritarian state structure the MP governments used public 
resources and facilities for its political ends in a clientilistic manner. 
3) Social Inheritance: The public sphere was closed to civil society organisations. 
Working class organisations were weakened: trade unions, flexible job market, etc., 
while religious brotherhoods expanded their organisations and gained large financial 
and political influence. Political elites and bureaucracy increasingly independent of 
any social and legal control used power and financial resources in an uncontrolled 
way. 
4) The Cultural inheritance: Those positive feudal values such as loyalty and 
trustworthiness were rejected in favour of negative feudal values such as 
authoritarianism and exploitation. In the area of industrial values systems the positive 
aspects such as trustworthiness and freedom condition for living together, and 
productivity were neglected while the values of the wild capitalism, opportunism and 
individualism were adopted. (Kongar, 2000, pp. 331-332). 
Getting rich by any means and at any price was a widespread ethos in the 1980s, 
undermining the social fabric. Social and moral values were deeply shaken as a result 
of the wild capitalist attitudes of the MP governments. 
The Motherland Party has destroyed all the values we held sacred. Ten years 
ago we as a nation used to consider swindling, theft, bribery and corruption as 
dishonourable. Now they are normal things. The Yalcin affair reflects this; 
Yalcin, whom we would have criticised a few years ago, has become 
everyone's darling today. (Ahmad, F, 1993, p. 209). 
The above quote illustrates correct what happened within a decade under the MP's 
government, in Turkey. There have been very few governments or political leaders 
that have had such far-reaching impacts on so many aspects of the social life. 
Although the Motherland Party came to power with a great majority, its clientilistic 
attitude meant that only a very small minority enjoyed the MP government years. 
According to a study between 1980 and 1986,30 trillion Turkish Lira had been 
transferred from wages (including farm labour) and salaries as profit, interest, and rent 
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to the capitalist sector. 89 Parallel to these findings the share of the wages and salaries 
within the GDP fell from 28 % to 14 %, similarly the agricultural sector lost half of its 
share of income within the GDP. 9O As income disparity increased so did the 
grievances of the lower and lower middle classes, shopkeepers, artisans, merchants 
and the peasantry. By the end of 1980's the Turkish working class was on the march 
to reclaim its rights lost with the 12 September regime. Nevertheless, the biggest 
challenge to Özal came from the pre-1980 political leaders and their new parties the 
TPP and SDPP. 
The local elections of 1989 gave the strongest indication of the decline of the MP's 
popularity. In that election, despite being in office and utilising all possible 
government resources the MP received only 21 per cent of the votes and became the 
third party. There were many reasons for this most importantly: the continuing high 
rate of inflation (around 70 per cent a year), unemployment, increased inequalities, a 
widened income gap, Özal's dictatorial, anti-democratic attitude, growing allegations 
of widespread corruption in politics including the Özal family and the MP's upper 
echelons, the unsolved Kurdish problem and political violence. 
In contrast, this election was a turning point for the centre-left SDPP. The SDPP 
increased its share of the vote by 4 per cent, to 28 percent, and captured 40 out of 67 
provincial centres including many metropolitan municipalities like Istanbul, Ankara, 
and Izmir (Mango, 1991, p. 180). It was a success for the SDDP and could have been 
a historic chance if the party had implemented sound social democratic policies, 
transparent, accountable management and responsive local governance. It would have 
won the general elections in 1991 on its own. But the SDPP made fatal mistakes, 
especially in Istanbul and Ankara and lost its chance for the general election (See 
Kongar, 2000, p. 223). The SDPP was not only unsuccessful in governing the 
municipalities and providing services, but many of its mayors and the upper echelons 
in the municipalities were involved in corruption scandals. Scandals that involved 
several billion Turkish lira such as iSKI in Istanbul and ASKI in Ankara which 
tarnished its image as the party of the centre left and caused a sharp decline in its 
89 See Ahmad, F 1991: 204. 
90 See chapter 4. 
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popularity. Also the growing influence of Ecevit and his party within the SDPP was 
another factor that led to the dimininishment of the SDPP's electoral support. 
2.6.2 The 1990s: The Era of Great Expectations And 
Disappointments 
Prime minister Mesut Yilmaz called early elections to be held on 20 October 1991, 
and the results were hardly surprising. Demirel's TPP became the largest party, 
capturing 27 percent of the vote and 177 seats, the MP 24 percent of the vote and 
114 seats, the SDPP 20.8 % of the vote and 89 seats, the WP 16.9 % of the vote and 
62 seats and DLP 10.8 % of the vote and 7 seats in the parliament (see Gökce, 1996, 
p. 43; Özbudun, 2000, p. 76). This election highlighted the increasing fragmentation 
of the party system to a degree where the largest party, the TPP, recived only around a 
quarter (27 per cent) of the votes. This situation forced a coalition government of the 
TPP and the SDPP. It is now clear, after more then a decade, that the TPP and SDPP 
government was only the begining of a long and unstable era of coalition 
governments in Turkey. 
The Dernirel and Inönü government was annonced on 20 November 1991 and despite 
initial fears the coalition government turned out to be stable and effective. This 
situation of course raised expectation of the government to solve the chronic problems 
of inflation and unemployment and find democratic solutions for the Kurdish 
problem. The TPP/SDPP government delivered very little. Instead Turkey faced a 
worsened economic crisis and an intensified war in the southeast. 
The April 1994 economic crisis, which was one of the worst in Turkish history, 
caused growing public disenchantment with the government. The government took 
drastic measures known as the economic decisions of 5 April: introduced an austere 
program to control inflation, strengthen the TL and increase exports and economic 
growth. Instead of solving these problems, inflation jumped from 74 percent in 
March 1994 to 144.3 percent in March 1995. In terms of income inequalities Turkey 
became the fifth worst nation for unequal distribution behind Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Chile (Tosun, 1999, pp. 178-179). The Turkish currency was devalued 
89 
over 50 per cent, thousands of workers were laid off, and wages and salaries eroded 
more than half in real terms. The agricultural sector also suffered big losses under the 
TPP, SDPP coalision government. 
As mentioned above the TPP was popular in small towns and villages while the 
SDPP's policies and ideology appealed to the working class and the new migrants of 
the gecekondues. 91 But, with the economic programme of 5 April the government 
sabotaged itself. This austerity program hurt the working classs, wage and salary 
earners, lower and lower middle classess, shopkeepers, merchants and artisans who 
voted for the SDPP. 
2.7 Conclusion 
What do all of these post 1983 governments' experiences tell us? It appears that they 
have all got one thing in common: failure. They all failed to solve country's long term 
socio-economic and political problems: high inflation, unemployment, income 
inequalities, over-urbanisation, housing shortages, deprivation in the gecekondus 
(slums), limiting the budget deficits, controlling the huge external and internal public 
debt, finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question, improving the education 
and health services and so on. Undoubtedly this situation has caused growing public 
disillusionment with all centre-left and centre-right parties. 
As a result of the neoliberal restructuring programmes, especially privatisation of 
public companies, millions lost their jobs, the wage and salary earners experienced 
over 50 percent loss in their real incomes, the agricultural sector which employs 43 
percent of the work force, saw its share of GDP fall from 28 percent to 14 percent. 
This means millions of small and medium sized farming families lost half their 
earnings. The total external debt rose to around 119 billion dollars, while internal debt 
soared dramatically to around 90 billion dollars. The level of debt reached a stage 
where the country was desperate to find new loans to keep up the interest repayments. 
All austerity programs of the last two decades have produced nothing but increased 





burdens for ordinary people. 92 Without exception, all post 1983 governments have 
failed to live up to their election promises and without exception each new 
government turn out to be worse than the previous one. 
Parties are evaluated on the basis of their policy performance in government. If 
citizens evaluate their performance positively they will be returned to office, but if 
they are evaluated negatively the public support behind them disappears. This is 
exactly what has happened in Turkish politics. The centre-right parties, the MP the 
TPP and the centre-left SDPP and RPP were elected in different elections with 
considerable electoral support but none of these governments satisfied voters. 
The Turkish party system jumped from cadre party to a catchall or cartel party by 
bypassing the mass party phase. Perhaps this is where most of the problems with the 
Turkish party system lie. 93 Due to the constant upheavals such as military 
interventions, the closure of the parties and interruption of the political system since 
1960, Turkish politics has become unrepresentative and unresponsive. 94 In a country 
where the party fragmentation, electoral volatility and party dealignment has been 
high, then the role of party organisations, and their campaigns becomes crucial in 
influencing voter's electoral preferences. 
It appears that Turkish parties have lost touch with the people. They have no means of 
establishing/setting and maintaining direct contact with potential voters. Except for 
the WP none of the Turkish parties has robust local organisations able to carry out 
year round party activities: going door -to- door to spread the party's message, 
ideology and policies and above all listening to people for feedback. Their 
organisations have simply not been organised as the local branches of a mass party. 
They lack staff and have very low membership, ideological conviction or enthusiasm. 
Since they are not ideological parties, members lack any meaningful reasons to join 
the party in the first place and become party activists. Unlike the WP's grassroots 
activists, the majority of them act with the instinct of maximising their interests, 
92 For the data on economic variables sec Chapter, 4. 
93 Ozbudun, 2(X)0, p. 99. 
94 See The Economist, 16 May 2001. 
91 
receiving some sort of benefit either material or otherwise, such as finding a job, 
receiving services or favour from the party. 
The current chapter has shown that mainstream political parties on the centre-right 
and left have been losing their appeal to society. They weakened in terms of 
organisational strength and electoral support. Also, there has been widespread 
disillusionment and decline in party identification and party attachment. All but one 
the WP/VP, with its vast very well organised grassroots organisations, has emerged as 
the major winner of this process. The WP/VP by advocating social policies like 
Ac/il 
Duzen (Just Society) became to represent the majority and most valnurable sections of 
society the lower middle and lower classes. Its clean, uncorrupted image has also 
helped enormusly to its rising popularity among a different section of society. 
What is important to underline again here is that in an atmosphere of high volatility, 
fragmentation and decline in party attachment, party organisations and their 
campaigning assume a critical influence on the electoral outcome. It is obvious that, 
when partisan attachments have weakened it becomes easier to influence voters 





FROM A MOVEMENT TO A POLITICAL PARTY: 
CHANGING CONTOURS OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I examined the contours of the Turkish party system 
from 
early 1980 to 2000 in line with global changes in socioeconomic and political spheres. 
I examined the causes of the decline of Turkish political party system. 
I identified the 
organizational characteristics of the major parties and party policies and governmental 
performances. Apart from the WP/VP, Turkish parties have declined 
for various 
reasons. In this chapter I concentrate specifically on the WP/VP. 
I examine the preconditions from which the Islamist movement emerged and then the 
process of the transformation of Islamist movements into a political party in 1970.95 
Following this section I examine electoral performance, party structures and major 
policies of all of the Islamist parties from the NOP to the VP. The last objective of 
this chapter is to identify the continuities and discontinuities throughout the last three 
decades and articulate the rationale behind the party changes in Turkey. 
The ideology of Islamism emerged from the mid nineteen century and various internal 
and external factors prepared emerge of it. In this respect Islamism as an ideology 
first appeared in the periphery (in India) of the Ottoman Empire in the mid nineteen 
century but then moved to the centre from 1870s. There were at least two axis for this 
95 For a short review of social movements see Castells M, 1976 p. 151; Diani M, Porta D 1999; Roots, 





movement one was the intellectuals and elite who advocated Islamism as a World 
view. Second axis was the ordinary masses that -although could not formulated and 
ideology -were in search of an `Islamic Order' (Mardin, $ 1995: 11-12). We should 
recall that beside the Islamist ideology there were other two Westernists, and Turkists 
Nationalists which all engaged a fierce competition with each other. 96 According to 
Islamists the weakness and decline of the Ottoman Empire was due to the 
abandonment of Islam. For them un-Islamic way of life and lack of Islamic mentality 
was the real reason for the Empire's decline. If this backwardness was the result of 
the un-Islamic governance the cure must be Islamization itself. If the Ottoman Empire 
wanted to be developed, civilised, prospered and glamorous it must return to Islam 
with its true meaning (Saribay, A. Y 1985: 60). In the main time it should be noted the 
majority of the Islamists, however, were moderate men who rose from the modern 
schools. For them the goal of modernisation can be achieved without losing religious 
and cultural heritage of Islam. They believed that the backwardness of the Islamic 
societies was not caused by the religion of Islam but due to deviations from it 
(Geyikda; i, M. Y., 1984: 33). 
Especially during the second Mevrutiyet (1908) Islamism became one of the most 
widespread political ideology (Mardin, $ 1995: 15-16; Sanbay, A. Y 1985: 61). The 
reason for this was the Sultan Abdulhamid II' s pragmatic Islamisation policies. In 
fact he was the first Sultan who actually turned Islam into a political ideology to fight 
against the separatist and nationalist movements of the non -Muslim elements that 
engulfed the Empire from 1870s onwards. One of the most important external factors 
for the politicisation of Islam was the Germany's imperialist ambition in the Middle 
East. 97 However Islamism was a limited movement to save the Empire from further 
disintegration. Neither Abdulhamid II's Islamism, nor the German pan-Islamist 
aspirations were sufficient enough to mobilise the society as a whole around the 
Sultan and the Place. 
According to Rustow (1991, p. 10) over the 19"' century Turkish political parties 
reflected significant changes and an underlying continuity in Turkeys political history. 
96 For a detailed account of the competing ideologies at the last quarter of the nineteenth century see 
Berkes, N (1964) 
97 See Sarlhay, A. Y. 1985: 62. 
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Not surprisingly today's major modern parties have their origins in the events that 
took place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Although the roots of the 
Islamic movement go back to the nineteenth century it was the last quarter of the 
twentieth century when it was transformed into a political party. 
3.2 First Generation Islamist Parties: The National Order 
Party & The National Salvation Party, 1970-1980 
The Islamist movement was transformed into a modern political party at the 
beginning of the 1970s and the first Islamist party the Milli Nizain Partisi (National 
Order Party-NOP) was established on 26 January 1970.98 It was an organised 
reaction by various sections of society that for various reasons, were not able to fully 
integrate into the new social structure shaped by advancing industrial capitalism and 
was increasingly threatened by the advancement of Istanbul's big bourgeoisie. 
By the 1960's the Turkish economy had reached a degree of capital accumulation and 
a certain degree of integration into the world economy, facilitating the transformation 
from commercial to industrial capitalism. No doubt this transformation was helped by 
the arrival of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, which was created, by and large, by the 
state. In other words the state acted as a `surrogate mother' (Keyder, 1987). By the 
1960's this new breed of bourgeoisie started to worry the Anatolian petit bourgeoisie 
town merchants, artisans, small shopkeepers, and small tradesmen in the hinterlands 
of Anatolia. In this sense the 1960s marked a new era. As Ahmed (1993: 376) 
argued: 
The Sixties marked the beginning of a process of transformation from 
commercial to industrial capitalism. This process required major reforms such 
as reform of agriculture and taxation, which the landowner and the privileged 
classes naturally resisted. It also jeopardized the livelihood of the Anatolian 
artisans and merchants who could not compete with large-scale industry and 
enterprises. To make matters worse, this petit bourgeoisie felt equally 
threatened from below by the militancy and organisation of the unions, 
especially after the formation of the WPT that carried the workinb class cause 
into Anatolia (1993, p. 376). 
98 See Sanbay, AN 1985: 99 
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Islamist reaction to the secular establishment came as a consequence of economic 
modernisation and the increased division of labour. As industrial production 
intensified in the metropolitans of Turkey it begun to disturb the livelihood of the 
traditional artisans and merchants who had been producing and trading locally in a 
manner unchanged for centuries. However, industrial production had become cheaper 
and available in vast quantities. Production in far away factories, some times abroad, 
had become possible. So traditional production was unable to compete and many local 
producers became bankrupt. 
Yücekök (1971, pp. 175-178) pointed out that Islamism emerged as the ideology of 
resistance, a tool of rebellion against the modernising secular establishment. Due to 
rapid social change that resulted from industrialisation, mass migration and 
urbanisation, religious ideology emerged as an anchor for displaced and distressed 
migrant masses. In circumstances where rapid social change occurs, religious values 
and networks offer a sense of continuity and a communal identity that had been lost, 
as well as a sanctuary from uncertainties, risks, threats and anxieties brought about by 
modernisation. 
Unsurprisingly, the reaction to this assertive industrial capitalism was strongest in the 
less developed regions. Election results in the 1970s had confirmed that the NOP was 
very popular in the poorest regions and districts. 99 The NSP performed very well in 
its first election contests and received 11.8 per cent of the total votes and won 48 seats 
in parliament (Saribay, A. Y. 1985, p. 144). It was a decisive moment in Turkish 
electoral history. For the first time an Islamist party became popular but also it 
showed that as a result of rapid urbanisation a new political cleavage was emerging in 
the cities. With urbanisation voting behaviour changed. 
The emergence of the NSP can be viewed as the fragmentation and polarisation of the 
Turkish bourgeoisie along economic interests. 100 By the 1960s capitalist development 
brought two sections of the bourgeoisie to a head-to-head collision. The Anatolian 
"petit bourgeoisie" was united under the banner of Islam against the advancing "big 
99 The regional disparity and party preferences are examined in detail in chapter 5. The NSP had 11.8 
per cent of the total votes in 1973 elections across Turkey but its electoral support rose as high as 33.0 
per cent in less developed districts. 
100 See ibid, p. 99. 
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bourgeoisie". In addition to the clash of interests between two factions of the 
bourgeoisie the process of modernization sparked a popular reaction, which 
transformed into a fully-fledged Islamist movement in the 1960s. Thus Islamist 
ideology was a consequence of the process of modernisation itself, whilst at the same 
time being a reaction against modernisation taking place since the 1920s. 
With the advancement of capitalism big business developed ties with the western 
world often becoming the local subsidiaries of western companies. This development 
simultaneously squeezed out the small merchants, traditional artisans, small 
tradesmen and shopkeepers. Necmettin Erbakan the founder of the NOP expressed 
the grievances of the small Anatolian entrepreneurs: 
The economic mechanism has been working for the advantage of the big city 
traders. The Anatolian tradesmen feel like orphans. Three to four large city 
traders have taken the lion's share of the import quotas... It is the people of 
Anatolia who put the money into the bank accounts but this money is being 
given to big city traders as credit... The chambers of commerce have become 
the vehicle of a small comprador-mason group. This great institution has been 
under the control of comprador trade and industry. Therefore we said we shall 
join the administrative committee to make it an institution that serves the 
Anatolian trader and industrialist as well" [my translation], (Quoted in 
Saribay, 1985, pp. 98-99). 
Erbakan complains about the unequal relations set by the economic mechanism 
dominated by the big city traders. It is not difficult to imagine how the Anatolian petit 
bourgeoisie increasingly became vulnerable to modern industrial production- 
industrial capitalism and increased capital accumulation from the early 1960s. 
Threatened by the big industrial capitalists the Anatolian bourgeoisie needed to 
organise around a political party to protect its very existence, and the NOP was the 
product of this process. 
The social base of the NOP later called the NSP was not just limited to the petit 
bourgeoisie but included support from some traditionally religious sections of the 
society, the old ulema (Scholars), small farmers, and migrant workers who had not 
integrated into the urban life in the big cities. 101 
101 For a detailed account of the social base of the WP/VP see chapter 4. 
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The establishment of the NOP cannot only be attributed to capitalist development. 
Historical, cultural and external factors also played a very significant role. Islam 
played a major role in Ottoman times and in this context religion, in particular, `has a 
unifying appeal for mass political mobilization. ' Religion is, often, in many Third 
world countries, the only source of identity. 102 Traditionally the Turkish Islamic 
movement developed parallel to the organisation of tarikat (brotherhoods). '°3 For 
instance, Mehmed Zahid Kotku the leader of very influential Jvkender Pa. ya Dergahi - 
one of the leading brotherhoods in Turkey- actively encouraged and supported the 
establishment of the NOP. The majority of Nurcus - Nurcu brotherhood- joined the 
NOP in the early days of its foundation ((; akir, 1994, p. 21). 104 
Foreign governments have also used Islam for their own strategic interests. The 
`green belt' strategy was developed by strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski in the US 
to stop the expansion of the USSR in the Middle East and South Asia in the 1950s and 
60s. The project was based on encirclement of the Soviet Union with a green belt of 
Islam against communism in Muslim countries such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Turkey. j05 There was a parallel development to this project. The 
governments of various parties openly or discreetly encouraged, supported or directly 
organised religious organisations such as the `Association to Combat Communism' as 
early as 1962 and presented Islam as the antidote to communism. 
The Saudi connection was crucial for its provision of resources for religious 
organisations to finance their multiple activities throughout the country)° Ironically 
the Saudi Arabian connection was strengthened after the military intervention in 1980. 
It developed to an extent that the Saudis were allowed to pay the salaries of the 
Turkish imams (priests) in Western European countries. 107 Nevertheless it was 
internal conditions that led to the emergence and rise of political Islam. One of them 
102 The role of religion in politics is explained in Chapter 5. Even in developed, industrialised societies 
religion has been a major variable influencing the political process. Apart of the religious revivalism in 
a global scale since the 1970s, religion is often the only ideology for the opposition in Muslin 
countries. See also Toprak, 1987, p. 219. 
103 $aylan, 1992, p. 154). 
104 Also see calislar, 1995, pp. 25-26; $aylan, 1992, pp. 154-158; Yalgm, 1999. 
105 For a detailed account of the project of 'green belt' see: Cali$lar, 0 (1995); Cakir, R (1994); 
Hunter, S. H (1995: 21); Kürk4ü, E (1996); Tu$alp, E (1994); Yal4in, S (1999). 
106See $aylan, G (1992: 237). 
107 For a detailed analysis of Saudi connections, see Mumcu, U (1996: 138), 
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was the usage of religion as a counter-force against an imagined "communist threat" 
in the political arena until the late 1980s. This process started from 1947 with the 
RPP's seventh congress to DP governments from 1950 to 1960 and continued with 
the 1972 military ultimatum and military coup of 12 September 1980. In fact the latest 
military government had employed the most enduring policy, with the help of right 
wing intellectuals and specifically the Aydinlar Oca, Ji (Club of Intellectuals). They 
developed a new official ideology called Türk Islam Sentezi (Turkish Islamic 
synthesis) based on Islam and Turkish nationalism. 10,1 
3.2.1 Ideology and Party Policies of the NOP/NSP 
Ideology as an institution of superstructure reflects the socio-economic conditions in a 
society at a given time. The NOP was undoubtedly in favour of the re-Islamisation of 
Turkish social life (Mardin, $ 1991: 136). In its foundation manifesto the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire was blamed for the abandonment of religious and national values 
local traditions, customs and Islamic ethics -that once made the nation one of the 
greatest civilizations-. To reverse this decline and make the Turkish nation once more 
a proud, world-class nation, what was needed was the protection of the Islamic 
identity and ethic: loyalty to Islamic and national values and material and spiritual 
development supported by the law and democratic order (Saribay, 1985, p. 101). 
Shortly after the closure of the NOP in 1972 the same cadres established the National 
Salvation Party (NSP). The ideology of the NSP was a continuation of at least a 
century old debate over Islam and the West. (Toprak, 1987, p. 227). Like the NOP 
the NSP stressed that the decline of the Ottoman Empire had been caused by the 
abandonment of Islamic civilization in favour of the western one. It was argued that: 
Our nation that once was one of the greatest in history that founded it model 
civilization, enlightened humanity and governed the world was also ahead of 
the West in terms of material conditions. It was far ahead in the areas of 
science, technology, natural sciences, teaching and training. Especially our 
ethical-moral superiority, which was the keystone of the basis of all of our 
success... Those western nations that could not topple our nation from outside 
tried it from within for centuries and finally succeeded it. They who wanted to 
108 There have been numerous of articles and books written on Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. See Güven4 
B., $aylan, G., et al (1994) , Turk Islam Sentezi (Turkish -Islam Synthesis), Sarmal Yayinevi, Istanbul; also see $aylan, G (1992: 111 ). 
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divert our nation from its own consciousness and erode its ethical and moral 
practices to destroy our nation have been successfully doing it from within for 
a few centuries. Those cosmopolitan and non Islamic movements which 
surfaced in the Tanzimat period and became legitimate day by day caused 
moral as well as material decline and led to the collapse of our great Empire in 
a short time' I my translation x. 109 
The NSP adopted an exclusive Milli Göriic (national view) ideology, a reaction of the 
small Anatolian bourgeoisie against capitalist developments in the 1960s. Also, this 
ideology was a reaction to the process of Turkish modernisation and its implications 
in social and political life. It can be said that the NSP as its predecessor has two 
important ideological components of industrialisation and Islamisation, which are 
both the least changed dimensions of the national view (Milli Görii. y) since the 1970s. 
The first chairman of the National Salvation Party Siileyman Arif Emre described the 
milli gärüý as: 
Our constitution gives the responsibility to the state to prepare the conditions 
in which every individual would develop himself or herself materially and 
spiritually. Our party puts this principle at the centre, and aims to plan the 
material and spiritual developments evenly. The leftist and liberal ideologies 
that give first priority to material development by neglecting the spiritual side 
are far from fulfilling the nation's needs. [My translation] 110 
It seems the Millie Gurus (National View) yearn for a balance between the material 
and spiritual worlds, however what constituted this balance was controversial. The 
advocates of the national view argued that since the 1920s the ruling elite had 
abandoned national and sacred values in favour of western values. Material and 
economic development and modernisation became the only goal. What they were 
opposing was the abandonment or neglect of spiritual development, considering that if 
someone is overly concerned with the materialistic aspects of life he will neglect his 
duties towards God. This view can be interpreted from another perspective as well. 
The process of modernisation, especially in the rapidly expanding cities, brings 
confusion and stress. Irr 
109 See Milli Nizam Partisi Kuruluý Beyannarnesi, Ankara, 1970, p. 34 (quoted ºn Saribay, 1985, p. 
100. 
110 Sec MSP Genel Backani Süleyman Arif Emre nin 1. Büyük Kongreyi Aqº§ Konuplas), Ankara, 
1973, s. 5/ 6 (Quoted in Saribay, A. Y 1985: 110-111). 
III See N. Erbakan (1975: 29-40), Quoted in Sari bay, A. Y 1985: 111-113. 
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3.2.2 The Main Policies 
In its definition of secularisation the Milli Görüý (national view) used the official 
definition of secularism, which was misunderstood in the first place. So secularism 
defined is as `the dictatorship of unbelievers over believers'. 112 Islamists have 
always condemned the West for its Imperialist attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire. 
Inescapably, the NSP's foreign policies too reflected its view on past relations 
between the Empire and Western Europe. In its programme, the NSP also blamed the 
west for causing the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and equally opposed Turkey's 
close relations with Europe since the establishment of the republic in 1923. 
The EEC was seen as an extension of western imperialism that caused the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. For the NSP the EEC was formed by Zionist circles within 
large amount of capital whose goal was to profit from it. The NSP declared: "[the 
EEC] has aims and activities that are beyond economic goals. " For example it 
requires that all member states must allow foreigners to purchase land. It will allow 
those Zionists all over the world to buy much land from Turkey for their malign plan. 
It would end Lip making Turkey an eyelet of Israel. Zionists and the West want Turkey 
to join the EEC for their imperialist aims. ' I 13 
In terms of party membership the NOP/NSP had a very restrictive attitude. According 
to the NOP's constitution there were a set of requirements for membership. Those 
aspirants must be Turkish citizens, should not be prohibited from politics, must be 
over 18 years old and non- Mason. One of the most noticeable general restrictions 
was against those people who were members of Masonic lodges. Those aspirants 
should indicate that they genuinely accepted party principles, were respectful of 
spiritual values and had a good reputation. 
The party charter allowed those who do not regularly pray (namaz) or fast but they 
could not fill any administrative positions (Yalcm, 1999, p. 5I). There was another 
112 Saribay, 1985, p. 1 18. 
113 See ibid, p. 127. 
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restriction that was not written in its charter: the anti-communist stand. Those who 
were suspected of being communists were not accepted as members. These two 
restrictions against "masons" and "communists" were erased in the NSP's 
programme. It was no longer written in on the programme but remained in practice. 
In conclusion the transformation of the Turkish economy from commercial to 
industrial capitalism that took place throughout the 1960s, changed the face of Turkey 
and led to an increase in social and political polarisation. The emergence of the pro- 
Islamic party was a result of this polarisation within the bourgeoisie class. Although 
the quarrel between these two sections of the bourgeoisie - petit bourgeois and big 
bourgeoisie- was about economics, the petty bourgeoisie chose to have an ideology 
that was by and large constructed from traditional and religious values. In this respect 
the NSP made good use of the Ottoman heritage sometimes by refining, other times 
by redefining or even by mystifying it. The NSP propaganda concentrated around the 
importance of "morals and virtue, " and it opposed secularism within the legal 
boundaries. 
The NOP's main aim was Islamisation of cultural and political life in Turkey. It 
proposed Islamisation of private and public life as well. The reason for Turkey's 
underdevelopment and cultural degeneration was seen to be secularisation and 
westernisation. The program of the party of Milli Göric was industrialisation and 
development of closer relations with Muslim countries chiefly Saudi Arabia. The 
NOP opposed Turkey's membership to the EEC. Instead it wanted to establish an 
Islamic Common Market, which opposed usury. The condition of national 
development was to return to Islamic values. To this end education had to be 
reorganised with a national and religious orientation. ' 14 
3.3 The Welfare Party (WP), 1983-1998 
When the Islamist movement was transformed into a political party in the early 1970s 
it continued to exist as a movement but also formed other parties under different 
names. This trend has continued since the beginning of the 1970s. When the NOP 
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closed down because of its `anti-secular' activities the NSP was founded shortly after 
in 1972. The same trend continued with the establishment of the Refah (Welfare) 
party when the NSP was closed and after Refah's closure in 1998 the Fazilet (Virtue) 
party. 
When the military government allow the establishment of new political parties the old 
cadres of the NSP to founded the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) under the leadership 
of Ali Turkmen a lawyer, and ex-advocate of N. Erbakan, and 33 founding members 
in 1983. Due to N. Erbakan's prison sentence and ten years prohibition from politics, 
Ahmet Tekdal, a close aide of Erbakan became its first leader. The WP had to find 
survival strategies under the military's scrutiny. It could not say it was a totally new 
party, but if it openly admitted it was continuation of the NSP this could have 
jeopardised its survival. So the WP highlighted the slogans like Milli Görii. } (National 
View) and Milli $'uur (National Consciousness). These terms sent a message that it 
was continuing in the tradition of the NOP and NSP (cakir, 1994, p. 24). 
The Turkish constitution bans (article 163) any political party `exploiting' religion for 
political purposes and prohibits any closed party from reopening either with the same 
name or under a different name. In reality it is very difficult and technically almost 
impossible to decide whether or not party X is a continuation of party Y that was 
closed. However we can see this struggle between trying to pose as a totally new 
party on the one hand and the very same party, a mere change of name from NSP to 
RP (WP) on the other. The choice of the name for the new party "Refali" literally 
meaning welfare or prosperity signalled the continuity of the NOP/NSP in this new 
party. Sen (1995, pp. 8-9) pointed out that: "... despite the fact that the WP inherited 
the political heritage of the NSP its theory, rhetoric and its social bases have 
significantly changed. " According to Yavuz (1997) although there is some continuity 
between the NSP and the WP, the difference was greater than $en says. The NSP 
represented those who were not fully integrated culturally and economically into the 
"modernist" centre. So it saw Islam as the remedy to cure the social problems, and 
aimed to return to traditional social and cultural life. In contrast, he argues the WP 
modernises traditional norms and institutions by breathing new life into them (1997, 
p. 70). The WP transforms the traditional norms and institutions with its modernist 
and secular characteristics. Perhaps this major change was due to the development of 
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capitalism and the expansion of the modern and secular schooling across the country 
that contributed to the emergence of a new generation of Islamist elite. 
In terms of organisational characteristics, ideology, specific party policies and the 
social bases, the WP is different from its predecessors the NOP/NSP. As pointed out 
earlier the WP/VP is the only modern mass political party. It has a nationwide, 
effective party organisation with a large, highly committed and active party 
membership. 115 
3.3.1 The Program and Basic Principles of the WP 
At the beginning of its program the WP explicitly declared its loyalty to the republic, 
democracy, constitution and principles of Atatürk. 116 The main goal of the party is 
to elevate the nation above the level of contemporary civilisations. `In order to do so: 
i) we will make sure that every corner of our country is developed and fully built. 
ii) Cultural and spiritual development will be encouraged. 
iii) All our national characters and features will be in perspective while these 
developments take place'. (]bid: 36). Among its main goals the WP made 
connections, though implicit, with its past especially with the ideology of the Milli 
Göru (national view). There were, however, some efforts made to distance 
themselves from the traditional National View such as putting democratisation, 
freedom of thought and expression high on the programme. 
Our party will strive to establish democracy in its true sense and create a full 
national representation. We oppose any idea and action that obstructs the 
normal function of the governance of the republic. Our party believes in the 
freedom of thought, expression and conscience. We consider any attempt to 
repress these rights as primitive and against secularism. (ibid: 36). 
Despite the fact that the WP tried to distance itself from its past, at the core of its 
ideology was the traditional ideology of the Milli Görti (national view). The reason 
for this was that the party elite `inner circle', both the traditionalists so called 
Aksa4lrlar (elders) and YenilikSiler (progressivists), came from the Milli Gääriiv 
115 For some elaboration see chapter 2. 
116 See RP Tiizük ve Program (WP's Program and Principles), Ankara, 1985: 35-36. 
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Teskilaii (Organisation of National View): that many call the party academy. It was 
the only ideology to which they were strongly attached. The National View and the 
Just Society were indispensable concepts for the WP. The centrality of the national 
view as the core ideology of the WP was admitted openly in a 1991 election 
manifesto. ''' Nevertheless, rhetoric of the traditional national view did not prevent 
the WP grasping social and economic changes and developing its strategy and tactics 
to win the sympathy of the wider electoral bases. The steady rise of the WP's electoral 
support has proven this argument. 
In its fourth congress (10 October 1994) Erbakan, the leader of the WP, announced 
the agenda of the WP government: 1) Clean government; 2) Return to the Milli Görüý 
(national view); 3) Spiritual development; 4) Establishment of the Just order, which 
included a Just economic order and real pluralist democracy 5) De-centralisation and 
strengthening of local government 6) An end to the state's economic interventions and 
activities; 7) Reforms in security; 8) Reforms in the judiciary and legal system and; 
9) Preventing the deterioration of the natural environmental balance. ' 18 
3.3.2 The Unstoppable Rise of the WP 
The increasing public support manifested itself in the local elections of 26 March 
1989. In this election 2,170,365 people (9.8 per cent) voted for Refah. Its vote share 
had risen to just under the national threshold of 10 per cent. Refah won the 
municipalities of Konya, $anlrurfa, Sivas, Van and Kali ramanmaraý, plus 46 other 
sub-districts (ilce) municipalities. (Soner, 1999, p. 193). 
The early general elections of 20 October 1991 were a turning point for the Refah 
party. This time 4,12 1,355 people voted for the WP. Its share of the votes increased to 
16.2 per cent and for the first time since the military coup of 1980, the party won 62 
seats in parliament. 119 When the NWP and RDP's share of the votes were taken out 
1 17 See 20 Ekim 1991 Secim Beyannamesi (The Election Manifesto 20 October 1991), Ankara. (1991: 
73), 
118 cakir, R 1994: 195. 
119 In this election fearing they would not acheive the 10 per cent national threshold the WP's 
leadership devised an alliance with two right wing parties the Ultra nationalist Milliyyetfi ca/r. yma 
Partisi MQP (Nationalist Work Party) (later became the NAP) and Islahagx Demokrasi Partisi IDP 
(Reformist Democracy Party RDP). 
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the WP's share of the votes was 13.1 per cent, an increase of over 4 per cent with 42 
seats in parliament. 120 
One of the reasons for the WP's good election result in 1991 was the change of the 
traditional propaganda style adopted during the election campaigning. The WP has 
one of the best organised, grassroots organisations. 121 
As Ayata observed from the early 1990s the WP added two new dynamic forces into 
its grassroots army. The women and youth active participation in election 
campaigning made an extraordinary contribution to the electoral success of the 
WP. 122 The WP's grassroots organisations were very adept at recruiting new 
members and convincing potential voters. With this new era the women members 
who were organised under the so-called Hanunlar Komisyonulari (Ladies 
Commissions). They persistently and skilfully toured neighbourhoods and did 
building-by-building, door-by-door vote canvassing. This method proved very 
successful for several reasons. Chiefly, while men work, women have time to visit 
their female neighbours to chat and canvas. Also women have better access to 
households, as they are socially more trusted and are in a better position to persuade 
other women. 
As Oral caliýlar observed, before the 1991 general elections, the WP changed its 
traditional election campaign style. For example for the first time they placed 
unveiled women on propaganda posters. The candidates paid attention to give modern 
messages. For the first time in this election the WP used issues and slogans that the 
left had been using for a very long time. In their election posters, in addition to the 
modern looking ladies, the portraits of workers struggling for rights, sex workers, and 
intellectuals opposed to oppression and torture, and environmental activists frequently 
120 See Kalaycioglu, 1998, p. 3. 
121 The WP's well organised grassroots activism have been observed by many students of Turkish 
politics. For some of them are: Ayata, 1997, p. 52; Berkey, 1996, p. 45; cakir, 1994, pp. 216-232; 
Darnton, 1995; Kalaycioglu, 1994; $en, 1995, pp. 82- 91. 
122 See Ayata, S (1997: 52). 
106 
appeared. It was as if the traditional religious party had gone and in its place a 
modern party emerged. No doubt it was a very important step for the WP. While 
doing this, Refah on the one hand was trying to preserve its traditional administration 
and ideology, and on the other, it was trying to reach out to new voters giving a 
modern, urban message. Those who knew the party could see that there was a struggle 
within the party to modernize it (caliýlar, 1995, pp. 56-57). 
By the 1990s political Islam was the fastest growing political force in Turkey. 
Welfare Party became the largest political party within a relatively short time, 
increasing its share of the vote from under 10 per cent (9.8 per cent) in 1989 to 24 per 
cent in the local election in 1994, which was a turning point in Turkish political 
history. One year later, with the general elections of the 24th December 1995 Refah's 
success continued attaining 21.4 per cent of the total vote and gaining more seats (158 
out of 550) than any mainstream secularist party. '23 
3.3.3 The Social Bases of the WP: Changes and Continuities 
There have been continuities in terms of the regional bases of the pro-Islamic parties 
NOP/NSP/WP and VP. According to statistical data collected since the early 1970s 
the Islamist parties NOP/NSP had been very popular in the less developed regions of 
Central Anatolia, East, South East and Northern Black sea regions. 124 The WP, 
especially in its early years continued to have the same electoral support from these 
less developed regions. 
The election results of the last three decades showed that traditional artisans, 
merchants, tradesmen and shopkeepers, plus traditionally religious sections of the 
society, reminiscent of the Ottoman clerical class, the Mosque community, some 
religious brotherhoods, and Sufi orders, supported the NOP/NSP. However in the 
nineties clue to rapid urbanisation and migration, its support base changed. The urban 
poor from growing gecekondus also started to support the WP. 
123 See Millernekili Gene! Secinr Sonuclciri 24.12.1995 (Results of General Election of Representatives) 
State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, November 1996, Ankara. 
124 Fora comparison see tables in caklr R 1994: 218,220 and 222 
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It would not be wrong to argue that among the Turkish political parties it was the 
WP's cadres who read correctly the swiftly changing needs of Turkish society in the 
early 1990s. As a result of the economic restructuring programmes rural migration 
accelerated and the population balance shifted from rural to urban. This rapid mass 
migration soon exhausted industry and formal sector capacity. This unabsorbed 
population contributed to the growth of gecekondus encircling all of the big cities 
where, in effect, more then half of the urban population live. It was the WP who saw 
the problem and developed policies and a political rhetoric that addressed the social, 
cultural and economic problems of the gecekondu masses. It gave the new migrants an 
identity, and an avenue where they could participate in politics; they could air their 
opinions and express their grievances against the establishment. In the meantime the 
left responded too slowly to the changes and needs of the masses. In this respect the 
WP' s economic programme the so-called Adil Diizen (Just Order), appealed to the 
urban poor, especially the gecekondu population. 
The WP's support has shifted from traditional, rural bases to more modern, dynamic 
forces in the cities. cakir observed that before the 1991 general elections the WP's 
meetings were thronged by thousands of young people wearing rubber boots, dirty 
jeans, long haired, looking like spectators at a local football match with plastic 
ribbons around their necks and arms. An Islamist writer Mehmet Metiner described 
the WP's election strategy in Istanbul as the "siege of Istanbul" by the rural poor 
(1994: 
. 
80). cakir added "you could see some of these young people in Metallica 
concerts too". The WP was no longer a party that limited itself to traditional humble 
sections of society. 
The WP's electoral appeal for support was wide ranging. It included retired military 
officers, ex-models, unveiled, modern dressed successful women such as the dentist 
Filiz Ergun as well as members of the minority Alevi sect. 125 By doing that the WP 
wanted to expand its electoral support to the non religious, secular sections of 
society. 126 In this manner it was determined to get people to vote for the WP. Before 
125 See Caliýiar, 1995, pp. 58-60; 
126 See Berkey, H 1996, p. 45; Cakir, R 1994, p. 216-232; Darnton, J 1995; KalaycaoOllu, E 1994; $en, 
S 1995, p. 82-91. 
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the 1994 elections, they made a very courageous effort, like targeting Alevis. 127 
Alevis, for many good reasons, have certain reservations about any right wing or 
religious party, but the WP's move showed how it was determined to broaden its 
electoral base. Similarly the WP wanted to expand its ties with the army to prove that 
if it got a majority of the vote the army would let them come to power. In its fourth 
congress in 1993,35 retired army officers joined the WP. It was a very big event, a 
showcase to demonstrate that good relations were developing with the army. 28 
3.3.4 The Moment of Party Change: From Cadre Party to Mass 
Party 
Katz and Mair (1995, pp. 2-28) identified four models of party: elite (cadre), mass, 
catchall, and cartel parties. What do most of the Turkish political parties look like? 
How can we classify them by using this format? According to Özbudun (2000, p. 86) 
"Most Turkish parties combine some characteristics of cadre and catchall parties, with 
some elements of cartel parties. " With the exception of the WP Turkish parties have 
never gone through a mass party phase. "Organizationally, the WP is the only 
Turkish party that comes close to the model of a mass party, or a party of social 
integration. " Nevertheless the WP lacks intra party democracy. (lbid, p. 92). Despite 
this the WP managed to distance itself from other mainstream parties by becoming a 
mass party, which was a positive development, a good example for the improvement 
of Turkish democracy. As Heper (1997, p. 37) points out: 
Since the mid-1990s, the RP [WP] has attained political legitimacy and, in 
turn, has adopted the procedural rules of democracy, i. e. those designating the 
constitutional means of competing for and holding political office. The party 
has also adopted an increasingly more secular platform and political strategies 
aimed at expanding its political base of support. 
127 Alevi is a non- Sunni much more liberal Islamic sect. It is believed that Alevis make around 20 to 
25 per cent of the Turkish population. Historically, there has been tension between these two sects. 
Since the (920s Alevis have overwhelmingly supported the Kenialist revolution and his modernisation 
project, especially the principle of secularisation. From the early years of the republic they have 
supported the RPP. established by Atatürk. which became the party of the centre. Secularism is very 
important for Alevis, for they believe they would be prosecuted or oppressed because of their beliefs it' 
the country were run by the Sharia (Islamic law) or a non-secularist government. That is why it was 
such an unlikely move by the WP to try convince the Alevi population to vote for the pro-Islamic WP. 
128 See Yalctn, 1999, pp. 228-230. 
r___ _---- ..: ý__ __ . ý_. _ý___. - -- . .ý. ý. . -- --- ,_ 
109 
This new approach was a result of a strategy change the party took in its fourth grand 
congress in October 1993. This change was in fact advocated by the Yenilikgiler 
(innovators) and helped to extend its social base (ibid, p. 37). 
Compared to its predecessors, the NOP and NSP, the WP made great efforts to 
transform itself from an ideological cadre party, as it was in the 1970s and 1980s, to a 
mass party from the early 1990s until its closure. The leadership of the WP had to 
make a historical but pragmatic decision, knowing very well there was no chance of 
acquiring the power with an electoral support of between 8 and 12 percent, which 
came from brotherhoods. For this reason the leadership preferred to direct a mass 
party with a religious flavour (Kiýlalº, 1995, p. 186). 
The struggle for change within the WP entered a new phase with its fourth congress, 
held 10 October 1994. The WP completed its restoration and decided whether it was 
going to continue to be an extension of the NSP or become a party in its own right, for 
the 1990s. It was entering a new period where its theory and practices were distinct 
from the NSP ($en, 1995, p. 115). The fourth congress was a sign of its growing 
confidence. The leadership felt that the WP had proven itself with the local elections 
victory in 1994. They decided to extend this tactic to the general elections and come 
to power. For that reason Erbakan said: "From now until the day that the WP came to 
power we call this "the period of taking power" (Quoted in ibid: 115). To do that, the 
WP's leadership needed to broaden its appeal. 
3.3.5 The Major Policies 
One of the best indicators of a party's characteristics is its membership policy. As 
Cord et al (1974, p. 305) point out, political parties are either "open" or "closed" in 
their membership requirements. Broad-based parties are more relaxed about 
membership criteria, keeping an open door to anyone who wishes to join. The 
"closed", elitist parties carefully screen prospective members, and behave like an 
exclusive country club. 
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With the WP the old NSP's perception of membership had changed from a truly 
"closed" elitist organisation to an "open" party. The stringent membership policies 
had changed. Members were not expected to be devoted Muslims with an Islamic life 
style who prayed praying five times a day, non smokers, abstaining from alcohol with 
a reference from a religious brotherhood or Saefi order. As one of my informants put it 
"the party used to be like a small community, a family business but with the Refah it 
became like a company opened up to the market/to everyone" 129 They were not 
expected first to be good Muslims but to develop an "identity of Refahldrk" 
(Welfareism). This identity is a secularist one with an Islamic makes up. (cakir, 1994, 
p. 59). 
In the policy sphere Adil Diizen was the crowning glory of the Refah Party. Many 
mistakenly interpreted this Just Order as merely the economic policies of the WP but 
it was part of an important social project that included social and political dimensions. 
Although the Adil Diizen has been much discussed and written about, it has never 
been clear what it really was. According to an Islamist writer Akgül (1997, p. 38) the 
Just Order is a project prepared by a elite group of Turkish and foreign experts. Its 
aim is to achieve a "social balance" in the image of the "natural balance" and unite 
Islam with humanity. Under the Just Order all people from different religions, ethnic 
groups and social classes will live in peace and harmony. Every fundamental right and 
freedom will be granted and protected for all. The Just Order is an original Islamic, 
scientific and humanistic project. (Ibid: 42). He says that there will be four different 
but coherent, interconnected but distinct orders within the state. These are: 1) Just 
Economic Order; 2) Just Political Order; 3) Just Scientific Order and; 4) Just Moral 
Order (Ibid: 43-44). 
Erbakan describes the current economic system as the "system of slavery". "This 
slavery system has been oppressing millions of people under economic hardship, 
poverty, unemployment and under development. This system has been robbing the 
rights and incomes of these millions of people and transferring it to a small minority 
group of imperialists, world Zionists and their collaborators. As a result the majority 
gets poorer while a small minority becomes richer and richer. This situation has been 
129 See Nizam Demir's Interview 
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causing social unrest in those countries and threatens security and peace in the 
world. "I30 He defines five microbes (germs) in this slavery system responsible for the 
present situation. These are: interest, unjust tax, the mint, exchange and credit" (Ibid, 
pp. 3-4). For him the Just Order is a "complete and eclectic" system. He says it 
contains useful elements of communism and capitalism but has no place for negative 
aspects of either system. (Ibid, p. 17). But the meaning and content of the Just Order 
has never been fully explained. 
According to the WP the Turkish economy is dependent on the US and those 
institutions, which are controlled by the US such as the IMF and World Bank. The 
profit acquired from Turkey through these institutions has allegedly been transferred 
to the World Zionists (cakir, 1994, p. 161). 131 
Erbakan (Quoted in ibid: 161) argued in a pamphlet in 1993 called `Turkeys Problems 
and Solutions' "In this changing world all humanity is searching for an order that will 
bring peace and happiness all over the world. The order that has been sought is the 
Just Order, which the WP and the Milli Görii, (National Order) have been insisting 
on. Therefore now Turkey's responsibility is to establish the Just Order as a good 
example. " 
In the same pamphlet Erbakan, after criticising Turkey's close ties with the West, 
outlined his plans in five steps to improve relations with Islamic countries. Those are: 
1) The organisation of the Muslim Countries' United Nations. (Islamic UN). 
2) Foundation of the Muslim Military Forces. (Islamic NATO). 
3) Union and Organisation of the Muslim Countries Common Economic Market 
(Islamic EEC) 
4) The Common Currency of the Muslim Countries (Islamic Euro) 
5) The Organisation of the Muslim Countries Cultural Relations (Islamic UNESCO/ 
ERASMUS) (Ibid. 161-162). 
130 Erbakan, N (1991: 11-12 Quoted in Cakir 1994: 133-34) Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Just Ekonomic 
Order) 
, Ankara . 131 Also, for an Islamic perspective on the WP's foreign policies see Akgül, A (1997a). 
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One can see he was planning a series of countermeasures against what perceived as 
the Western domination. Those counter measures were to create a Community of 
United Muslim Countries. I will not discuss the nature and relevance of these plans 
but they elucidate the WP's ideal foreign policy. Although it softened its rhetoric 
against Zionism and Western Imperialism, it did oppose Turkeys' NATO 
membership, and application for full membership of the EU. It fiercely criticised the 
Custom Union and declared it would renegotiate its terms and conditions. 
Perhaps the most important change in the WP's program was the definition of 
secularism. It was defined for the first time as: Secularism is not the enemy of 
religion, on the contrary it is a principle developed to safeguard the freedom of 
religion and conscience against any fraudulent attempts. "(Ibid: 37; see also Soner, 
1999, p. I87). However reality is often different from words. It has been widely 
discussed whether the WP was a secularist or an Islamist fundamentalist party. 
Opinions are divided with some saying the WP is a secular organisation, putting the 
party before Islam. They argue that the WP actually brings its less secular followers 
into the modern and secular world. cakir argues that although the WP looks, like a 
religious organisation externally, its organisational attitude can be classified as a 
secular one. The WP has a mechanism of making everyone first Refahli (People from 
WP). In effect the identity of the WP is that every member acquires a secular identity 
with an Islamic glitter (cakir, 1994, pp. 51-59). 
There are, of course, opposing opinions on this matter. Opponents argue that 
whatever the WP says about their loyalty to the principle of secularism they are lying. 
Once they come to power they will abandon secularism and make Turkey a theocracy 
like Iran, ruled by the Sharia. 
3.4 The Virtue Party (VP), 1997- 2001 
The social origins of the Turkish political parties goes back to the late years of the 
Ottoman Empire and, it seems, since then the socio-cultural cleavages have been 
playing a very important role in terms of the party preference and electoral behaviour. 
Although this cultural cleavage emerged a few centuries ago in the Ottoman Empire, 
6r 
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it especially became influential in electoral sphere in modern Turkish history 
(Kalaycioglu, E 1998, p. 4). 
The relations between different social classes are not as clear-cut as one might expect. 
In other words they overlaps and it makes the analysis of political life a bit difficult. 
Until the late 1960s Turkish politics revolved by and large around the axis of stateist 
elitist versus traditional-religious and liberals. It might be seen contradictory to have 
traditionalist /conservatives and liberals under the same umbrella as they are standing 
for very different political ideologies, but because of the defeat of the Ottoman empire 
and some other reasons these two groups were very weak. So in order to counter 
balance the stateist elites, which consisted of central bureaucracy and military elite 
and headed by M. Kemal had to stick with each other (See Kongar, E 1998, pp. 131- 
133). Mardin (1973: 169-91) argued that: "centre-periphery" relations provides a 
good explanatory scheme to comprehend Turkish politics. " Nur Yalman an out 
standing student of Turkish culture points out that during the `beneficent period of 
1838-1877, Ottoman society divided into two kulturekamps. 132 The polarisation of 
the Ottoman society was accelerated by the reform period of 1838-1877, which is 
known as the Tanzimat Donemi (reformation period). The general characteristics of 
this two kulturekamps has been described as: 
One side of the divide are those who adhere to an "image of Good Society" organized and 
ruled by means of rational thinking, science, and materialist-positivist understanding of 
universe, life, society and politics; and the other side cleavage are those who believe in an 
"image off Good Society" which espouses traditional (patrimonial) style of life, which in turn, 
is designed with a religious (Islamic) understanding of moral society, law, and politics. 
(Kalayctoglu, E 1998: 4). 
On the one side of this `kulturekamp' there is a rationalist, positivist materialistic 
world view and the "image of Good Society" for this group can only be achieved if 
the social, economic political and cultural life organised and ruled by rationality, 
science and materialist positivist principals. On the opposite side of this divide these 
who believes the "image of Good Society" is can only based on traditional style of 
life. In this society religion (Islam) dominates almost every aspects of social life. 
It can be said that the divide of two kulturekamps have not been contained with the 
collapse of Ottoman empire but continued for more then a seventy years to dominate 
132 Cited In Kalaycioglu, E 1998: 4 
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the Turkish polity. (See Saribay, AN, 1991, p. 122) There are many scholars who 
have suggested ever since that the Turkish political system is `composed of a coherent 
and organised "state" elite that constitutes the centre, and pitted against it persists a 
culturally heterogeneous, complex, and even hostile periphery''33 (Kalaycioglu, E 
1994, p. 403) Centre, obviously, represents the stateist elite consisted of civil and 
military bureaucracy and periphery represents the traditional/conservatives elements 
such as notables, big land lords, traditional merchants, town artisans, tradesman and 
the ulama the religious elite - uleinu (Clergies men), doctors of religion. The liberal 
elements are mainly consisted of the westernised elites who opposed the repressive 
nature of Kernalism -the stateist elites- and any kind of state interference into the 
economic and political life (Kongar, E 1998: 131). Even today the cleavage of 
Table: 3.1 How would you place the VP on the left-right scale? 
WHERE DOES THE VP STAND? FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Centre-right party 14 33.33 
Islamic party/ Party of believers 13 30.95 
A mass party which is neither on the left nor 
on the right 
10 23.80 
Right wing party 3 7.14 
Conservative right party 2 4.76 
Total 42 100 
Source: Fieldwork data from Ankara. 
secularist (laicist) / religious-traditionalist continues to be one of the most influential 
variable that determines the party preferences and electoral outcomes in Turkish 
politics. However, from the late 1960s onwards there have been some new political 
issues such as emergence of class politics and ethnicity and gender added in to 
political equation that determines the party preferences and electoral behaviour. )34 
The Virtue Party founded as the successor of the WP in 1997, by a group of close 
aides of the leader of the Welfare Party Nejmetin Erbakan. It has continuities and 
discontinuities with its predecessor the WP. Where does the VP stand on the political 
133 The emphases are authors. 
134 See Kalaycioglu, G 1998: 3-7. 
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spectrum? To answer this question I have asked my informants: how would you place 
the VP on the left-right scale? 
As mentioned above the VP is the continuation of the previous pro-Islamic parties the 
NOP/NSP/WP. Yet the changes that came with the VP is apparent and leaves not 
much space for speculation. 
Table 3.2 shows that the VP has moved from religious/extremist right to centre-right 
position. It seems my empirical findings confirms this observation. According to one- 
third (33.33 percent) of my informants the VP is a centre-right party. The party 
leadership has taken this line and has been making every effort to move party toward 
centre-right. However as my finding suggests this policy of moving to the centre has 
not been accepted by all of the party activists. Because there is a substantial 
proportion of them views the VP as an Islamic party. Around one-third (30.95 
percent) of my informants placed the VP on the left-right scale toward the far right 
end; as an Islamic party or as some of them put it "the party of believers". The third 
largest block which consists of around one-quarter (23.80 percent) viewed the VP as a 
mass party that is neither on the left nor on the right, while les then one-fifth (7.14 
percent) saw it as right wing party and 4.76 percent of them saw it as a conservative 
right party. 
The result is surprising in some sense because it seems the party split into three large 
blocks representing, the centre-right, religious fundamentalist or Islamist right and the 
third one is mass party neither on the left nor on the right. But in other sense it 
confirms the existing fault line between the moderates or so called 'progressivists/ 
youngsters' that led by Tayyip Erdogan (ex-mayor of Istanbul) and the `elders/grey- 
haired' traditionalists led by Erbakan (the long term leader of the NSP/WP/VP since 
the 1970s). The third block however seems difficult to fit in a context: for some of 
the respondents in this group the VP is neither on the left nor on the right. The reason 
for this they gave was it is un-Islamic to have divisions such as left and right. For 
some others the VP is a true mass party that is beyond the old left right divide. It can 
be argued that the majority in this group are members that joined the VP with non- 
religious and non-ideological reasons. However at the ideological level this third 
group does not seems to be unified or homogenous. Therefore other two groups can 
assimilate it. 
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In fact the VP's first Congress confirmed this fact in 15 May 2000 in where two 
groups of delegates from centre-right and Islamists clashed fiercely over the control of 
the party organizations and positions. The third group did not display any significant 
appearance. The final split emerged when the VP closed down in 2001. The VP split 
right in the middle and became two different parties: the AK Partisi (Justice and 
Development Party) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan representing the centre- 
right ideology and the second party is called the Saadet Partisi (SP) (Happiness Party) 
representing the traditionalist line of Erbakan's Islamic ideology. 
Despite the fact that the WP was charged with anti secular activities and closed down 
by the Supreme Court in 1998 the VP continued to enjoy widespread public support. 
Since than the Fazilet (Virtue) party has been under the watchful eye of the secular 
military and civil elite. It seems the anxiety over the rise of the political Islam in 
Turkey has been unfound. 
As the election results have been showing throughout the 1990s the WP/VP gathered 
around 20 percent of the total vote in Turkey. This means the rest of the 80 percent of 
the Islamic population does not vote for the VP. How is this to be interpreted? The 
answer is rather simple. The Christian population of Germany or Holland does not 
only vote for the Christian Democrat Parties (CDP) either. It is true that in Turkey as 
in many other countries religion as one of the influential political variable has been 
playing an important role in terms of voting behaviour, it has got its own limitations. 
Equally there are other socio-political variables that influences citizen's party 
preferences. In fact as studies shown that not more than between one-third and one- 
half of WP/VP's voters- that is equivalent of around 10 percent of total vote in 
Turkey- came from religious reasons. The rest came from party's non-religious class 
appeals. 135 
The full impact and consequences of this transition process that started with the 
closure of the WP and the VP being established in its place will be discussed later but 
as one would have predicted the closure of the WP had a negative effect on the 
election results of the new VP. The WP enjoyed 21.4 per cent of the total vote and 
135 See Özbudun E, 2000, p. 88. 
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158 seats in parliament. It had become the largest party in parliament. However, the 
VP suffered a6 percent of loss of support in the last general elections (18 April 1999) 
it received 15.0 percent of the vote and 105 seats in parliament. )36 Nevertheless it did 
rather well in the simultaneous local elections. 137 
There were, though, some surprising outcomes in the last elections. Among them the 
swap that occurred between the NAP and VP in the district of Erzurum deserves a 
close examination. As many districts in the Eastern and central Anatolian regions 
Erzurum is a strong hold of the religious right and the extreme right. The reason for 
this is the existence of Alevi/Sunni divides in these regions. )38 Although both parties 
the WP/VP and NAP have been strong in the district of Erzurum, the WP/VP had won 
by obtaining more than one-third (34.34 percent) of the votes the metropolitan 
municipality in local election (1994). In the same election NAP obtained less than 
one-quarter (22.59 percent) of the vote. However this figure turned up side down, the 
NAP obtained one-third (33.18 percent) of votes and won, beside 19 other it (district) 
municipalities, the metropolitan municipality in Erzurum, while the VP obtained one- 
quarter (26.31 percent) of vote. 139 
How this NAP/VP swop can be explained? There can be a few reasons for this to 
happen. Perhaps the most important point we should mention is that the social basses 
of the both parties are much closer to each other than they are to other parties on the 
right. This closeness could lead substantial swings in between these two parties. It has 
been calculated that across the country there were around 4.5 percent of the VP's 
voter shifted their vote to the NAP in 1999 general election (Berberoglu E, 1999). It 
seems the shift from the VP to NAP in Erzurum is (8 percent) almost twice the 
national average. The most likely reason for this swing it seems is the process of 28 
February that led to the resignation of the first Islamist led government in 1997. Just 
before its first year in office this government was pushed to resign by the country's 
powerful military. The chain of events that occurred while it was in office damaged 
the WP as party that in conflict with countries establishment. Although majority of its 
136 Istanbul daily Hurriyet, 20 Nisan (April). 1999. 
137 For the result of the 18 April 1999 elections see Web pages: http: //www. trt. net. tr/secim99 
138 Sec cakkir R 1994, p. 221. 
139 See www. yei-elilet. org. tr/sqiiiiler/iiiclex. plii); Hurriyet (Istanbul) daily, 20 April, 1999. 
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voters saw it as unjust repression of the WP and its cause and their loyalty has 
increased to their party, some of its supporters disillusioned with the party and 
leadership. They criticized Necmettin Erbakan for his uncompromising, 
confrontational style and switched their support to the NAP in 1999. Giving the fact 
those WP/VP's voters in Erzurum, unlike voters in gecekondus of big cities, are more 
likely to support the party for religious and ideological reasons. And, also, compare to 
any other right wing parties the NAP and WP/VP have much vide common ground 
and share similar national and religious values. For these reasons such shifts between 
two parties are more likely to happen. 
It can also be argued that local elections have their own dynamics. I am not arguing 
they are independent of the general socio-economic and political conditions in a 
country but local politics is more likely to influence by the local issues. I have 
observed during my fieldwork in Ankara that at the local level the politicians can be 
rather pragmatic and look possibility of alliance and tactical voting. Also the 
personality of candidates at the local politics can be very influential on the electoral 
outcome. 
3.4.1 The Aims of the Party 
In its party constitution the main principles and goals are declared as: "... bring peace, 
freedom, justice, and respect for the nation. To this end we act with respect to the 
charter of the universal human rights and basic human ri(yhts. " 140 In his opening 
speech of the meeting "ilk Adim (First Step) Kutan, 1998a explained his party's five 
main views and aims: 1) Democracy, 2) Human rights, 3) Freedom, 4) Rule of law, 5) 
Development and contemporariness. When we have acquired these five points, there 
will be: Peace and safety, Freedom, Justice, Welfare and prosperity and 
respectability" (Kutan, R 1998a, p. 3). 
The party was founded in an atmosphere of political turmoil. With the 28 February 
1997 process, the military was determined to punish the WP. Under these conditions 
the VP had to be extremely cautious not to attract the military's or the court's 
attention. So its program, codes, ideology and rhetoric had to be very carefully 
140 (1998: I) Fazilet Partisi TÜZUK, (Virtue Party Book of Code of Practices) Ankara 
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orchestrated. Compared to the WP's programme, the VP's program is full of 
compromise, assurances, pleas for cohesion, unity, democracy, respect for the rule of 
law and the principle of secularism to appease the authorities. 
`Today is the first year of the VP's establishment. Our party was established by our 33 
friends on 17 December 1997, has established its organisations in 80 districts, all sub- 
districts and villages. With its 144 MPs it has became the opposition party of Turkey. 
As the VP we are the party of compromise and dialogue. These are not the needs of 
our party but of the country' (Kutan, 1998b, pp. 3-5). In its program the VP gave 
priority to politics and the State. In this section the present condition of Turkish 
politics and problems of central governance are criticised. It argues that politicians 
have lost their credibility, meaning the people will shy away from politics (ibid, p. 6). 
In this rapidly changing world, Turkey has increasingly faced internal and external 
changes in economic, social, political, scientific and cultural systems (Ibid, p. 7). 
Our understanding of politics and government is not to oppress or ignore the 
demands for change, but to transform these demands and criticisms into peace and 
development. It is the indispensable part of our policy and government to elevate 
these demands to the level of political representation to transform them into the most 
important ingredient of democratic government and economic development (ibid, p. 
7). Later on it argues that it is the main charter of the VP to unify all different 
political, ideological and different life styles of the citizens under the will of living 
together. (Ibid, p. 7) [My translations]. 
It seems that the VP presents very liberal policies, compromising far more then the 
WP. It has been suggested that following the postmodern coup of 28 February 1997 
political Islam has been seeking new ways and avenues to survive. 141 One of the most 
commonly discussed strategies for change was the VP's move from the far religious 
right to the centre-right. It has been a necessity for the cadres of the old WP and new 
VP to move towards the centre. 
141 See Donat, Y (1998) "Fazilet `te "orta Vol" ara>vo" (The VP searches for "middle way" (Sabah 
II July 1998, ) 
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Perhaps the clearest sign of the change in strategy change was the transfer of 
`Nationalist-Conservatives' or in some cases `liberal' figures such as Prof. Nevzat 
Yalcinta*, All Coýkun, Abdülkadir Aksu, Cemil (ýicek and Nazli Ilicak. All of them 
are well-known, significant political figures in Turkey. This transfer made it clear that 
the VP had no interest in reviving the WP but in effect, had departed from the 
traditional NOP/NSP/WP line altogether. 142 As one would expect there have been 
reactions against all these changes in strategy. Some traditionalist, conservative 
elements tried to limit the changes but the newcomers knew what was waiting for 
them and after negotiating with Erbakan they secured their places. 
The WP/VP has a very pragmatist tradition, '43 making the Islamic movement in 
Turkey very different from Islamic movements. It never had an agenda of Islamic 
revolution like Iran or Algeria, but instead took a parliamentarian, electoral path to 
increase its space and influence in society. 
3.4.2 The Major Policies: Change and Continuity 
In the VP's election manifesto secularisation is described as `one's freedom to choose 
whatever belief one wants. "It means the state is a referee not a player". It cannot be 
seen as a means of pushing aside any sort of religious expression in society and it 
cannot deny religious and moral freedoms. Otherwise this institution of solution will 
itself become a problem. Religion is not something that you could remove from inside 
the people and throw away. The diversity that occurs from religious differences must 
be accepted as cultural richness. In the past our nation has always encouraged this 
richness and shown great tolerance to it. On the issue of secularism the VP upholds 
human rights. ""44 
From the above sentences we see that their attitude towards secularisation became 
more positive. The NOP/NSP saw secularism as the oppression of religion and the 
oppression of believers by atheists. The VP does not hold the traditional National 
View anymore. The VP does however imply that there are complaints and grievances. 
142 Özgiirel, 1998 " Fa;. ilet Partisi ride rota De qi, yikligi"(The Chang Of Direction in the VP), Istanbul 
daily Radikal, 23 Cyliil 1998 ( 23 September 1998). 
143 Özbudun, E 2000. 
144 See Cüni iginda Türkiyc, (1999: 38-39). 
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The VP's leadership rightly complains that the concept of secularisation has been 
politicised and it needs to be redefined according to its original meaning. Kutan 
argued that: "We have to define secularisation according to the democratic characters 
of these societies from where the concept came. " (1998a: 23). "In Turkey 
secularisation has been politicised. In other words, it is not secularisation that we have 
in Turkey it is secularism. We are refusing politicised secularisation because it 
degenerates the core of democratic secularisation. " He continued: "Turkey has to 
make her choice not for the authoritarian -Jacobean secularisation but democratic 
secularisation"(Ibid, p. 23). It can safely be claimed that for the first time the VP 
guided the issue of secularisation into the right direction. The traditional National 
View point of secularisation was rather dry and unsophisticated. It was not so much 
debated as a concept but rather rejected with a blunt refusal or criticism. 
It appears that this time secularisation has been become a semi-philosophical issue 
rather than a purely political one and debated with care, not bluntly rejected. By this I 
am not intending to say that it is not a political issue, but rather the way that in which 
the VP brought it into the public debate indicates a new approach. This must be the 
overall effect of their new programme concentrated around democracy, human rights, 
freedom, rule of law and development. 
It can be argued that the VP made one of the most dramatic changes in the traditional 
National View's so called Just Economic Order (JEO). The Just Economic Order 
confused many people for good reasons. It offered JEO, policies that attracted the 
lower middle and lower classes but it was, in reality, the free market economy with 
added superfluous words. The VP rightly abandoned it and declared themselves 
defenders of the free market economy, fast track privatisation, maintaining all ties 
with foreign banking and financial institutions and so on. Its basic economic policies 
are summarised as: 
- The economy must be in accordance with the free market economy, private 
ownership and private entrepreneurship. 
- An economic strategy that is open, highly competitive and sustainable must be 
developed. (I 998b, p. 56). 
- The state must be withdrawn from the economy to undertake its primary duties. 
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-Development of healthy relationships with the IMF and the World Bank (1998b, pp. 
36-37). With this new era the VP dropped its opposition towards Turkey's integration 
in world economy. Thus the VP needed to distance itself from the Adil Düzen project. 
A. coýkun, the VP's deputy chairman responsible for economic issues, pointed out 
that the program of the Just Order was an empty concept unsuitable to addressing 
Turkey's problems. For that reason there is no trace of it in the VP's program. 145 
As discussed in chapter 4 since the 1980s Turkish economy has been witnessed major 
economic crisis, long term high inflation, high unemployment rate, and high rate of 
internal and external debt, extensive budget deficits and like. Since then the neoliberal 
economy policies have led a major restructuring process that has not been yielded any 
benefit for millions of people across the country. On the contrary it caused a 
significant drop in the real earnings of salary and wage earners. The impacts of the 
neoliberal policies on the agricultural sector has been far more worse and triggered 
what I called `the second phase of rapid urbanization' started from early 1980s. 
The WP's just order and its importance can only be appreciated against this 
background. First of all the Adil Diizen (just order) offered an alternative to neoliberal 
structuring policies that has been hurting the working classes. It offered a kind of 
`third way' solutions to the problems and ills of neoliberalism. The Adil Diizen, in 
fact, it was not just limited to the economy policies of the WP but it was promising 
just social order, just political, legal and moral order. It was promising almost a 
regime change based on sort of a religiously inspired queasy egalitarianism. 
Throughout the 1990s party's main slogan was Adil Diizen gelecek zulüm bitecek (Just 
order will prevail, oppression/unjust will perish). Although the project of "just order" 
was not coherently developed, nor was it well articulated to avert potential critics, it 
did attract massive attention from lower middle and lower classes across the country. 
Studies have shown that just order did indeed contribute to the electoral success of the 
WP in the local (1994) and genera (1995) elections. A 1996 survey found out that 
around 13.4 percent of the voters who voted for the WP did so because of the WP's 
promise of `just order". 146 As it is the case VP's abandonment of the policy of just 
order would inevitably alienate those voters who in the first place voted for WP for its 
145 cakir, 1998a. 
146 See Özbudun, E 2000, p. 90. 
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promise of just order. Up to now the VP doe not seems to come tip with an alternative 
economic policy to compensate its lose by ditching the just order. As is stands now 
the VP might not be able to appeal to the urban poor as it did in the 1990s. However, 
the economic issues are not the only issues that elections fought for. As argued in 
chapter 2 Turkish political party system has been declining, the political stalemate has 
not been overcome. Beside the economic issues there are many other issues such as 
widespread corruption, ethnic and religious issues where the VP can have chance to 
increase its votes. Keep in mined that compared to the other mainstream parties the 
VP is a mass party with a vibrant, very well organised grassroots organisations and 
this fact will always have an impact on its electoral performance. 
In terms of membership the Virtue Party has worked very hard to acquire new 
members. The WP had over four million members and the VP aims to reach at least 
that figure. But according to Kutan the VP have 310,000 members (May 10,1998))7 
Unfortunately since then the VP has not updated and declared its membership figures. 
Table: 3.2 When Did You Become Member? 







0-2 1999-97 The Fazilet 
(Virtue) Party 
6 14.63 14.63 
. 
3-7 1996-92 The Refah 7 17.07 58.53 
8-12 1991-87 (Welfare) 10 24.39 
13-17 1986-83 Party 7 17.07 
19 - 23 1980-77 The NOP 0 0 26.82 
24-+ 1976-70 /NSP 11 26.82 
Total 41 100 
Source: Fieldwork data from Ankara. 
I can make a prediction on the basis of the information given by administrators of 
both party branches before the elections of 18 April 1999. They individual branches 
registered one third of the members that they had in the WP. So a rough estimate can 
put the membership at around one and half million. Of course it is not an exact 
prediction. 
147 See Recai Kutan (1998a, p. 2). 
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When I asked when members joined the VP, I found that the majority (85 percent) of 
them were members of a very young party (the VP was founded in 1997) for a very 
long time. As table 3.1 shown more than a quarter (27 percent) declared they had 
been members for at least 19 years or more -indicating the NSP period-, while 59 
percent of them has been members for a period of 3 to 17 years - indicating the WP 
period- and only 15 percent joined the VP since 1997. 
The most striking departure from its traditional line came with its policies on external 
relations. The VP dropped almost every objection that the national view maintained 
since the early 1970s. After assessing the new world order and the process of 
globalisation the VP lays down its basic principles on foreign policies as: 
- Our first priority is to develop good relations in our region with our neighbours. 
Without having good relationships no country could prosper. 
- Among our priorities is to increase the economic, cultural and political relations with 
our neighbours, and develop regional integration. 
- Due to its history and geographic positions Turkey cannot stay away from Europe. 
In this respect the customs union needs to be rearranged in line with our political 
interests. 
- We believe Turkey's role within the NATO should continue. 
- We support the full membership of Turkey into the EU. 
- Our long-term friendship with the USA will continue. In addition to its Atlantic and 
European dimension, Turkey should develop her relations in North Africa, South 
Asia, East Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. To this end any kind of relationship 
with the Central Asian republics will be developed (1998b: 43-47). 
3.5 Conclusions 
Although, the Islamist party was not a newcomer to Turkish politics, the electoral 
successes of Refah triggered a flood of suspicion and paranoia among Turkey's 
secularist elites. Refah's narrow victory with 21.3 percent of the vote and 158 seats 
out of 550 in parliament created shock waves not just at home but also abroad. 
(Sayari, 1996, p. 35). Irtica fohisi (phobia of Islamic fundamentalism) dominated the 
daily reports. Some newspapers urged an immediate action against the eriaatci 
_______ _ _______ ______ __ __ ___ ý. .___. ... __ .: r;.. -ý ..: ý. -.. -ý . :,. ý.ý. ̀. ý.. a Yý. -,. .. ý_. --Fý. ý--ý,.. .. 
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yükseliv (rise of fundamentalism); others urged the military to intervene to restore the 
principles of secularism. 
On the other hand, it is hardly surprising to see that the WP made big election gains 
from 1991 onwards. The bulk of its supporters and votes come from the lower and 
lower middle classes urbanites; new migrants in the gecekondus (shantytowns) who 
had escaped from rural poverty but found another in the cities, wage and salary 
earners who lost half of the real wages, petit bourgeoisie; shopkeepers, artisans and 
small merchants were all increasingly threatened by the advance of big business. 
The religious dimension of the WP/VP has been the focal point in Turkish political 
discourse. Are they fundamentalists? Is there a threat of Islamic revolution in Turkey 
or have they got a plan for bringing Shariat to Turkey? Are they democrats or 
fundamentalists? Are they doing takkiye (deceit; deceiving us)? When faced with a 
similar question the leader of the VP, Kutan replied: "I swear not we are not cheating, 
we genuinely believe in a secularist republic, peace and coexistence of all citizens, 
democracy and human rights". 148 However at the grassroots level my empirical 
findings showed that three in five joined the VP for Islamic or ideological reasons. 
This means they are more radical then ordinary members and voters. For this group 
Mawdudi's `theo-democracy' 149 could be more desirable. They want the republic to 
take an Islamic tone rather than an authoritarian secular but even this issue would not 
be discussed explicitly in public. 
The role they see for religion is however not easily understood. Although they do not 
want to see a sharp separation of state and religion, they do understand that in 
contemporary Turkey it is impossible to introduce Islamic laws: sharia. Some of them 
totally oppose this separation and insist that without religion the state and society will 
148 Donal, Y Istanbul daily Sabah, II July 1998. 
149 For the concept of `then-democrayc' see Esposito and Voll, (1996, p. 24). 
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diminish, but the majority stated clearly that they wanted the principle of laiklik 
(secularisation) redefined as it is in Western democracies. For them this meant to 
have religion and the state totally independent from each other. What most see right 
now is that religion is not free from the interference of the state. On thing is certain 
that the Islamist movement is not static, as it has been wrongly perceived so. Like 
anything around us it too has been changing with the time. 
It can be argued that majority of the reporters and commentators in the media, as well 
as many writers and academic has been making a major mistake in their approach to 
the Islamist movements. They see them as static relics of the past not as a product of 
present times. For many since they are religious or Islamic fundamentalist movements 
they never change, as if they existed in an ivory tower. But this is not the case. As 
table 3.2 illustrated since the 1970s the Turkish Islamist movement has change 
beyond recognition. As depicted in table 3.2 that last three decades pro-Islamic party 
has changed from an anti-system cadre party (NOP/NSP) to a mass system party (the 
VP). From its membership policies to support base, attitudes of secularism to 
economy policies, form foreign policies to women policies the change has been 
prevalent in many areas. 
Change of Mind or Change of Tactic? 
Although the rise of the WP/VP has overwhelmingly been viewed as the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism, neither its leading cadres nor the majority of its voters seem 
to be religious extremists or fundamentalists. Unlike in many Islamic movements in 
the Muslim world the Turkish Islamic party leader Erbakan and his close associates 
are not clergymen but have professional or business backgrounds (Heper, 1997, p. 
35). Erbakan himself is a professor of engineering who graduated from a German 
university. Furthermore, in contrast to other Islamic movements the tradition of NOP- 
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NSP-WP/VP has not been able to produce original Islamic thinkers like Jamal al Din 
al -Afghani, Mawdudi, All Shariati, or Ayatollah Khomeini. Erbakan is not an 
Islamic thinker. 150 
If we return to the beginning of this chapter the changes in a party system or a 
political party are reflections of the realities of global changes. 151 In this manner it 
can be argued that political Islam in Turkey has been constantly evolving. This is a 
direct consequence of the modernization and secularisation process that has occurred 
since the 1920s in Turkey. 
Another important dimension to party change has been the use of force by the state 
toward the anti system parties in Turkey. The NOP/NSP and the WP were anti system 
parties. For that reason they were constantly scrutinised and interfered with. As the 
Turkish constitution forbids the reestablishment of a party closed down by the court 
the parties had to be different. Nor could they simply be superficially different. They 
had to avoid contentious issues and gravitate toward the centre. I am not suggesting 
that this is purely on the basis of force as it involves rewards as well as sanctions. As 
well as being forced to moderate their ideologies, rhetoric etc., the WP/VP has 
displayed more pragmatist characteristics than other fundamentalist groups. This 
pragmatic approach is leading the Islamists to change. 
150 (ýakir, 1994, pp. 126-127. 
151 Maor, 1997, p. 52. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
URBAN ROOTS OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
The destiny of Turkey's political system is determined by three metropolitan cities; Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir because the majority of MPs elected by the three. Yet, the power balance in 
terms of voting is determined by the urban poor of the gecekondus (slums). " 
152 
4.1 Introduction 
Although rapid urbanization has started from the 1950s, due to the restructuring 
policies it gained another momentum from the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 1997 
the balance of the population changed from rural to urban: those who lived in the 
cities increased from 43 % in 1980 to 65% in 1997. This fact has played a crucial role 
in the ascent to power of political Islam in 1996. 
For years the Islamic movements were thought to be traditionalist, anti-modernist 
rural based phenomena. On the contrary, I argue that those movements are modern in 
their understanding of the world, and organisational structure. They emerged as a 
result of modernisation and rapid urbanisation in many Muslim countries. Political 
Islam in Turkey shares many characteristics these movements. 
In this chapter I examine the relationships between the process of rapid urbanisation, 
political participation and the rise of the WP/VP. In the first half of this chapter I 
discuss the nature of Islamic movements, their urban characteristics and urbanisation 
and its effects on political participation. Especially in this context I focus on the 
political implications of rapid urbanisation such as the relationship between 
urbanisation and political participation. I discuss whether or not the process of 
urbanisation in Turkey has facilitated a greater degree of political participation or not 
152 Sec Milliyet, 22 January 1999. 
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and, how the WP/VP has responded to this process. Local politics are also affected 
by rapid urbanisation. In this study I look at the ways in which urban local politics has 
changed and its impacts on the rise of political Islam. 
Rapid urbanisation has become one of the most common characteristics of developing 
countries. Today they consist of large urban populations. However, the pattern of 
urbanisation has been very different compared to that in developed countries. What 
are the causes and the implications of over-urbanisation? 
I will look at various reasons why urbanisation broadens the social bases of political 
participation. Specifically in the Turkish context I focus on the characteristics of 
urbanisation and its implications for the political process. 
As mentioned earlier the neoliberal economic policies that were implemented from 
the early 1980s led to a second phase of rapid urbanization overshadowing the first 
phase which was started from the 1950s. The second phase that occurred from the 
1980s led by a large- scale migration from villages and towns to the major city 
centres. One of the prime objectives of this chapter is to investigate whether the rapid 
migration from rural to urban centres has any impact on voting patterns. More 
precisely to see whether the second phase of rapid urbanisation, which started from 
the early 1980s has strengthened the religious right in the middle of the 1990s. It has 
been suggested that the massive migration in the 1980s, led by neoliberal 
restructuring programmes of the 1980s had a strong effect on the rise of the WP in the 
1990S. 
4.2 Urban Politics 
4.2.1 Cities as the Social Bases of Political Islam 
The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a rapid and unprecedented revival 
of religious movements of every faith around the World. Among these movements 
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political Islam has been the most frequently discussed. The reason for this is due to its 
extent and potential implications for many regimes in the Middle East, and other 
Muslim countries like the newly emerged Turkic-Muslim countries of the former 
Soviet Union, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey as well as its external consequences. 
Islamic parties and movements have been given a special place but very often they are 
viewed as fundamentalist, anti-western or anti-modern. 
As Oliver Roy (1994: 1) puts it 
Many in the West seem to view the end of our century as the era of the 
"Islamic threat. " The irruption of Islam into the political landscape is often 
perceived as an anachronism; how is it possible, late in the twentieth century, 
to return to the Middle Ages? We envision bearded mullahs everywhere, 
surging forth form mosques and villages to attack the modern-day Babylons, 
seeking to create a reactionary, irrational, and violent world. 
As Roy points out many commentators in the Western media as well as academics of 
various disciplines tend to equate these movements with "extremism", and 
"terrorism". They are often perceived as "irrational", "intolerant" and "fanatics" who 
want to turn the clock back to 700 AD". For some they are the "Green Menace" 
echoing the "Red Menace" of the former Soviet threat. 153 It seems from the analysis 
and comments of these influential writer's, that the vision of Islamic movements or 
militant Islam, as a threat to the West has gripped the imagination of Western 
governments and the media (Esposito, J 1995, p. 3). 
Another commonly shared view among Western intellectuals, governments and media 
is that Islamic movements are an atavism, a rejection of modernity and the Western 
way of living (See Seyyed Vali, 1995, pp. 121-139). They are often viewed as 
"fossilised relics, insulated from and oblivious to their surroundings, living 
perpetually in a bygone age" (Caplan, 1987, p. 5). They also are considered 
intellectually limited and alienated from the rest of the contemporary world (See 
153 See, for example, Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations? ", Foreign Affairs , Summer 
Issue, 1994: 22-49; Levis, B "The Roots of Muslim Rage" Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990: 47-60; 
Miller, J "The Challenge of Radical Islam", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 43-56.1993: 43-56; 
Munson, H "Not all Crustaceans are Crabs: Reflections on the Comparative Study of Fundamentalism 
and Politics", Contention, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring, 1995: 151-166. 
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Walker, 1987, p. 197). Liberal commentators like Hadar (1993, pp. 27-42) views 
these movements as a reaction to the 'confusion and anxiety' of modernity, as well as 
a revolt against failed Western style political and economic orders in the Middle East. 
The liberals' point of view differs from the rest because they do not directly suggest 
that Islamic fundamentalist movements are against modernity but they say they are 
reacting against the `confusion and anxiety' brought by the process of rapid 
modernization and uneven development. 
It can be argued that the majority of approaches are narrow in their focus on the 
ideology of the Islamic movements as a simple, `literal reading' of the 'secret text', the 
Koran and its desire to turn to the past and are a distorted image of these movements. 
They ignore the sociological reasons behind the rise of Islamic movements altogether. 
As I argued in chapter 1, from pre 1979 Iran to Algeria, in many Muslim countries 
political Islam emerged as a reaction against modernising, secular, oppressive and 
failed states that failed to solve socio-economic problems and corruption. The 
contemporary problems such as mass urbanisation, unemployment, former or existing 
foreign domination are the overriding cause of their growth rather that merely 
religious reasons. (See Halliday, 1995a, p. 48). Contrary to the dominant view Islamic 
movements and parties have successfully adopted their ideologies and organisational 
structures to the contemporary world. 
The emergence and subsequent rise of Islamic movements have been closely 
connected with the major socio-economic changes that occurred in Muslim countries. 
As Esposito (1995) points out the modernization and Westernisation process that 
many Muslim countries undertook after their independence was primarily understood 
as a substantial degree of urbanisation. As the modern governments, private 
companies and foreign investors focused on urban areas there started a process of 
rapid urbanisation triggering massive migration from rural to urban centres. However 
due to the realities of poverty in urban slums and shantytowns the hopes of the 
majority of the new migrants for a better life did not often materialise. (Ibid, p. 16). 
In addition to unrealised expectations, loss of small community ties and traditional 
values, the newcomers to the cities were shocked by modern urban life and its 
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Westernised culture and mores. Therefore many of them felt alienated and 
marginalized, and found an anchor in religion. For them Islam offered a sense of 
identity, fraternity, and cultural values that helped the urban poor to overcome the 
fears of their new environment. It is obvious that in many Muslim countries the urban 
poor and the lower middle class found a welcome sense of meaning and security in a 
religious revivalism. (Esposito, 1995, p. 16). There are individual case studies that 
support this observation. In many Muslim countries, notably Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan and Turkey, where Islamic movements have a strong 
presence, the similar socio-economic problems like rapid urbanisation, rampant 
poverty, unemployment, housing shortages, lack of basic services, etc., have been 
prevalent. For example Iran, prior to the revolution, had undergone a massive socio- 
economic transformation accompanied by rapid urbanisation and uneven economic 
development. In fact this was the real cause of the collapse of the Iranian monarchy. 
In his analysis of the Iranian revolution F. Halliday points out a process of rapid and 
uneven economic development throughout the 1960s and 70s, which caused great 
inequalities and social tension in the cities. The advancement of modern capitalism 
caused a significant threat to the bazaar merchants, created a widespread injustice and 
social tension that unified and mobilised bazaar merchants, the Iranian clergy and the 
urban poor to overthrow the Shah's regime in 1979 (see Halliday, 1995a, pp. 48- 
53). 154 Similarly Walton, J and Seddon, D (1994: 174) observed a strong involvement 
of Islamic movements in many of urban popular protest during the 1980s. 
"From 1979 onwards, after the Iranian revolution the relationship between 
popular urban protest and the dramatic rise of Islamism, with its explicit 
objective of overthrowing "illegitimate" regimes, became a matter of major 
concern to many governments, while commentators persistently drew attention 
to the revolutionary appeal of Islamism and to the increasing strength of the 
Islamic movements, particularly among the urban and disadvantaged in a 
period of rapid and traumatic economic and social change. " 
Halliday (1995a, p. 72) suggested that: although the Iranian revolution seemed to be a 
reaction against the modernisation process it had a `unique combination of modern 
and traditional in its institutional and ideological features' Its modernity is the product 
of rapid urbanization, industrialization, and the demographic and social tensions 
created by the social transformation of the 1960s and 1970s. (Ibid, p. 72). For him the 
154 See also Kcddic, 1981, pp. 239-249. 
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Iranian revolution was only partially a religious revolution, being more of a great 
modern urban movement that was created by the process of social transformation 
(ibid, p. 72). In a similar vein Roy (1994) argued that these movements are the 
product of the modern world. They involve young militants educated in modern 
schools raised in recently urbanised families some from the impoverished middle 
class and contrast to common belief, are rarely mullahs. They borrowed Marxist 
terminology and tactics. Also the masses who support and follow these Islamic 
movements are not "traditional" or "traditionalist" either. They, by and large, live with 
the values of the modern city where they have adopted the current trend of 
consumerism (1994, pp. 3-4). For a long time -mistakenly- many commentators 
believed that Islamist movements would only flourish in societies where modernity 
and urbanisation had failed to materialise. By assuming that Islamist movements are 
anti-modernist, irrational and archaic phenomenon these commentators mostly failed 
to see their true characteristics. It is extremely important to emphasise that Islamist 
movements are not traditionalist rural small town organisations or a prehistoric 
phenomenon. 
It has been observed that political Islam has followed a similar route in Turkey. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Turkey underwent a massive socio-economic 
transformation that led to further polarization of Turkish society. The sixties were the 
beginning of a process of transformation from commercial to industrial capitalism 
(Ahmed, 1993, p, 376). This transformation increased the tension between the 
Anatolian petit bourgeois (tile artisans, town merchants, small tradesmen, and 
shopkeepers) and the upper classes of Istanbul. 155 
The Anatolian petit bourgeoisie organised and rather cunningly utilised Islam's 
political potential to mobilise some sections of the electorate in rural and urban areas. 
The first pro-Islamic party, the NOP (later known as the NSP), was founded in 1970. 
It was rather popular in the poorest regions and districts in the 1970s. 156 But later in 
the 1970s as result of rapid urbanisation a new political cleavage emerged in the 
1 55 For further elaboration see Chapter 3. 
156 See Saribay, 1985, p. 144 
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cities. The NSP became popular in the big cities as well as well as in the less 
developed regions. 157 
In the 1970s the social bases of the NOP/NSP consisted of the self-employed: 
artisans, town merchants, small shopkeepers and tradesmen those religious 
entrepreneurs, who had graduated from modern secular schools of the republic and 
the urban poor who had been displaced and disappointed with their urban experiences 
in the urban areas. 158 In the rural areas, however, its social bases were different with 
support from traditional, religious strata in the less developed semi feudal regions. 
From the mid 1980s the demographic composition of the country began to change. 
Due to the neoliberal restructuring policies a very rapid urbanisation process took 
place and by the early 1990s the population balance had shifted from rural to urban 
centres. Currently 65 percent of the population live in cities. 159 In the 1990s the WP 
(the successor of the NSP) became a predominantly urban-based mass party. Its 
electoral support base broadened among the urban population drastically. )60 
Mainly the gecekondu areas that encircle the main metropolitan cities have supported 
the WP/VP. Their supporters are the migrant workers who are disillusioned by the 
unwelcoming environment of the cities with their harsh living and working 
conditions, unemployment, poverty, lack of housing and basic services. They are 
wage and salary earners whose income dropped 50 percent between 1980 and 1990, 
due to high inflation and the devaluation of the Turkish Lira. The lower middle 
classes: artisans, traditional merchants, small shopkeepers and tradesmen whose 
existence was further threatened by the neoliberal restructuring policies, and finally 
the Kurds who are in search of their own identity and cultural rights. The WP/VP's 
non-nationalistic, Islamic approach towards ethnic groups appeals to some sections of 
the Kurdish population. '6' The Popularity of the WP/VP lay behind its inclusive, 
157 See Özbudun, 1973 cited in Saribay, 1985, pp. 143-144. 
158 See cakir, 1994, p. 21. 
159 See Table: 4.1. 
160 See chapter 3. In a recent interview, the leader of the VP Recai Kutan, also said 
that the majority of their voters and supporters lives in towns and urban centres. See 
Recai Kutan's interview by Melih Birsel, Giindemdekiler, NTV, 28 October 1999. 
161 See Ayata, 1993, pp. 51-67; Kalaycioälu, 1996, pp. 403 424; Ögütcü, 1994, p. 826; Özbudun, 
2000, pp. 87-91; Saribay, 1985, p. 45. 
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broad ranging religious and nonreligious appeal. It emphasises the religious values, it 
respects the national and moral values as well as it emphasis industrialization, social 
justice and an honest government. (Özbudun, 2000, p. 91). 
As argued, the WP/VP is an urban-based political party. Analysis of election results 
indicates that, since the early 1990s, the social bases of the Refah (Welfare) -Fazilet 
(Virtue) party has shifted to the cities. (cakir, 1994, p. 223). It is a new development 
for Turkish Politics because, traditionally the NSP had its support in rural villages and 
towns in the 1970s, however, with rapid urbanisation its support base has changed 
from rural to urban centres. This was especially evident with the unprecedented 
election results in the local elections of 1994 when the pro-Islamist WP received the 
majority of its votes from urban centres rather than its traditional supporters in the 
rural areas (ibid. 223). According to the latest surveys this trend continued in the 
general elections of 1995 
In general terms Third World countries have faced multiple problems of 
underdevelopment: poverty, unemployment, rapid population growth, low life 
expectancy, rapid urbanisation, lack of housing and basic services, very little 
education and health services and above all political instability and undemocratic 
governments. The majority of the Muslim countries share many of these problems as 
well. 162 Therefore any attempt to understand the emergence and development of 
Islamic movements must take these conditions into consideration. 
4.2.2 A Dramatic Population Shift: The Causes of Rapid Migration 
The speed and scale of urbanisation that took place between 1950 and 1980 puts 
Turkey in the ranks of the fastest urbanising countries in the world. » 3 By 1950 only 
25 percent of the population lived in the cities compared to the 75 percent lived in the 
rural areas. However at the end of the twentieth century 65 percent (40 million 
people) of the population lived in urban centres. 
162 Kepel, 1994, pp. 13-46. 
163 For detail see Danielson, and Keles, 1985, p. 26. Also for the urban and rural population and their 
ration to total population see table 4.2. 
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When Mustafa Kemal took the power in 1923 his prime task was creation of a modern 
and secular nation state. In order to achieve his goal M. Kemal must have come the 
same conclusion as Luicie W. Pye (1963) did. Pey (quoted in Danielson and Keleý, 
1985: 3) argued, " Any systematic effort to transform traditional societies in to modern 
societies must envisage the development of cities and modern urban societies. " Since 
than the policy of rapid urbanisation has been persuade as a means of transforming a 







% URBAN RURAL 
POPULATION 
% RURAL 
1927 13,648,000 3,305,876 24.2 10,342,391 75.78 
1935 16,158,018 3,802,642 23.53 12,355,376 76,47 
1940 17,820,950 4,346,249 24.39 13,474,701 75.61 
1950 20,947,188 5,244,337 25.04 15,702 851 74.96 
1960 27,754,820 8,859,731 31.92 18,895,089 68.08 
1970 35,605,176 13,691,101 38.45 21,914.075 61.55 
1980 44,736,957 19,645,007 43.91 25,091,950 56.09 
1990 56,473,035 33,326,351 59.01 23,146,684 40.99 
1997* 62,865,574 40,882,357 65.03 22,179.676 34.97 
Source: 1990 Census of Population, State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, Ankara, October 
1993, pp. 8-9. 
* Data for 1997 taken from the State Statistical Institute's web pages: littp: //www. die. gov. tr 
/'I'URKIS/SONIST/NUFUS/ankara. gif. . 
backward, "uncivilised" traditional society. Despite the policy of rapid urbanisation 
the growth of city centres in between 1927 and 1950 were far from fulfilling the goal. 
Apart from Ankara's impressive transformation from a small dusty Anatolian town in 
to a city with it's over 300.000 population by 1950, urbanisation in general was slow. 
As table 4.1 shows by 1950, only one forth (25.04 percent) of population lived in the 
cities. The majority of population 74.96 % lived in the rural areas. 
As shown above table (4.1) that during the last fifty years the population balance has 
changed drastically in favour of cities. Between 1950 and 1990 the annual rate of 
population growth was 24.45 per thousand. The urban growth rate was almost twice It 
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can be argued that majority of the reporters and commentators in the media, as well as 
many writers and academic has been making a major mistake in their approach to the 
Islamist movements. They see them as static relics of the past not as a product of 
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Source: Data drawn frone table 4.1 
(43.94 per thousand) this figure for the same period. Reflecting this increase in urban 
population growth rate has been declining in rural areas since the 1950s. In 1960 
Turkey's population reached to 27,7 million where one third (32 %) of lived in the 
cities and two third (68 %) lived in the rural areas. In 1970 population reached to 35,6 
million where 38 percent of it lived in the urban and 62 % lived in the rural areas. In 
1980 the population reached 44,7 million 44 percent of which lived in the urban and 
56 per cent lived in the rural areas. By the 1990 the population increased to 56,4 
million and two third (59 %) of lived in the urban and one third (41 %) of it lived in 
the rural areas. In 1997 population has increased to 62,8 million by now 65 per cent of 
it lived in the urban areas while 35 per cent lived in the rural areas. 
ý,:, ý-- ... ý: ý ý <... ý. _-, ý.. ý. 
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Between 1985 and 1990 Turkey's population was increased 21.71 per thousand per 
year. 164 Furthermore between 1980 and 1990 the rural population suffered a negative 
growth of -7.91 per thousand per annum. This negative growth of population in the 
rural areas was not due to falling birth rates but indicates significantly accelerated 
rural to urban migration from the early 1980s. Figure 4.1 also illustrates a dramatic 
fall of the rural population, by contrast between 1980 and 1990 the urban population 
jumped by 52.85 per thousand a year. It appears that the 1980s marked a new phase 
of rapid urbanisation in Turkey. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between 
the restructuring policies of the 1980s and dramatic population movement from rural 
to urban. 
Not only have the salary and wage earners in the cities lost out since the 1980s the 
agricultural sector has also been badly affected by neoliberal economy policies. One 
of the objectives of the neoliberal-restructuring programme was the termination of 
low interest rates for agricultural loans and credits provided by the state owned Ziraat 
Bankasi (Agricultural Bank) and more importantly the abolition of agricultural 
subsidies crucial to maintaining small and medium sized farmers. 
The 1980s in Turkey started with a military coup that was staged in 12 September 
1980. It was for the third time since 1960 the country's military sized the power and 
dismantled all political structure; all political parties were closed down parliament and 
the government dismissed, trade unions, civil society organisations, all kinds of 
associations were outlawed, thousands were detained and interrogated. All kinds of 
politics banned, politicians were poisoned and later banned from politics. However 
the most lasting legacy of the coup was and has been the introduction of neoliberal 
restructuring policies that was already negotiated between IMF and the Demirel's 
government in 24 January 1979. The decision for a major economic restructurisation 
was decided but the Demirel's government was nervous about its social political 
implications therefore its implementation was postponed until the military's action. 
164 See 1990 census of Population, 1993, p. 28. 
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At the beginning of the 1980s the agricultural sector employed over 43 percent of the 
total population, today this rate is 34 percent. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that 
any policy change will automatically affect millions of lives. By the 1990s this sector 
was on the verge of collapse. This sector lost 25 percent of its share of the GDP, 
which fell from 24 % in 1984 to 18 % in 1990 (Tosun, 1999, p. 172). This decline was 
reflected in a sharp decline of income in the rural population. As income steadily 
shrunk more and more people from rural areas sought employment in urban centres, 
thus causing the problem of over-urbanisation in the major cities. 
4.2.3 The Problem of Over-urbanisation 
There has been a great transformation in Third World countries. Unlike peasant 
societies of the 1940s and 1950s they now consist of large urban population. Since 
the 1950s underdeveloped countries urbanised rapidly so their urban population 
doubled in the 30 years to 1975. The rate of urbanisation increased even faster from 
fall 1975 to 1990. In 15 years it doubled again reaching 40 percent of the population o. 
Third World countries (Roberts, 1995, p. 1-27). 
What makes the urbanization process much more problematic in Turkish context is 
that the half of this urban population has been concentrated in Turkey's five mega- 
cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana and Bursa and causing a rapid growth in the 
gecekondu population. (See Table 4.2). 
From the early 1930s onwards urbanisation was seen as a means of modernisation and 
economic development in Turkey. It was believed that any systematic effort to 
transform traditional societies into modern societies must involve the development of 
cities and modern urban societies. 165 However, the way in which underdeveloped 
countries urbanised was very different to developed, industrialised nations' 
165 Pey quoted in Danielson and Keles, 1985, p. 3. 
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urbanisation. For many reasons the underdeveloped countries could not repeat the 
same process in the way of urban growth. 
Many developing countries, including Turkey, witnessed a rapid urbanisation from 
the 1950s. By the 1970s their urban population doubled, but the rate of urban growth 
did not match the rate of industrial growth in many of these countries. The gap that 
appeared in this process created a different kind of phenomenon known as 'over- 
urbanisation'. As M. Castells points out: 
"The phenomenon ... 
known as over-urbanisation -a term that connotes the 
idea of a level of urbanisation higher then that which can 'normally' be 
attained, given the level of industrialisation. Over-urbanisation appears as an 
obstacle to development, in so far as it immobilises resources in the form of 
non-productive investments, necessary to the creation and organisation of 
services indispensable to great concentrations of population, whereas these 
countries do not justify themselves as centres of production. " (Castells, 1977, 
p. 41). 
According to Castells over-urbanisation is not only an imbalance between the growth 
rate of urban population and the level of industrialisation but also an obstacle to 
economic development due to the resources transferred to non-productive investments 
such as services for the urban population. If the urban population growth is not led by 
the demand for labour what then is the driving force of the over-urbanisation. Castells 
points out that there are two factors in the acceleration of the growth of urbanisation 
(a) an increase in the natural growth of population in the rural and urban areas, (b) 
rural-urban migration (ibid. 46). The increase in the rate of natural population growth 
is due to the advancement in the medical area. The question of the driving force of 
the rural-urban migration is rather complex. In Turkey the flood of migration from 
villages to cities has been caused more by the rural push than the urban pall since the 
1950s but due to the major shifts in socioeconomic conditions the push factors has 
became much intolerable from the early 1980s. 
In relation to the social and political implications of over-urbanisation Castells argues 
the concentration of high rate of unemployment and low standard of living can create 
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a fertile ground for political extremism (Ibid, p. 41). By providing a vast 
concentration of population in a space in a given time urbanisation facilitates social 
mobility and increases human/ individuals contact with others, and increases the 
chance of economic, social and political participation. 
4.2.4 Urbanisation as the Facilitator of Political Participation 
From the early 1950s onwards there has been a number of studies primarily 
concerned with the relationship between socio-economic condition and voting 
tendencies in the Western Europe and Northern America. These studies particularly 
focused on the relationship between the socio-economic conditions and voting 
behaviour of a particular community. An early empirical study of American voting 
behaviour concentrates on the 'social bases of American partisanship'. This study 
established an " Index of Political Predispositions based on social classes, religion, 
and rural/urban residency", and observed a strong correlation between voting 
behaviour and social class, religion and type of residency. (Dalton, 1988, p. 152). 
Similarly Bell and Boat's (1956-7) study, in San Francisco, showed that family and 
socio-economic neighbourhood characteristics influence the development of informal 
group relations between friends, relatives, neighbours and co-workers'. A similar 
study carried out in Britain found a strong correlation between socio-economic class 
characteristics in a neighbourhood and voting behaviour (Berry, D 1970, p. 34). 
Political participation is expanded by modernisation in general and urbanisation in 
particular. Both played a very important role in the process by creating the social 
bases and networks of political participation for the larger sections of societies. 
Deutsch (1963) argues that urbanisation combined with other features of social 
mobilisation would increase the interaction and political communication of citizen to 
citizen and citizens to state. He also suggested that this could lead to greater 
awareness of citizens of the 'instrumental stakes of politics'. Similarly Learner (1958, 
p. 46) argues that historically urbanisation has been the first stage of modernisation 
and also the most important aspect of urbanisation, he argued, is the increase of 
political participation. 
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Almost twenty years later Roberts (1995) in his study of Latin American urbanisation 
points out that by introducing new political issues like age, gender and ethnicity 
alongside the those of living and working conditions urbanisation have been, in many 
ways, expended political participation among citizens. This expansion in citizens' 
political participation is led by what Inglehart, R (1977) called is "cognitive 
mobilization". He (cited in Inglehart, 1997, p. 168) argued that: 
The coming of advanced industrial society leads to a syndrome of 
intergenerational changes that bring significant further increases in citizen 51 intervention in politics. A Long-term rise in educational levels and in mass 
political skills has characterized all industrial societies. An extension of social 
mobilization beyond the transformations brought by urbanization and early 
industrialization, this process has been termed "cognitive mobilization". ... 
Cognitive mobilization is based on invisible changes that upgrade individual 
skills. 
According to Inglehart (1997, p. 169) mass political participation developed in two 
major stages, the first one was based on an older model of elite-led political 
participation. In this stage citizen mobilization led by the institutions such as political 
parties, trade unions, church etc., and it was a low level of participation mostly limited 
with voting. The second stage of political participation is called 'elite-challenging 
model' and because it requires a relatively high skill levels it facilitated by the 
development of cognitive mobilization. For Inglehart (1997, p. 169) elite-challenging 
model of participation is issue oriented and based on hoc groups rather than on 
established institutions. It seeks particular policy changes rather than simply giving a 
blank check to a party elites. 
These new issues in politics such as gender, ethnicity, identity and environmental 
concerns etc. arose from a major shift in the value system. According to Inglehart, R 
(1977, p. 21) this value change from materialist to post-materialist values `linked with 
a culsture of socio-economic changes including rising levels of education, changes in 
the occupational structure and developments in the sphere of mass communication 
networks. ' The politics shifted away from old-politics that were dominated by 
materialist values to new-politics that determined by non-materialist or post- 
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materialist values. The value change occurred as one of the consequences of 
modernity and economic prosperity that West experienced since the Second World 
War (ibid, p. 21-22). As Robertson (1995) pointed out in the last twenty years many of 
Third World countries has witnessed rapid urbanization that has created new middle 
classes as well as puling millions of poor from rural areas. This process inevitably 
introduced new issues into politics as well as heightening the old political issues such 
as living and working conditions, unemployment, poverty, and like. 
In addition, in the urban context the networks of participation are now denser then 
they were in the past and less family oriented. There has been an increase in the flow 
and quality of information because citizens have better and easy access to mass 
media. Also thanks to mass media, the wrongdoing and failures of the rulers can be 
transmitted across the nation immediately (Roberts, 1995, p. 211). What we can say 
of Roberts' analysis of political participation in Latin American experience is that the 
process of urbanisation in developing countries followed a different path and created 
social problems, yet urbanisation broadens the social bases of political participation. 
The emerge of new political issues such as gender and ethnicity indicates the emerge 
of a new kind of citizens that are more worldly-wise, self conscious, better educated 
and demanding. He/she is not just preoccupied with the work and living conditions 
but some other issues which are less economic more social, cultural or ethnic. '66 
Nevertheless, Roberts points out a fundamental characteristic of developing countries: 
"The fear of poverty is as much a preoccupation of the majority of the population as it 
was in early periods of urbanisation" (ibid. 19-20). Perhaps not surprisingly following 
Roberts' (1995) findings one can detect several parallels between the urban centres 
and living conditions of the urban poor in Latin America and in Turkey. 
166 According to Inglehart (1997, p. 237) "ethnic and cultural issues are becoming more prominent. 
Economic conflicts are increasingly sharing the stage with new issues that were almost invisible a 
generation ago: environmental protection, abortion, ethnic conflicts, women's issues and gay and 
lesbian emancipation are heated issues today. " 
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The unprecedented rise of the WP in 1994 and 1995 elections was strongly related to 
the process of rapid urbanisation that took place between 1980 and 1990. The WP 
gained the largest share of the municipalities across the country securing 19 % of the 
votes and 26 municipalities out of 72 provincial capitals including Istanbul and 
Ankara. )67 According to Shmuelevitz (1996, p. 175) there is a direct relationship 
between migration and rise of the WP/VP. 16$ What we have seen is that from the 
early 1980s due to the neoliberal economic policies a second wave of rapid 
urbanisation took place. 
4.3 The Implications of Rapid Urbanisation 
4.3.1 Economic Consequences and the Growth of Shantytowns 
The social base of party support in certain areas is determined by the socioeconomic 
characteristics (income level, type of occupation, and level of education) in the 
studied areas. Despite the fact that many observers discredit class cleavages, they play 
an important role in voting behaviour in Turkey. )69 
Both the sub-districts Keciören and Mamak have a large proportion of gecekondu 
settlements. This means both districts are home to thousands of poor, lower and 
lower middle class residents. Mamak obviously has a larger number of gecekondu 
houses. i 7o 
167 Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1997, p. 144 
168 Shmuelevitz (1996, p. 175) argued that " There is no doubt that the continued waves of immigrants 
to the big cities and the continued socio-economic crisis, which the coalition governments of the 
centre-moderate right and the left of centres parties did not yet managed to solve, only strengthened the 
trends which appeared in the elections of 1991 towards the extremism, especially towards the religious 
right as the most promising option to solve the crisis. " 
169 For an analysis of 'old politics' and 'new politics' see Dalton & Kuechler, 1990, Challenging the 
Political Order; Pakulski, J. 1991, Social Movements, pp. 25-5I; Russell J. Dalton, 1988, Citizen 
Politics in Western Democracies, pp. 151-176. 
170 For it quick reminder. I have dealt with the socio-economic characteristics of Ankara in brief and 
in some detail sub districts of Kegiüren and Mamak in chapter I. I shall not repeat the facts here. 
ý ý: ý. ýýýýý, wy 
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Historically first gecekondus emerged on the outskirts of rapidly expanding cities 
from the 1950s. 171 From the sociological point of view gecekondulavºna 
(squatterisation) was due to a growth of population that was not matched by industrial 
growth. 172 When we focus on the historical development of the phenomenon of the 
gecekondulaýma we notice its dual dimensions- quantitative and qualitative. The 
quantitative dimension refers to the numbers of gecekondus and their populations and 
the rate of gecekondu dwellers within the general population. From 1950 onwards the 
numbers of gecekondu and their population have been increasing. 
As with many other rapidly urbanising countries newcomers responded to the lack of 
regular housing by occupying state owned land illegally and built gecekondu houses. 
Gecekondu settlements soon become the main source of housing (Danielson and 
Kelq, 1985, p. 41). There seems to be a wide gap between the growth of population 
and the growth of industrial investment in the major Turkish cities since the 1950s. 













Istanbul 983 1,467 2,132 4,433 7,309 744 
Ankara 289 650 1,236 1,878 3,236 1 120 
Izmir 228 361 521 1,096 2,694 1119 
Adana 118 232 347 575 1,934 1640 
Bursa 104 154 276 445 1,603 1540 
Source: Danielson and Kele$ (1985, p. 50) and 1990 Censuses of Population, State Institute of Statistic, 
Printing Division, October 1993. 
In Turkey rapid urbanization was a respond to the major socio-economic shifts that 
occurred from the early 1950s, however as mentioned earlier, since the 1980s there 
has been another major restructurization of the Turkish economy that led to the 
second phase of rapid migration from rural to urban centres. It was this second phase 
of rapid migration that changed the population balance from rural to urban. In less 
171 "Over-urbanisation" as one of the key concept of urban studies has been discussed by many 
Western as well as Turkish writers. See for example Michael N. Danielson and Rusen Keles, The 
Politics of Rapid urbanization, 1985 , pp. 38-39; M. Castells, 1977, The Urban Ouestion, pp. 41-43. 172 Danielson and Keles, 1985, p. 38. 
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than twenty years urban population increased from 19.6 million in 1980 to 40.8 
million in 1997 (see table 4.1). 
Table 4.2 shows that migration was concentrated around the five largest cities: 
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana and Bursa. From 1945 to 1990 Turkey's population 
multiplied by 3.04. While the urban population multiplied by 9.67, this rate was just 
1.45 among the rural population. Istanbul's population grew by 7.44 while Ankara's 
population multiplied by 11.20, and Izmir's population multiplied 1 1.19 times. 
The second phase of rapid urbanisation took place between 1985 and 1990. During 
this period Turkey's population increased 21.71 per thousand per year. In Istanbul, 
however, this rate was more than twice (44.78 per thousand per year) the national 
average, Ankara's population grew (21.28 per thousand per year) slower than 
Istanbul's but was still higher than national average, in Izmir it was 30.14, in Adana 
22.86, and in Bursa 38.26 per thousand per year. Even some cities like Antalya grove 
as much as 47.88 per thousand per year, making the difference of population increase 
more visible in between rural and urban areas. 173 
Although in the 1950s urbanisation was led by industrial growth and economic 
vitality in the cites in the 1950s, the massive population flowing from the countryside 
to cities soon exhausted the jobs and housing facilities created by the industrial 
growth. The reason for this rapid urbanisation, apart from a short period, was the 
'push' factors of rural Anatolia. ''` 
Keyder (1987, p. 136) argued that under the impact of rapid urbanisation as 
experienced in most developing countries the shantytown became a tangible 
correlative of substantial demographic movements reflecting the dramatic flow of 
population into urban areas. It created serious implications and upheavals in social 
balance. Following the massive migration there appeared a belt of gecekondus that 
grew rapidly and soon encircled all of these expanding cities. 
173 See 1990 census of Population, 1993, p. 28. 
174 1 any using the term `push' factors as Castel Is, (1977, p. 41) used. 
_ -ý: ý .ý ýý. __ý 
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According to Peker (1996, p. 19) between 1980 and 1985 2.9 million people migrated 
and vast majority (two-third) of them ended up working irregularly in the low income 
marginal sectors. By 1995 over one third (35 percent) of all urban population is lived 
in the gecekondu areas. In the first instance it may not appear as a significantly high 
ratio of urban population but we must remember that the vast majority of gecekondus 
has been concentrated around Turkey's five largest cities. 
Table: 4.3 Ratio of Gecekond (Squatter) Population within the Urban 
Population: 1955-1995 
Years Number of Number of Ratio of gecekondu 
units Individuals population Within the 
Urban Population 
1955 50,000 250,000 4.7 
1960 240,000 1,200,000 16.4 
1965 430,000 2,150,000 22.9 
1970 600,000 3,000,000 23.6 
1980 1,150,000 5,750,000 26.1 
1990 1,750,000 8,750,000 33.9 
1995 2,000,000 10,000,000 35.0 
Source: Kclcs R, Kentlesme politikasi, Imge Kilabevi, Ankara. 1993: 383: " Kongar, 2000: 566. 
As argued previously over-urbanisation has been the most challenging problem facing 
Turkey since the 1950s. A key indicator of over-urbanisation is the ever-expanding 
shantytown encircling the main Turkish cities. The quantitative dimension of 
gecekondus in predominantly urbanised Turkey has great significance for this study 
because the WP/VP gets the bulk of its urban support from gecekondu areas. 
As shown in table 4.3 in 1955 gecekondus consisted of only 4.7 percent of the urban 
population. The ratio increased almost four times (16.4 % in 1960) in five years, by 
1970 this trend slowed down slightly 23.6 % and 26.1 % in 1980. By 1990 
gecekondus consisted of 33.9 percent of urban population indicating a relatively high 
increase since the 1980s. In 1995 there were two million gecekondus and 10 millions 
gecekondu dwellers that make up more then one third (35 %) of whole urban 
population in Turkey. 
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However, as it has been observed by some researchers that the most of urban 
population growth has been concentrated around those big cities that has population 
of one million or more (See Kongar E 2000, p. 556-57). Thus, the ratio of gecekondu 
population is far greater in those largest cities. For instance gecekondu population 
Table: 4.4 Squatter Housing in Ankara 1950-1990' 
Years Number of Number of People Percentage of 
Squatter Living in Squatter Population 
Houses Housing Living in 
Squatter Housing 
1950 12,000 62,400 21.8 
1960 70,0(H) 364,000 56.0 
1970 144,000 748,000 60.6 
1980 275,000 1,450,0(X) 72.4 
1990* 350,000 1,750,000 58.4** 
Source: Figures (950-80 taken from Danielson and Kele,, 1985: 166 
* Figures for 1990 taken from Kele, R, Kcntle, mc politikasi, Imge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1993, p. 384. 
** The fall in the ratio of gecekondu housing from 72.4 % in 1980 to 58.4 in 1990 in Ankara is 
unlikely to indicate a slowdown in the rate of urban ization/squatterisat ion in the 1990 in general but it 
might be an indication of rapid transformation of old gecekondu areas -while the new gecekondu areas 
growing -into authorised apartments in Ankara (See Ozdemir N, 1999). 
makes up to 70 per cent of Ankara (in 1980) and 58.4 (in 1997), 55 per cent in 
Istanbul and 50 percent in Izmir (sec Gökce, 1996, p. 92). This figure clearly indicates 
that between half and two third of all Istanbul, Ankara and tzmir are consists of 
gecekondu population. A close examination of Ankara's demographic make up can 
be helpful for a better understanding of political significant of gecekondu areas in 
general and electoral success of WP/VP in particular. 
M. Kemal chose Ankara as the capital city of modern and secular republic in the early 
1920s and it has been one of the fastest growing cities in Turkey. In the 1920s Ankara 
was a small Anatolian town with its around 20,000 population (Kelq, 1971, pp. 1-2). 
By 1950 its population was 289.000,650,000 (in 1960) 1,236,000 (in 1970), 
1,878,000 (in 1980), 3,236,000 (in 1990) and in 2000 its population reached to 4,007, 
150 
860. Between 1990 and 2000 Ankara's population increased 21.37 %o(See table 4.2) 
175 
Parallel to increase of Ankara's population we see an increase on the ratio of 
gecekondu population. In 1950 there was 12,000 gecekondus and 62,400 gecekondu 
dwellers consisting of only 21.8 % of population, following decade we see a five fold 
increase in the numbers of gecekondus (70,000) accommodating 364,000 gecekondu 
dwellers making up 56 percent of Ankara's population. By 1970 there were 144,000 
gecekondus 748,000 gecekondu inhabitants making up 60.6 percent of population. 
Following decade the numbers of gecekondus went up to 275,000 and its population 
doubled to 1,450,00 making almost three quarter (72.4 %) of Ankara's population. 
According to a latest estimate by the 1990 58.4 percent of Ankara's population lived 
in gecekondus. There were 350,000 gecekondus with 1,750,000 inhabitants. (Gökce, 
1996, p. 92). Unfortunately, obtaining an accurate, consistent and up-to-date data on 
gecekondus has not been easy for the students of social sciences in Turkey. The 
reason for this is the State Statistics Institution that is the only institution for 
nationwide statistics is not collecting data on gecekondu areas. However it is plausible 
to expect a decrease on the rate of squatter settlements within the total urban 
population in Ankara, because of the transformation of gecekondu settlements into 
authorised apartment blocks. 176 Nevertheless, the ratio of squatter settlements is still 
58.4 percent and constitutes a great significance. 
4.3.2 Gecekondus Under the Restructuring Policies 
The 1980s were a turning point in many senses that brought major shifts in the 
direction of the economy and politics in Turkey. The structural adjustment 
programme, which was backed if not imposed by the IMF and the World Bank and 
aimed to replace the closed, interventionist economic model with the neoliberal 
market economy had a profound impact on Turkish society. Undoubtedly the socio- 
175 See littp: //www. die. gov. tr/nufus_sayimi/020I2002T3. jpg 
176 See for example, Nihan Özdemir's unpublished Ph. D. thesis on The Transformation of Squatter 
Settlements into Authorised Apartment Blocks: A Case Study of Ankara, Turkey. Submitted at the 
University of Kent at Canterbury, 1999. She has studied two districts of Ankara Kcriören and Cankaya 
in where this transformation ofgecekondus into apartment blocks took place. 
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economic and political implications of these restructuring programmes have been 
tremendous. 177 
By the late 1970s Turkey's economic crisis had deepened. Coupled with widespread 
social unrest, increased violence and political killings in the streets this led to the 
military seizure of power on 12 September 1980.178 The military government is 
widely seen as an opportunity for the big bourgeoisie to implement the IMF's well- 
known `24`x' January' [1979] decisions adopted by the conservative Demirel 
government but which had not been implemented. 
Soon after the military coup (1980) the Chief of the General Staff made a speech in 
which he plainly and explicitly extended his support for the neoliberal, restructuring 
programmes. ''` Because the big business like TÜSIAD accused the successive 
governments for their `populist policies' that made the work force uncontrollable and 
leading to the failure of economic model. Therefore it was believed that the labour 
market must be reorganised under an authoritarian regime (Tosun, 1999, p. 146). As 
Vehbi Koc, one of the most prominent representatives of the big business explained: 
Before the 12 September action we had to do everything under the democratic 
system. It was necessary to spend months to pass an amendment or it law. 
... 
The difference under the military government is that because you do not 
need to pass the decisions and laws from parliament everything is so fast, even 
when they make a mistake they correct it quickly without any political 
approach. It was because; they have no fear of losing seat in the parliament or 
losing the voters' faith. 181) 
Koc was not just justifying the military coup but also expressing how big business 
was desperately in need of the radical economic reforms made possible by it. The 
main objectives of the restructuring programme were as follows: 
177 For a detailed analysis of structural adjustment programme and its impacts see collection of essays 
in Eralp, A, Tünay, M and Yeýilada, B, 1993; Boratav, K. 1990; "Inter-Class and Intra-Class Relations 
of Distribution under 'Structural Adjustment' : Turkey during the 1980s" pp. 199-230, in (eds. ) Aricanli, 
T and Rodrik, D 1990; Oni§ Z and Webb, S, 1993 pp. 128-184; See also Ziya Oni$, 1997, The Political 
economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the Welfare Party in perspective" Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 743-76. Ramazanoglu, H, 1985, Turkey in the World Capitalist System, Gower 
Publishing Company Ltd. 
178 For some accounts of the military rule of 12 September 1980 see: C. H. Dodd, 1990, The Crisis of 
Turkish Dentocvacv, The Eothen Press; Qetin Yetkin, 1995, Tbrkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika 
(Turkey's Military Coups and America ), Ümit Yayincihk, Ankara; and also see, William Hale, 1994, 
Turkish politics and the Alilitarv, Rutledge, London. 
179 For an account of the economy politics of the military regime sec: Tosun, T 1997: pp. 145-148. 
t8° Cumhuriyct, 26 Ocak 1982 (Cumhuriyet January 26,1982) quoted in Tosun, T 1999: 146. 
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1) The economy to be exposed to free market forces and international competition; 
2) Private sector to be supported and public investment to be restricted; 
3) A rapid and extensive privatisation programme that meant the privatisation of the 
State Economic Enterprises; 
4) Encouragement of exports and foreign capital with all available means, various 
incentive measures were taken; 
5) Devaluation of the Turkish Lira. 
6) Keeping wages and salaries at low levels. In order to achieve this goal the trade 
union and collective bargaining legislation was changed. 
7) And finally, but very importantly, agricultural subsidies to be abolished altogether. 
(See Dodd, 1990, p. 101; Ramazanoglu, 1985, pp 220-242). 
This so called structural adjustment programme consisted of extensive privatisation, 
closure of many state owned enterprises, mass redundancies from the public sector, 
rolling back the state from economic areas in favour of private investment, flexibility 
of the labour market, increasing sub-contracting, restrictions on unionisation. Turkey 
was introduced to the neoliberal economic model by Turgut Özal who founded the 
Motherland Party (MP), a centre right party, in power from 1983 until 1991. 
By the mid 1980s there was a stiff rise in the urban population in contrast to the sharp 
decline of the rural population. Between 1980 and 1997 many millions of people were 
added to the cities' poorest sections in the gecekondu areas. No doubt this high rate of 
migration during the 1980s and 1990s automatically added many new social and 
economic problems to the ever-expanding gecekondus. Gecekondus were already 
considered the poorest sections of the urban population. For years this population was 
badly affected by countless austerity programmes that had been frequently imposed 
by successive governments. 
It can be argued that structural adjustment policies have been more destractive in 
Turkey especially on the urban poor. Every economy has its specific characteristics. 
Privatisation is one of the main pillars of neoliberalism and can have devastating 
consequences in a country where the state acts as the locomotive force of economic 
development. In Turkey, for example, up until the 1980s, for historical reasons such 
as the lack of an industrial bourgeois class, the state was very active in the economic 
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sphere. Since the 1930s the state has been the main entrepreneur for infrastructure 
investments: roads, bridges, electricity, irrigation to industrial production in areas like 
coal, mining, steel, cement, sugar; from the financial sector: banking, insurance to 
state monopoly of the production of cigarette, alcoholic drink and the salt; and from 
services to agriculture. 
In fact, the public share of capital in the State-owned Enterprises (Kama Iktisadi 
Tesebbiisleri) is nearly 50 percent of the total capital. The government employs 3 out 
of 8 million regularly employed workers (Cam, 1999, p. 697). Thus, it is plausible to 
argue that, throughout the 1980s and the 1990s the implementation of neoliberal 
restructuring programmes like the privatisation of public enterprises, deregulation of 
the labour market, restrictions on unionisation or collective bargaining, increased 
subcontracting, temporary or part time employment, 18' had a profound impact on the 
wage and salary earners; low and lower middle class, the poor, landless and small 
peasantry, shopkeepers and artisans. 
Consequently, as is evident from table 4.5 the share of wages in the GNP sharply 
declined from 26.7 percent in 1980; 24.6 percent in 1981 and 82; 24.8 % in 1983; 
21.6 % in 1984; 18.8 % in 1985; 17.5 % in 1986; 17.0 % in 1987 and finally to 14.0 
in 1988. The decline of the share of wages within the GNP meant a loss of one- 
half of real wages for most ordinary wage earners. As a result of neoliberal economic 
policies, particularly the low wage and income transfer policies, the gap between the 
richest 20 percent and the poorest 20 percent of households widened further. For 
example the share of total disposable income for the poorest quintile household within 
the TGNP was 5.24 percent in 1987 and 4.86 percent in 1994. On the contrary the 
share of the richest quintile household received from TGNP rose from 49.94 percent 
in 1987 to 54.88 percent in 1994. 
Consequently Turkey became one of the five worst countries alongside Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, in terms of unequal income distribution. '82 A parallel process 
involving the index of real wages shows a substantial decline in wages between 1976 
and 1986. Real wages fell more than 50 percent in ten years. The index of 100 in 1976 
181 See Peker, 1996. 
1 82Tosun, 1999, pp. 179-180. 
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fell to 49 in 1985 (Boratav, 1990, pp. 206-207). This means that the wage and salary 
earners and their dependents, lost 50.9 percent of their income in less than ten years. 
Undoubtedly, under the restructuring programme the cities were most affected. 
Especially the urban poor living in low-income gecekondu areas were forced to take a 
second or sometimes third jobs, in order to provide the daily bread. 
Table: 4.5 GDP Shares of the Different Types of Income Between 1980 and 1988 
Income Types % 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Agricultural 
Incomes 23.9 23.0 21.8 20.5 20.4 19.1 18.1 17.6 15.8 
non-agricultural 
Incomes 76.1 76.9 78.2 79.5 79.6 80.9 81.7 82.4 84.2 
Wages 26.7 24.6 24.6 24.8 21.6 18.8 17.5 17.0 14.0 
Income Other 
Then Wages 49.5 52.4 53.5 54.7 58.0 62.1 64.2 65.4 70.2 
GNP Growth 
Rates -1.1 4.1 4.5 3.3 5.9 5.1.8.0 7.4 3.4 
Source: Özmucur, H 1989, (quoted by Baharoglu, D. 1993, p. 74). 
The IMF-designed restructuring programmes, however, did not solve the major 
shortcomings of the Turkish economy. Since the 1980s the high rate of inflation has 
been eroding, on a daily basis, already low wages and salaries. There have been many 
economic austerity programmes supposedly designed for economic recovery, but so 
far, without exception, all have failed to achieve to that goal. As Theo Nichols (1996, 
p. 2) argued `continuing IMF and World Bank policy interventions have made the 
distribution of income in Turkey among the most polarized in the world'. Those who 
lived on agricultural incomes witnessed a dramatic (44 percent) fall in income. The 
share of agricultural incomes within the GNP was 23.9 percent in 1980 but fell to 20.4 
in 1984 and 15.8 percent by 1988. 
There are two important points to make. The first one is that the neoliberal economic 
policies, by causing income disparities, disintegrated rural life so that millions of 
peasants had to seek employment in the cities. The second point is that the low wages 
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and salary policies deepened the poverty of the millions of urban dwellers in the 
cities. The low wage policy of the 1980s hit worst the gecekondu areas, inhabited by 
millions of newcomer migrants of the rapidly growing cities. 
The declining income in the villages was due to accelerated internal migration. 
Millions of villagers moved to cities where they again faced a declining trend of 
wages and salaries. The low wage policy was a deliberate attempt to curb internal 
demand while increasing exports. Also this low wage policy was designed as a 
vehicle of income transfer from the wages and salaries of millions of people including 
the lower middle classes to the interests and profits of a small minority. The rationale 
behind the income transfer was to materialise the elusive capital accumulation and by 
doing so, the ruling elite and bourgeoisie sought to solve the deepened economic 
crisis. 
4.3.3 The Political Implications of Rapid Urbanisation 
The first political implication of the expansion of gecckondus was in the growth of 
local politics. Between 1945 and 1990 the numbers of municipalities increased nearly 
four times (352 percent) from 583 municipalities in 1945 to 2053 in 1990. In line with 
the massive growth of gecekondu areas there was increasing need and political 
pressure on the central government for the provision of infrastructure and services. 
Therefore the political significance of gecekondus increased. 
The second implication has been the shift of electoral preferences of gecekondu 
dwellers. Studies show that there have been important electoral swings from time to 
time in gecekondu areas. 183 It was observed that throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
culture of optimism was prevalent among gecekondu dwellers. But this economic 
growth and culture of optimism was undermined by the economic stagnation 
deepened by the lack of foreign currency and the unforeseen petrol crisis in the mid 
1970s. The optimism the first generation of migrants enjoyed gradually faded away. 
In this crisis atmosphere, as Özbudun (1976, p. 106) points out, the Republican 
183 Sec Danielson and Keles 1985, pp. 101-1 10 ; Karpat, 1975, p. 89-199 ; Hale, 1981, pp. 117-127; 
Ozbudun, 1976, pp. 200-205; Shmuclevitz, 1996, pp. 162-193. 
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People's Party (RPP) moved to the left, stressing the need for greater equity and 
attention to the problems of the poor. 
Table: 4.6 Party Support by Type of Housing Area in the National Elections, 
1965-1973 
Election Years (National Elections) 
City 1965 1969 1973 
JP RPP Oth JP RPP Oth. JP RPP Oth. * 
Istanbul 52.0 30.4 17.6 47.8 33.8 18.4 28.5 48.9 22.6 
Gecekondus 62.4 19.1 18.5 53.8 21.8 24.4 26.7 47.5 25.8 
Ankara 46.5 30.2 23.3 42.4 36.0 21.0 29.2 44.8 26.0 
Gecekondus 52.5 25.8 21.7 43.4 30.1 26.5 27.7 45.9 26.4 
Izmir 62.1 29.8 8.0 53.2 35.1 11.7 40.9 44.6 14.5 
Gecekondus 72.1 17.0 10.9 60.7 22.6 16.7 36.5 44.2 19.3 
" JP= The Justice Party (Conservative), RPP= The Republican People's Party (Left of centre, 
Oth. = Other Parties (Includes NSP The National Salvation Party and TLP The Turkish 
Labour Party and some other small parties). 
" ** City rows of data do not include gecekondus in these particular cities. They were estimated 
separately. 
Source: Danielson and Kclq, The politics of Rapid Urbanisation, pp. 107-109. 
As shown in table 4.6 voting preferences drastically changed. Throughout the 1970s, 
the slide of lower income voters towards the left accelerated. Two decades later, a 
very similar swing on the voting behaviour of gecekondu dwellers has occurred. As 
the neoliberal restructuring programmes went ahead, they created enormous 
inequalities, unemployment, income losses, growing uncertainty, abandonment of 
social security policies, millions of new migrants in the cities and so on. 
As mentioned above the impacts of the neoliberal policies have been much more 
brutal on the gecekondu population, so there has been a significant swing in voting 
behaviour. This time, (in the 1990s), gecekondus chose to support the Welfare Party 
for precisely the same reasons they supported the RPP in the 1970s. The WP/VP has 
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been the only party that seems to care for the problems of the urban poor and pay 
attention to the demand for social justice and equality. 184 
Undoubtedly the 1990s was a decade of great expectations in many senses but it was 
rather a disappointment for large sections of society in Turkey. Mainly the lower 
middle and lower classes, the urban poor, and the Kurdish minority were increasingly 
disaffected with the mainstream centre left and centre right parties and slid toward the 
WP in the millions. 
The 1990s witnessed two important developments as well. First was the emergence of 
the gecekondu areas as a key electoral force. The second was the process of party 
convergence leading to the collapse of the Social Democrat party. In this atmosphere 
the WP/VP emerged as the `one guard' of the exploited poverty stricken urban 
masses. With its promise of Adil Diizen (Just Society), greater equality, restoration of 
the state's role in the economy, and clean! uncorrupted government and its very well 
organised, very active and committed grassroots activists the WP/VP appealed to the 
gecekondu dwellers more strongly then any other parties. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to illuminate the modern faces of political Islam. It is 
argued that contrary to common belief, Islamist movements are the product of the 
process of modernisation and rapid urbanisation. They emerged and flourished in 
rapidly urbanised societies rather then rural towns or traditional communities. As is 
evident from my own empirical data on grassroots activists of the pro-Islamic Fazilet 
(Virtue) Party the cadres of these Islamic movements are educated in western style 
modern schools. They tend to be better educated than the majority, with a higher level 
of occupation and income. In the meantime the activists and leading figures may 
have anti imperialist attitudes but to view these movements, as a threat to the West 
would be misleading. 
It was argued that the peasant societies of Third World countries in the 1940s and 
1950s underwent a great transformation and within thirty years became the urbanised 
184 See Ayata, S 1993, pp. 51-67; cakir, 1994, p. 223; Kalaycioglu, 1996, pp. 403-424; Milliyer, 
(Istanbul daily) January 22,1999; Ozbudun, p. 88 and Shmuelevitr,, 1996, p. 168. 
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societies of the 1980 and 1990s. Likewise, many underdeveloped Muslim countries, 
such as Iran and Egypt, also experienced rapid rural to urban migration and faced the 
social, economic, cultural and political consequences of it. It has been highlighted that 
there is a positive correlation between urbanisation and political participation. 
Urbanisation, in various ways, expands the social basis of political participation. As 
participation gains a more rational and less family/tradition orientation the numbers of 
the networks of participation increase as well. With urbanisation the rate of literacy 
and newspaper readership grows. Due to developments in new information 
technologies communication and information transformation becomes ever easier. 
Today an ordinary citizen can have an extraordinary amount of information at his 
reach. 
Since the 1950s Turkey witnessed a rapid urbanisation process. However, the pattern 
of urbanisation has been very different compared to developed western countries. 
Urbanisation of the developing countries was not led by a significant industrialisation 
or economic development, but was created merely by the factors of rural push. 
Because the over-urbanisation- in Turkey was led by rural push rather then urban pull 
it was prone to cause social problems. One of the most noticeable phenomena 
following the rapid urbanisation was the gecekondu settlement that enveloped the 
metropolitan areas. Due to the lack of resources for housing the newcomers took the 
initiative and built their own houses. In fact they have created their own cities in many 
cases. 
Perhaps, it is time now to consider the relationship between neoliberal restructuring 
programmes implemented since the 1980s, which are a significant part of 
globalisation process and the unprecedented rise of the WP/VP throughout the 1990s. 
Is there any sign of an alternative to this process? Can the rise of the WP/VP be 
interpreted as an alternative movement against neoliberal policies? 
It has been observed that global capitalism has significantly eroded the functions and 
the borders of nation states. One of the consequences of globalisation is the end of the 
nation state. As a result national level governance has become ineffective (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996, pp. 175-195). This development has also undermined the ability of 
governments and political parties to govern. International corporations have 
increasingly taken over the nation states' space by pushing them out of both 
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economics and politics. In this process they have acquired increasing power to dictate 
policies of taxation, privatisation, flexible labour markets and other issues suit their 
interests. This influence often takes the form of IMF led economic "restoration" or 
"stability" programmes and usually tied to new credit. 
As Guehennon, 1995 (cited by Hague, Rat al 1998, pp. 36-37) argues, "the demand of 
the global economy has transformed politics into management". He claims that 
"governments no longer make choices, they simply manage their country's 
engagement with global markets" The expansion of economics in the form of 
neoliberalism has left very limited room for politics. The very essence of politics has 
been negated. It is left without any purpose or function. Inevitably, extremely 
weakened politics has caused widespread apathy among citizens. Because politics is 
reduced to management, voters lose interest and simply turn away from it. The best 
example of this can be found among western democracies. For example in Britain, 42 
percent of voters did not bother to vote at the last general election in June 2001. It is 
estimated that voter turnout in that general election fell to 58% - "the lowest level of 
popular participation for such an event in more than 80 years. " 1A5 As neoliberalism 
takes over the world on the back of globalisation, it creates inequality, injustice, 
poverty and misery for millions, as well as dissent and dissatisfaction. As a result the 
majority of the urban poor become hopeless and turn away from politics. 
This is not so in the Turkish case. As the neoliberal restructuring policies obliterated 
everything in their way the urban poor of the gecekondu areas increasingly politicised 
and raised their voice against this process. By voting, supporting the WP/VP or 
becoming party activists the urban poor actually make a strong statement. They 
declare that they will not give in or surrender to global capitalism but instead will 
fight against it. The poor urban communities indicate their dissatisfaction with the 
whole process and show their intention to create an alternative by throwing their own 
leaders into arena and unite around the WP/VP who is opposed to this process. The 
185 See "A strong case of election apathy" BBC Tuesday. 5 June, 2001, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/vote2OO I /hi/english/features/newsid_ 1371000/ 1371 191. stm) 
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WP/VP offer a kind of third way-Adil Diizen (Just Society)-between capitalism and 
socialism. 186 
I argue that as a result of neoliberal economic policies, millions migrated from 
villages to the periphery of the major urban centres. There they were further 
disappointed and disillusioned with the mainstream political establishment. This 
dissatisfaction of the urban masses due to the economic crisis and political instability 
changed voting patterns. At times of crisis, especially among those newcomers, there 
is a tendency to turn to extremes, both on the right and the left. 187 The urban middle 
lower and lower classes and the under classes of the gecekondus sought an alternative 
to the incompetent, corrupt, elite mainstream politics. 
In the 1990s the gecekondus areas, more recently known as varoslar, became the 
main battleground for political power. Today the three major cities of Istanbul, 
Ankara and Zaire, where the majority of MP's are elected, and the gecekondus with 
their large population hold the electoral balance. It was pointed out that at the last 
general elections (1995) the majority of those urban poor who earned between $ 654 - 
1000 a year voted for the Islamist WP. 188 The Islamist WP/VP emerged as the party 
of social justice and prosperity, as their names imply. Many scholars noted that the 
WP with its Adil Dilzen (Just Society) fills the gap left by the decline of the centre- 
left RPP due to its privatisation programme while in power (1991-1995). By using 
this historic opportunity the WP strengthened its position amongst the urban poor and 
disadvantaged masses by giving voice to their grievances, concerns and identity 
problems. 
The WP/VP has a massive and very active grassroots organisation in action not only 
at election time but all year around. As one of my grassroots activist informants told 
me, "We are not 'seasonal workers' like the other parties' activists. 189 We are 
permanent workers in our neighbourhood". They work as social workers and do a lot 
186 The WP/VP as argued in chapter 2 and 3 the only modern mass based political party and opposed 
the neoliberal economy policies. It has proposed a kind of social democratic economy policies called as 
Adil Mizell (Just Order). Also see Özbudun, 2000, p. 88. 
187 Shmuelevitz, 1996, p. 168. 
188 See Milliyet, January 22,1999. 
189 The term seasonal worker takes it's meaning from an employment practice common in Turkey. 
There are thousands of people who work for government on seasonal contracts e. g. in the agricultural 
sector seasonal workers usually work 3 or 4 months in summer in a year. 
161 
of social work in the gecekondu neighbourhoods, being consistent not only a few 
months before the elections but throughout the year. 
Considering the surprise election successes of the NAP in the last general elections in 
18 April, 1999 one can say that the NAP undertook major changes in its leadership, 
some of its main policies and adopted new campaign strategy and tactics that the 
WP/VP used effectively. '90 In the last general elections there were two very surprising 
results; one was the Democratic Left Party (DLP) that doubled its share of vote from 
10.8 % in 1995 to 22.3 percent, the second was even more surprising; the ultra 
Nationalist Action Party (NAP) which has increased its share of vote 10 percent from 
8.2 % in 1995 to 18.1 percent in 1999 (see table 2.2). It was a big surprise that even 
the NAP's leadership found hard to contemplate. '' However there is a sociological 
explanation for both parties' unprecedented election successes. 
Both parties have done so well because they share something quite similar. Both are 
the nationalist parties; the NAP is on the extreme right of the political spectrum and 
the DLP is again nationalist party on the left side of the spectrum. When analysed the 
political and electoral background it can be seen that both parties seized the wind that 
was created by the capture of Kurdish Separatist leader Abdullah Ocala in Nairobi- 
Kenya on15 February 1999, just two months before the elections. A. Öcalan that 
being charged with treason and killing of 35 000 people during the 15 years brutal 
conflict in the Southeast Anatolia was captured with a special operation by the 
Turkish security forces and flown to Turkey with a big publicity. This spectacular 
capture provided an enormous political prestige and credit for the Bulent Ecevit and 
his party the DLP that was in office as a minority government with Motherland Party 
(MP). The MP a centre-right party that was weakened by endless corruption charges 
(e. g. Turkbank scandal) and its dissatisfying policies in previous government as well. 
On contrast the veteran leader of the DLP Bulent Ecevit has been renounced with his 
honesty and clean image in politics. 
190 cakir R, 1998b, "The NAP afterTurk-es", Istanbul daily Mi//iyet, 29 September 1998. 
191 Nurriyet (Istanbul daily) 1999, "The big success surprised the NAP too" 21 April 1999. 
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The 1999 general and local elections-at the same time- were held in a background of 
extreme climax of corruption scandals that rocked nearly all political parties and 
politicians and under the shadow of the `Susurluk eventt' that reviled the deep running 
unlawful connections between hundreds of bureaucrats, upper echelons of political 
parties and politicians especially both centre-right parties of TPP, MP and Mafia. It 
was Ecevit's DLP and at some extent the NAP was left untouched by the climax of 
corruption scandals. 
The NAP was established thirty years ago and until 1999 it has always been on the 
fringe of political spectrum. But since death of Türkeý it has transformed itself from 
an old style extreme right to conservative centre-right party. Especially the death of its 
long-term leader Alpaslan Tiirkes -an ex-officer involved with a military coup in the 
1960 and fired from the army - also he was very much involved with extreme street 
violence that Turkey experienced in the late 1970s. Upon his death the NAP selected 
a new leader; Devlet Bahceli an academic and his restructuring policy changed the 
image of NAP from a gang-like, mafia-involved extreme nationalist party to a much 
liberal, peaceful, system-party. Its new outlook was declared as "struggle against 
globalisation while doing that they wanted to avoid the trap of culturelism of new 
left". They claimed that the 21-century will be century of Turks' and claimed to 
transform Turkey to "a leader country in the global scale" ((; akir R, 1998b). NAP 
leader D. Bahceli declared their main aim as the fulfilment of the public demand for a 
"clean society" obviously referring the extremely corrupted political elite. Its main 
election slogan was the struggle against poverty and corruption that both were the 
centre issues of the 1999 elections. 192 
After the death of its ex-leader Türke* the NAP spend a quiet and difficult year. But 
just before the elections it seems it regained its confidence and quite confident to 
make real electoral gains. It seems the party accepted D. Bahcelis leadership. In 
addition Bahceli himself there are many academics in the party. He has got many 
lecturers and retired bureaucrats as his advisory board. All plans prepared in order to 
gain at least 10 percent of the vote. In our meetings in Anatolia with the members of 
Luke Ocular (NAP's local organisations) everyone seemed confident to obtain at least 
10 percent of vote (cakir R, 1998b). 
192 Milliyct 1999, "The aim is a clean society", 29 April 1999. 
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Before the elections in 18 April 1999, the NAP adopted the some of the WP/VP's 
campaign strategy and tactics. Like the WP/VP the NAP too chose the urban poor as 
the main target group. In addition to its Ülkü Ocaklca-r, which is its main local 
organisations and well spread in the neighbourhoods, it set up neighbourhood bureaus 
coordinated with the Ülkü Ocaklari. In these bureaus they mainly recruited poor, 
disadvantaged, unemployed, and excluded young people. They some times fined jobs 
to them or after indoctrinating with its ideology they run very active election 
campaign. In fact according to Ozbudun (2000, p. 81) in terms of "membership 
participation in party activities- other than voting- was found to be highest in the two 
strongly nationalistic parties, the NAP and the PDP... " As Özbudun observed before 
the elections in 1999 the NAP's members were very active in participating the local 
party campaigning. Similar to the WP/VP the NAP organised sonic small scale 
welfare services in the areas such as collecting from wealthier ANP supporters 
individuals, business, shopkeepers or from those municipalities that hold by NAP to 
distribute in the poor gecekondu areas. 
It has been argued that the young generation who was born after the coup (in 1980) 
has played a crucial role in the NAP's election success of doubling its share of vote in 
1999 elections before the last election the government changed election law and 
lowered voting age from 20 to 18. It meant an increase of 2.5 million new, young 
electorates and half of which, it is believed, and this number voted fro the NAP. 
(i$leyen, E 1999). The NAP has been building up its support in many different levels, 
but in the last five years it came to be characterised as the party of young those who 
born after the military coup of 1980 and have no idea about the NAP's extreme right 
violent past. It appeals to this group because they disillusioned with the existing 
centre-right and left parties. Demographically, Turkey has a very young population 
but it seems majority of mainstream parties has not been paying enough attention to 
this fact as much as the NAP has been doing. 
One of the most important variables that affected the rise of the NAP was the 
escalation of the Kurdish uprising in the Southeast Turkey. The rise of Kurdish 
nationalism and intensification of fight between the security forces and the PKK has 
led to a rise of nationalist feelings among many ordinary Turks especially the young 
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less educated, unemployed and excluded youth in the gecekondus as well as in the 
small town in central Anatolia regions. The NAP has been building its support among 
the young people because they are the party that invaded the football stadiums with 
their nationalistic slogans, especially with an anti Kurdish rhetoric. As mentioned 
above the war in the southeast led to death of more than thirty thousand civilians 
including 501 children, 512 women, 3,489 army members mainly young soldiers, 180 
police man and 1144 mainly Kurdish village guards. 193 Throughout the 1990s the 
NAP developed a strategy of turning every death in to a political stage. By being there 
sharing the grievances, walking with the funeral precessions, shouting slogans like 
"the martyrs does not die, the country wont be split" and anti-PKK slogans the NAP 
turned its image to party of carers of the martyrs that sacrificed their life for the 
country and for their families. (See Pulur, H 1999) 
Finally it can be said that in this climax of heightened wave of nationalism and 
patriotism and the capture of the leader of the PKK just two months before the 
elections gave an enormous momentum for both nationalistic parties the NAP and 
DLP. It would of course be a mistake to argue that the electoral success of the ANP 
was due purely to on its nationalistic policies and anti-PKK stands but as mentioned 
there were other important socio-economic and political issues like fight against 
corruption and poverty that party advocated in its election campaign. 
In the mean time the social democrat RPP, like many in Western Europe, lost belief in 
its core ideology of freedom, equality and social justice and failed to put forward an 
alternative ideology against the rising new right, but rather became a bad imitation of 
it. Consequently it has lost its traditional working class support. In turn the Islamist 
VP will continue to enjoy the support of the urban poor. In fact the mass support that 
the WP/VP attracts can in many ways be classified as a squatter movement unique in 
its mobilisation strategies under the VP's flag. 
193 Radical (Istanbul daily) 1999, "Here is the bloody bill", 17 February 1999. 
165 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EXPLAINING THE MEANING OF PARTY 
MEMBERSHIP: ROUTES TO AND REASONS 
FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
"A certain number of recent sociological studies (Ferry and Renaut, 1987; Piotte, 1987; 
Melucci, 1989; Ion, 1990) have focused on a phenomenon previously overlooked by 
researchers: namely, what individuals gain from their involvement in collective action, what 
motivates them, their need for self-assertion and a recognition of their difference. In other 
words, these recent studies emphasise that in order to grasp the scope or meaning of social 
movements, researchers must take into account the ways in which individuals become 
involved, the concerns that motivates their involvement, and what they as individuals derive 
from their participation in a collective project" (Hamel, Pierre 1995, p. 236). 
5.1 Introduction 
Party members, argued Whiteley, (1995, pp. 211-233) are a distinct group of people 
who by joining a party participate in politics far more than ordinary citizens. 
Consequently, these members are an ideal group to use for examining high-cost types 
of political participation. The literature concerning political participation shows that 
most of the research in this area is devoted to the basic type of political participation, 
i. e. the voting participation, and such studies examine voters and their attitudes. 
Interestingly party members, especially party activists, have not been studied at all. 
Many scholars have commented on the lack of attention and suggested an urgent need 
for more comprehensive research on party activists. As most studies are directed at 
voters and party members the most important participants, party activists, are 
neglected. The question of why some party members choose to become political 
activists while others do very little remains unanswered. 194 
There are different theories to explain citizens' involvement in politics. These theories 
run from rational self-interested individuals to class action; from resource 
194 Sec Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie 1993, p. 310; Leigh ley, 1995, pp. 181-209; Whiteley, 1995. 
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mobilisation theory to opportunity structure theories; from psychological, individual 
needs to a function of an individual's social position etc. However in my study I. 
prefer to use the standard model developed by Verba and Nie (1972) and used by 
many students of politics. They argued that: 
The individual's decision to participate and how to participate depends on his 
social circumstances -the set of social characteristics that defines his "life 
space, " where he lives, what he does for living, his education, his race, and so 
forth. These social circumstances generate sets of attitudes conducive to or 
inhibitor of political participation. How and how much he participates will 
also be affected by the institutional structures within which he finds himself. 
All of these forces lead him to a decision to participate or not... (Verba and 
Nie, 1972: 19). 
An important aspect of understanding why people join a political party is to examine 
the actual mechanics of how they join in the first place. »95 The way in which an 
individual joins a party, association or an interest group tells a lot about both sides: 
the individual's intention, level of commitment, expertise, social environment, 
motives, aspirations and the resources that he/she might possess. The same is relevant 
for the organisation itself. 
This process unfolds the structure and the working principles of an organisation; such 
as whether the organisation is open to everyone or if there are any restriction or 
conditions, whether it actively recruits new members or takes a passive attitude. This 
process spells out whether the party is resourceful, outgoing, reaching out to ordinary 
people at the grassroots level and actively engaged in recruiting or not. What are the 
patterns of membership and why did members join the VP in the first place? By 
doing this I intend to learn more about the driving forces behind joining the party and 
then becoming a political activist. 
In chapter 2,1 concentrated on the decline of the political party system in Turkey. It 
was observed that apart from the WP/VP, mainstream political parties have 
experienced widespread fragmentation, electoral volatility and organisational decline. 
Due to its nationwide, well-organised grassroots organisations and highly committed 
party activists, the WP/VP escaped this trend. As noted in chapter 2, grassroots 
organisations have played a key role in the WP's rise to power. In this chapter I aim 
195 Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson (1994, p. 77). 
e 
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to find out how party activists got involved the party and their patterns of 
participation. In other words it is the aim of this chapter to find out how and why the 
VP's members joined the party in the first place and than to find out the main socio- 
economic condition of it. To do this I examine data collected in the field to discern 
patterns such as activists' perception of their activities, how they describe themselves 
and their current position within the local grassroots organisations? 
5.1.2 Who Are They: The Current Status of Members 
When asked, the majority (79 percent) of my informants described their role within 
the Virtue Party as grassroots activist or active VP members in the first instance. As 
we see from the following figures, the majority of them are leaders and 
representatives of neighbourhood executive committees-196 One third of them (9 of 
these 33 activists) said in addition to their duties in the neighbourhood executive 
committee, they have either membership or office in the VP's sub-district (lice) 
organisation as well. 
Table 5.1 How would you describe your relation with the VP? 




As mpathiser/su orter of the Virtue Party - - 
A voter of the VP - - 
An active member of the VP (grassroots, activist) 33 79 
Activists who also hold an office membership in 
sub-district committee. * 
6 14 
Other (activists, party workers: branch 
administrator etc., ) 
3 7 
Total 42 100 
Source: Fieldwork in Mamak and Keciören -Ankara 
" The fourth and fifth rows overlap each other. Some of these grassroots activists also hold an office 
or membership in ilgeis excutive committee therefore the total number and percentage is more than 
it should be. 
The second group (14 percent) of my informants consists of those who put their 
membership in the VP's lice (sub-district) committees before their position in their 
neighbourhoods. This division indicates an upward mobility within the party 
organisation at the local level and a high expectation and desire among grassroots 
activists for higher positions in the party organisation. Some of neighbourhood 
196 See Appendix 11 
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representatives are also members of the executive committee of sub-district branch. 
Those who put their role in ilce (sub-district) as office holding or member of ilce 
executive committee before their duty and role in the neighbourhood organisations 
showed a strong desire for upward mobility and high expectation to climb up the 
carrier ladder in politics. There are studies that indicated careerist expectations as one 
of the motives for political participation and becoming a political activist. I return to 
this point later for analysis but for now just indicate this as a possible explanation 
among various others. 
Only 7 percent of them said they were activists without any office or membership of 
any committee. Some of them were also party workers e. g. branch administrator or 
data processors. This group were also active. They are not just professionals in their 
areas they are full members of the VP and do actively work wherever possible. 







Neighbourhood Representative (leader of the Nbh. 
Committee) 
17 40 
Member of Neighbourhood executive committee 6 14 
Member of sub-district 
Executive committee 
4 10 
Active member with no office or committee 
membershi 
4 IO 
Member of Youth Committee 5 12 
Other ( art inspector, worker etc., ) 6 14 
Total 42 100 
Source: Fieldwork in Mamak and Keciören -Ankara 
I asked them their actual positions in the party organisation. I wanted to see whether 
they held any elected office, positions or membership in any particular committee, or 
whether they were just party activists with no elected office or membership. It appears 
that the majority (55 percent) of my informants are either members of neighbourhood 
or lice (sub-district) executive committees. Some 41 percent of them are 
representatives of neighbourhood executive committees. They are the chairmen of the 
party organisation in that particular neighbourhood and they are directly accountable 
to the party's lice branch. They normally chair the weekly meetings with the members 
of the executive committee if there is no one from the Ilse party organisation. Some 
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14 percent of them are members of executive committees in their neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood executive committees consist of 14 members and they have a 
clear-cut division of labour amongst them. Some of these specific tasks that are done 
by the members are for example PR (Public Relations), chairmen of the electoral 
affairs, chairmen of the education and propaganda, chairmen of financial affairs and 
the like. These members are responsible for carrying out their daily tasks in co- 
operation with the rest of the executive committee. 
There is a systematic and efficient division of labour in the VP's local neighbourhood 
organisations. In terms of organisational structure the neighbourhood organisations 
are too highly developed and specialised to function as a mass political party. Another 
aspect of this organisation is the sense of accountability within the party hierarchy. In 
a sense all VP party organisations are accountable from the smallest neighbourhood 
organisation to the sub-district from district to the national centre of the party. One 
fifth of my informants are currently members of the executive committee in ilce. This 
is a clear sign of upward mobility within the party organisation and very important for 
those activists. All of the members of the il4e executive committees are also members 
of neighbourhood executive committees. In most case they are natural chairmen of 
these neighbourhood organisations, but they would like to be seen as members of an 
upper level organisation in the first place. There is a vibrant organic relationship 
between the neighbourhoods and the lice party organisations. 
Another one fifth of the activists hold neither elected office nor any membership but 
this does not mean that these members are less active or committed. They are very 
active and dedicated to their party. In fact being free from all administrative duties 
and paperwork required in the local branches, these activists can spend more time on 
canvassing, leaflet distribution, fund raising or meeting the people in the 
neighbourhood. Twelve percent of my informants stated their current position as 
being a member of the Youth Committee. Several commentators of Turkish politics 
have noticed that the youth and ladies' committees were the real assets of the Welfare 
Party (Ayata, 1997, p. 52 and cakir, 1994). In terms of political mobilisation, the pro- 
Islamic Welfare Party and later its successor the Virtue Party is the only political 
party in Turkey which has successfully integrated women into its party organisation. 
Often in poor gecekondu (slums) neighbourhoods' veiled women from every age 
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group young, middle aged or old go door-to-door canvas votes while the men are 
working. They use interesting and clever tactics and strategies: a mixture of religion, 
e. g. reading verses, citing from the Koran, poetry from Islamist poets and political 
propaganda that often comes in an indirect, implicit way in their house meetings. 
The youth commission, however, has a much more direct approach. The youth 
commission has a division of labour, which is a mirror image of the neighbourhood 
executive committee. Their tasks are more diverse and more demanding in some 
ways. Their tasks vary from organising sporting activities, and support facilities for 
the young often unemployed people, to fundraising and organising charities to collect 
money, food, cloth, shoes, coal and wood for heating, medicine and the like to give 
the poor, elderly, handicapped, orphans or widows in their neighbourhoods. The 
youth committee holds out seminars to educate those who feel close to the VP. These 
seminars are designed to indoctrinate newcomers and pursue those who have not 
formally joined. The majority of the youth group are educated; most of them are at 
least high school graduates. Most of these high school graduates went to the religious 
Intain-Hatip Lises (prayer-leaders and preachers high schools) and some have 
university degrees. 
During the election campaigns they usually carry out activities that require more 
muscle then brain. They put flags, posters and leaflets all around the ilce (sub- 
district). They do it late into the night. While I was in Ankara for my fieldwork, I 
witnessed them putting posters on all available walls in their neighbourhoods, hanging 
hundreds of plastic party flags between the electricity pylons and high buildings; and 
between balconies. Even the mosque minarets could not escape from this flagging- 
fever. 
The Gen4lik Ko» iisyonu (Commission of youth) is an independent group with its own 
division of labour, but during the election campaign they seemed to subordinate 
themselves, their youthful energy and enthusiasm to the neighbourhood executive 
committee. During this time their physical strength, and dynamism becomes crucial 
for the party's local election campaign. 
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The last category in my informant group is classified as the others, consists of 14 
percent of my sample. These activists are not member of any committees, or holding 
offices but they have important duties within the local party organisations. Some of 
them are party workers working fulltime professionals for the party, but should not be 
confused with the professionals who organise the party campaigning or professional 
party workers in other larger parties. Despite professional status they are no less 
active or less committed to the VP. Usually, they are from the traditionally religious, 
conservative regions and are raised from an early age within the Islamist groups such 
as Milli Genclik Vakfi (MGV) (Foundation of the National Youth), which has been 
known as the school of the party since the early 1970s. This group includes the party 
inspectors whose duties are to inspect all sorts of party activities on the ground and 
report to the ilce. They are party activists obviously with a special task to make sure 
that every unit; every individual does their bit in the service of the party. There are 
inü ahit (teachers) and bac niiyahit (head teachers) who educate the party members on 
various issues from how to watch the ballot box on election days, to how to talk to or 
approach people in their neighbourhoods. There are administrators, secretaries, and 
other clerical staff whose work is crucial for the party as well. 
5.2 Routes To Membership 
5.2.1 Regional Disparity and Party Preferences 
There are several dynamics involved in the process of party membership. It could be a 
rational choice for an individual seeking material benefit from his/her engagement 
with the party. It could be altruistic, emotional or expressive attachments that drive 
one to join a particular party or being drawn by the social norms or collective 
incentives (see Whiteley et al 1994, pp. 77-89). There are many of theories concerned 
with the reasons for political involvement: resource mobilisation theory, collective 
action theory, Standard Socio-economic Status Model general incentive model and 
others. The majority of my informants were born outside Ankara (See chapter 6) in 
this context it is worthwhile seeing if there is any regional pattern or any significant 
relationship between regions and party membership 
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The first pattern that emerged is that the majority of my informants come from less 
developed regions. More than three quarters (76 percent) of my informants were born 
elsewhere and migrated to Ankara at an early age. The majority of them were born in 
the poorest Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia regions, historically strongholds of the 
pro-Islamic NSP and later the WP/VP. There is a close correlation between the index 
of regional development and party preferences. Therefore I suggest that people from 
the poorest regions in Turkey not only tend to vote for the WP/VP but also are more 
inclined to become party activists compared to other provinces. 
In general, the problem of underdevelopment leads to greater diversity between 
different regions. Since the early nineteenth century great regional diversity has been 
one of the persisting characteristics of Turkey. Perhaps one of the most obvious 
reasons for this historical phenomenon is the `dependent economic development' that 
started with the penetration of Western industrial goods into the Ottoman market. 197 
From the early nineteenth century the process of modernisation and economic 
development started from the western and coastal regions, i. e. Istanbul, Izmir and 
Bursa. 198 Since then the Central and Eastern regions have been lagging far behind the 
developed western regions. 
In 1967 a study by the Turkish State Planning Organization showed that the most 
highly developed Marmara region had an index value of 145 on a composite index of 
socio-economic development, while the least developed eastern region had an index 
value of only 65. Almost twice as great a proportion of the active population is 
employed in industrial and service sectors in the Marmara region as in the eastern 
region. (Özbudun, 1976, p. 97). 
From an electoral perspective the regional divisions have been one of the important 
aspects of political life in Turkey. The studies of electoral support for political parties 
have indicated a direct and clear connection between the level of regional socio- 
economic development and party support. Turkish scholars from the 1960s noticed 
the connection between the regional diversity and party support as well. 199 
197 See for example, Keyder, c, 1987: 25-48. 
198 See Özbudun, E 1976: 97. 
199 See, for example, Özbudun E 1976: 104 
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There is a long established pattern of regional differences and voting behaviour. For 
example in the elections of 1973 the National Salvation Party (NSP) gained much of 
its electoral support from underdeveloped and semi-developed districts. Its share of 
vote in the developed regions was below the national average. 
Table: 5.3 The distribution of votes according to rate of regional development 
and party support in the 1973 election. 
CATEGORY OF DISTRICT RPP JP NSP DP RRP OTHERS 
Developed 38.6 32.3 8.4 10.3 3.8 6.6 
Semi-developed 30.5 32.1 13.7 13.6 5.5 4.6 
Underdeveloped 27.5 23.4 15.4 12.8 7.4 13.5 
Source: $en, 1995, p. 20. 
" RPP: Republican People's Party, JP: Justice Party, NSP: National Salvation Party, DP: 
Democratic Party, RRP: Republican Reliance Party, and Others: other smaller parties such as 
Worker Party of Turkey (the TIP). 
This trend seems to have continued during the 1980s and 1990s. It appears that 
regional diversity is also influential in terms of party membership. The results of my 
field survey shows that the majority of the VP's activists come from the poorest 
regions in the country. 
Turkey is geographically divided into seven regions. Not all the regions have a clear 
or consistent electoral trend but the region of central Anatolia has been known for its 
traditional conservative attitude since the 1940s. Historically speaking during the 
Ottoman times this region was on the sectarian fault line between the Turkrnen-Alevi 
and Kurdish East and Sunni-Turkish/Ottoman western regions. (See Mardis, $, 1991, 
p. 90). As it was a buffer zone religious ulama (religious clerical class) in these 
regions, with the backing of the central authority in Istanbul, assumed the role of 
guardians of the din ve devlel (religion and the state) against the Alevi Turkmen 
population. Mai-din argued that in line with the state's fear of the spread of Shiism in 
the Eastern regions, the guardians of the local Sunni ulenia saw Alevism as a 
deviation that had to be exterminated. Especially in Sunni communities in the Eastern 
districts between the Kizilhrmak River and Erzurum people were indoctrinated and set 
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against the Alevis by the Sunni religious leaders (Ibid, p. 90). In addition this region 
has also been experiencing one of the highest rates of migration to urban centres. 
It seems that throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Islamic movement made 
considerable political gains in central Anatolian towns such as Yozgat, cankiri, and 
corum. Parallel to this process the WP became the most popular party of the 
gecekondus. The increasing popularity of the Islamic WP/VP in poverty stricken 
gecekondu areas relates to the same dynamics as apply in the less developed regions. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that three quarters (76 percent) of my informants came 
from four provinces: Yozgat, cankiri, corum and Ankara. Three of those towns were 
among the 20 provinces where the WP had the highest share of the total votes in 
1991.2201 In the general elections of 1991 the WP received 39.5 percent of the votes in 
Yozgat, 29.2 percent in cankiri and 27.9 percent in corum (cakir, 1994, pp. 216-226). 
From my survey data it appears that more than a quarter (26.19 percent) of my 
informants were born in Yozgat. They later migrated to Ankara. 12 percent of my 
informants came from cankiri. With a similar number from corum another town that 
was at the centre of sectarian divide between Sunnis and Alevis. At the regional level 
this sectarian division determines the political cleavages. The second largest 
informant group (24 percent) was born either in Ankara centre or in Ankara's sub- 
districts. The rest of my informant group, with the exception of two activists who 
were born in Western towns, were mainly born in two Eastern regions. These are 
Eastern Anatolia and the Eastern Black Sea regions. One fifth of my informants were 
born in Erzurum, Malatya and Gümti hane in the Eastern Anatolia Region. Some 7 
percent were born in Girasun, Rize and Trabzon in the Eastern Black sea region. 
These regions are predominantly Sunni Muslim but ethnically the Eastern Black sea 
Region differs from the Eastern Anatolia Region. Although the ethnic make up of 
these regions are different, both are at the bottom end of the regional development 
scale. Economically and socially both regions share the same fate of economic and 
200 The biggest reflection of the gap between the regions might be the direction of migration dependant 
on social and economical development. Since the 1950s, there are certain regions and provinces which 
have been experiencing out-migration well above the national average such as Agri, Amasya, Bingöl, 
Corum, Kars, Malatya, Mardin, Mud, Nigde, Ordu, Sinop, Tokat, Tunceli and Yozgat. These cities are 
mainly situated in the Eastern regions with a high proportion of rural population, high birth rate and 
low level of agricultural income. (See, Peker, 1996, Chapter 1). 
201 See Cakir, R 1994: 218. 
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social backwardness: a low level of industrialisation, low level of schooling, high 
illiteracy rate (especially among women); high birth rate and infant mortality; and a 
high rate of out-flow migration. 
It have been pointed out by many students of politics that one of the most important 
variables in terms of political participation, voting behaviour and party preferences is 
socio-economic conditions. The socio-economic status model was fully developed by 
Sidney and Nie (1972). It was argued that those citizens who occupy higher social and 
economic status participate more than the average citizen occupying lower social 
status. Similar arguments are made by Barnes and Kaase 1979; Milbarth, 1977; Parry, 
Moyeser and Day 1992; Dalton, 1988 and Dowse and Hughes, 1986. As citizens 
identified themselves as belonging to a certain group or social class they voted for 
parties which explicitly stood for their interests (Hague et al, 1998, p. 106). 
What can we make all of this? It is obvious that there has been a clear connection 
between the index of socio-economic development and support for political parties at 
the regional level. As observed, the majority of VP activists migrated to Ankara from 
the less developed Central, Eastern Anatolia and Black Sea regions. Since the early 
1970s the Islamist parties from the NSP to VP have been the party of the petit 
bourgeoisie, traditional small merchants, tradesmen, artisans, shopkeepers and the 
poor peasantry in these less developed regions (Yücekök, 1997, pp. 40-5 1). From mid 
1980s the WP expanded its social bases among the urban poor (See chapter 4). 
The core of the WP/VP support has been the mass of wage and salary earners, 
traditional small artisans, merchants, tradesman and shopkeepers as well as lower and 
middle classes who have lost out under neoliberal economic policies implemented 
since the 1980s. 2022 The WP made considerable election gains from mainly gecekondu 
areas of the big urban centres. 203 As argued in Chapter 4, from the late 1980s the 
WP/VP assumed the role of the social democrat parties in these run down areas where 
202 For a detailed account of the neoliberal economy policies and impact of the restructuring program 
on the lower and middle lower classes see Chapter 4. 
203 According to the latest estimates in 1995 there were two million gecekondu housing units with ten 
million inhabitants. All together thirty live (35) percent of the urban population is living in the 
gecekondu areas (Kongar, 2000, p. 566). 
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it runs support networks for newcomer gecekondu dwellers. Its grassroots 
organisations have very effectively mobilised the gecekondu population. 
5.2.2 How Did They Become Members? 
I asked questions about the recuitment procedure: whether the party recruited them or 
if they decided by themselves and approached the party. If you go back to the date 
that you joined the party, did you approach the party or did the party approach you? 
Table: 5.4 How did the activists become members of the party 




I thought and decided by myself 16 39 
Party approached via it friend of mine II 26 
Someone from my family/ relatives asked me to join 9 21 
Loyalty / admiration for the party leader 6 14 
Total 42 100 
Source: Same as above 
The process of membership is one of the less studied but more important aspects of 
political participation. The way an individual joins a party, association or an interest 
group tells a lot about the individual's intentions, level of commitment, expertise and 
the resources that he/she might possess. The same is relevant for the organisation 
itself. This process would indicate if the party was resourceful, outgoing, actively 
engaging in recruitment or not. 
Table 5.4 show that two fifths (39 percent) of my informants can be classified as `self- 
starters' which means they themselves thought carefully and decided to join the party. 
To become member of a political party as a `self-starter' is a very important indicator 
of the emotional and ideological commitment of the specific individual. According to 
the `general incentive model' that I am using, `self-starters' can be classified as 
activists who have a high degree of expressive motive to participate (See Whiteley, 
1995, pp. 223). Self-starters may well be the cream of the party activists because of 
their high level of ideological conviction and passion for the party. The second most 
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numerous groups are those who were recruited by the party. Some 26 percent of them 
told me that they were approached by the party to join which shows a considerable 
success for the party's ability to recruit new members, especially in the case of party 
activists. Although in the first instance this figure may seem to be low we should not 
forget that this group are political activists, and the very nature of political activism 
can contradict the idea of being recruited rather than being a recruiter. In other words 
they mostly tend to be self-starters. Among this group some said the party approached 
them via a friend and this fact is confirmed by my observations in the field. 
The VP uses various strategies and tactics in terms of recruiting new members or for 
vote canvassing. They are always keen to approach in an informal, friendly way 
usually by using friends, traditional family networks, kin relations, or hemcehri 
associations. 204 More than one quarter (26 percent) of activists reported that they were 
approached by the party via a friend. This indicates at least two different dynamics at 
the local level. One of them is a very well organised, militant like, hard working, and 
very active local party organisation that can recruit new members. Studies show that 
citizens contacted personally are more likely to vote and to be interested in the 
gladiatorial activities. 205 The second dynamic is that the effect of the social 
environment and informal or small social groups such as family, friends, etc., for 
instance some of those who join the party did so because they were asked or 
persuaded by their friends. It seems that the effect of friendship at the local level was 
important for my informants. 
However one must be careful not to underestimate the capacity of the party 
organisation in terms of recruitment. They were approached by a friend but as I 
indicated above the VP is a true master of public relations and has its own tactics of 
how to contact people on the ground. Approaching through friends relatives, or a 
henicehri (someone from the same town) is a well practised method of contacting or 
recruiting new people. This means that a friend may play a role in someone's 
204 The word hem ehrilik describes a presumed tie excising between people from the same village, 
town or province ( Kalaycionlu, 1998, p. 18). The irem ehri networks have been one of the widespread 
forms of solidarity among newly migrated families in the metropolitan areas. It was developed as one 
of the informal coping strategy among the migrants from the same regions. It has been studied by many 
Turkish social scientists most noticeably See Ayata-Giine$ 1991: 1994: 326; Schuler, 1998; $enyapili, 
1978; Tekeli, 1982. 
205 See Milbarth and Goel, 1972, p. 136. 
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recruitment but the whole credit should not go to the friend because the friend was 
mobilised by the local party branch in the first place. Having said that, I do not 
suggest that friends or families are ineffective but rather the primary reason in this 
case was different. In fact when both party affiliation and family membership are 
combined the result is more visible. 
It must be acknowledged that the WP/VP have been successfully tapping into the 
existing traditional, religious and cultural resources. From the early days of its 
establishment the WP and then the VP creatively made use of traditional religious 
networks, relationships, associations, groups and cultural resources. They also utilised 
the traditional solidarity organizations that have been around for centuries. They also 
innovatively reconfigured the old, traditional political culture especially in relation to 
religious issues, social justice and equality, e. g. the rhetoric of Adil Diizen (Just 
Society) with a greater emphasis on Islamic brotherhood and the like. Also, the 
WP/VP, in its political campaigning, used a certain type of language and phrasing 
with which most people identify. The glorification of the Ottoman era as the `golden 
past' have been one of the strongest aspects of the WP/VP's party activism on the 
ground. 
The third group, which make up 21 percent of the activists, said someone from their 
family or relatives had played a leading role in their involvement with the party. Like 
many thing in our lives politics and political attitudes are learned from an early age. 
This process is called political socialisation. According to Cord et al (1974, p. 184) 
political socialisation is: 
... the process by which the individuals 
in a given social system learn their 
values, norms, concepts and attitudes about both the political and the 
individual's relationship to the political system... In the broadest sense, 
political socialisation is the way in which a society perpetuates its political 
culture. It is a continuous, lifelong process, which is part of each individuals 
conditioning and education as much as of the culture lie is born into. 
In this process the individual learns from family; father, mother brother/sister and 
other relatives about all aspects of politics. In later life he/she may retain these ideas 
as most people do. Studies have shown that even long after we have left home, the 
influence of our parents continues to affect many aspects of our behaviour. For 
example most people vote as their parents did. The family is the most influential 
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factor in a person's political behaviour because it controls the early years crucial to 
the development of the personality of an individual, between three and thirteen (Cord 
et al 1974, p. 185; See also Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 5-6). 
It appears that my findings confirm the large body of literature in this area which 
shows that those who are raised in a family which has an active tradition of 
involvement in political parties, social movements, or other sorts of interest groups, 
very likely to inherit the family norms of participation and their political persuasion 
will be affected by `family tradition'. 206 
This emotional attachment and loyalty to the primery groups can be assessed as what 
Whiteley (1995, p. 223) called the influence of `significant others'. He argued that 
`party activists are motivated by the perception of social norms, the opinion of 
"significant others" or people whose opinions they respect and value' (1995, p. 223). 
People develop very deep emotional ties and long lasting loyalties and a sense of 
belonging towards primary groups such as family, peer groups and small, close 
communities. The role of the family is extremely important in the process of political 
orientation. It is a key agent through which the political culture is transmitted from 
one generation to the next (ibid: 107). Table 5.4 shows that for 21 percent of my 
informants' membership happened through the family. 
The last group is those who joined the party because of their loyalty and admiration 
for the party leader. Some fourteen percent of them joined the party because they felt 
loyalty and admiration for the leader. This is confirmed by my observations too. The 
loyalty and admiration towards the founding father of the Islamist movement 
Necmettin Erbakan was explicit among all party members, supporters or activists. He 
is a well known, respected and admired leader among VP supporters, voters, activists 
or MPs; young or old, men or women. 
Throughout his thirty-year political career he has enjoyed high popularity and 
undisputed leadership among his party form rank-and-file members to the MPs in 
parliament. However he was effectively banned from politics by the Supreme Court in 
206 Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, p. 65; see also Butler and Stokes, 1974. 
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1998, which is another source of sympathy towards him because in the eye of 
his 
people he has been victimised, his political rights being denied by the authorities. 
If we go back to the role of the family as a formal learning ground and its effects on 
political choices we have got more than enough evidence to confirm that family has a 
great impact on an individual's political choice. This is true also for my informant 
group. Four in five of my informant group said that they have someone in their family 
who at least votes for WP/VP if not a member. 
5.2.3 Family and Party Membership 
"Among all of the influences acting on partisan identification, the family is the strongest. 
" 
(Crotty and Jacobson 1980, p. 26). 
The vast majority (79 percent) of the VP's activists have another member of family 
who is, one way or another, involved: either a member or even party activist in some 
cases, supporter or voter of the party with the Virtue Party (see table 5.5). In the 
context of family and political preferences the above table clearly indicates the 
significance of family on the individual's political choice. 
Table: 5.5 Apart from you, is there anyone in your family or close kin who is 
also a member, supporter or voter of the WP/VP? 
Answers Frequency of 
Occurrence percent (%) 
Yes there is someone 33 79 
Who are they? 
Parents 8 19 
Wife 8 19 
Children 6 14 
Brother /Sister 3 7 
Uncle/Aunt 2 5 
Part of Family 4 10 
Whole Family 11 26 
No there is no one 9 21 
Total 42 100 
Source: Fieldwork in Mamak and Ke4iören -Ankara 
What is more interesting and significant in terms of the role of family and political 
participation is that within this group 26 percent of them said their whole family are 
members, supporters or at least vote for the VP. In this context the term `whole 
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family' consists of extended nuclear family parents, brother and sisters, children if 
they are over eighteen and uncles, aunts and cousins. Sometimes it can be interpreted 
as a clan like family, which especially in less developed rural regions tends to live 
together under an elder leader. These traditional large families, support political 
patronage- the traditional form of political participation. 
Whether it is the traditional large or extended nuclear family, family ties are much 
stronger in Turkey then in the rest of Europe. For this reason it is very common to 
observe that party support runs through families and members usually remain loyal to 
their families and parties. Supporting the same party expresses loyalty to the family as 
well. It can be argued that the involvement of whole families in addition to the activist 
is a significant indicator of the social base of political activism. It might be one of the 
prime conditions for political involvement and becoming a political activist in a party. 
The influence of the family, especially the parents on the individual's political 
behaviour is also apparent from the high rate of parents who are also involved with 
the WP/VP. One in five (19 percent) of my informants gave their parents as the other 
family member who was also member, supporter or voter of the party. If we recall the 
above discussion on the effect of the family as the most influential agent of political 
socialisation the parent's role is significant. From the data it is clear that family and 
the parents in this case played a very significant role on political orientation of this 
specific group (20 % of informants indicating parental support for WP/VP). This role 
is more important because becoming a political activist goes far beyond merely 
voting, supporting or even becoming a member. Those members influenced by their 
families, primarily by parents in turn influenced and persuaded their spouses to 
support the VP. A considerable percentage of them, one in five (19 percent) said their 
spouses, in most cases wives, are also members or supporters of the WP/VP. 
Contrary to the role of family or parents the involvement of wives can be interpreted 
as the influence and indoctrination of the activists on the spouses rather then being 
influenced by the parents or fancily. At the same time we notice that existing studies 
of female political participation in Turkey have shown that there has been an 
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evolutionary process from dependent voting towards independent female participation 
and voting behaviour. 207 
Fourteen percent of informants said their children were also involved with the party. 
Ten percent of them said part of their family supports; votes for or are members of the 
VP. The involvement of the children can be another sign of the influence of parents 
and family on the political socialisation process. Maybe fourteen percent does not 
seem much but we must remember that in Turkey the voting age was 20 and only 
recently (in 1998) went down to 18 and political party membership also requires an 
age limit of at least 18 and above. So 14 percent may look insignificant but it may be 
due to the age of children as well. Nevertheless it is important to show the extent to 
which political activism takes place within a family context. Finally seven (7) percent 
of them said their sisters or brothers and four (4) percent said their uncles or aunts are 
also involved with the same party. 
My empirical findings show that there are two related forces at work. First the family 
as the most significant agent of political socialisation has influenced the WP/VP' s 
grassroots activists and played an important role in moving them from merely voting 
for the VP to becoming activists for it. Second grassroots activists are active within 
their families as well. That they do not leave their role as political activist at the front 
door but rather take it in and talk about politics in general and express the ideology, 
party policies and propaganda the other members of the family. So they persuade, 
recruit and mobilise members of their own families. As one activist told me "if the 
leader of the family chooses a path the rest will naturally follow him. " 
The second group consisting of 21 percent of informants said they have no one in 
their family who are members, supporters or voters of the VP. My data shows that 
instead of being introduced by someone from the family this group joined the party in 
207 For an analysis of female voting in Turkey see Burcak Keskin, 1997, "Political Participation 
Patterns of Turkish Women" Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) MERIA Journal, 
December 1997, Vol. I No 4. The article is available on the web: 
htip: //www. biu. ac. il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1997/issue4/jv I n4a5. html. Also readers may consult the 
following material: Arat, Y, 1984, "Patriarchal Paradox: Women in Politics in Turkey, " Associated 
University Press. Dülger, Ilhan, 1987, "Turkiye'de Sehirde Yasayan Kadinin Siyasi Haklarini Kullanma 
Egilimleri, " DPT, Ankara, 1987. -Koker, L 1990 "Modernlesme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, " Iletisim 
Yayinlari, Istanbul, Koray, M, 1995, "Turkiye'de Kadin, " Turkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Arastirmalar 
Vakfi, 1995. Tekeli, S, 199 1, "Women In Modern Turkish Society, " Zed Books Ltd, London. 
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other ways. Among this group six (out of nine in total) of them joined the WP/VP as 
4 self starters', the party and friends approached 2 of them and one of them joined the 
party for the loyalty and admiration of the party leader. Because majority of it joined 
the party as `self starters' this group compared to the other grassroots activists may 
have much clearer and better ideas about party principles, policies and a greater 
ideological understanding and stronger commitment towards party. In the next section 
I discuss how my informants assess their own role as grassroots activists in relation to 
the electoral outcomes. 
5.2.4 Political Efficacy and Party Membership 
Seyd and Whiteley (1995, pp. 219-220) pointed out that if the individual believes that 
his/her participation will be for the collective good then there is a greater chance that 
he/she will participate. It was observed, during my field research, that grassroots 
activists are influential on both sides: within the local community as well as rallying 
for local needs, problems and demands at the sub-district level. I asked: If you were 
asked to scale the significance of grassroots activism upon the party's performance on 
a scale how would you scale it? 






Very Important 33 74 
Important 8 19 
Not so Important 1 02 
Insignificant - - 
Other 2 05 
Total 42 100 
Source: Same as above 
As Table 5.6 indicates three quarters of VP grassroots activists believe their political 
activism is `very important for the party's election results'. While one in five of them 
believe it is `important'. This means that the vast majority of activists highly value 
their participation and strongly believe it will make a change if they participate in the 
way they do. Following Seyd and Whiteley's (1995) logic it can be argued that my 
informants joined the party and chose to become political activists because they 
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strongly believe that their grassroots activities are `very important' to the electoral 
performance of the VP. I will discuses this point further in chapter 7. 
5.3 Reasons For Membership 
When asked the most important reason for becoming members, informants' answers 
vary from religious grounds to ideological reasons, from national and sacred values to 
WP/VP's specific economic policy of a `just order', or as a reaction to other parties. 
The literature review also suggests that the discourse of political participation is a 
contentious issue among students of politics. 
Table: 5.7 the most important reason for membershi 




Religious reasons, because it is an Islamist party. 17 40 
Ideological closeness / The WP/VP respects and protects 
the national and sacred values. 
9 21 
Only the WP/VP can solve the socio-economic problems 
and best for the country. 
6 14 
Other reasons: trustworthiness/ cleanness, loyalty to 
leadership, Protecting the poor, etc., 
7 17 
As a reaction to other parties. 3 7 
Total 42 100 
Source: Same as above 
Since my research focused on the grassroots activism of the WP/VP I had to grasp 
the initial motivation of the members for joining the party. So I designed an open- 
ended question in my questionnaire to gauge the motives for membership. The choice 
of an open-ended question was a deliberate attempt not to restrict or lead informants 
to pre-coded categories. Hence the informant felt free to express the most important 
reasons for joining the party. Can you tell me what was the most important reason for 
you to become a member of the VP? 
Without delving into theoretical debates, I describe what my informants said about the 
process of becoming a member and getting involved with the WP/VP. The stated 
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reasons vary but it can be collected under these headings: religious, ideological, 
capability of solving the socio-economic problems, reaction to other political parties 
and other reasons which are trustworthiness, loyalty to the leadership, protecting the 
rights of the weak and poor people. 
5.3.1 Religious Reasons 
It is an established fact that the WP and its predecessor the VP have been described as 
the religiously oriented or pro-Islamist party and this fact, it seems, played a very 
significant role on the process of membership. 208 More then forty percent of the 
grassroots activists joined the WP/VP for religious reasons (see table 5.7). In other 
words they were drawn to the WP/VP as an Islamist party. For this reason, I consult 
the interviews in order to provide a more coherent and clear reasoning that aroused 
the religious motives. 
Through the interviews, I examine the issues, priorities, problems and reasons that 
respondents expressed for joining the Virtue (Fazilet) party. Throughout my fieldwork 
I talked to many political activists about why they joined the VP. One of them was 
SUha celik. He is the member of the administrative committee of the VP in Keciören 
Sub-district. He owns a furniture shop in Siteler, a large industrial estate where the 
major furniture production and trade is based. I asked him the most important reason 
for joining the VP. 
Because of my beliefs and my attachment to the Refah (Welfare) party in the 
past I have chosen this [VP] party. Also, the VP is the closest party to my 
beliefs, woridviews and my race and I believe only the VP would back me in 
this manner. " "I joined the VP because we (my friends and I are mostly 
tradesmen, shopkeepers and artisans) are always criticising things constantly 
among us. Later I thought if we are criticising things and if they are bad and 
you are good then you have got to do something to change this. Then I 
thought, I must come forward and to work towards this end. If you go then 
you would deter one bad. If a man is good then he must do the same thing. So, 
I thought, by doing this we would clean up politics. (Sc) 
As known that grievances are the first conditions of any political action but they 
usually do not mean much unless an individual, one way or another, decides to take 
208 See Kalaycioglu, 1998, p. 15. 
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action. In Sc's case he and his associates were criticising things constantly and these 
discussions led him to take action. Having a clear objective such as deterring one `bad 
politician' from office by involving as the `good' in politics. Alongside religious 
reasons, he firmly believes that if the `good people' like himself and friends get into 
active politics rather than just passively criticising things constantly they can serve a 
cause; to provide some sort of public good. 
The Second case is Nizami Demir, he is one of the oldest of my informant group. He 
is sixty-eight years old and has been actively engaged politics since late 1960s. He 
joined the Islamic movement with the foundation of the Milli Nizam Partisi (National 
Order Party) the first party born out of the Islamic movement in 1969. He explains 
why he joined the Islamic movement and became a political activist. 
I have been within this movement since the National Order Party (1969) and 
the reason for my membership was, I wanted to serve the rise of Islam, for the 
sake of Allah and in order to establish a state that is based on Allah's laws the 
Sharia. When I joined the party no one asked or guided nee there. I myself 
searched and decided to join. I have passionately devoted myself to this cause; 
it is for the sake of Allah. I hoped and wanted to live a true Islam with its real 
meaning and so joined the party. (ND) 
ý 
The first thing that Nizam Demir tells is his desire to serve Islam for its rise. He says 
it is for the sake of Allah. A similar statement made by another activist: 
For me the most important reason was to support our Islamic cause. Also, 
supporting the VP to rescue Tayip Erdol; an and Hoca from imprisonment, as 
well as defending the Imam-Hatips [religious schools]" (Halis, VPs Aktepe 
neighbourhood Representative). 
Mütalip Özbay says that: "It is an attempt to make the religion of Islam prosper. I 
believed that I can find a better opportunity under the WP/ VP government, and live 
my life as my religion orders me". 
A great many of them joined the VP beceuse it is an Islamist party. For example Full 
Dalkiran of Yqiltepe Neghbourhood says : "... it is an Islamist party and inclined 
towards Islam. Where there is Islam there we are. " In the case of religious beliefs and 
party preferences, the party's attitudes towards religious beliefs are also determinant 
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factor for membership. "I have joined the VP because it is a party which most suites 
to my religious beliefs"[FD]. 
The fact that the VP has an Islamist outlook attracts like-minded people from all 
walks of life. Naci Tunalt, representative of Ekin Ba§ak Neighbourhood also joined 
for similar reason. He said: 
Because it is close and warm to Islam. We are raised in this way; there would 
not be any other party. It was only the WP who provided a life that Islam 
orders us. It proposes adil diizen (just society) as well. 
Y 
Mustafa $ahin a member of the municipality parliament of Mamak replied to my 
question in this way: "[I joined the party] because of its Islamsit worldview, and its 
Islamist policies". 
To serve or to support the Islamic cause, to establish an Islamic regime as they put it, 
is one of the most frequently given reason among this group. It can be argued that 
those activists who join the party for the cause of Islam are ideologically more radical 
then the other VP activists. It has been observed by the students of political sciences 
that ideological radicalism is one of the most important causes of the political 
participation (Ashford, D 1972; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Marsh, A, 1990 and 
Milbrath and Goel, 1977). There is such group among the WP/VP's activists who 
joined the party to serve the Islamic cause, to establish a regime that based on Koran's 
principles. They would argue that all Muslim communities unless an unbeliever's 
army occupies them must live by the God's book and orders, not by men made laws 
and rules. From this perspective for this group Turkey as a staunchly secular state is 
not the place where they can live by the Koran. This perspective, obviously, makes 
them to get involve politics in a more active way. As Kitschelt, H (1989, p. 407) 
suggested those party militants who are more radical and calling for rapid, 
comprehensive and profound changes in the society and politics, are more likely to be 
recruited by the political parties, make converts among party activists and gain office. 
209 
209 A similar observation done by Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, p. 100. 
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Perhaps than, it is not surprising to have high numbers of participants joining the VP 
for religious reasons, because religion has been a social variable that influences 
political preferences, and this happens in the Turkish case too. 
As Jennings, Allerbeck and Rosenmay (1979, p. 463) argued that: 
"Although advanced industrial societies are becoming increasingly 
secularised, the vestiges of religious cleavages are impressive indeed. One of 
the most successful predictors of party allegiance and voting in most Western 
European countries remains religious preference, however nominal that 
preference may be. Many European parties are divided into the secular versus 
confessional based, and sometimes within the later between Catholic and non- 
Catholic... Moreover, religious institutions continue to be strongly evident in 
all countries. " 
In another major study religion was placed among the seven variables that influenced 
political participation such as education, income, sex, age, race, religion and location. 
(See Verba and Nie, 1972, pp. 97-101). Despite the changing value systems210 "most 
of the political parties are still organized around Old Political cleavages of class and 
religion" (Dalton, 1998, p. 148). The interaction of religion and politics is a historical 
fact. It was religion that dominated almost every aspect of social life for centuries. 
When the political parties emerged it was there and ready to provide social bases for 
political parties while later the class cleavage entered the arena. 
Other studies also show that the influence of religion on voting behaviour continues. 
(See Kalaycioglu, E 1998: 10). In Turkey there exists a historical socio-cultural 
cleavage that runs along the secular/religious divide. 
If we go back to the empirical data there are a variety of statements that describe what 
they really meant by religious reasons. Some of them joined the party to support the 
island (lava (cause of [slam), or so that the religion of Islam could prosper as well as 
to support the establishment of a Sharia regime on the basis of the Koran. For some it 
was the VP's warm and intimate approach to Islam, while others said ' because it is 
compatible with my Islamic identity'. 
In many societies, including Turkey, religion is one of the bases of political ideology. 
(Turan, 1994, p. 42). As a primary element of culture religion has acted as a constant 




source of political ideology. Especially in times of rapid change, religion provides 
certainty, stability and continuity. 
As one would expect there appears to be a close correlation between Islamic identity 
and party membership. For example Remzi Özcan a representative of the 
neighbourhood of Misket said that: 
We all have an Islamic identity. For me the most important reason was the 
VP's Islamic character that is compatible with my religious beliefs. When I 
decided to join a political party I went to different political parties and listened 
to different discussions, in the end I saw that I had a deep-rooted passion for 
this party. I said, so this is the party where I am going to work and God let me 
do so'. 
Similarly other activists argued that the VP represents an Islamic identity. This fact is 
very important for people who are very loyal to their religion. Now I shall look at the 
second most cited reason for party membership. 
5.3.2 Ideological Motives: Loyalty to the National and 
Sacred Values 
On the second rank of table 5.7 come the ideological reasons. The VP's loyalty to the 
national and sacred values seems to play an important role when activists decide to 
join. More then one in five (21 percent) of the VP activists joined the party because 
they see the Virtue party, like its predecessors, is the only party loyal to the milli ve 
inanevi degerler (the national and sacred values). In general terms, respect for the 
national and religious values and traditions, desire for the preservation of the 
traditional life style, old customs, and above all a glamorisation of the past are the 
main ideological values shared by VP members. Also, in this context, it is important 
to recall that the milli ve inanavi deb>eirler (national and sacred values) have always 
been at the centre of the ideology of the Islamic movement in Turkey (See Saribay, 
1985, p. 99; Yücekök, 1971, pp. 175-178 and Yücekök 1997). 
Muhlis Karaagac, from neighbourhood of Kutlu in Mamak, comes from Sungurlu a 
sub-district in the district of corum. He was born in 1949; his father was a kapici 
(doorkeeper) in Sungurlu. He moved to Ankara when he was 13 years old where he 
studied in a vocational training college. He got involved in a right wing student union 
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at an early age and later joined the ultra nationalist Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) 
National Action Party (NAP). 
MK We are, from birth, inclined towards right wing parties. I finished Elementary 
School in Sungurlu and when I was going to start the high school I came to 
Ankara. Through a friend of mine I got involved in Milli Turk Talehe Birligi 
(The National Turkish Student Union in 1975. After my graduation from high 
school the left-right clash started and my father was shot by Dev Sol 
(Revolutionary Left) people. Then I shot one of them and got imprisoned. 
I was originally a member of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and at that 
time the NSP seemed pacifist to us or so we thought. After the military coup in 
1980 1 was not involved in any political party until 1987. In 1987 we (my five 
brothers) and me set up the first NAP's Bizimocak branch in Dereboyu Street 
where no leftists were allowed to enter. I was a member of the NAP at that 
time but came from the same social background as the majority of the WP/VP 
people. For example we pray five times a day, we are true believers, and we 
always defended these people in our work place. I mean, no matter what your 
outlook, because I was praying regularly they would call me Refahii-Refah's 
people-. To tell the truth I was defending the ideas of WP but I was not a 
member or anything like that. Finally I joined the WP. The most important 
reason for my membership was its loyalty and respect for the national and 
religious values. 
This short summary of Mr Kasaa ac's schooling and migration from corum to 
Ankara and the process of joining the WP/VP tell us a lot about his political 
orientation. Starting from on early age, he has always identified himself with right 
wing politics. As a child he was raised in a poor working class family, his father was a 
doorman and most probably was not able to maintain his overcrowded family in 
Sungrlu so migration was essential for the family's survival. In Ankara he got 
involved in ultra nationalist student movement, became an activist, and got caught up 
with the street violence that characterized the 1970s. He shot someone from a leftist 
group and got imprisoned for a while. But as he grew older he started to move 
towards the WP and finally became a member and activist 1994. The most important 
reason he gave was that of WP/VP loyalty and respect for the national and sacred 
religious values. He is not alone, by any means, in his choice of the WP for 
ideological reasons, and loyalty to the national and religious values. 
There are some issues that we should underline. The first one is the ideological aspect 











that the pro-Islamic Fazilet (Virtue) party is the closest to his beliefs and worldview. 
There is a sense of purpose as he states that if one good person enters politics he/she 
would eliminate one `bad' politician from politics. So a sense of personal impact on 
politics and ideological factors was his reason for joining the party. 
Twenty one percent of my informants joined the party for similar ideological reasons. 
In the case of Remzi Özcan from the neighbourhood of Misket, he too was formerly 
close to the ultra right wing the Nationalist Action Party and like many others he 
migrated to Ankara to find a job in his early teens. He explains: 
I was close to the MHP (NAP), I mean in my childhood I was with the NAP as 
were 90 percent of the people from the district of Yozgat. Before the military 
coup of 1980, approximately 90 percent of Yozgat supported the NAP. At that 
time I was a student. After school I went to away to find job. There I started to 
join political gatherings, meetings and so on. By then because of my Islamic 
identity 1 liked Hoca's [N. Erbakan] speeches so started to listen to him... As I 
said, the most important reason for my membership was the ideological 
closeness. It is also close to my religious beliefs, because I have got an Islamic 
identity and I saw that there are big similarities between my beliefs and the 
WP's ideology. Before joining the WP/VP I thought, and enquired about some 
of the other political parties, I listened to their speeches and attended their 
meetings. I saw that none of them were for me, so I said well this is it, it is the 
WP where you are going to serve people. And Allah helped me to get to work 
for this party. I am here because it follows Allah's path. 
He continues: 
I have no material expectations from my service for this cause. For ten years I 
have been working personally for this party without any expectations or any 
material gain. I have never asked for any favour or put forward any demand to 
the party. So far I have been managing the things by my own resources, self 
sufficiently. I do whatever I can do and up to the point I can carry on. 
There are great similarities between the last two cases. Both identified themselves 
with the ultra nationalist NAP in their youth and both approached political Islam for 
ideological reasons, national and religious values. In this interview Mr 
Özcan 
highlights a very interesting aspect of political activism that is the expectations of the 
party membership. As I argue in chapter 6, membership has certain responsiblities and 
benefits. Although the rights and responsiblities of party membership vary according 
to the party type, in most cases it is the resources, material benefits or influence 
gained from membership. Özcan says that "I never asked any favour or forwarded any 
demand" at the same time he actually indicates that there are such activists within the 
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VP who benefit either materially or otherwise from their membership, which is 
usually seen as the by-product of party activism. Obviously this matter is rather 
sensitive and hard to talk about but Özcan's interview provides some insight. There 
are many more activists who joined the VP for ideological reasons. In a similar vein 
some others responded: 
I chose the VP because it behaves according to my beliefs. " While some other 
joined and became activist to support their Islamic cause. One said, "The 
reason for my choice of the VP is that only this party is close to my beliefs, 
world view and my race and only the VP would protect me. (Süha celik, 
KeCiören). 
It is rather remarkable to see that since the beginning of the 1970s the core ideological 
compoants: the religious and national values of the pro-Islamic party have not been 
dented at all. In other words they are still the highest ranking values. In the field this 
fact was mentioned by many party activists. For example a retired worker from the 
Turkish Railway told me that: 
The reason I am in this party is that the VP gives greater priority to religious 
values. Also they are trustworthy, would not steal or deny anyone's rights. 
The leadership is uncorrupted. I used to be supporter of the NAP but later they 
got corruption and started to turn into the criminal gangs in every corner. 
The fact that the majoritty of VP activists appear to be more radical than the VP 
leadership and the ordinary VP voter seems to be a paradox, and a contradiction to my 
original hypothesis. In chapter one, I hypothesised that the rise of political Islam was 
not necessarily a result of a re-Islamization of society, widespread Islamic revivalism 
or an expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. Rather it was partly a reaction against 
the major socio-economic shifts and partly due to the WP/VPs very well organised, 
militant grassroots organisations. Now can this paradox be explained? 
Before I move to explain this seemingly paradoxical situation I shall first explain how 
this group was defined as `radicals'. The criterion to define who are the radicals and 
who are not is based two variables: the first one is the incentives that the activists 
decleared as the most important reason for their involvement. The second variable is 
their attitude of secularism; their opinion on the separation of state and Church. I have 
classified three broad dimensions of the VP's ideology, the religious radicalism, the 
religious conservatism and the centre-right or centrism. Those who declared religious 
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and ideological reasons were placed on the right of ideological left-right scale. 
Among the radicals those who decleared desire for establishing an Islamic state 
(sharia) regime, live by the God's orders, serving the Islamic cause etc., were 
classified as radical group. Those who declared non-religious or ideological reasons 
e. g. the VP is best party to solve country's socioeconomic problems, helping the poor, 
honest and trustworthy etc., were placed on the left side of ideological spectrum. In 
between there is those religious conservative who joined the party because of its 
respect for the religious and nationalistic values, respect for beliefs etc., 
The level of ideological radicalism is closely connected with the `principality' 
reasons. Principality reasons are the religious principles that every Muslim men and 
women must live by, which means living by the principles of the holy book Koran. 
They joined the party to support the Islamic causes, or to establish sharia (Islamic) 
regime. For them every Muslim must live under the Sharia regime, in other words this 
is the fundamental principle of Islam, it is God's order. As pointed out elsewhere that 
ideological radicalism is one of the determinants of high level of political 
participation. Seyd and Whiteley (1992, p. 100) argued that 
"Ideological radicalism should motivate activists to become more involved 
than the inactive members, because the reword for their involvement is the 
ability to give expression to deeply held beliefs". 
Some students of political parties have long studied the paradox that we mentioned 
above. May (1973, p. 135) argued that political parties as many other organisations, 
are stratified. This stratification is reflected in terms of ideological variations between 
the different sections of the party activists on the one hand and the leadership and 
voters on the other. From Moisei Ostrogorski's time in the nineteenth century to M. 
Duverger in the 1960s May (1973), Kitschelt (1989) and Seyd & Whiteley (1992) the 
Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity has been observed by many students of political 
parties. It implies that voters, party activists and leaders have divergent political 
ideologies (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, p. 100). According to Kitschelt curvilinear is 
more likely to occur among specific groups of activists below the leadership stratum. 
For him curvilinear between voters, leaders and the political activists is closely 
connected with the party system-e. g. Curvilinearity is more likely to occur in two 
party system democracies like in the UK the US, less so in other party systems (1989, 
pp. 400-421). 
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As Seyd and Whiteley argued the ranks-and-file activists in a political party are more 
radical than the party leadership on the one hand, and the party voters on the other 
(1992, P. 100). The empirical findings in this chapter suggested that there is 
curvilinearity between the VP's activists on the one hand the leader and party voters. 
At the first glance it seems that an ideological gulf between a groups of individuals 
within the same party is unthinkable but their positions within party led them to 
different ideological positions. 
Is there any evidence of an ideological gulf between the voters and party activists 
within the VP? It seems that such an ideological gap exists (see Table 5.7). For 
example a study, in 1997, discovered that among WP voters only one third of them 
voted for the party because it was an Islamic party (see Heper, 1997, p. 35). The law of 
curvilinear disparity is visibly illustrated when comparing Heper's (1997) findings 
with table 5.7. The comparison of the data (table 5.7) with data from Heper (1997, 
p. 35) suggests that there is a disparity between the grassroots activists and the 
WP/VPs voters. Three in five (62 percent) of my respondents joined the party because 
of religious and ideological incentives whereas according to a survey (See Heper, M 
1997, p. 35) `only one-third of the WPs voters voted for the party primarily because it 
was an Islamic party'. 
Another similar but more recent nationwide study has found that one in five (19.8 
percent) of voters across the country wanted Sharia and would vote for the WP/VP for 
this purpose (TÜSES 1999: 69). But as the study breaks down the data it emerges that 
less than half of them who said they would vote for VP (47.6 percent) wanted a Sharia 
regime because it is the `necessity/condition of Islam'. More precisely 47.6 percent 
of those who wanted Sharia regime did so for "principality" reasons. 211 However the 
other half of the voters wanted Sharia regime for "functional" rational reasons. In 
211 1 am using the "ilkeseP' "principality" and "arafsar' "functional" reasons in the sense that defined 
by TUSES (1999, p. 71) and Özbudun, E (2000, p. 90). Principality reasons applies those voters who 
saw an Islamic political order as indispensable to their religious beliefs. In other words, sharia for therm 
is the most fundamental inseparable and existential condition of their religious beliefs. From the 
principality point of view every Muslim community, every men and women must live in an Islamic 
regime by the law of Koran. The "functional" reasons on the other hand are not religious but by 
product of it. For example some of the voters thought that Islamic regime is good for economic and 
political reasons. For sonic others Islamic regime would promote virtues and moral values in the 
society. 
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other words two in five (39.8 percent) of this group wanted a Sharia regime because 
they believed it is a better system for political, social and economic reasons. What this 
second comparison tells us is that although the margin between the activists and 
voters narrowed in TÜSES (1999, p. 69) study, there is still a 12 percent gap between 
these two groups of individuals. 
Finally, because 62 percent of my informants expressed either religious or ideological 
incentives as the most important reason for their membership in the WP/VP, it 
indicates a strong ideological and radical presence among VP grassroots activists. 
And it seems at this point, we can answer one of our initial questions' `what draws 
members to join the party in the first place? ' The answer has to be the ideological 
radicalism because it seems that on average the members are twice as radical as 
ordinary VP voters. 
5.3.2.1 The Role of Ideology in Political Participation 
It appears that one of the most acknowledged predictors of political participation is 
ideology and for the same reason ideology is the most studied factor of the political 
process. 212 Every thing other than ideology is part of culture, especially the political 
culture. 213 But ideology can be distinguished from political culture by its clarity, 
coherence, and greater internal consistency. Because of its consistency it can 
influence political action more then political culture. Ideology also "contains a set of 
political values, states to be desired and, if possible, striven for, attained and 
maintained" (Dowse and Hughes, 1986, p. 236). Therefore it can be said that to 
understand a particular political ideology is to understand that political culture. I will 
briefly introduce the development of the Islamic ideology in Turkey but first let us to 
emphasize a few important points regarding the importance of ideology in political 
process, especially, its role on the party support and membership. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the rate of conventional political participation is 
positively influenced by the degree of political sophistication (Klingemann, 1979, 
212 There is a sizeable body of literature concerning ideology and political participation that is 
impossible to cite here all. For a selected literature see Ashford, 1972; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dowse 
and Hughes, 1986; Milbarth and Goel, 1977; Marsh, 1990: Verba and Nie, 1972). 
213 Dowse, Rand Hughes, J 1986, especially see chapter 8 
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p. 28 I ). The first function of ideology is to help individual order, retain and understand 
political information. It provides a framework into which new information can be 
placed, coded and given wider meaning. It become possible to process new 
information once a framework has been established. The level of ideological thinking 
in other words `ideological conceptualisation', is seen as the first and most important 
precondition for making and acting upon political judgements, but says Marsh (1990, 
p. 58), it is not always a sufficient condition. For him "it is when the holder of an 
organised body of political knowledge identifies with one set of ideological values, 
within the Left, Right, or whatever, that strong political judgements are made. " 
According to Daniel Bell, ideology can be described as `the conversion of ideas into 
social levers'. For him ideology has the capacity to make people take action. Again 
he suggests that "the most important, latent, function of ideology is to tap emotion" 214 
So that those who share this ideology will act to achieve the ends indicated by these 
ideology. As far as G. Sorel is concerned ideology creates a sense of mission and 
nobility. It creates solidarity amongst believers. 215 
In terms of ideology and value consciousness on average my informants have a high 
level of ideological conceptualisation and strong adherence to national and sacred 
values. A Europe wide study found that the level of ideological thought and political 
action are very closely connected and those who acquire a high level of political 
thought tend to participate in high level political activity e. g. become political 
activists (see Marsha, 1990, Chapter 3; and Klingemann, 1979, p. 279). It seems this 
generalisation also applies to VP activists in Turkey. I have observed that the majority 
of the VP members seem to have a high level of ideological conceptualisation and 
ideological recognition; party activists especially seemed to have a very advanced 
knowledge of Turkish politics, and knowledge of current socio-economic and political 
issues. 
Although I have processed the religious and ideological reasons separately they can 
be seen as a different way of expressing the same thing. It can be argued that the 
religious reasons (40.42 percent) and ideological reasons (21.42 percent) such as 
ideological closeness, loyalty to the national and sacred/ religious values can in fact 
214 Cited in Dowse and Hughes, 1986, p. 238. 
215 Cited in ibid, p. 238. 
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be placed under the principle of Islamism that includes the principles of Islam and 
the desire for greater Islamisation in society. 2216 In this case those who choose to 
become members and activists of the VP comprise almost two thirds (62 percent) of 
all VP activists. 
5.3.3 The VP is the best for Country 
The main incentive for this group's involvement with the VP is "the collective 
positive incentive" resulting from the implementation of a party programme or the 
value of collective goods. Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson have developed the 
collective benefit incentive (1994; see also Seyd and Whiteley 1992: Chapter 4 and 
5). It is assumed that those party activists who closely agree with the general party 
views should have the greatest incentive to seek the implementation of those policies 
and therefore work hard in their constituencies (Ibid 1994: 114). 
As already noted two in five of my informants joined the VP for reasons other than 
religious or ideological. Nearly half of this group (14 percent of all VP grassroots 
activists) joined the VP because they thought it was the best available option among 
political parties to solve the country's problems (see table 5.7). This category will be 
examined under two sections. The first group, which consists of 14 percent of all 
informants, expressed their trust in the VP to serve the country better. What incentives 
drew them to join the VP? It is apparent from some of the interviews that there are 
individuals who joined the party thinking of the welfare and well being of the people. 
"I thought about how I can contribute to the welfare and the well-being of the 
people of Turkey. In this process the VP appeared as the party in which I 
could do these things if I joined, and so I became a member of it. Otherwise 
there wasn't any personal expectation or any thing like that. " (Representative 
of neighbourhood of Asagiayranci). 
The representative of the neighbourhood of A$a; iayranct clearly indicates the 
elements of the solidaristic views among the grassroosts activists. It is a desire to 
216 According to Kalaycioglu (1998, p. 9) since the 1950s, traditionalists, including the centre right and 
religious right, have maintained the upper hand in electoral contests. For him they tried to carry out 
policies that were geared to accomplishing their version of a good society in Turkey. He argued "in the 




contribute to the welfare and happiness of others with whom activists associate. In 
this context it can be argued that unlike the first two categories of participants this 
third group joined the VP for non ideological and religious reasons. This means they 
are not concerned with Islamic principles but with wordly, everday problems such as 
how to help others in society, and how to solve long term socio-economic problems. 
As mentioned earlier the WP/VP developed a new political rhetoric from the early 
1980s onwards: "serving the people". Thinking in a historical context it has never 
been the case. It has always been the other way around; only the state deserves 
citizen's service and obedience. Since one party rule, this view has been the 
mainstream approach among political parties. Contrary to this approach one of the VP 
leaders says that politics is a competition for the `best servant of the people'. In a 
similar vein another informant said: 
I wanted to be a member of the VP because they could serve our country much 
better. They are trustworthy, treat everyone equally, they like their fellow 
citizens and are the best people. " 
He carries on: 
Our organisation is like a family where there is always solidarity and cooperation 
between friends. Even sometimes without visiting my own relative we would visit out- 
friends. 
... What we do right now is what the leftist people used to 
do in the past. 
Similarly the representative of the A. Pasa neighbourhood argued: 
"They have been doing a good job for the country and would not steal, or eat state's 
money and provide good service". 
The expression of "they have been doing good job for the country" strongly indicates 
the reason behind his support for the VP. That is the firm belief of the collective 
benefits or public good resulting from the implementation of a party programmeu7 in 
this case by the Virtue party through its socio-economic policies. 
The second element is that the party is seen as honest, trustworthy, morally superior 
and uncorrupted. Widespread corruption and corrupt politicians has been a matter oi' 
217 Sec Seyd, Richardson and Whiteley 1994: 114. 
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concern for some time in Turkey. Since the 1980s the issue of political corruption, 
bribery, nepotism, favouritism, combined with organised criminal gangs, some 
business circles and Mafia connections have became common elements of the 
political scenery. For example Hasan Tuzun from the Ayvali neighbourhood 
highlights the lack of any interest among mainstream political parties to protect the 
rights of the disadvantaged sections of society, instead they are seen as corrupt and 
involved in organised crime. For him the opposite is true for the VP. He says that: 
I found the VP closer to me because they defend the rights of the poor and the weak 
people. They are never involved with the Mafia or organised criminal gangs. 
For representatives of the Hurel neighbourhood the matter of concern was similar to 
that of previous informants: `the political situation, widespread injustice, plight of the 
nation, and the socio-economic conditions' were the main reason he joined the party. 
He continues, 
I believe that the WP/VP would solve these problems better than any other party. 
Also, personally I do not trust any of the other parties. 
Here again the driving force behind his participation was a sense of dissatisfaction 
with the current social and economic conditions social inequalities and mistrust of 
other political parties. 2 8 Within this category there are informants who joined the 
party with the considerations of economic material development combined with the 
spiritual one. The Turkish modernisation project has always been overly concerned 
with the concept of secularisation. So Islam and religious institutions were pushed 
aside, imprisoned within the private sphere. The control over religion loosened over 
time but it has never been free from state interference. This fact has always caused 
grievance, resentment and disapproval within certain sections of society. This fact 
was explored and to a degree exploited by the religious NSP in the 1970s and the WP 
until its closure in 1998. As one of my informants put it, the pro-Islamic parties 
advocate alternative development strategies, which combine the material (economic) 
development with the spiritual (religious) one. 
Now, Hoca used to use a phrase "madeli i'e tnancvi kalkinnia" 
[material/economic and spiritual/religious development]. He was saying that 
we would take these two issues together. So I liked the idea. I think it is our 
218 1 have discussed this point in last chapter. For an elaboration See chapter 4. 
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most natural right as Muslims. We need economic development as well as 
spiritual in this world. Every Muslim should be rich so that he can live in good 
faith. On the other hand Good faith is necessary when we go to the other 
World. Yes we are believers. Believing in all His commands, all His Verses 
that are sent us, is sunet and sebiyets therefore we joined the party. (Irfan 
Erdogan) 
When we look at how and why Idris Erdogan joined the Islamic party it appears that 
he considered the issues addressed by the leader of WP/VP, economic development, 
modernisation and industrialisation not only for the material benefit of modernisation 
but also for spiritual development and well-being. It seems that for him the spiritual 
and religious aspects of social life play key role in his involvement in the Islamic 
movement as well as economic development of higher living standards. The issue of 
economic development on the basis of greater industrialisation has always been given 
great importance by the leadership of the Islamic movement. 
It appears that they believed the VP would be effective in dealing with social, 
economic and political problems. For this group it was the party's programme and 
policies, the social and economic issues which the VP have been promoting which 
appealed to this group. It appears that 60 percent of VP grassroots activists are more 
radical in ideological and religious terms than ordinary voters (see table 5.7). 
However the ordinary WP/ VP voters are more concerned with socio-economic 
problems than Islamic values or the ideology of Islam. 
This view was shared by 40 % of my informant group. Indeed it was the main reason 
for involvement. The majority of the WP/ VP s voters are from the bottom of the 
social scale: from the lower middle and lower classes, low wage and salary earners, 
small shopkeepers, artisans and poor peasantry. The majority of them live in 
gecekondus encircling the metropolitan areas. 
The World Bank classified Turkey as upper-middle-income economy. 219 Her GNI 
(gross national income) per capita was calculated at around $ 3,100 in 2000.22220 
Undoubtedly, the most fundamental economic problem is the disturbing income 
polarisation between the poor and rich in Turkey. In 1994 the poorest 20 percent get 
219 For the World Bank's definition see http: //www. worldbank. org/data/countryclass/classgroups. htIn 
220 See littp: //www. worldbink. ot-g/data/databytopie/GNPPC. pdf 
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only the 5.43 percent of total income while the richest 20 % received the 50 percent of 
all income (See table 6.9). Unfortunately there is no available date for the average 
income for the gecekondu areas. However as argued in chapter 4 gecekondus consists 
of the poorest sections of urban population. It is highly likely that majority of the 
wages of those who are employed in formal sector in gecekondus would be earning in 
line with the minimum wage that is calculated by the government. In April 1999 the 
minimum wage for those over 16 years olds was 68,000,000 TL per month which 
was equivalent of 178 US dollars in a month. 
According to a study by TESEV (2000) (Turkish Economic and Social Research 
Foundation) there is a close connection between income distribution and voting 
patterns. When analysing the 1995 election results the TESEV found that across 
Turkey the majority of those people whose income varied from $654 to $1000 p/a 
voted for the Welfare Party. Another important finding of the TESEV study was that 
the outcome of the electoral process is being decided by the big metropolitan cities 
like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Furthermore, the balance of the vote in these cities is 
being determined by the `urban poor' who live in the varovlar (gecekondu) areas. The 
study results indicated that in gecekondus the most important factor for voting 
behaviour was economic. 22' Those parties who are aware of this fact developed 
strategies to attract the gecekondu vote. 
It was reported that the VP was very active in gecekondu suburbs of Istanbul. As part 
of the election campaigning the VP often addressed the essential problems of 
gecekondus: unemployment and poverty. Apart from its election strategy the VP 
organised charities and "financial help" for the most needy. At the 1995 general 
elections, the WP developed the policy of Adil Dilzen (Just Society). Following the 
WP's closure its successor the VP left the rhetoric of Adil Düzen (Just Society), but 
this time, to compensate this shift, it adopted more explicit leftist policies during the 
last elections (1999) the VP. 222 
The same trend continued with the last general elections of 18 April 1999. "Poverty 
gave its response at the ballet box" reported Milliyet. It continued "In this election 
221 TESEV's study was reported by Milliyet 22 January 1999. 
222 [bid. 
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too, due to widespread income inequalities, people voted for the marginal/extreme 
parties like VP, NAP and HADEP instead of mainstream central parties. "223 As the 
TESEV study points out the urban poor who make up a substantial proportion of the 
urban and general population have been supporting the WP/VP because of its policies 
on unemployment and poverty. During the 1990s the WP (later the VP) appeared as 
the party of gecekondus, and addressed their vital problems. 
For example, one of my informants Mehmet Balci- a pharmacist from the Senlik 
quarter. Unlike the majority of my informants he was born in Ankara and was not a 
migrant. He is a university graduate, married with two children - He says 
I saw that the VP approaches Turkey's problems in a more rational way... 
There is a wonderfully close relationship between the party and the people. It 
was this coordination and co-operation between the VP and people that drew 
me to this party. " 
For M. Balci the way that the VP approaches Turkeys problems was the key factor for 
his involvement. It may or may not be the rational choice at the individual level but 
the rationality of the VP's socio-economic program and policies, and his trust in the 
VP's potential to serve the country was the main reason for his membership. At the 
second level, it seems that the `wonderfully close relationship' between the party and 
potential voters played a significant role. In particular lie draws attention to the high 
level of co-ordination and co-operation between the VP and its people. 
It must be said that this close interaction, co-operation and co-ordination has a 
significant meaning. As the only mass membership party the WP/VP developed a 
close relationship and cooperation between the party and the potential voter. 224 Thus 
it made a real difference in terms of voter turnout and public support for the VP. The 
closer relationship between the party and the people gave the VP a very positive 
image. This positive image can then be translated into voter support at the elections. 
This aspect was also a frequently expressed reason for many grassroots activist for 
their close involvement with the party. 
223 Sec Istanbul daily Milliyet 20 April 1999. 
224 See Berkey, 1996, p. 45; cakir, 1994, pp. 216-232; Özbudun, 2000; Sayan, 1996, p. 36. 
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5.3.4 Other Reasons: trustworthiness/cleanliness, loyalty to 
leadership, protecting the poor. 
The fourth group from Table 5.7 was classified as others. This group gave other 
reasons than religious or ideological ones. They make up 17 percent of the total 
informant group. They see the VP as trustworthy, which means politically clean, 
uncorrupted and the party of the poor. Some said they trust the VP because it would 
not steal people's money, and it is open and clean unlike other parties. Some of them 
expressed loyalty to the leadership. There are people who support the VP as an act of 
solidarity because of what they see as the unfair treatment by the media, security 
forces and other parties. In the first place comes the issue of corruption and the party's 
record on this matter. 
In a country where public resources and power are distributed, by and large, through 
client list networks there is inevitably a high degree of widespread corruption and 
injustice. I stated earlier that corruption, favouritism and clienteles have reached a 
degree, which threatens the very existence and continuity of the Turkish state. The 
widespread corruption and nepotism has not just created an atmosphere of contempt, 
resentment and alienation of large sections of society but it has also allowed a small 
group of multi-millionaires to mushroom while the problems of unemployment and 
poverty get deeper and deeper. This fact has also dangerously eroded the most 
fundamental ethical and moral values in society. 
It can be argued that this widespread corruption has also badly damaged the country's 
economy. According to a research report, which was released during this year's 
Davos summit (2001 Davos economic forum) by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 
Turkey is in fourth place after China, Russia and Indonesia among thirty-five 
countries where the corruption and non-transparent governance is seriously damaging 
the economy. The report suggested that every year 36 percent of public funds, corrupt 
politicians, bureaucrats, business and mafia/organized criminal gangs in Turkey steal 
tax and state revenues. This means an ordinary taxpayer had to pay 36 percent extra 
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taxes last year. 225 With this background it is not hard to imagine why and how the 
public lost its faith in mainstream political parties in the early 1990s. Ordinary people 
believe that all politicians and parties are involved in corruption to some degree but 
the question is which party does it less. In this case because of its religious 
orientation, and supposed moral superiority the WP/VP have the upper hand in 
elections. 
It seems that moralist politics have been developing as it reaction against 
institutionalised and widespread corruption scandals, patron-client relations, and non- 
transparent governance. The more politics is dominated by moral issues the more the 
WP/VP will continue to attract mass voter support, as well as increase its 
membership. 
Here are some of my informants' views on the WPIVP. Ahmet cavuýoglu a member 
of the Mamak ilce excutive committee, explains what he thought about the VP when 
he joined: 
I have found the WP/VP truthful and genuine. Their words and promises 
match with their actions. You could not see this in other parties. This party 
comes from within the people so it deals with the people's problems. It acts 
with the people. 
Similarly the representative of Bahcelerici neighbourhood argued that: 
[The VP} are trustworthy, uncorrupted, genuine, truthful and would not 
promise anything that they could not keep. What they say is that they work for 
the sake of Allah... " There are people who have been discriminated against 
because of their beliefs. It is something that is widespread. All citizens feel 
that way. For example my wife is veiled and she won't lower it even if you 
offered an apartment from the cankaya district. But my daughters do not wear 
headscarf and they won't wear it for an apartment in cankaya either. 
He points out the moral and ethical characteristics that were important for his 
involvement with the party. The characteristics that he highlights such as trust- 
worthiness are what normally every political party should have, but it is often not the 
225 See Hürriv, et (daily), Istanbul, 30 January 2001, "Tiirkiye yolsuzluk liginde dördiincii oldu" 
(Turkey got the forth place on the league of corruption); Radikal, (daily), Istanbul, 30 January 2001, 
"Karanlik Iýlerde Zirve Yolundayiz" (March to the pick on the path of dark, dirty business) We are on 
the fourth place on the way of dark busineses. ); Milliyet, (daily), Istanbul , 30 January 2001, 
Yolsuzlukda ilk dürde girdik "We got the fourth place on the corruption iseses"; Yeni Evrensel, (daily), 
Istanbul "Davosun Ardindan (After Davos)", 01 February 2001. 
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case. He also raises the issue of discrimination and repression on the basis of religious 
and ideological beliefs. Such issues are obviously very important and are discussed 
below. For now I return to the issue of corruption and its implication for politics 
throughout the last two decades. 
5.3.4.1 Widespread Corruption 
Corruption has infected all institutions and many layers of society since the 1980s. 
The reason for this widespread and persistent corruption has been the involvement of 
three important circles: derin devlet (deeper state or the inner circle), the Mafia and 
the politicians. One of the prime reasons for this scale of corruption cases is the low- 
intensity war against the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK, in the Southeast. In the name 
of national unity and defence of the country against the separatist movement, many 
unlawful acts have been carried out. During the last decade Turkey witnessed rampant 
corruption, gigantic scandals and abuse of public funds, which has inevitably eroded 
the already low public confidence in political parties and parliament. No wonder that 
for more than a decade politicians have been the least trusted and respected people in 
Turkey. 226 Loss of confidence in the political elite has badly affected the political 
parties to the point that for more then a decade no party has been able to obtain a 
majority or even over 25 percent in parliament to form a single party majority 
government. Consequently, unstable and patchy coalition governments have ruled 
Turkey since the 1991 general elections. 
Although the relationship between the: the Merin devlet the Mafia/business and 
politicians/bureaucrats was speculated for a long time, a traffic accident involving a 
lorry and a Mercedes near a town called Susurluk opened a Pandora's box. 227 It 
226 A new study has found that political parties and parliament (The Grand National Assembly) are the 
least trusted group among Turks. The degree of trust for parliament is 3.2 out of 10, and political 
parties received just 2.1 out of 10. Sec TESEV's study Türkiye de Yolsuzluklar Hane Halki ArWtrtna 
Sonclari (The Results of The Study of Corruptions in Turkey) 28 February 2001. TESEV's web 
address: www. tesev. org. tr 227 Susurluk is the name of a small town near to Balikesir but with this famous traffic accident it was 
transformed and came to describe it phenomenon in Turkish politics. On November the 3 1996, a 
Mercedes automobile collided with a lorry 4 miles away from the town of Susurluk-Balikesir. At first 
it seemed it very ordinary accident, nothing unusual on Turkish roads, but soon it became clear that one 
high ranking police officer Huseyin Kocadag, a runaway criminal , Mafia leader Abdullah Catli and a 
parliamentarian the leader of a Kurdish Tribe of Bucak Sedat Bucak were in the same car. What made 
the car so distinct was that this car was packed with guns, explosives, long range assault rifles and so 
on. This accident was a picture of the relationship between the state, the Mafia and the security forces 
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revealed the multiple dimensions of the corruption and the close relationship in the 
triangle of politicians, the Mafia and the police. 228 It is believed that despite the many 
revelations that followed the Susurluk accident, reports by the state appointed 
inspector, a high judge Kutlu Sava, media reports and accounts of many independent 
reporters, only the tip of an enormous iceberg has been uncovered. 229 Despite the fact 
that there has been some degree of willingness among the ruling elite to clean up this 
extra ordinarily tainted infrastructure, the corruption scandals have not slowed 
down. 230 
As political corruption became more visible in everyday practices, the long forgotten 
ethical and moral dimensions of politics made a comeback into political discourse. 
Ethical and moral issues and religious values came to be considered serious election 
issues. Refah (Welfare), as the pro-Islamic party, rightly criticised its opponents for 
being unethical and immoral and claimed superiority. 
In this context the WP was helped by two factors. The first was that it had not been in 
government since the 1980s so there was no record of corruption, scandal or any 
wrongdoing. Second, more importantly, because the WP was a religious Islamic 
party, it was able to claim moral superiority over its rivals. Indeed it did not require 
much effort by grassroots activists to turn this moral superiority and clean image into 
electoral success by the mid-1990s. By offering ethical policies, clean politics and 
promising to clean up the corrupt state mechanism the WP became the largest party in 
parliament by 1995. 
which has developed over a decade and has been fuelled by the low intensity war in the Southeast 
against the PKK. 
229 See for a detailed account of Susurluk see: http: //ilef. ankara. edu. tr/susurluk/. 
Also, a key word search (on 22/01/2001) through Google. com found 8,910 news item and articles on 
the Susurluk. This figure itself indicates the massive debate and importance of the SUSUrhlk event in 
Turkish politics, 
229 Kutlu Sava a state prosecutor was appointed by the government to investigate the Susurluk event 
and produced a 400 page report. This report was important because it was the first time a state 
appointed prosecutor investigated such a corruption case and by and large it was objectively pointing 
to the relations between the mafia-criminal gangs, politician/bureaucrat and the some elements within 
state. For a summary of it see Hürriyet , 13 Ocak 
1998, "late tarihi rapor" (Here is the historic report, 
13 January 1998). 
2.10 It was the first time a government in Turkey resigned because of a political scandal. M. Yilmaz 
Government had to resign and called the early general elections of 18 April 1999 after the Turk Bank 
scandal. 
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5.3.5 Freedom of religious beliefs and expression. 
It is important to remember that the origins of the problem lie with the modernisation 
project, which started in the late nineteenth century and entered a new phase with the 
Kemalist revolution. Some of the activists and many of those with whom I had regular 
contact mentioned a genuine grievance and unease about their freedom of religious 
belief and expression. Some of the themes that my informants brought up during 
interviews were part of an age-old problem of the role and place of religion in Turkish 
republic. The republic was built in the image of the West, especially the French 
republic, and religion was brought under the state control as a direct consequence of 
the principle of secularism. The term luicity was borrowed from French and of course 
had its French approach, which is tolerant to religion. 
Now we have all seen that the WP emerged as the biggest party of the right 
after the 1994 local election. It represents common sense. For example, we all 
see the torture that our young girls through in university because of the 
headscarf issue. Again the numbers of the Imam-Hatip (religious schools) 
students have falen from 590,000 to 250,000. Economicaly things are not any 
better either. The M. Yilmaz government has not been succesful. It was 
Erbakan who increased the civil servants' wages by 50 %. By considering all 
these matters I became a member of the WP/VP. (Yahya Konuk representative 
of the Mutlu neighbourhood). 
As a modernist and secularist movement the republican elite has never been sure of 
what to do with one of the most influential and historically fundamental social 
institutions: religion. Religious freedom is part of the current political debate. It is an 
old one but can take different forms as well. From the mid-1980s onwards the turban 
(headscarf) issue has led to it confrontation between the secular authorities and 
religious movements. Since then it has been transformed into a major symbol of the 
freedom of beliefs and expressions. It was left to rest when the Ozal government 
permitted students attending school to wear headscarves but later it was banned. The 
process of 28 February (1997) once more made the turban issue one of the key 
battlegrounds in the schools and universities. For VP grassroots activists the turban 
(headscarf) is a religious obligation, every Muslim woman should wear it. Not only is 
it seen as a religious condition but it has also been elevated to the level of human 
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rights. They argue it is a matter of freedom of expression and an individual's right to 
wear whatever he/she wants. However the authorities see it as an ideological 
uniform, an extension and expression of the Islamic fundamentalist ideology and no 
regime should allow any party, organisation or movement to destroy democracy by 
using it. 
The events of 28 Fenbuary had many victims: the closure of the Refah party which 
received 6 million votes in the 1995 general elections created an atmosphere of 
resentment, injustice and a denial of basic rights. Those who identified with the party 
also felt victimised by the system. For example one of my informants, Serif from 
Peyami Sefa neighbourhood, explains why he joined the WP: 
I came to identify myself with the WP/VP because of the unfair treatment of 
the VP by all the other parties, the media, judiciary and the military. All this ill 
treatment made me side with the weak victim. 
Victimhood is a powerful] social unifier. Many ethnic or religious minority groups 
such as the Jews, share this experience of victimisation and it bonds these group very 
strongly. I observed a similar attitude among the WP/VP members and grassroots 
activists. Ordinary WP voters also felt that state surveillance of the Islamic movement 
and the closure of the WP was a direct attack on their freedom and democratic right to 
choose. 
For some the choice of the WP/VP was due to its leadership. Loyalty or appreciation 
of a particular leader can be a strong incentive to join a party and even become a 
political activist. As happened in the case of M. Demir: 
The reason behind my membership was because that year Melih bey [M. 
Gökcek the Mayor of Ankara since 19941 was a candidate for Ankara's 
metropolitan municipality in 1994.1 was originally a member of the NAP like 
my father. But I liked M. Gökcek when he declared his candidacy from the 
WP I decided to become member of it too. 
He continued: 
I liked his speeches especially one that was on the TV with other rival 
candidates. They were all talking academically using academic jargon and so 
on. I knew that people would not understand a word of it. On the contrary 
Melih bey was talking plainly, clearly, like an ordinary guy. When I saw this I rI> 
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said to my brothers "that's it, we will win" and we did indeed. (Melih Demir 
member of the nbh. Committee). 
As well as personal loyalty there can be other incentives like wanting to strengthen 
right wing politics, as an activist from Mamak ilce did: "I always wanted the right to 
be powerful and win, so for this reason I joined the VP. " 
For this group of activists the particular (VP) party is not so important as long as it is 
a right wing party. The VP is described as right wing by 7 percent of activists. The 
strategy that this group employed was that the WP seemed to be the most likely 
winner among other rightist parties so they supported and joined the party. 
Contrary to the popular image -which views the WP as no more than an Islamic 
fundamentalist party-, surveys shows the WP combines religious and class appeals 23t 
Between one-third and one-half of its voters support is associated with religion and 
ideological reasons. When the voters were asked why they voted for the WP half of 
them gave ideological reasons, like `the WP's defence of religious values (20.6 %), its 
promise of a "just order" (13.4 %), and its respect for "national and moral values" 
(12.5 %). Less than one third of them (29.6 percent) saw the WP as honest and 
reliable party. One third (33.1 %) of all the WP's voters viewed their party as the 
party of the poor and oppressed"(ibid, pp. 90-91). Since 1994 local elections the WP 
has strong roots in the gecekondu areas. By wining most of the municipalities it has 
diminished the left parties leading role in those low-income gecekondus areas (ibid, 
p. 91). 
It is plausible to think that the WP/VP would appeal right wing votes as well. 
Especially since it's forth congress in 1994 and with its closure the VP has moved its 
rhetoric and some of policies towards the centre. Although there is not any specific 
statistical data to know precisely at what extent the WP would attract support among 
ordinary right wing voters, it is expected that its move toward centre ground would 
attract votes from centrist voters who have not a particular desire for any sort of 
religious regime but vote for the WP/VP for its right wing stance. 232 
231 Ozbudun, f 2000, p. 89. 
232 See, Ibid, p. 9I I. 
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As mentioned above that party activists view the media, judiciary, the state, military 
and other parties as hostile and unfriendly toward the WP/VP. Reaction to other 
parties was also an important incentive for VP activists. In addition to the above 
factors there has been an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with all of the mainstream 
political parties influencing some of my informants to join the VP. 
5.3.6 As A Reaction to Other Parties: Political 
Dissatisfaction 
Some 7 percent of all grassroots activists joined the VP because of political 
dissatisfaction with existing mainstream political parties. The political literature on 
dissatisfaction is rich. Due to constrain on space and a desire to clarity I do not review 
this literature in detail here. The relationship between dissatisfaction and political 
behaviour is at least as old as the serious study of politics it is widely believed that 
those who are dissatisfied are the source of public unrest, and that political violence is 
too often caused by individual frustration (Barnes S et al 1979, p. 381). The theory of 
personal dissatisfaction and political action has been greatly influenced by the concept 
of relative deprivation (ibid: 384). 233 A. Marsh (1990: 1 (0) argued that: 
As soon as people realise in sufficient numbers that they are not getting the 
things they want and feel they ought to have, they become frustrated. 
Frustration leads to dissatisfaction that leads to demands, which, if unmet, will 
lead to anger and aggression and thence to protest action. 
As Marsh puts it, frustration and dissatisfaction feed each other unless this circle is 
broken by adequate policy implementations. In conventional politics the personal 
dissatisfaction can be expressed via voting behaviour, supporting a party or possibly 
becoming a party activist. It is argued that policy dissatisfaction increases support for 
the political process and thereby political participation. 234 
233 I am using the concept of "relative deprivation" as defined by W. G. Runciman (1966). He (1966, 
pp. 10-II) argued that: "Relative deprivation should always be understood to mean a sense of 
deprivation; a person who is `relatively deprived' need not be 'objectively' deprived in the more usual 
sense that he is demonstrably lacking something. In addition, relative deprivation means that the sense 
of deprivation is such as to involve a comparison with the imagined situation of some other person or 
group. This other person or group is the `reference group', or more accurately the `comparative 
reference group'. " 
234 Dalton, 1988, p. 50; also see Farah, B., et al 1979, Clip. 14. 
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There are grassroots activists who joined the WP/VP as a reaction to mainstream 
centre-right and centre-left parties. However the number of voters who voted for the 
WP/VP because of their dissatisfaction or disillusionment has been far greater then 
the number of political activists and it has far-reaching consequences on Turkish 
politics. There has been a significant climate of partisan realignment and electoral 
volatility since the mid-1980s (sec Kalaycioglu, 1998, pp. 4-5; also Özbudun, 2000; 
Tosun, 1999). In fact, for some political commentators the electoral volatility and 
partisan realignments were partially responsible for the WP's sudden rise in the local 
(1994) and general (1995) elections. 223; As Sayari (1996, p. 36) find out that: 
"The declining strength of the mainstream parties, especially those on the 
centre-right, is the best indicator of the electorates dissatisfaction with the 
parties' perceived failure to resolve the country's pressing social and 
economic problems. In increasing numbers, Turkish voters have deserted 
them and turned to the Islamists. " 
For him there are three factors for the growing support of the WP. First is the 
widespread public disenchantment with the mainstream parties on the right as well as 
on the left. Secondly the militant like grassroots activism. Third the increased role and 
visibility of religion in Turkey. 
There is no doubt that if the failure of the mainstream secular parties disillusioned 
voters due to continuing social, economic and political problems, the same process 
alienated those who felt policy dissatisfaction deeper then ordinary citizens due to 
peculiar characteristics (e. g. those individuals with a high social status will not just 
switch their party support from A to B but decide to get involved in and participate in 
politics at a higher degree by becoming a member of B). 
5.3.6.1 The Left loses Ground to the WP in the Varolar 
The WP and later the VP have exploited the vacuum created by the evaporation of 
social democratic parties and policies in Turkey. It was said that the left spectrum of' 
23 Kalaycioglu (1998, p. 12) argued that: "The Turkish party system is not only plagued by 
fragmentation, and the volatility of the electorate. Furthermore, in the 1990s a realignment of the vote 
seems to be happening, as the centre left-right spectrum rapidly diminishes, while the far-right 
increases with leaps and bounds. " 
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Turkish politics has been quickly shrinking since the 1980s and this created a vacuum. 
The Islamic Welfare party successfully filled this. I had a conversation in Ankara in 
1999, with Ahmet Albayrak one of the campaign managers and a close aide of the 
newly elected Mayor of Mamak sub-district. He is a university graduate holding an 
MA in political science. Upon my question about his views on the WP's rise, 
especially in i'aroslar, he said that: 
The left lost its support in the varo*lar while the WP/VP got stronger. It was 
the left who used to welcome those newly migrated people from rural areas to 
the big cities. They used to build some of their houses to show solidarity and 
find them jobs. But later the leftist parties stopped doing this. Instead of the 
left, now, the VP's cadres have been doing these things. 
What do you think is the reason for the loss of support for the left in Turkey? 
The left was weakened because during Demirel's government they were in the 
government as a junior partner of the coalition, 236 and controlled many 
municipalities. During this time they were involved in lots of corruption 
scandals and faced many sleaze allegations. So they lost their credibility and 
public confidence. They were unsuccessful too. The left betrayed the people's 
hopes and dreams. The people saw them as a way forward, as a hope for a 
better future, but they turned their backs on the people. They did not respect 
people's values and beliefs.... Turkey has been changing very rapidly and this 
situation has created the problem of a cultural identity crisis. Our traditional 
elites still has this mentality "I can educate the nation, I can teach the people" 
but the people say " no I will be how I want to be, not how you want ". In fact 
the situation has transformed into a class war". (Ahmet Albayrak). 
Mr. Albayrak raises serious issues, which help explain the fall of the left and the 
unstoppable rise of political Islam in Turkey. Albayrak first points out a very major 
shift in the attitude of left wing parties towards their social base. The Turkish left, 
represented by the RPP, lost touch with its historical social base the lower middle and 
lower classes: salary and wage earners, poor and landless peasantry, unemployed 
under classes in the post-1983 period. It was no longer interested in social policies, 
unemployment, poverty, low wages and salaries or the widening gap between the poor 
and the rich. As well as shirking solidarity with gecekondus, the RPP dumped "social 
democratic policies" in favour of the free market economy, privatisation of large 
236 The PP, which later became SODP (SDPP) joined the government with Demirel's TTP following 
the general elections of 1991. Upon the sudden death of the President T. Ozal in 1993 Demirel left the 
government to become President but the coalition government continued under T. tiller and M. 
Karayalgtn until 1995. 
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public companies, privatisation of traditionally free public services, and large budget 
cuts from social programmes. 
On the second level comes the corruption and unsuccessful government years as a 
junior partner of a coalition government with the centre right TPP and 
municipalities. 237 On the third level the uncompromising elitism that runs deep in the 
leftist parties manifests itself as looking down on the people, disregarding and 
disrespecting local culture, traditional or religious values that are accepted and 
respected by the majority of the population. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter 1 discussed the roots of and reasons for party membership. I began by 
identifying the relationship of my informants within VP local branches. I wanted to 
see how they describe their position with particular local VP branches and found that 
a vast majority (79 percent) of them view themselves as party activists. There were 
other substantial groups who view their positions as activists but also hold elected 
office or membership at the sub-district executive committee. The rest consisted of 
party workers, branch administrators and so forth. 
Secondly I described their present position within their particular local party branch. 
Two fifths (40 percent) of them were leaders of their neighbourhood committees. 
Some 14 percent were representatives of their neighbourhood executive committee. 
One fifth were members of the ilre (sub-district) executive committees that 
prestigious and influential at the local level and signifies a desire for upward 
mobilisation. Another ten percent described their position as activist members without 
any elected office or membership in any kind of committee. Twelve percent of my 
informants were members of the youth committee, very vibrant, creative, energetic 
and enthusiastic units within the local branches. This figure confirms the overall ratio 
of youth involvement in the VP. After clarifying the relationship and the position of 
237 In the local elections of the 1989 the PP later became SHP (SDPP) won many municipalities 
including the metropolitan cities Istanbul, Ankara, Kayseri and Mersin but due to the widespread 
corruption scandals it lost them in the following 1994 local elections. In this period scandals involving 
large publicly owned municipality companies ISKI in Istanbul and ASKI in Ankara were very high 
profile. 
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my informants within the VP I moved to the process of participation and becoming a 
member of the VP. 
It is important that we grasp the process of participation including the decision- 
making process, and which factors playa role before an individual joins the VP. Table 
5.4 shows that 38 percent of my informants joined the VP as `self starters' which 
means they are highly motivated (see Whiteley, 1995, p. 223). Also it is very possible 
that the `self starters' may well be the cream of party activists since they possess a 
high level of initiative. More than one quarter (26 percent) of activists reported that 
they were approached by the party via a friend. 
Some 21 percent of my informants said that someone from their family played a 
leading role in their involvement with the party. It was observed that like numerous 
things in our lives, political attitudes are learned from childhood. It is a sign of 
persisting consequences of political socialisation to which every individual is 
subjected from a very early age. 238 It seems that the family continues to be one of the 
key components of the political process and to play an important role in my 
informant's decision to become party members. The last group (14 percent) in this 
section tare those who joined the party out of loyalty or personal admiration for their 
party leaders. They became members because they were motivated by the social 
norms. In this group it seems that `party activists motivated by social norms are 
responding to the perceived opinions of "significant others" e. g leaders, or people 
whose opinions they respect and value' (see Whiteley, 1995, p. 223). As was expected, 
a very high degree of devotion, admiration and emotional attachment was observed 
among all of the VP's people from ordinary rank-and-file members to the MPs in 
parliament. 
One of the outstanding findings of this chapter would be the influence of the family 
on the process of participation. The breakdown of data has revealed that there is a 
positive correlation between family and party membership. In other words the family 
has a profound impact on an individual's political choice and membership in a 
political party. Table 5.5 shows that around four in five (79 percent) of my 
informants have someone in their family who is also involved with the VP. 
238 See Cord et I. 1974, p. 184; Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 5-6; 105. 
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There appeared another strong incentive for membership. Around three quarters ( 74 
percent) of my informants viewed their role as party activities as `very important' for 
VP electoral succes. In fact it can be interpreted in this way: they see themselves, their 
campaigning activities as very important therefore they have a high perception of 
personal influence in politics. 
The fourth aim of this chapter was to identify the major incentives of party 
membership. It was observed that the paths to membership were influenced by five 
different variables: religious, ideological, collective positive incentive including moral 
integrity and, finally political dissatisfaction. The literature revive showed that all of 
the five variables have been widely recognised and extensively studied as predictors 
of political participation. These variables have been treated as the main predictors of 
political action regardless of whether it is conventional or unconventional political 
action. 
Sixty two percent of my informants expressed either religious or ideological 
incentives as the most important reason for their membership in the WP/VP. This 
indicates a strong ideological and radical presence among VP grassroots activists that 
are both indicators of high political participation. The first two variables or reasons 
are evidence of a high level of ideological conceptualisation and ideological 
radicalism that is one of the characteristics of party activism and explains why 
members joined the VP in the first place. 
The rest of my informant group, 38 percent, joined the VP for reasons other than 
religious or ideological. For sonic 14 percent of them the VP is the best for country. 
In other words they joined the party because of the `collective positive incentives'. 
Another 16 percent joined the VP for Other Reasons: trustworthiness/ cleanliness, 
loyalty to leadership. They see the VP as trustworthy, which means politically clean, 
incorrupt and the party of poor. Some said they trust the VP because they would not 
steal people's money. The last group, some 7 percent of my informants said they 
joined the VP as a reaction to other parties. For this group the political dissatisfaction 
with established parties was the driving force for membership. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE GRASSROOTS ACTIVISTS 
The people who may not think of themselves as heroes, but in many ways are the biggest 
heroes of all, are the party members who stuck with us through the hard times as well as the 
good. ... It is you, after all, who saw us through the period of 
deepest despair, stuck with the 
party and helped see it back to power. Even when we were written off we bounced back and 
that was down to members and trade unions in every community continuing to fight for us. 
(Tony Blair, 2000) 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two parts. Part one is devoted to conceptual definitions and a 
brief history of mass membership parties. Despite the decline of mass membership 
parties, membership is critical to political parties. In this context the benefits and costs 
of membership for the parties is discussed. For operational purposes I focus on the 
concepts of membership remembering that the concept differ from party to party. 
Later, in order to define the grassroots activists I explore the literature on 
membership. 
In the second part of this chapter I study the socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party's grassroots activists. My first goal is to 
see whether there is a consistent and coherent pattern among active members of the 
VP. Than I identify members social class, educational background, occupational 
characteristics, employment sector, social status, and the length of time spent in the 
city/ urban area. Different variables will be tested and compared with data from other 
studies to see whether there are peculiar socioeconomic or demographic 
characteristics prevalent among VP activists that may have led to political 
participation or party activism. To this end I use some statistical data and the analysis 
217 
of recent Turkish studies on the socioeconomic, demographic backgrounds and 
political attitudes, voting behaviour and membership attitudes. 239 
6.2 The Conceptual Framework 
6.2.1 The Emergence & Development of Mass Membership Parties 
Political parties are the key components of representative democracy. They are the 
bridges between politics in general and society. Parties are the most permanent 
agencies of political participation and have played their role with great success. 240 
Throughout the twentieth century political parties were the key mediators between the 
population and the power centres, governments. In the following chapter (chap 7) I 
will be dealing with questions like: Do party organisations matter? Why grassroots 
activism is important? Why does party organisation matter? And finally I will be 
exploring the question of how the party organisation makes a difference? 
Nevertheless, in this chapter more then the mass party itself I focus on party 
membership. M. Duverger (1964,63) argued that the concept of member is linked 
with a particular notion of political party that was born at the beginning of the 
twentieth century along with Socialist parties and that has subsequently been imitated 
by others. " 
Historically the concept of membership, Duverger (1964, p. 63) points out, is the 
product of an evolutionary process, which led from the cadre party to the mass party. 
The establishment of political parties in general, and particularly mass parties, was the 
outcome of a series of major revolutions and transformations that occurred throughout 
the nineteenth century. In Europe, modernisation, industrial revolution and 
239 For example, TÜSES 1999 in a recent study of the social structure and the electorates/ supporters of 
political parties in Turkey. This study represents all Turkey and deals with various aspects of the 
electorate. The second one is by Ahmet Yiicekök, ( 1997) Dinin Siyasalla$masi (The Politicisation of 
Religion ) is carried out in Istanbul. It has a large sample of 15.683 and deals with politics as well 
issues of identity. At the last part of this chapter data are compared with the findings of these studies . There are other studies like Özbudun, E (2000)'s study on contemporary Turkish politics and TESEV 
(2000), 
240 See Scarrow, 1996. 
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urbanisation coupled with nationalism contributed to the awakening of the masses. 
Although, the mass party was created through nationalism and religious institutions, 
the real and functioning mass party emerged with the rise of the Communist and the 
Socialist movements between the 1840s and 1870s. By the end of the nineteenth 
century there was a considerable working class with institutionalised working class 
parties. 2aº 
It has been argued that membership of political parties developed in an evolutionary 
process. When working class movements around Europe were transformed into 
political parties, notably in Germany where the SPD was founded in 1875/1890, and 
the Labour Party in 1900/1906 (See Berger 1994, p. 1) membership emerged as the 
pillar of these political parties. In France the socialist party was born as a vehicle for 
the political participation of the working class. 
It can be seen that mass membership was the only way for these socialist - working 
class parties to sustain their financial needs and undertake daily routine tasks like the 
organisation of local party branches, registration of new members, organisation of 
ward meetings, distribution of party outlets, vote canvassing, and the like. 242 
Working class parties also made a breakthrough by creating and utilising membership 
effectively for election purposes, registering new members and collecting membership 
fees. Thus, by the first quarter of the twentieth century working class parties were 
more powerful than any other party in Europe. 
The mass party represented a higher stage in the process of party evolution; however, 
241 Duverger, 1964, p. 63; see also Blondel, 1958, p. 40. 
242 As Berger (1994, p. 88) noted: "... In many places the SDP managed to install itself within working- 
class communities as a creditable alternative to other political parties. It did so by developing into a 
neighbourhood-based party that became meaningful to the everyday lives and struggles of the workers 
in it particular locality. Party members were given a strong sense of cohesion and belonging by simple 
organisational innovations such as the introduction of uniform membership booklets after 1907 or the 
weekly (sometimes monthly) payment of their membership fees. " 
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this view began to change from the 1960s onwards. I discuss party decline below 
(chap 7) but for now it can be said that mass membership parties may have declined 
due to the lack of public interest while it may have been a matter of grave concern for 
politicians as well as the establishment in Western Europe, in Turkey things are quite 
different. There is widespread, and popular interest in politics and that has been the 
main concern of the political elite and the establishment. The closure of the pro- 
Islamic Welfare party was a reflection of this concern among the military and 
secularist elite. 
6.2.3 Why Membership is Valued 
The concept of membership was an invention of the mass parties and it represented a 
higher step on the ladder of party evolution. There have been some changes in the 
party systems. Inevitably these shifts led to the changes of the functions, scope and 
perception of party members. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, members remain 
highly valued by their parties and party leaders. For example in his centenary speech 
at the Old Vic theatre in south London, Labour leader Tony Blair praised local 
activists as the "biggest heroes" throughout the party's 100-year history. While he 
reminded his audience that there could be no going back to the party values of the 
1980s, he used the occasion to reach out to party activists. 243 By praising the 
grassroots activists as the "biggest heroes" of the Labour Party's hundred year history, 
in effect, Tony Blair acknowledged the key position of party activists for the party's 
future and to reassure those activists who increasingly feel alienated from Downing 
Street. 
According to Scarrow (1996, pp. 42-46) party members have the following benefits 
for the party 
Legitimacy Benefits: It is rightly assumed that high numbers of members will secure 
a greater degree of legitimacy for a party. Legitimacy measured not in the legal sense 
243 The Guardian, Monday 28 February 2000. 
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but in social terms like acceptability and popularity. 
Direct Electoral Benefits: Members are valued by their parties for their electoral 
benefits as voters, because evidence suggests that members vote more frequently than 
non-member voters. 
Outreach Benefits: As Scarrow (ibid. 43) puts, it even-low level members can 
function as ambassadors to their community, therefore they can mobilise and multiply 
the vote wherever they live. 
Financial Benefits: Members' financial contributions are still valuable and regarded 
as such. 
Labour Benefits: Especially at pre election times for an active election campaign 
members' free labour can be decisive on the outcomes of elections. 
Linkage Benefits: Party members are also essential in order to maintain the 
connections between the party and the 'grassroots'. They behave like a bridge or nerve 
cell in a body, which maintains the linkage between the brain (the party) and body 
(the voters or public opinion). 
Innovation Benefits: In an era where knowledge and information are valued as 
equivalent to material value, parties value their members for new ideas and improve 
party policies accordingly. 
Personnel Benefits: Through membership party leaders get the opportunity to know 
their members more closely. So when leaders need new recruitment membership 
provides an unequivocal value. 
º The driving force for mass membership varies from party to party and through time 
and place yet there are some universal factors that come into effect. 
6.2.4 The Concept of Party Membership 
In order to define the membership or the `grassroots', first we need to answer the 
question of who/what is a member? How can we define a member of a political party? 
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One of the immediate problems for the definition of a member is that it can take a 
different meaning from one type of party to another (see Duverger 1964, pp. 142-147). 
Being a member of a fascist party can be very different from being a member of a 
Liberal Democrat Party. The totalitarian or absolutist party would require total 
submission and adherence from its members whereas the second would be much more 
flexible with its membership. For example strong obligations, several responsibilities 
and few privileges are typical of American parties. The opposite is true for Italy: 
Lombard League. (Scarrow, 1996, p. 17). In different countries members may all pay 
dues and be enrolled on membership lists but their relationship with the party, their 
position and their gains from membership can be very different. 
A. Leiserson argued that the extent and the nature of the party's demands on its 
membership give a good clue to the character of the party. He defines three types of 
political party and party membership. The first is what he calls, the totalitarian party, 
which includes Communist and National Socialist parties. Totalitarian parties are 
defined as demanding of their members an "exact unquestioning obedience and 
loyalty to its by tenets, its program, and its orders over and above the claims of 
government and law, family, church, employer, or trade union" (Leiserson, 1958, 
p. 137). The criteria for membership of Communist parties are rigid and severe 
including recommendation by full members and a period of provisional membership 
varying from six months to two years, and above all approval by a party committee 
(Leiserson p. 142). Since the days of Leiserson, however, the concept of totalitarian 
parties has changed dramatically. There is not, as he describes, a single Communist 
party today which demands an uncompromising obedience to its orders or leaders. 
Nationalist parties have also changed although to a lesser degree and their criteria for 
membership remains one of the most rigid and severe. 
The second type of party that he defines is absolutist parties. These parties expect 
their members to observe secretly 'some religious or ethical doctrine, the solidarity of 
some racial or national group, or the higher ethical quality of a socioeconomic policy' 
(Leiserson, p. 137). He points out that, although absolutist parties require application 
forms for membership they are far less exclusive, militant and rigidly disciplinary. As 
they have a broad cross section of ideological applicants such as the working class, 
religious brotherhoods and racial or nationality groups these parties are inclined to see 
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party organisation as a 'mass educational and social movement' and their members as 
party workers. Members "attend meetings, participate in organisation programs, speak 
publicly and act as a faithful carrier of the word to the rest of the potential 
membership group. A membership card and annual or monthly dues payments are 
also common attributes of such parties' membership practices... "(Leiserson, p. 143). It 
appears that there are some contradictions between the way Leiserson describes the 
absolutist parties and their understanding of membership. Can they be much less 
exclusive, militant, monastic and much less rigidly disciplinarian? The long history of 
conflict, for example, in Northern Ireland, which is based on religious sectarian 
division, shows they are extremely exclusive and militant and monastic. 
The third types are the Liberal parties. For Leiserson the majority of European and 
American parties can be seen in this category. A liberal party he argues "arises in a 
situation in which the party places the Constitution or the welfare of the 
Commonwealth as the highest political value, and frankly admits its instrumental, 
pragmatic role of providing the personnel and policies most conducive to those ends 
(1958, pp. 137-138). It must be said that his description of liberal parties is rather 
uncritical. Nevertheless his assessment of the membership conception of liberal 
parties is quite valid. As he (1958, p. 144) states, "the liberal ideological conception of 
party membership is relatively loose and informal". Most liberal parties require their 
members to be formally enrolled in the party, but the requirements are far less 
exclusive, specific and demanding. It is also true that today most of the political 
parties in Europe and America has a similar understanding of membership. Leiserson, 
differentiates the type of membership according to the types of party ideologies. 
However, there are different types of members within one single party. 
The best-known example for this is the British Labour Party. Since 1918 it has made a 
distinction between its affiliated members and individual members (Duverger, M 
1964: 61). It may look contradictory to have more than one kind of membership 
within a single party but this is how the relationship between parties and their 
members works. Some members have greater aspirations than others to devote 
themselves to party activities. Some have less time but greater financial resources to 
contribute. Others, like grassroots activists, have ambition, and a reasonable degree 
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of political education to advocate the party's views and indoctrinate other members. 
This is not a simple division of labour amongst party members but constitutes 
different degrees of participation and therefore different kind of membership too. 
Moreover, there are some criteria that help us to define the concept of 'member' 
In everyday language the concept of 'member' of a party coincides with that of 
adherent - in Europe at least. The latter is distinguished from 'supporter', who 
declares his agreement with the doctrines of the party and sometimes lends it 
his support but who remains outside its organisation and the community it 
forms; the supporter is not, properly speaking, a member of a party. 
(Duverger, 1964, p. 62). 
Duverger emphasises the difference between members/grassroots and 'supporter'. A 
supporter is not within the created organisation, the so-called party, but he/she stays 
on the periphery, agreeing with the party's fundamental principles but not enrolled or 
attending any kind of regular meeting or activity. If we look at some definitions of 
party member we see there is a pattern, which includes the most distinctive elements 
of party members. This is what we seek. According to David Berry (1970, pp. 31- 
32): "... party members are those who individually subscribe to a political party, hold 
a membership card, and presumably have their names recorded on membership lists. " 
In his account a subscription to the party's membership list and holding a membership 
card are the most important elements membership. Scarrow points out that: 
... A useful way to make this 
distinction party member as those whose relation 
to a party involves both obligations and privileges. Two of the most common 
obligations imposed by parties on their members are the injunction to refrain 
from joining rival parties, and the requirement to contribute to party funds. 
Common privileges include the right to participate in candidate selection, and 
the right to influence programmatic decisions. In some countries, parties also 
(or alternatively) offer their members special access to goods and services. 
(1996: p16). 
Scarrow' s definition of membership also draws a line between the supporter and the 
member of a party. For her we can only distinguish a member from the rest of 'the 
border of the universe of all party supporters ' if they have both obligations and 
privileges within the party organisation. The most common obligations are that no 
party tolerates involvement of their members with rival parties and, financial 
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contribution from the grassroots level. She also points out privileges members may 
have. e. g. the right to take part in candidate selections and the right to influence 
various levels of decision making. 
6.2.4.1 Members 
Throughout our search to define members of a party a pattern has materialised. A 
member is a person (1) who is formally enrolled in a political party; (2) who shares 
and acts upon the ideology, programme or policies defined by the party; (3) who is 
constrained from joining or being involved with another, especially, a rival party; (4) 
who makes financial contributions to the party and; in return, (5) who enjoys 
privileges within and outside the party. These privileges vary from country to country 
and from party to party but they can include good opportunities for a political career 
as well as according to Scarrow special access to goods and services, which are 
mostly from public resources. 
I have documented a pattern of party membership but we must also define the activist 
member / grassroots activist which is the focal point of this research. The definition 
of membership / grassroots is the first step in this process. The next step is how we 
can identify the concept of active members or grassroots activist. 
In order to define the grassroots activists I will utilise the concept of militant as 
proposed and used by M. Duverger (see 1964: pp. 109-116) and Michaud (1975, p. 
125) in the context of French Communist Party. Finally, Karl W. Deutsch (1970: 48) 
`s definition of political activists will be explored. 
6.2.4.2 Militant 
There are strong similarities between the 'militants' that Duverger (1964: 109-I 16) 
used in his classification of party membership and the 'grassroots activists' that are the 
subject of this study. Duverger (1964, p. I 10) argued that: 
The militant is an active member: the militants from the nucleus of each of the 
party's basic groups, on which its fundamental activities depend. Within the branch, 
for example, there is always to be found it small circle of members, markedly 
different from the mass, who regularly attend meetings, share in the spreading of the 
party's slogans, help to organise its propaganda, and prepare its electoral campaigns. 
These militants constitute it kind of caucus within the branch. They are not to be 
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confused with the leaders: they are not directors but executives; without them it 
would not even be possible to carry out any activities. 
What we should be looking at in Duverger's definition of militant is to see the 
differences between the ordinary members as he calls them the 'masses' and the active 
members he calls 'militants'. Clearly, the militants are fewer with more influence and 
activity within the branch. They regularly attend meetings and spread the party's 
ideology and slogans. They are vital for preparing and executing the election 
campaigns. Although, Duverger prefers the term 'militant' instead of 'active member', 
at the beginning of his definition, he admits that the militant is an active member. 
Michaud's definition of militant is different then Duverger's. There is no strong 
ideological devotion in Duverger's concept of militant but Michaud's militants 
defined in the context of the French Communist Party are strongly bound with the 
Communist Party's ideology and organisational structure. He wrote, "The real strength 
of the party resides in its large number of devoted militants... and well trained and 
efficient local leaders" (1975, p. 125). As his term militant is so much equated with the 
Communist Parties and our subject pro-Islamic Welfare/ Virtue party is far from 
being Communist, we should seek out some other definitions. Deutsch's definition of 
political activist seems more in line with the WP/VP's activists. He proposes six tests 
for identifying the political activist: 
An activist is a person (1) who is member of a political organisation; (2) who 
gives money to a political organisation or candidate; (3) who frequently 
attends political meetings, whether of committees or of large groups; (4) who 
takes part in electoral campaigns; (5) who writes letters on political topics to 
legislators, political officeholders, and/ or the press; or (6) who talks about 
politics to people outside his immediate circle of family or friends (1970, p. 
48). 
He considers a political activist to be anyone who fulfils at least three of these six 
conditions. On the bases of his not so stringent tests, 3 percent of the population in 
most countries can be classified as political activists. The first two conditions, being a 
member of party and paying regular dues, are the same criteria for membership of 
party. But the rest of the conditions: frequent attendance of political meetings; taking 
part in electoral campaigns; writing letters on political issues to government officials 
or press and; talking about politics in public/ out side family and friend circle, are the 
conditions that constitute an activist. 
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If we compare the two concepts Duverger's 'militant' and Deutsch's 'political activist' 
we could see that there are some parallels and differences between the two. The 
parallels are regular attendance of meetings, taking part in the election campaigns, 
spreading the party's views, goals and slogans, writing letters and preparing electoral 
campaigns and the like, but the differences are equally important especially when 
applied to our case study: the grassroots activists of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party (VP) in 
Turkey. Duverger's definition of 'militant' is much more exclusive, and implies some 
clear-cut lines between member and active member. For example, his emphasis on the 
small number of people whose activities are fundamentally important for the party. In 
Deutsch's definition of active member there is no such fundamental role for a small 
number of people who are considered to be activists'. 
6.2.4.3 Grassroots Activist 
To solve the problem of conceptual definitions I adopt an eclectic approach. It seems 
both definitions, militant and political activist could be converged in to one. 
Although, Duverger's description of militant seems much closer to the VP's 
grassroots activists that I study. But, because the term `militant' has negative 
connotations with the communist parties of the 1950s and especially its negative tone 
in Turkish politics I instead use terms like `party activist', `active party member' or 
`grassroots activist'. I define the grassroots activist as (1) a person who is an active 
member of party; (2) who is in many respect different from the rest of the members; 
(3) who regularly attends political or informative party meetings; (4) who actively 
shares and actively advocates the party's ideology, policies and goals; (5) who 
actively engages all aspects of the electoral campaigns; (6) who has some sort of 
resources such as financial, political, ideological or cultural if not free time for party 
activities; (7) who has a strong ideological conviction, has better political 
knowledge, and devotion to the party leadership. 
It can be said that grassroots activists are the core of the party organisations. They are 
the real fighters of the parties on the ground. They are the real people struggling to 
increase the scope of influence and hegemony of the party upon the non-member as 
well as to re-educate the members and carry the party into power. This is in order to 
ý 
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realise their own political agenda that is mostly more radical than the ordinary 
members'. 
6.3 The Case of The Virtue Party and Its Grassroots 
Activists 
Political rights and duties in general are drawn up by the Turkish Constitution (1982) 
section four. The rules concerning party formation, membership, and withdrawal from 
membership are outlined by article 68 and 69 of the Constitution and by the law of 
political parties panel code number 2892.244 Paragraph Il of panel code 2802 
specifies the conditions of becoming member of a political party. There are certain 
restrictions on who can be members and who cannot. Civil servants in the public 
sector and corporations, judges and prosecutors, members of higher judicial organs, 
member of armed forces and students are restricted from joining political parties or 
organisations. 
From my observation and interviews with the grassroots activists in Keciören and 
Mamak, in Ankara it can be said that the Virtue Party has been working very hard to 
acquire new members. Its predecessor Refah had over four million members before it 
was closed down. Now the VP aims to reach at least that number. Unfortunately since 
its foundation the VP has not declared its membership figures and my request from its 
head office was also fruitless, but I can estimate on the basis of information given by 
the administrators of both party branches. Before the elections on 18 April 1999, the 
as individual branches registered one third of the members that they had in the WP, so 
a rough estimate can put the membership around one and half million. Of course it is 
an estimate and may not be utterly accurate. 
i 
6.3.1 How to Become a Member of The VP 
To become a member, first the candidate must fill in the membership form. This form 
contains three parts. Firstly the candidate declares that the fulfils the conditions set by 
the law of political parties, he/ she will observe the party's programme, rules and code 
244See Dodd, C. H (1990: 172-173), The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, The Eton Press 
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of conduct and will pay the membership dues for a year. Secondly they must provide 
demographic information: the neighbourhood, his/her name, surname, parents name, 
Fazilet (Virtue) Party's Membership Application Form 
FAZILET PARTISI VIRTUE PARTY 
Üye Giri$ Beyannemesi Membership Form 
FAZILET PARTISI ...... 
iLcE BASKANLIt; I VIRTUE PARTY .... DISTRICT 
2802 Sayih Siyasi Partiler Kanunu'nun ADMINISTRATOR 
II. maddesinde üngürülen $artlari ta$iyorum. I fulfil the conditions of the paragraph II of 
Partinizin tüzük, program ve i4Yönetmeliklerine panel code number 2802' to become member of a 
uymayl kabul ve ytilik .............. 
TL. Üyelik political party 
aidatini ödemcyi taahhüt ediyorum. I declare that will observe the party's program, 
Üyeli? te Kabulümü rica ederim. Tarih: rules and code of conducts and will pay the 
/...... /........... IMZA membership dues of ... 
TL a year. 
MAHALLESI :.......................................... I would like to be accepted as a member. 
ADI SOYADI 
......................................................... 
Date:..... /.... /... Signature 
BABA VE ANA ADI NEIGHBOURHOOD ................................... 
DO6UM YERI VE TARIHI: 
............................... 
NAME AND SURNAME:......................... 
TAHSIL PARENTS' NAMES: .................................... 
DURUMU: 
................................................. BIRTH PLACE 
AND DATE:.................... 
MESLEK VE SANATI :.................................... EDUCATION:.............................................. 
OCCUPATION AND SKILLS: ..................... 
IKAMETGAH ADRESI :.................................. HOME ADDRESS:........................................... 
EV ve 1$ TEL: .................................. HOME AND 
WORK TEL:........................... 
KAN GURUBU BLOOD GROUP: ............................................ 
(I, cE ÜYE SIRA NO 
.................... 
DISTRICT MEMBER NUMBER:................... 
TAVSIYE EDENLER REFERENCES: .................................................... 
Yukarida ismi ve adresi yazili $ahsi tanidigimizi We declare that we know this applicant for 
ve partimize üye kaydinda bir mahsur membership and have not got any objection 
buluntnadigim arz ederiz. REFEREE REFEREE 
TAVSIYE EDEN ÜYENIN TAVSIYE NAME-SURNAME NAME - SURNAME 
EDEN ÜYENIN AND SIGNATURE AND SIGNATURE 
ADI- SOYADI - IMZASI ADI- SOYADI - IMZASI 
birthplace and date, education, skills and occupation his residential address, telephone 
numbers. The third part consists of the referees' names and signatures. They also 
make a declaration, which says I know hinm/her and support his/her membership'. 
I have witnessed several people filling in the application for membership. It takes 
about ten minutes to complete the form. The reference system does not work precisely 
as stated in the form but the administrative secretary asks who the referees are and 
usually they find someone whom both knows. They are issued with membership cards 
229 
with their photographs. Members are very keen to obtain their membership cards from 
the administrator and proudly display them. Some treasure and retain old cards issued 
by the Welfare Party before it was closed down. Membership fees are not always 
paid. In fact I have not seen anyone pay it there. In Turkey, political parties can, 
according to their share of the vote, get hefty sums of state funding therefore the 
membership dues are not really what parties financially rely on. 
As argued in chapter 2, the Turkish party system has been experiencing a major 
impasse. They face an increased party fragmentation, electoral volatility and 
organisational decay. This process went hand in hand with increased party 
detachment, declining organisational capacity and party identification among citizens 
(Özbudun 2000, p. 73). Also, there has been a process of policy convergence between 
the centre-left and the centre-right parties caused by the process of globalisation and 
neoliberal restructuring policies. 245 Hence they have been in desperate need of 
something different that separates them from others. In this context well-organised 
grassroots organisation and committed grassroots activists equipped with modern 
technology make a real difference. During my field work that coincided with the 
election campaign period in Turkey, I observed that compared to other centre right 
and centre left parties, (which I visited several times in their local party branches), the 
VP have far better grassroots organisation and far better election campaign strategies. 
The strategies, tactics and campaign methods used by the WP/VP during the first half 
of the 1990s became the new standard' of election campaigning. In contrast, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, very much with Ozal's Motherland Party (MP) and 
many others the election campaigns were organised and executed in the American 
style; media led election campaigns using mass communication technology, increased 
use of opinion poling, PR expertise and the like. 246 In the general elections of 1987 
and 1991 the MP subcontracted its election campaign to a very famous American PR 
company, which carried out George Bush's presidential campaign. Other parties like 
the TTP either signed contracts or invited expensive expertise and consultants from 
abroad. 
245 For a detailed account of the party decline and policy convergence in Turkey see Chapter 2. 240 For a debate on the effects of the grassroots party organisations on the electoral outcomes see Chapter 7. 
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At the beginning of the 1980s the style of election campaigning changed. The 
resource-rich conservative parties rejected grassroots organisation and came to rely on 
clientilist ties, spin-doctors, hi-tech and high budget election campaigns. When the 
WP had made unforeseen success in 1994 and 95 elections this trend started to 
change. Many of mainstream political parties began picking up the methods 
developed and used by the WP. 247 
From our observation in the field, it was quite apparent that grassroots activists were 
putting up an extremely vibrant campaign throughout the period. It was observed that 
many grassroots activist were extremely generous with their time working long hours 
in the neighbourhoods. Some activists owned shops, groceries, warehouses, petrol 
stations etc., and in order to join the campaign, would either find someone to run the 
shop or close their shops altogether. Even some of those usually employed in the 
public sector, would use their annual holidays or get bogus sickness reports from the 
doctor through networking just to be able to join the campaign. These example show 
how committed the VP's grassroots activists are to their party activities. 
6.4 The Socioeconomic Profile 
`People who talk together vote together' 248 
6.4.1 The Social Environment: Sub-districts of Mamak and Keciören 
Before it became the capital city of the modern and secular Turkish republic, Ankara 
was a small, dusty Anatolian town at the beginning of twentieth century. Its good 
fortune came when the founding father of the new republic, Mustafa Kemal, chose 
this humble town as the capital city. From this historical moment as chosen location 
Ankara has had a massive, planned and deliberate transformation in every sense and 
direction. 
Ankara started to grow as the only planned town reflecting the ambition of the new 
Kemalist elites to create a modern capital city with its wide streets, long boulevards, 
247 It has been several times reported that some of these mainstream parties adopting the VP's campaign 
model. See Milliyet 22 Ocak 1999 (daily Miliyet, 22, January 1999). 
248 Miller, W. L (1977, p. 65) Quoted in MacAllister, Jet al., 2001, p. 42. 
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picturesque monuments, modern theatre and art buildings. Until it became exhausted 
by the influx of migrants from rural Anatolia, Ankara continued to grow as a planned 
city. 
Ankara witnessed a rapid urbanization process from the 1940s and onwards. As all the 
governmental offices were concentrated there its development was driven 
predominantly by public sector employment mainly in office jobs and public and 
private services sectors. Although there has been growth in the industrial sector, its 
rate is relatively small compared to Istanbul and the rest of Marmara region. Keciören 
and Mamak are both administrative districts of Ankara. 
6.4.2 Sub-District of Keciören 
It can be argued that the type of housing (e. g. whether it consist of mainly gecekondu 
(squatter) housing, apartment blocks, luxury apartments or villas) in a neighbourhood 
is one of the main indicators of its socioeconomic conditions. In general terms, the 
location of a neighbourhood in a town or city is also an important indicator of its 
inhabitants' social and economic backgrounds. It is also one of the most significant 
variables influencing the political process. 249 
From the early 1950s onwards there has been a number of studies primarily concerned 
with the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and voting tendencies in 
Western Europe and Northern America. 250 These studies focus particularly on the 
relationship between social environment, e. g. neighbourhood factors, and social and 
political participation. For example one of the earliest empirical studies of American 
voting behaviour concentrates on the social bases of American partisanship. This 
249 For a recent debate about the neighbourhood effect on voting behaviour see MacAllister, I et al., 
(2(x)1), "Class Dealignment and the Neighbourhood Effect: Miller Revisited" in British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 31, Part I, (2001), pp. 41-59, see also Savage, M (1987) "Understanding 
Political Alignment in Contemporary Britain: Do Localities Matter? " in Political Geography, Vol. 6: 
(1987), pp. 53-76; Warde, A and Svage, Met al (1988), "Class, Consumption and Voting: An 
Ecological Analysis of Wards and Towns in the 1980 Local Elections in England", Political Geography 
Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1988), pp. 339-351. 
250 See Micheal, G et al (1982), "Political participation and neighbourhood Social Context Revisited in 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 1, February 1982, pp. 144-149; Kenny B. C (1992), 
"Political Participation and Effects from the Social Environment" in American Journal of Political 
Science, VOL/ 36, No. 1, February 1992, pp. 259-267. 
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study found that "an Index of Political Predisposition based on social classes, 
religion, and rural/urban residence was a strong determinant of voting choice" (Dalton 
1988, p. 152). Similarly Bell and Boat's (1956-7) study, in San Francisco, shows that 
family and socioeconomic neighbourhood characteristics influence the development 
of informal group relations between friends, relatives, neighbours and co-workers'. 
Another similar study carried out by Berry (1970, p. 34) in Britain, found that there 
was a strong correlation between socioeconomic class characteristics in a 
neighbourhood and voting behaviour 
The concept of neighbourhood effect has been employed in electoral studies for a 
long time. (MacAllister, J et at, 2001) In my research I am particularly interested in 
the neighbourhoods effects on political participation and voting choices. The reason 
for this is that since the 1970s many scholars have rejected the effects of the class and 
socioeconomic status of neighbourhoods on the electoral process. However 
MacAllister, J et ai (2001, p 59) pointed out that as recently as the last general 
elections (1997) in Britain there was strong evidence of such influence: 
We have provided strong evidence of very significant differences in voting 
behaviour within each of the country's three main social classes at the 1997 
general election according to the socioeconomic status of the area in which 
they lived. The lower the area's status- at a range of spatial scales including 
not only the constituency and ward but also bespoke neighbourhood varying 
from populations of 10.000 to less than 500- the greater the ratio of Labour: 
Conservative voting within each class. Geography clearly does matter. 
It was observed, during my fieldwork in Ankara, that the party support was 
predominantly affected by the socioeconomic characteristics (income level, type of 
occupation, type of employment and level of formal education etc) of the 
neighbourhoods. In other words class cleavages which had not been credited much by 
some observers, still play a much more decisive role on voting preferences. We will 
not discuss this lengthy issue here but it seems that class cleavages and party support 
in Turkey are being neglected in favour of alternative approaches like 'the new 
political cleavage and new politics'. 251 We shall return to this point in later chapters 
and will focus on the socioeconomic parameters in Keciören and Mamak. 
251 For an analysis of-old politics' and new politics' see Dalton & Kuechler, 1990, Challenging the 
Political Order; Pakulski, J. 1991, Social Movements, pp. 25-51; Russell J. Dalton, 1988, Citizen 
Politics in Western Democracies, pp. 151-176. 
Illustration l: A Typical Middle Class Settlement from Ke4iiiren Sub district 
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Illustration 2: A 'Typical Gecekondu Settlement in Ke4iöiren Sub district 
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In terms of the type of housing both sub-districts are comprised of a large proportion 
of gecekondu (squatter) settlements. 252 This means both districts are home for 
thousands of poor, lower and lower middle class residents. Mamak has a larger 
proportion of gecekondu dwellers than Keciören. 
As mentioned in chapter 1 that more then half of (55 percent) Kegiören's population 
currently lives in the gecekondus. However there has been a steady change in the 
composition of Keciören's population. There has been a continuing growth in its 
middle and upper middle classes which are composed of traditional bourgeoisie class 
like artisans, merchants, tradesmen, shop owners, contractors and so on. Also there 
has been a growing number of professionals like doctors, chemists, solicitors, public 
and private managers, etc., who have moved to Keciören's more prestigious, richer 
neighbourhoods. 
The ratio of gecekondu housing in comparison to the general population in Ankara is 
below the average (58.4 %) of Ankara (see Table 1.5). This is partly due to the 
growth of middle class area and also, partly rapid transformation of the gecekondus 
into authorised apartment blocks and the expansion of new settlement areas by the co- 
operatives in Keciören district. 
6.4.3 Sub district of Mamak 
The second district I have chosen is Mamak where I have lived for two years between 
252 The term Gecekondu, translated as "Houses which land in the night", has been 
used to describe a type of housing which is hastily erected in a single night if possible 
with, usually, low quality materials, and they were grouped together for security reasons. 
Danielson and Kelcs, 1985 The Politics of Rapid Urbanisation, pp. 162-166. 
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1989 and 1992. Just after graduating from university I moved to Ankara to attend a 
Master degree in the department of Sociology at the Middle Eastern Technical 
University in Ankara. I settled in the Mamak, neighbourhood of Misket where my 
parents have a home. The majority of the neighbourhood however was poor, the 
housing and services were considerably low quality. The way people lived, the things 
they were concerned with the values they shared were also very different from Ankara 
proper. My interest in this district goes back to those years that I spent there. I was 
not surprised at all that on returning to the same neighbourhood for my field research, 
I saw very little change. The neighbourhood looked the same, except for a few roads 
being broadened and improved, but the rest had stayed as it was ten years previously. 
Neither has things improved for the inhabitants. They have still got the same concerns 
and worries about the next day's bread. 
As mentioned earlier the county of Mamak is the one of the poorest of all 
administrative districts of Ankara. Compared to the wealthier districts (e. g. Cankaya) 
Mamak has all of the socioeconomic characteristics of the Third World cities. Some 
of its neighbourhoods are very poor the housing conditions are inadequate, income 
per family is very low and unemployment is higher then the national average. 
The quality of housing visibly worsens in these neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the 
district. High social deprivation, inadequate urban services, poorly maintained 
schools, substandard health services, a high rate of unemployment, low income and an 
unskilled labour force are the most common characteristics of these neighbourhoods 
on the outskirts of Mamak. In addition to these factors the integration of the 
gecekondu population to urban life is still a major problem and a major issue that 
affects political cleavages and voting choices. The process of integration of the 
gecekondu masses into city life demands a lot more than simply time spent in the city. 
Illustration 3: A Typical Gecekondu Settlement from Nlamak Sub district 
Illustration 4: A Typical Cecekondu from Mamak Sub district 
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The sub district of Mamak appears to be a predominantly gecekondu area. Although 
gecekondu (squatter) housing is found, by many students of urban studies, to be 
relatively high standard housing compared to its equivalents in many Asian and Latin- 
American cities, most gecekondu dwellings have considerable deficiencies. Lack of 
space and overcrowding is a common problem. Gecekondus average 2.6 people per 
room, compared with 2.1 for all urban housing (Danielson and Kelq 1985, p. 167). 
Only a few of Mamak's 63 neighbourhoods are non-gecekondu urban areas and 
occupied by traditional middle and new middle classes. These non gecekondu urban 
areas are mainly in central Mamak and developed alongside the main road called Tip 
Fakultesi Caddesi. Some of these non-gecekondu urban neighbourhoods are as 
follows: A. Pasa, Cebeci, Demirlibahce, some parts of Türközii, and inner Tuzlucayir. 
The rest of Marnak sub district mainly consists of gecekondu (squatter) settlements. It 
seems to have at least 79 percent gecekondu housing. In Mamak there are 95000 
houses in total and 75000 of them are classified as gecekondus. 253 
6.5 The Profile of Membership: Who Are They? 
"All other parties have got tnembers, but we have got believers in our party" 
(N. Erbakan, the leader of the WP) 
The rapid rise of the Islamist Welfare party in the middle of the 1990s was 
remarkable. Within a short time the WP became the biggest political party in Turkey. 
254 1 have pointed out time and again that the WP/VP owes its unprecedented rise to 
very well organised, effective party organisations established across the country and 
to its highly committed, hard working, very active militant grassroots activists. 211 
Now is the time to examine who are they really? Are they educated or uneducated, 
employed or unemployed, young, old, what do they do for a living, where do they 
live, where were they born, what is their social status etc? All those questions will be 
dealt within this section. 
253 These figures were given by Gazi Sahin the candidate mayor(presently mayor of Mamak) of the 
Virtue Party during his interview Cora local TV channel called Kann! A, 8 April 1999. 
254 To prevent repetition reader may consult chapter 3 and 4 for a detailed account of the rise of 
political Islam in Turkey. 
255 For more detail see chapters I, 3 and especially 7. 
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Before I move on, a few words about the gender issue in my research. All the 42 
informants whom I interviewed are male. Although I have made some observations 
and had occasional contact with members of the VP's hanim koanisyonlcu-i (ladies 
commissions) I have had formal interviews with only male party activists. There are a 
few reasons for this. First of all despite the fact that the hanim komisyonlari within the 
WP/ VP have been often acknowledged for their important contribution in vote 
canvassing, they usually remain inactive once elections are held. While they deserve 
this acknowledgement for their impressive role in terms of door-to-door vote 
canvassing grassroots activism needs consistency and long-term commitment. 
Secondly, whatever their contribution may be, ladies tend to not take the full initiative 
but rely on directives and advice from district branches via neighbourhood 
organisations, which are totally dominated by the male activists. The third reason was 
entirely based on concerns with the logistical problems of fieldwork. Given the 
boundaries of gender relations in this particular group and especially being an 
outsider, at least at the beginning, I anticipated some problems regarding accessibility 
for observation and undertaking interviews. I decided therefore to concentrate on the 
mainstream grassroots activist population because woman party members constitute 
only 4 percent of the total party membership in Turkey. 256 Therefore I decided to 
concentrate on the dominant mainstream grassroots activists of the VP. 257 
In the following section I aim to profile the socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the VP's grassroots activists. The reason for this is first of all to find 
out who the activists are, what sorts of social background they come from, their social 
status, age, income level, education and occupational background, marital status and 
like. Finally I intend to uncover the dominant socioeconomic characteristics of the 
VP's activists and compare these social variables with the socioeconomic status 
model developed by Verba and Nie 1972, chapter 8; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978 and 
used by many others like Dalton, 1988; Marsh, 1990; Milbrath and Goel 1977. It was 
argued (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, p. 63) that there is a strong relationship between 
256 See TESEV 2000, p. 23. 
257 Having said that, this is definitely not an attempt to deny or underestimate the existence and 
importance of haninrlar komisyonur (women's committees) within the grassroots organisation but we 
must note that grassroots activism predominantly is still a male vocation. 
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socioeconomic status and political participation. "Individuals with higher levels of 
education and higher levels of income will be more active in politics. " (Verba at al 
1978, p. 64). Dalton (1988, p. 49) stresses the role of social status as the main 
stimulant to participation. Social characteristics strongly correlated to political 
participation are age, education, gender, socioeconomic status, type of residency, 
strength of party identification, sense of political efficacy and policy dissatisfaction 
(Dalton, 1988, pp. 49-50; Dows and Hughes, 1986, pp. 272-273; Marsh, 1990). 
6.5.1 Place of Birth and Type of Residency 
First of all I asked where my informants were born. Table 6.1 shows that less than a 
quarter (24 %) was born in Ankara, the vast majority (76 %) being migrants from 
rural Anatolia. 
Table: 6.1 where were you born? 
PLACE OF BIRTH NUMBERS PERCENTAGE 
Ankara 10 24 
Elsewhere 32 76 
Total 42 100 
Source: Field Survey in Mamak and Ke4iörren Districts-Ankara 
Although I did not have any questions about family history, it is most probable that 
informants born in Ankara are the sons of first or second-generation immigrants who 
migrated to Ankara when it was thriving in the 1950s. The majority of our informants 
(76 percent) themselves migrated at a relatively early age for a better life in Turkey's 
fast growing urban centres. As in many other developing countries Turkey was 
transformed by the rapid urbanisation, which took place from the early 1950s. We 
must bear in mind that during the early 1990s the WP/VP became an urban-based 
political party. A nationwide recent election study found out that 58 percent of those 
who would be voting- if the election were held today- for the VP live in the urban 
areas compared to 42 percent in the rural areas (Sec TÜSES 1999, p. 109). 
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How long have the grassroots activists been in Ankara? 
Table: 6.2 The time spent in Ankara 
PERIOD NUMBER PERCENT 
(Years) 
0-5 0 0 
6 -10 I 3 
11-15 3 9 
16 -20 7 22 
21 -30 10 31 
31-+ II 34 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field survey in Marnak and Keciören-Ankara 
Some 87 percent of grassroots activists have been living in Ankara for more than 16 
years. My data reveals a similar pattern between the time that our informants migrated 
to Ankara and the pattern of rapid urbanization that took place since the 1950s. More 
then one third (34 percent) of the VP's grassroots activists have been living in Ankara 
for more than 31 years and must have migrated to Ankara with the first wave of rapid 
migration. Another 31 percent migrated between 21 and 30 years ago while less than 
a quarter 22 percent settled in Ankara between 16 and 20 years ago. Around 9 
percent migrated between 11-15 years ago and only 3 percent came to Ankara 6- 10 
years ago. 
How can we interpret this data relating length of domicile in the city and becoming a 
political activist? It looks as if there is a pattern. Our data suggests that the longer the 
time spent in the city the more likely one is to participate in politics and become a 
political activist. More than two third (66 percent) of our informants said that they 
have been living in Ankara for at least 21 years. As it was argued in chapter 4 in 
detail that there are strong correlates between political participation and urbanisation 
in general and urban residence and time spent in urban areas in particular. Berry 
(1970, p. 34), Danielson and Kelq (1985, pp. 100-102), Deutsch (1963) and Lerner 
(1958, p. 46) all agreed that urbanisation combined with other features of social 
mobilisation would increase interaction and political communication from citizen to 
citizen and citizens to state. 
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6.5.2 Marital Status 
Marital status is another social variable that plays a significant role as a predictor of 
political participation and voting behaviour. Like age and political participation, 
marital status is a variable classified as ' Life Cycle and Participation' (Verba and Nie, 
1972, p. 139). As Yücekök (1997, p. 69) suggested there is a relation between the 
ethnicity and marital status of an individual. Those sub- ethnic/religious groups who 
described themselves as `Muslims' and `Kurds' have a much higher ratio of marriage 
than those who described themselves as `Turks' and `Turk-Kurds'. As shown in table 
6.3 the majority (81 percent) of my informants are married. Less then 20 percent (19 
%) are single or widowed. Only a small minority (11 %) are unmarried/ single, the 
other 7 percent being widowed. 
Table: 6.3 Marital Status 
MARITAL STATUS NUMBER PERCENT 
Single. 5 12 
Married 34 81 
Widow 3 7 
Divorced 0 0 
Other/cohabit 0 0 
Total 42 100 
Source: Same as above. 
It is true that different ethnic or religious groups give different priorities. For example, 
in Istanbul among other sub-groups those who defined themselves as Muslim and 
Kurdish have a high ratio of marriage. At present 80 percent of `Kurds' and 76 
percent of `Muslim' are married while this ratio is 72 percent for `Turkish' group and 
73 percent within the population as a whole. In this study he found that 13 percent of 
the population are single and the remaining I1 percent is widowed or divorced. 258 
Since the 1970s politics evolved from `party centred' to `candidate cantered' politics 
personality became an important factor. 259 Marital status in this context counts a great 
deal. In general being married, having a decent and happy family life makes for good 
photo opportunities for media consumption. Regardless of the country; continent; 
258See Ahmet Yiicekük (1997: p. 69), Diirirt Siyasallas, nasi, AFA Yayincilik, 
19 See Crotty and Jacobson 197 I . 
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poor or rich; the culture; the religion; family values and family ties are considered the 
fundamental core of the society. Thus given a universally recognisable value and high 
priority. 
6.5.3 The Family 
In this stage we have no clear, sign of the relationship between marital status and its 
function in politics. Over 80 percent of our informants (active members of the VP) are 
married but there are many factors that play a role in this matter. Being married with a 
family can be highly valued for a candidate of an important seat but people do not get 
married because they are in politics. There are traditional, cultural norms and religious 
factors as well. It has been suggested that those who are married are more likely to 
take political action than single persons. 
The size of family and the number of children of our informant group is also another 
social variable closely related to political participation. The size of average 
households of our informant group is 5.07. As parents comprise 2 per household, the 
average number of children is 3.07 for our group. The size of the average household, 
in Turkey, is 4.97 in total, 4.33 in district centres and 5.75 in the sub-districts and 
villages (in 1990). 
Table: 6.4 Number of children? 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN NUMBERS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
2 2 7 
2 9 18 33 
3 6 18 22 
4 5 20 19 
5and+ 5 35 19 
Unanswered 10 - 27 
Total 37 100 
Source: Same as above 
In Ankara the size of the average household is 4.23 in total, 4.08 in the province 
centre, 4.51 in districts and 5.22 in the sub-district and villages. It was observed that 
33 percent of our informants have 2 children per household, which is below the 
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national average of 2.97 children in 1990.260 Less than a quarter (22 percent) has got 
3 children. 18 % have 4 children and the other 18 % have 5 and more children. Only 7 
percent of our informant had only have I child (See table 6.4). However on the whole 
It appears that in terms of the average number of children, our informants have (3.07 
children/per household) 0.84 more children per household compared to average 2.08- 
children/per households in Ankara. This may be affected by their religiosity and 
because they are members of the Islamic Virtue party and their religiosity may have 
an impact on the number of children they have. 
6.5.4 Educational Qualification 
In this section, I will analyse the pattern of educational qualifications of our 
informants and its possible implications for the party preferences. The educational 
background of our informant group is a rather interesting one. From this figure we can 
say that our informant group is highly educated. More than one-third (38 percent) 
have attained a high school education, a ratio three times higher than in Ankara (11.59 
percent) and four times that of Turkey as a whole. There are no illiterates among 
them and only a very small percentage (2.38 percent) has no diploma. More than one- 
fifth (21.24 percent) of them have a primary education. 19 percent have an 
elementary/ high junior education and almost one in ten (9.25 percent) have a 
university or equivalent degree. The rate of university graduates among them is twice 
the rate in general in Turkey (see Table, 4). 
The ratio of illiteracy and literate without a diploma (literate without a diploma 3.38 
percent) is so small compared to 18 percent in Ankara and 21 percent of the national 
population. Those with only primary education are only 21 percent compare to 44 
percent in Ankara and 52 percent of whole male population. In contrast, 19 percent 
attended junior high school / elementary schools compared to 12 percent in Ankara 
and II percent of the male population in Turkey as a whole. 
If we break down this data about the type of school attended, we will see a very 
260 See 1990 Census of Population, p. 179. State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, October 1993, 
Ankara. 
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important aspect of the schooling among our informants. 
Table: 6.5 Distribution of educational level in the Survey districts, compared 






Mamak Ankara Turkey "`* 
N%% %n 
005.29 11.18 
Literate without a diploma 1 2.38 12.83 10.27 
Primary School 9 21.24 44.15 52.26 
Elementary/ Secondary (in total) 8 19.04 12.42 10.84 
(a) Imam- Hatip (Religious-) 
prayer-leader and preachers) 4 (50.00) 
High School (in total) : 16 38.09 11.59 
(a) Modern/ non vocational 8 50.00 - 
b) Technical/Vocational 4 25.00 4.34 
c) /H ( Religious High: 




4 9.25 9.25 4.75 
42 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Data collected during the fieldwork in Ankara 
* Drawn from 1990 Census of population, pp. -89 
** See 1990 Census of population, pp. 12-13. 
As our informant group consisted of male grassroots activists we have chosen the male side of the 
column. 
Half of these who attended junior high/elementary school, and 25 percent of those 
high school degree holders graduated from religious IH schools. This is very 
significant in terms of formal education and political preferences. 
The positive relationship between education and political participation has been 
observed in many studies since the 1950s (See Dalton, 1988; Dowse and Hughes 
1986; Lerner, 1964) Educational background is among the many variables, which 
influence both political participation and the partisan preferences ( Dalton, 1988, pp. 
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35-57). The type and the duration of formal education is very influential upon the 
political process. In his study of "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey", 
Kalaycioglu, (1994, pp. 402-425) examined the critical role of formal education in 
determining party preferences. He argued that education is important in determining 
one's political allegiance to the values of the centre or periphery. 
Those who attended secular schools for longer tend to support the parties of 
the centre (or the SDPP or DLP); those who do not attend secular schools do 
not tend to support the parties of the centre. In fact, he argues, secular 
education is negatively correlated with religiosity (Ibid, pp. 419-420). 
Further evidence shows, at the end of the 1990s, that `centre-periphery value 
orientation, formal education and ethnicity emerged as the most important 
independent variables with the highest predictive capability in determining party 
preferences in Turkey' (Kalaycioglu (1998, p. 10). In Turkey 1H schools have been at 
the centre of a long running controversial debate on the role and the possible impacts 
of IH schools on the rising Islamic movement. 
Since the 1980s there has been an explosion of religious Imam Hatip (IH) (prayer- 
leader and preachers) 261 schools and Koran courses. Although, those schools were 
opened with a limited purpose to produce religious functionaries: Imams (prayer- 
leaders) and Hatipes (preachers) for community needs, since the 1960s they have 
transformed into an alternative mainstream education system (Akýit 1994, p. 147). 2262 
The number of IH Schools and students went on rising during the 1990s and by 1995- 
1996 the number of ! Hs had risen to 561 and the number of students to 492,809. 
261 Since the 1960s I1-1 schools have been causing great controversial debate among the Turkish 
scholars. Although originally they were set up to produce religious functionaries like imams, hatips , later the number of schools and students mushroomed. And as it grew in numbers it has grown in 
influence in politics too. There has been a growing body of literature on these schools. For some of 
them see: Akyit, B(1994, pp. 145-171 "Islamic Education in Turkey" in (Ed) Taper, R, Islam in 
Modern Turkey, 1994, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London. Ayata, S "The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism 
and Its Institutional Framework". in (Ed) Eralp, A. et. al, The Political and Socioeconomic 
Transformation of Tu ke%', Praeger, London ; Lapidot, A (1995) Islam and Nationalism: A Study of 
Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in Turkey, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Durham. 
262 The number of IH schools, teachers and students has steadily increased. There were seven IH 
schools in the academic year 195 1-52. By 1958 their number had increased 18, with 2,476 students. In 
1987-88 academic year there were 376 middle-level and 341 lycee- (high school) level IH schools, 
Willi nearly 240,000 students. If we recall that in the 1985-86 academic year there were 4,400 official, 
secular, general middle-level schools and 1,206 high schools, with approximately 2.4 million students 
the ratio of iH schools' students within the official, general student population reached the level of one 
in ten (Ak$it, 1994, p. 147). 
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(Gökce, 1996, p. 130). Thousands of these graduates from the IH schools instead of 
taking employment as prayer-leaders and preachers, went on to study at universities to 
become engineers, public administrators, doctors, teachers, lawyers etc. How right or 
accurate to view those schools as anti-secular? 
There has been a great deal of conflicting argument and confusion. Some would argue 
that since they are run and maintained by the Ministry of Education and above all 
their curriculum is prepared by the ministry they could not become an institution 
where anti-secular, anti establishment ideas are harboured. For them those are the 
schools where students learnt their religion alongside modern science and literature as 
well as the principles of Atatürk. Others would condemn them for brain-washing new 
generations as young as 12 years old producing an anti-secular, anti-. republic, 
fundamentalist population to become the 'vote basket' of the right wing parties. For 
many, since the 1950s, these schools have been the backyard of the conservative right 
wing parties. 263 Those claims especially focused on the supposedly organic 
connection between the pro-Islamist WP and the Imam-Hatip Lycces. Many media 
report observed strong association between successive pro-Islamist parties namely the 
National Salvation Party (NSP) in the 1970s, the WP from 1983 to 1998 and later the 
VP and the IH schools. However these claims are no more than media reports and 
needs to be sociologically investigated. 
We do not have sufficient empirical evidence to support either of these opinions apart 
from a few existing studies. For instance Akýit (1994) observed the `fathers of imam - 
Hatip school students are overwhelmingly rural farmers, farm workers, urban small 
traders, craftsmen and civil servants. Most of them articulate conservative and 
traditional attitudes towards gender roles and relationships'. A quarter of them 
accepted that 'women should be educated' and 'must work', but only 8 percent 
accepted that 'women can travel alone'. More than half (60 percent) do not believe 
that modern science can solve all the problems we face but, interestingly the other 40 
percent state greater faith in science. Yet, only one in ten agree that there can be a 
good man without religious faith' (Akýit 1994, pp. 150-151). The socioeconomic 
background of these students indicates traditional rural, small traders and craftsmen 
263 See Erbil Tusalp, (1994, pp. 54-55), Feriat A. $, (Sharia Co. ), Bilgi Yayinevi, Ankara 
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the petit-bourgeoisie from precisely where the pro-Islamist NS13 the predecessor of 
the WP used to derive its electoral support. Although the social basis of the WP/VP 
has changed since the 1980s, these strata still support the pro-Islamist WP/VP. 
The data shows that nearly one fifth of my informants (19 percent) attended Imam- 
Hatip schools. This finding can be interpreted, as the Imam-Hatip schooling an 
important independent variable that has considerable influence on my informants' 
political preferences and their decisions to become political activists. It can be said 
that among many influences education is one of the most important determinants of 
political participation. 264 Age of an individual is also widely accepted as an influence 
on political participation. Many students of political participation pointed out a close 
relationship between the age of the citizen and the likelihood of their political 
participation. 265 
Most studies of political participation have found a distinctive curve of participation 
associated with age or what preferred to call is the stage of life of the citizen. 
6.5.5 Age 
It has long been suggested that there is a close relationship between age and citizen's 
commitment to the degree of participation. Many studies of political participation 
have found a distinctive curve of participation related to age or what Verba and Nie 
calls 'position in the life cycle' (Verba and Nie, 1972 pp. 138-139). They argued that 
political participation is low in the early and late years of the citizen. It starts to raise 
slowly from the age of 20, reaches its picks in the middle of the age of 40s than 
declines from the age of 50s (ibid, pp. 138-139). 
From our point of view one of the most important findings in this study is that the 
average age of my informants is 42.83 years old that is very similar with Verba and 
Nie's (1972, p. 139) findings. They found out that the peak years of a citizen's 
political participation in the ' Life Cycle and Participation' is in his/her mid 40s. 
264 See Dalton 1988, p. 50. 
265 See for example Verba and Nie, 1972; Marsh A, 1990. 
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i 
AGE GROUP (N) PERCENT 
25 and under 4 10 
26-35 10 24 
36-45 9 21 
46-55 13 31 
56-65 2 5 
66 and over 4 10 
Total 42 100 
Table: 6.6 how old are they? 
Source: Fieldwork 
The maximum participation occurs when citizens in their 40s and 50s. Comparing 
with Verba and Nie's (1972) finding my data displays a similar pattern with an 
average age of 42.83 years old. 
It appears that over three quarter of my (76 percent) informants are aged between 26 
and 55 years old. Less then 10 percent are 25 and under; while one-quarter (24 
percent) are aged between 26 and 35. More than one-in-five (21.42 percent) are aged 
between 36 and 45. The largest single group that constituting one-third (31 percent) of 
our informants are aged between 46 and 55 years old. 
The average age of my informants is 42.83 years old, within the same age group that 
Verba and Nie (1972) pointed out when individual's political activity reaches its peak. 
From this perspective my finding confirms Verba and Nie's (1972) finding and shows 
that the pattern has not changed since then. What is more it shows that despite the 
contrary arguments there are many similarities between political activists in the West 
and Islamist political activists in Turkey. 
6.5.6 Occupational Characteristics 
Occupation as a person's regular work or profession266 is one of the main pillars of 
the social status of an individual. In the main time social status is a primary factor that 
influences a citizen's decision to participate (See Dalton, 1988, p. 50). The relationship 
between social status and political participation have been one of the most commonly 
studied aspects of the politics (See Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Marsh, 1990; Milbrath 
266 Collins, 1992, p. 1037. 
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and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972). In their famous study Verba and Nie (1972, 
p. 130) developed a model called socioeconomic standard model (SES) and found out 
that 
"The relationship between socio-economic status and overall participation is 
linear and fairy strong. Those in the lowest sixth of the socio-economic scale 
have an average score of -46 on the overall participation scale; those in the top 
sixth have a score of 66. " 
Table: 6.7 A Comparison of the occupational distribution of activists with the 
Turkish population nationally. 
District District Turkey as a whole** 
Activists' of of Frequ Per cent Total Per cent 
Occupations267 Mamak Ketiören ency (%) (N=819) (`%) 
Blue Collar Worker 76 13 30.95 313 17.4 
Routine White Collar 
Worker 505 11.90 97 5.4 
Shopkeepers & Artisans 347 16.66 314 17.4 
Employers (Public & Privat 
Managers) 1237.14 13 0.7 
Self-Employed (Self-employed 
Professio: Doctors, Advocates) 246 14.28 23 1.3 
Retired (from Public & Private) 516 14.28 na na 
Others(Unemployed, Students) 1124.76 59 3.3 
Total 24 18 42 100 819 
Source: Fieldwork, 
*I am using, with some modification, the occupational classification used by TOSES 1999: 47; 170- 
171. 
** TÜSGS 1999, p. 47. This nationwide study represents the entire electorate. 
Two groups; Small Farmers (n= 498; %= 27.7) and Housewives (n=483; %= 26.8), are excluded 
from the table. So the total percentage is less than 100. 
In the previous chapter, especially under the heading of Socio- Economic Conditions 
267 I) Blue Collar Worker 2) Routine White Collar worker (Office jobs + Teachers, Nurses) 3) Shop 
Keepers & Artisans (works for their own) 4) Employers (Non agricultural private managers) 5) Self 
Employed (Self employed professionals, solicitors, doctors, chemists, financial consultants. etc., ) 6) 
Retired (from public and private sectors) 7) Others (unemployed, students, unspecified, etc., ). 
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and Changing Voting Patterns in Gecekondus (See p. 32) I argued the importance of 
socioeconomic conditions in relation to partisan preferences. Now, without delving 
into the theoretical complexity between occupation and political participation, I aim to 
examine the occupational pattern of our informant group. 
More than one-third of (31 percent) our informants are blue collar workers, while 12 
percent are classified as routine white collar workers including office clerical workers 
as well as low ranking civil servants, teachers etc. The second largest bloc (16.66 
percent) is shopkeepers and artisans. It is not surprising that this group is the second 
largest of the VP's grassroots activists, because shopkeepers and artisans; the petit 
bourgeoisie due to its class position has always supported the religious right since the 
days of the NSP in the 1970s. A recent study confirms that the shopkeepers and 
artisans share first rank with small farmers in terms of supporting the pro-Islamist 
WP/VP. Both groups extend 16 percent of their vote to the WP/ VP. (See TÜSES 
1999, p. 115). The self employed (professionals, advocates, doctors, financial 
consultants and the like) and retired workers' groups constitutes the next largest (both 
with 14.28 percent) of party activists. Routine white-collar workers constitute 12 
percent of our informants while employers constitute 7 percent of grassroots activists. 
The only small category (4.76 percent) is that classified as others including students, 
unemployed and unspecified groups. 
The only way of making sense of the statistical data is to compare it with others 
available. To have a wider picture, or avoid not being able to see the wood for the 
trees I have compared my findings with the statistics concerning the male population 
in Ankara (1990) 268 and a nationwide study by TOSES (1999) that concerns 
particularly the voters, political party affiliation and social structure in Turkey. When 
compared to the occupational pattern of my informant group with the TÜSES (1999, 
p. 47)'s findings it appears that the ratio of blue-collar workers (31 percent) among my 
informants is almost two times higher that of the national average of 17.4 percent. 
This is true for routine white-collar workers (11.90% among my informants and 5.4 % 
national average) too. The ratio of shopkeepers and artisans is in line with the national 
average (17.4 %) though it is a little bit lower among my informants (16.66 %). The 
268 For Population by gender and occupation in Ankara see the web page www. die. gov. tr/TURKISH/ 
ISTATIS/ ESG I/ 06 ANKARA/nufus4. html 
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ratio of employers, public and private managers is 7 percent among our informants 
while it is less than 1 percent within the general population. 
However, when we compare the occupational pattern of our group with the population 
by gender and occupation in Ankara it appears that, in general, our findings are much 
more in line with occupational pattern in Ankara. (See Table 6.8) For example the 
ratio (31 percent) of blue-collar workers is 2 percent less among our informants than 
in Ankara (33 percent). 
Table: 6.8 Comparing the Occupational pattern 
Occupations 
i Districts of Keciören &Mamak Turkey as a whole* Ankara y* 
Total Per cent Total Percent Percent 
(N) (%) (N) (%) (% ) 
Blue Collar Worker (3 30.95 313 17.4 33.32 
Routine White Collar 
Worker 5 11.90 97 5.4 15.01 
Shopkeepers & Artisans 7 16.66 314 17.4 6.02 
Employers (Public & Private 
Managers) 3 7.14 13 0.7 1.22 
Self-Employed (Self-employed 
Professional, doctors, advocates) 6 14.28 23 1.3 11. s3 
Retired (from public & private) 6 14.28 na na na 
Others (Unemployed, students) 2 4.76 59 3.3 22.82 
Total 42 100 819 100 q()*X 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: As table: 6.7 
* TOSES 1999s Findings of the occupational percentage in Turkey as a whole. 
** Occupation percentage in Ankara (Male population). Data drawn from 'population by gender and 
occupation in Ankara (in 1990)' sec the web page www. die. gov. tr/TURKISH/ ISTATIS/ CSGI/ 06 
ANKARA/nufus4. html 
*** the occupational group of agriculture, fishing, hunting and forestry compromising 10 percent of 
occupations in Ankara is excluded. 
The ratio (12 percent) of routine white-collar workers is smaller compared to (15 
percent) in Ankara. One of the biggest differences between the two sets of data is that 
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of shop ownership. An average of 17 percent of our informants are shopkeepers and 
artisans compared to only 6 percent of Ankaralis. As the difference is big (11 
percent) we may argue that there seems to be a positive correlation between 
grassroots activism and shop keeping in Ankara. 
As mentioned earlier the shopkeepers and artisans among those groups who have 
largely supported pro-Islamist WP/VP party. Another similar study found that 29 
percent of the `party workers' -it consists of all major Turkish parties- across Turkey 
are artisans and shopkeepers. This ratio is over 50 percent when tradesmen are 
included among them included. (TESEV 2000, p. 22). Again there are more self 
employed (14.28 percent) individuals among our group than in Ankara as a whole 
0 1.53 percent). 
Table: 6.8 shows that our informant group has a higher than average ratio in Ankara 
in two groups: the shopkeepers, artisans and self employed professionals. One-third of 
our informants (31 percent) are shopkeepers, artisans or self-employed individuals 
compared to 17.55 percent in Ankara. Undoubtedly these two types of occupation are 
very different from blue collar or routine white-collar workers in terms of available 
time, income, social status and therefore social influence. We must emphasise that 
because one-third of our informant group has a relatively higher earner high status 
occupation they must be resource rich activists. Now we shall move on to the next 
variable the level of income among our informant group. 
6.5.7 Income Level 
One of the most common explanations, for political activism focuses on the 
importance of social status as a stimulus to political participation. By its nature 
politics requires a certain level of activity in order to stay informed and to understand 
the complexity of the political process. So the first step for participation is whether 
one's social status matches these requirements. It is assumed that higher-status 
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Table: 6.9 Distribution of household income by quintiles (annual) (in 1994) 
Groups 
Total Urban Rural 
Average Average Average 
Income Income Income 
(%) TL (000) (%) TL(000) (%) TL (000) 
-------- -------- ------- -------- ------ -------- 
First 20 % 5.24 964.5.43 1 126.5.21 824. 
Second 20 % 9.61 1 768.9.33 1934.10.03 1586. 
Third 20% 14.06 2588.13.60 2819.14.98 2370. 
Fourth 20 % 21.15 3 892.20.71 4294.21.97 7565. 
Fifth 20 % 49.94 9 189.50.93.10559.47.82 7 565. 
Source: 1994 Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, p. 284. 
citizens are more likely to have the necessary resources such as more money, time, 
easy access to political information, and the knowledge and ability to become 
politically involved (see Dalton 1988, p. 49; Di Palma 1970, p. 3 ; Verba 1972 , 
pp. 125-137 ). It is assumed that high-status; high-income level and higher education 
plays a vital role in the political participation. In terms of income distribution there is 
a big gulf between rich and the poor. The distribution of household income by 
quintiles clearly shows how income distribution is unequal. 
Table 6.9 shows a disturbing income polarisation between the poor and the richer 
sections of the urban population. The richest 20 percent earns as much as ten times 
that of the poorest 20 % of household in Turkey. While the richest 20 % receive the 
50 percent of all income the poorest 20 % get just 5.43 percent of total income. The 
second 20 quintile does not do much better either. It gets less than ten (10 %) percent 
of the income. The third quintile earns only 14 percent of total income, whereas the 
top two quintiles enjoy 70 percent of income. If we return to our case the 
occupational pattern and income figures from our fieldwork, the data will inevitably 
reflect the general picture. 
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As table 6.8 shows my informant group seems to have higher social status through 
occupation. Compared to Turkey in general and specifically in Ankara my informant 
group hold more prestigious occupations. Of course it is much more difficult to 
outline a comprehensive income index. This has been made almost impossible by the 
last two decades of high inflation. To make calculations on the basis of Turkish Lira 
would not be helpful at all since its value changes continually. 









Less 70 I 3 4 10 
71-100 4 5 9 21 
101-150 7 9 16 38 
151-200 3 4 7 17 
201-250 I 3 4 10 
300+ 2 0 2 5 
Total 18 24 42 10(1 
Source: Fieldwork 
However in order to make sense of our data we will give some estimations on income 
levels. One of the main problems with studies on Turkey is the complexity of 
extracting economical data, made more difficult by major differences between the 
regions, cities and above all between the neighbourhoods. 
Ten percent of my informants earn 70,000,000 Turkish Liras or less in a month, 
which works out at $184 or £115 p/m. This amount is equivalent to the national 
minimum wage (68,000,000 TL) of an adult (over 16 years old) in 1999 and 
109,000,000 TL from January 2000. We should keep in mind that the rate of the 
minimum wage is determined by a committee of employers, employees and the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Security and is applied in the formal private 
sector. It also reflects the wage rate in the public sector and a large proportion of state 
employees fall in a similar wage band. 
The next poorest fifth (21 percent) of my informants earn between 71 to 100 million 
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TL. ($185.5 to $262) in a month. 269 The largest group which is consists of more than 
one-third (38 percent) of our informants earns 101 to 150 million TL ($265- $525) a 
month. The third largest group (17 percent) earns between 151 to 200 million TL 
equivalent to $396 to $521. The top earners in our table are the small (5 percent) 
number of people who earn 300 million ($787) and more in a month. If we compare 
our group within itself the gap between the poorest earners and the richest is narrower 
(4.28 times) compared to 10 times the distribution of the national household income 
by quintiles annual in 1994 (see table 6.10). The median of the monthly income of my 
informant group is 140,717,000 TL per month, which is very close to the average 
earnings of 137,800,000 TL. However there is a clear difference in terms of average 
monthly income between those who live in Keciören and Marnak sub-districts. The 
average earning of Kecioren group among my informants is 140,717,000 TL per 
month while the Mamak group earns 131,062,500 TL per month. In the main time the 
median income (140,000,000 TL) of the Keqiören group is very close to the average 
earnings (140,717,000 TL) of this group. 
According to State Statistics Institute in Turkey the GDP per capita is $3200 per 
annum. In Ankara this rate is $3521.270 The arithmetic mean of the income (the 
average earnings) of our group is 137,800,000 TL per month. If we transform this into 
dollars it works out at $4377 per year, higher than the GDP per capita in Ankara. It 
seems that there are parallels between my findings and the TESEV's (2000). They 
studied a sample of local party leaders and workers of five mainstream parties in 16 
selected provincial capitals across Turkey. The average earnings in this group are 
160.000.000 TL. (2000 p. 23). It is higher than what my informants earn on average 
but this is to be expected since the TESEV's research was done on the party 
organisations in the district capitals among party workers -leaders and higher 
representatives- whereas my informants are from neighbourhood committees. 
Nevertheless, it shows that both groups earn more on average than ordinary people in 
Ankara. This confirms previous findings that suggest a positive correlation between 
269 * The data collected during my fieldwork in Ankara between Februarys to May 1999. ($[= 381 000 
TL in 16 April 1999). 
270 Milliyet 16 April 1999. 
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higher socioeconomic status- high-income level- and a high level of political 
participation. It appears my informants have got relatively high status, occupations 
and high income. Therefore, I can conclude as predicted that, this factor must have 
played an important role, in the case of our informant group, in the process of 
becoming political activists within the VP. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have tried to conceptualise the concepts that will be used 
throughout our research. First of all I have looked at the emergence and development 
of mass membership parties. That was necessary to grasp the concept of membership 
and grassroots activism. It was noted that from the 1960s mass membership parties 
started to decline in some Western European countries but this was not a universal 
trend. On the contrary, it was observed, in the Turkish case that it is other way 
around. Due to the high level of political participation during the 1990s the authorities 
became suspicious and tried to curb this rise in political participation. The Closure of 
the Welfare Party - the predecessor of the 
VP- was a reflection of this concern among 
the secularist Turkish elites. 
Why do parties need membership? We have argued that despite the trend in the mass 
party organisations membership still holds a key role within parties. In order to define 
the concept of grassroots activist I explored the concept of militant as defined and 
used by M. Duverger (see 1964: 100) and, Charles A. Micaud (1975: 125). Finally, I 
examined the concept of political activists suggested by Karl W. Deutsch (1970: 48). 
I have decided that Duverger's concept of militant and Deutsch's political activists 
could be used for our case study. 
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The second part of this chapter examined the socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party's grassroots activists. Our first goal was to 
see whether there is a consistent and coherent pattern among the active members of 
the VP. We have looked at the socioeconomical and demographic characteristics of 
our informants. For this we have examined social class, age, marital status, the length 
of time spent in the city/ urban area, educational background, and occupational 
classification and income levels. All these variables are compared against relevant 
groups with data from the State Statistic Institute's figures, other studies and sources. 
In doing so we have found out important and consistent patterns among our informant 
group. Now we have a portrait of the pro-Islamist VP grassroots activists. For 
example 76 percent of them migrated at an early age to Ankara. More than 65 percent 
of them have been living in Ankara for at least 21 years. This is obviously evidence to 
support the arguments about the relationship between urbanization and the degree of 
political participation (see Di Palma 1970; Özbudun 1976). 1 have found that the vast 
majority (81 percent) of our informants are married with an average of 3.07 children. 
Both of these figures show a clear similarity with the finding of A. Yucekok (1997). 
In his study he classifies a group of people with Muslim identity among Istanbul 
residents. The similarities mostly occur in areas like marital status and family size. 271 
In terms of educational qualifications our informant group is well above the average 
of Turkey and Ankara. There are no illiterates among them compared to Ankara 
(5.29) and 11 percent in Turkey as a whole. In general 65 percent of then received at 
least an elementary/ secondary and higher education. Another important point about 
our group that I wanted to emphasise is that 19 percent of them attended religious IH 
271 For details see Yücekök, A 1997. 
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schools at the higher junior and high school level. 
The analysis of the findings on the educational characteristics of the VP's activists 
can be interpreted as: firstly the finding has supported the idea of 'participation is 
greater among the better educated' and secondly, the role of formal education in terms 
of party preferences. It seems that those who attended to religious IH schools tend to 
vote for and support the pro-Islamic parties like the VP. In fact the ratio of religious 
education is significantly high among my informants. Nearly one fifth (19 percent) of 
the WP/VP activists are graduates of ! Hs; half from high school and the other half 
from IH's junior sections. (see table 6.5). Having a religious educational background 
must have a significant influence on an individuals' decision to participate in politics, 
but it must also be very influential on his/her decision to become a political activist as 
well. 
I have looked at age and political participation and found that the pattern of age for 
our grassroots activist group is identical with Verba and Nie's (1972) findings. The 
average age of our group is 42.83 years old. My data displays a very similar pattern 
with Verba's findings on 'life cycle and participation'. He found that in his 
participation scale' there is a peak point ( age group 40-50) where people participate. 
(1972, pp. 138-139). 
In the case of occupational characteristics we found a distinct pattern of occupation in 
our group. For example compared to the average in Turkey the ratio of prestigious 
occupations such as employers (7 percent) and self-employed professionals (14 
percent) is very high. One-third of our informants (3l percent) are shopkeepers, 
artisans or self-employed individuals compared to 18 percent of Ankara's general 
population. Undoubtedly such relatively high status occupations will provide a higher 
income level. 
The final finding of this chapter was the higher rate of average income among our 
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informant group. For our group the average income is 139.000.000 TL per month. In 
Ankara the average GDP per capita is $3521 in a year. When we transform the 
average earning of 139 m TL into the US dollar ($1= 381.000 TL in April 1999) it 
works out $ 4377 per annum per grassroots activist. On the bases of these figures it is 
plausible to argue that our group is slightly better off-they appear to earn more in 
relation to their local community. As a result they have more resources in terms of 
more money, more free time, easy access to information about complex political 
issues and more knowledge to participate in the political process. 
Finally, if we were going to summarise the portrait of a grassroots activist we could 
say that he is a migrant from rural Anatolia, arriving about 21 years ago, settled in a 
gecekondu neighbourhood most probably among his fellow villagers. He is 42.83 
years old and married with 3.07 children. He attended at least elementary/ secondary 
school. His occupation is relatively high status compared to his neighbours and his 
earnings are higher then the average in the neighbourhood. He was most probably an 
active ex-member of the WP and joined the VP as soon as the WP closed down and is 
politically active. He regularly attends party meetings, actively engages, spreads the 
VPs ideology and slogans in his work place, tea houses, mosques, weddings, during 
regular visits to the neighbourhood's sick, elderly or bereaved. 272 He would talk 
politically sometimes implicitly but more often explicitly on political issues. He 
would practise his theological knowledge and relate reported incident from the 
prophet Mohammed's times, if possible, to support the ideas that he is raising. He 
reads the Milli Gazete the official daily of the VP, while having a strong ideological 
conviction with better political knowledge, and a devotion to the party leadership. 
272 See table: 8.1 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NOT LIKE ANY OTHER PARTY 
THE AFFECTS OF GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM ON 
THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME 
As the British general elections approach the local parties are gearing themselves up to do 
their bit - and the evidence is that they do make an 
important contribution to turnout and party 
support. "A key to Labour's landslide in 1997 was the revival of the grassroots party set in 
train by Tony Blair. From 1994 when he became leader until the 1997 general election, the 
grassroots party increased in size by about 40 %. Many of these new recruits helped to turn 
the Labour vote out on polling day 273 
7.1 Introduction 
`Do grassroots party organisations make a difference in terms of increasing party's 
electoral fortunes? ' In this chapter I am going to seek to answer this question. There 
are two competing approaches to the effects of the party organisations on the electoral 
turnout. The first one called, for the purpose of this chapter, the `the counter 
argument' argues that the influence of the party organisations has been diminished. 
This group led by Butler and Kavanagh, 1992; Crotty and Jacobson, 1980; Herrnson, 
1986 and Huckshorn, 1984. They argued that due to technological developments such 
as television, computers, mass communication technologies and the rise of new 
expertise groups -PR experts, campaign managers, pollsters, fund raisers etc., the 
local party organisations have lost their role as the means of election campaigning. 
However this approach is fiercely opposed by another group of students of the 
politics. 
273 Whiteley, P and Seyd, P., (The Guardian, 27`x' March, 2001). 
261 
This approach will be called `the pro-argument' which defends the party organisation 
effects on the electoral process. This approach is led by Crotty, 1971; Frendreis, P. et 
al 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Seyd and Whitely 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 
1994 and 1999. They say that despite developments in the party structure and the 
campaigning techniques the party campaigning makes a considerable contribution 
towards the parties' election results. For example Whiteley, P and Seyd, P (1998) 
explain the Labour party's landslide victory in 1997 on the basis of the Labour's 
hardworking grassroots activism. There is evidence showing that in many Western 
countries an active membership organisation is an asset for the party, and as the 1997 
British general election has shown grassroots activism can make a very positive 
difference (see Whiteley, P and Seyd, P 1998). After discussing both approaches I 
will be moving to the case of the Virtue Party in Turkey. 
At the beginning of my research I hypothesised that the rise of political Islam cannot 
be described simply as religious revivalism or Islamic fundamentalism. But, rather, 
there have been' worldly reasons'-social problems- responsible for its popularity. As 
well as some socioeconomic reasons, the Virtue Party's well organised, militant like 
grassroots activism has been very influential on its increase of popularity and share of 
the vote in Turkey. To test this hypothesis I will be consulting my empirical data 
collected during my fieldwork in 1999 in Ankara. In the second half of this chapter I 
will be exploring the methods and techniques of the VP's grassroots activists. How 
often do they meet with the potential voters? Where do they usually meet with 
potential voters? What are their strength and weaknesses? What is distinct about 
them? What is distinct about their activities? 
Also in this chapter the organisational structure of the VP will be briefly explained. I 
will give some details about the structure of the VP and its local branches. E. g. the 
neighbourhood executive committee, the leader of committee of the electoral affairs, 
propaganda, public relations, finance, political affairs and so on. 
In short, in this chapter I any aiming to find out the role and effects of grassroots 
activism in connection with the unprecedented rise of political Islam in the mid- 
1990s If it happens that the local party campaigning has a positive effect and played a 
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significant role, then I will be asking how did the local party organisations contribute 
to the success of the WP? 
7.2 Do Party Organisations Matter? 
7.2.1 The Counter Argument 
There is a sizeable body of literature on grassroots organisations and the effects of 
grassroots activism on party performance. Especially in relation to local campaigning: 
its effects on both increasing a party's share of the vote and voter turnout in general 
elections. However, not all students of electoral studies agree on the benefits of 
grassroots activities in this regard (See Butler, 1952; Butler and Kavanagh, 1992; 
Crotty and Jacobson, 1980; Kavanagh and Jones, 1998; Herrnson, 1986; Huckshorn, 
1984: Chapter 5; Jones, B et al., 1998; Mair, 1994; Scarrow, 1996: Chapter 1). For 
many writers in this category the effect of local campaigning on electoral outcomes 
have been almost insignificant. In the meantime the majority of them acknowledge 
that in the past the party organisation has had greater impact on the electoral process 
but due to the developments in communication technologies and campaigning 
techniques party organisations have lost their importance as an exclusive means of 
campaigning. 
For a long time, however, the influence of the party organisations was taken for 
granted by the majority of political science scholars. As political parties have been 
very important actors in Western democracies the fundamental questions were easily 
overlooked. 274 That was until Anthony King made the charge that "most writers on 
parties note what they take the functions of the party to be, but they do not go on to 
ask whether parties actually perform these functions, and if so what to extent and 
under what conditions. " 275 
In the 1980s a number of scholars, such as Crotty and Jacobson (1980), Orren, G. R 
(1982), Abramson, J. B., Arterton, F. C., and Orren, G. R (1988) and many members of 
Harvard University's Campaigning Finance Study Group (1979) became alarmed by 
274 See Scarrow, S (1996: 10). 
275 Quoted in Scarrow, S (1996: 10). 
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developments in the campaign politics. They suggested that the effects of the party 
organisations have declined sharply. Their concerns were especially focused on the 
diminished role of the parties in candidate recruitment, nomination and financial 
contribution. Also for them parties become less important in terms of providing 
information and advice in contemporary elections (Herrnson, 1986, p. 590). 
Some of these studies were concerned with the technological changes that made the 
party organisations redundant. For example, Crotty, W and Jacobson, G (1980) did 
one of the earliest studies. Crotty and Jacobsan observed: 
The role of the political party in campaigns has given way to the technology 
of television-centred campaigns built on polls and run by the media and public 
relations experts. The evolving politics is a candidate centred, technocratic 
exercise in impersonal manipulation. (1980, p. 65). 
Crotty and Jacobson emphasised the emergence of television technology and the new 
breed of PR expertise, which they say replaced the role of the party organisations in 
campaigning. In this fashion Huckshorn (1984, P. 130) suggested that: 
... 
Since World War II, scientific developments such as television, computers, 
opinion polls, and other social and technological inventions have 
revolutionised mid-century office seeking. Except in some rural areas or in 
some local campaigns, one can no longer rely exclusively on speeches, rallies, 
and door-to-door campaigning, nor can one depended on party organisations 
for needed resources. 
He adds: 
New techniques in political campaigning have arisen because of profound 
changes in American politics; these changes have centred on weakened party 
structures and greater personalism. Traditional party organisation that were 
able (at least in some places) to mobilize voters and get them to the polls to 
"vote the ticket" have given way to a new form of politics based on the use of 
mass communications that reach the voters through electronic means. (Ibid: 
133). 
Here again technological and social inventions have been replacing the role of party 
organisation as the sole machinery of campaigning. In this study Huckshorn, R. J., 
(1984) makes a distinction between `the old politics: meeting the voters' and `new 
politics: reaching the voters'. His distinction is, obviously, based on how the voter is 
being mobilised and what techniques and technologies are being used. The new 
technologies mean the candidate does not need to meet the voters but can reach them 
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through electronic means. With a similar view Scott and I-Irebener (1984, p. I) point 
out that: 
Parties have increasingly seen their major campaign services slip away one by 
one as historical eras and the nation's needs have changed. Party services 
have also been severely curtailed because of modern technology. Candidates 
are relying increasingly on the mass media, public opinion polls, and public 
relations experts instead of on the parties. The parties are thus being 
challenged by non-party political actors from the delivery of campaign 
services. 
It appears that the observers in this category saw the technological innovations: 
developments in communication technology increased use of opinion polling, and 
computers paralleled with growth in expertise in public relations, statistical analysis, 
professional fund risers, campaign organisers and campaigners as making "traditional 
party organisations" irrelevant and outdated. As a result the role of party campaigning 
on electoral outcomes has diminished. 
Similarly those who see no use for local campaigning see the decline in party 
membership as supportive evidence. Probably the most commonly mentioned reason 
is the developments in communication technology. TV, computers, facility of mailing 
systems increasingly enable leaders to get their message across to voters without the 
assistance of the party members and grassroots organisations. In other words 
development of new and faster communication technologies provide the tool that 
party leaders need for a direct contact with the voters (Scarrow, 1996, p. 6). 
As well as technological and social innovations there have been other developments 
leading to the decline in importance of party organisations and their campaigns. These 
developments are diminishing party loyalty, single-issue politics the growth of other 
political activity and increasing costs of politics (see Crotty and Jacobson 1980: 
Chapters 1,2). Some writers argue that while party campaigning is losing its 
importance politics is moving away from `organisation centred' to `candidate centred' 
politics. So campaigns have to be planned, organised, financed and executed by the 
candidate. Since one person's effort will not be nearly enough to fulfil what a 
meaningful campaign requires, the candidate will have to employ `modern' campaign 
technologies, techniques and expertise. Also since the involvement of the party 
organisation is limited he has to raise money by himself. It has been argued that in 
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this new form of politics there is little place for `traditional' style party organisations. 
276 However we should keep in mind that the bulk of these changes have been taking 
place in the US. Also the impact of these changes has been different at different 
political levels. 
Candidate-centred politics is more explanatory at the congressional level but it does 
not mean that it dominates in national elections as well (see Jacobson, 1997, p. 5). 
One must remember that there are some fundamental differences between the 
American and the European political and party systems. This does not mean that I am 
underestimating the changes and developments, which affected political parties in 
Europe. 
There are strong parallels regarding party organisation changes, the role and the 
assumed values of membership, decline of the membership parties and the decreased 
importance of effects of the party campaigning in Europe and the US. For example, 
Kavanagh and Jones (1998) observed similar problems in declining popular 
attachment, diminishing membership, deteriorating political and increasing non- 
political interests. They also noted the reluctance of interest groups to associate 
closely with political parties and parties' increasing need for relevant campaigning 
skills from outside their organisations (pp. 201-202). Consequently many argued that 
parties had lost their prime role as the medium of election campaigning. Naturally, 
the loss of the parties' role meant a diminished effect of local party campaigning on 
voting behaviour and voter turnout. Butler and Kavanagh saw no "evidence of great 
benefits being reaped by the increasingly sophisticated and computerised local 
campaigning" (1992, p. 245 quoted in Whiteley and Seyd, 1999, p. 3). Similarly 
another important research body, the Nuffield election studies, have consistently 
questioned the benefits of local campaigning. 277 
From a different perspective Peter Riddell (1998, pp. 203-207) analysed the changes 
that political parties have undergone. He argued that the main functions of the parties 
changed from selecting and nurturing competing teams of political leaders to 
276 For example see Crotty, W Jacobson, G 1980: 65; Jacobson, G., 1997; Scott, R and Hrebenar, R., 
1979: Chapter 6; Wattenberg, M., 1991. 
277 See Whiteley and Seyd, 1999: 2-3. 
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becoming a means to advance the careers and views of relatively small numbers of 
activists and full-time politicians. This is because the parties no longer represent the 
bulk of the middle and working classes that caused by the decline of class politics in 
general since the 1970s. He also dismisses the role of campaigning but not its effects, 
saying there is a tendency to overestimate the election campaign itself. Obviously, he 
adds, the intensity of the campaign can change a voter's choice, make someone 
change their view or think more politically but it is unclear whether the campaign 
itself is decisive in most cases as opposed to the events of the preceding four or five 
years. ' (Riddell, 1998, p. 206). The first two points are related; the first is that the 
political parties have gone through tremendous changes, because their social/class 
bases have changed. The second point he raises is that campaigning can affect 
electoral outcomes; voting behaviour and voter turnout. The third point that he makes 
is that the meaning of election campaigning itself. One can easily dismiss this view 
because it is important what party policies are and what the party will do when they 
come to power. It is a totally different matter whether or not a party is going to fulfil 
its election promises when it is in power although the elector usually thinks it will. If 
it does not, that party will be punished in the next election. 
Huckshorn (1984: 132) suggested a more gradual approach to the role of the party 
organisations. He argued that: 
The change has not been universal. Pockets of party-run campaigns still 
remain, and some of the surviving political machines still rely on the power 
generated for the precinct captains by patronage appointments, but even the 
machines have adopted many of the new techniques of campaigning. 
Some other scholars put forward an alternative interpretation emphasising that 
political parties are transforming rather than declining. They say that with the 
increased availability of new technologies and campaigning techniques the party 
organisations have in some cases started to provide much better campaigning services 
including training sessions, survey data, and media assistance (Herrnson, 1986, pp. 
590-591). 
We now return to the main argument about the effects of party campaigning on the 
electoral process. As discussed above the counter account dismisses the idea that 
election campaigning through grassroots activism can make a difference or influence 
election results. From this point of view party organisations have changed due to 
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technological and social innovations. For the majority of these writers the `traditional' 
party organisations and its functions have been made redundant by mass 
communication technology and growing masses of PR expertise. However, it is true 
that party organisations changed not merely as a result of such developments. The 
availability of mass communication technology -television and mass media-, 
increased use of opinion polling, computers and the internet does not necessarily 
mean the decline of grassroots organisations and party oriented campaigning. It can 
be quite the opposite. The more a party has these technologies and expertise at its 
disposal the more effective it would become in terms of election campaigning. May 
be the best example for this is the Welfare/Virtue Party during the 1990s in Turkey. 
The WP combined the very well organised militant like grassroots organisations with 
the latest campaigning technology (e. g. used computers to keep a full record of every 
voter in neighbourhoods in all local party branches) and made surprising electoral 
gains during the 1990s. 27R 
7.2.2 The Pro-Argument: Benefits of Party Membership 
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the role and effect of party 
organisations on the electoral performance of political parties. These studies focused 
on local party organisations and grassroots activism (For example see Clarke, H et al 
2000; Crotty, 1971; Frendreis, P et al 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Kramer, 
1970; Seyd and Whitely 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994 and 1999). It seems that one 
reason for the low interest in party organisations and their influence on the electoral 
process is that the role and vitality of their activities in regard to the parties' election 
performance was not a well-studied area within election studies. 
Crotty (1971) points out the influence of political party organisations and their 
activities in obtaining party objectives and above all winning elective offices has not 
been grasped very well (1971: 439). Crotty, in his study `Party effort and its impact on 
the vote' argued that party activity made a difference, often substantial, in the 
proportion of the vote that could be explained. (1971: 447). He (1971: 443) sums up: 
278 The unprecedented election success and the influence of the WP's grassroots activism will be 
discussed in following section of this chapter. 
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A well-organised party that extends itself to campaigning for its candidates 
can have a decided impact on increasing its proportionate share of the vote. 
Put more directly, organisation, as the professionals have so long been 
contending, does appear important in achieving party objectives. Party 
activities, and those conducted during the campaign period in particular, are 
important influences affecting the vote". 
Despite a declining image in recent years, the mass membership parties are more 
likely to influence the electoral outcome. Referring to the conventional argument 
about the diminished effects of the party organisations and local campaigning effects 
on the electoral outcomes Pattie, C ct al (1995) pointed out that: 
The conventional wisdom as advanced by the influential Nuffield election 
studies has been that local campaigning has no impact upon the outcome of 
elections and serves merely as a ritual activity for local party activists. 
Clearly, this is no longer a tenable case: the local campaign, while not as 
widely publicised or as glamorous as its national counterpart, still plays an 
important function in shaping the outcomes of British general elections. 
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of studies focusing on the effect 
of parties' activity on voter turnout at the grassroots level. In a major study entitled 
`How to Win a Landslide By Really Trying - the Effects of Local Campaigning on 
Voting in the British General Election of 1997' Whiteley and Seyd (1998) analysed 
the effects of the local party campaigning on the Labour party's unprecedented 
election victory in 1997. They argued that until very recently the evidence on the 
effects of local party campaigning on the vote was restricted almost entirely to the 
US. Most of these studies indicated that `the campaigns had a significant influence on 
turnout in state and federal elections (Ibid: 4). 
In their study of the general election of 1997, Whiteley and Seyd emphasised three 
important factors suggesting that local election campaigns might be vital for the 
Labours landslide in 1997. These factors are as follows: First, is the declining 
partisan attachments among voters which they say have been weakening for decades, 
and have now reached quite low levels in the UK (1998, p. 7) Therefore, they argued: 
"Since the evidence suggests that these trends have continued, it is clearly much 
easier to influence voters by campaigns both at the national and local levels when 
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partisan attachments have weakened in this way. " (Ibid: 8). 279 If the partisan 
attachments have been weakening for a long time and reached a new low level then 
winning or persuading new voters must have became relatively easier. 
The second factor that they stressed was the `electoral swings'. They suggested that if' 
electoral swings are uniform across Britain as they were in the 1950s and 1960s then 
there is little that local campaigning could achieve. However, they claimed, this 
situation has changed by the 1990s. The standard deviation of the two-party swing 
was 4.3 per cent in 1997 compare to 1.4 per cent in 1955 and 2.1 per cent in 1970. 
'Obviously, there is much greater scope for local campaign effects when the changes 
in party support are so variable across the country' (ibid: 8). Party dealignment has 
been an important factor in electoral studies. 2X0 When the level of party dealignment is 
increasing it is easier for party activists to recruit new voters, supporters or even 
members. Than it can be argued that it is possible to see an increase in the effects of 
the grassroots organisation on electoral results where there is a high level of party 
realignment. 
The third factor, in their analysis, is the transformation of the Labour party into `New 
Labour'. For them (1998), `New Labour, `succeeded in reversing the decades-long 
decline in membership by an active campaign of recruiting new members after Tony 
Blair became the leader in 1994'. This new strategy was so successful that the 
grassroots party grew 40 per cent in its size from 1994 to 1997(1998, p. 8). Therefore 
one can expect an increase on the effects of local campaigns due to this influx of new 
members that New Labour recruited. 
In their study Whiteley and Seyd observed that "The correlation between the 
campaign index 281 and the Labour vote share was +0.32, indicating a modest, though 
279See also Crotty and Jacobson, 1980, p. 27; Wattenberg, 1991, pp. 36-46). 
280 The issue of party realignment will be discussed later on. 
281 In order to assess the impact of grassroots members' campaign activities during the 1997 general 
elections in Britain Whiteley and Seyd (1999) developed an index called campaign index. They 
surveyed activists about the campaign activities such as displaying election posters, donating money to 
the election funds, driving voters to the polls or taking numbers at polling stations, reminding voters to 
vote on polling day, delivering leaflets etc. Then they combined all these campaign-related activities 
into an overall campaigning index for each respondent. They (1999, p. 25) explained how the campaign 
index was calculated: "A respondent scored one for each activity in the first sub-table. The second sub- 
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statistically "highly significant relationship. "(1998, p. 12). It was observed that among 
various variables "... the Labour campaign index had the largest influence on the 
voting preferences in 1997, apart from the proportion of working class in that 
constituency. This indicates that local campaigning was very important in explaining 
the Labour landslide victory. " 
Further in their study Whiteley and Seyd compared the local campaigns carried out by 
all three: Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. They found many 
similarities between the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, but less so with the 
Conservative party campaigning (1998, p. 11). There were often differences. One of 
the most interesting findings in their study was that the effects of campaigning were 
greater for the Liberal Democrats than they were for Labour. The Liberal Democrats 
would have won 69 seats instead of 46 if they had campaigned at twice their actual 
rate (ibid: 21). As expected the weakest campaign effects in the simulations were for 
the Conservatives (1998, p. 22). In fact one can expect such results since the 
Conservative party has aged membership organisation and declining party 
membership figures with very little activism (See Kavanagh and Jones, 1998, p. 201). 
Whitely and Seyd (1998, p. 22) finally concluded that: "... local party activists play 
an important role in mobilising the vote in British general elections. " 
In regard to the effects of local party campaigns some of the research has focused oil 
the mechanisms and driving forces of political involvement. Studies looked at the 
patterns of membership, the ways in which individuals become members of a party, 
the reasons for becoming party an activist, and the ways in which the grassroots 
organisations influence election results. Likewise, in a recent study Clarke et al (2000) 
focussed on key questions such as who joins political parties? What draws people to 
become active party members? What difference does party organisational activity 
make? (2000, p. 75). 
table had four possible responses... 'not at all', 'once', 'twice', 'three or more times'. These responses 
were scored 0,1,2, and 3 respectively. Thus the scale ran from zero (an individual did nothing at all) to 
31 (an individual responded 'yes' to each of the seven items in the first sub-table and 'three or more' to 
the eight items in the second). The constituency campaign index in figures I and 2 measures the 
aggregate scores for all respondents in each of the 200 constituencies. " 
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Regarding grassroots activism Clarke et al, suggested that: "... local parties' 
campaign efforts continue to matter in an age of nationally oriented, media-centred 
politics suggesting that a party's short-term successes and long-term prospects will be 
enhanced if it can attract members and mobilise them to work on the party's behalf. 
Local organisational activity is especially crucial for new parties because they 
typically lack the financial and political resources available to their old line rivals. " 
(2000, p. 76). 
Clarke et al also drew attention to the lack of systematic study of the "political 
attitudes and beliefs of rank-and-file party members, or of factors that affect how 
active such people are in local party organisations. " (2000, p. 77). 
It appears that in their research Clarke et al (2000) examined three important aspects 
of grassroots activism; the motives of activists to join the party, the role of the local 
party organisations and the factors that influence the degree of grassroots activism. 
In this context it must be mentioned that membership continues to be an invaluable 
asset for political parties for several reasons: to maintain the image of a mass party; as 
a viable channel for the political representation, as legitimisers, as a means of 
communicating to the electorate and more importantly members have been valued as 
a means of electoral mobilisation (Mair, 1994, p. 15). One of the indispensable roles of 
the membership is to have a party organisation itself in the first instance, then come 
the other benefits as mentioned above. The effects of party organisation or local 
campaigning on the electoral process cannot be considered separately from the 
membership. Party members, says, Whiteley, are a distinct group of people who by 
joining a party participate in politics far more than ordinary citizens (Whiteley, 1995, 
p. 211-233). As stated in Chapter 6, membership especially active membership is the 
key element, the main motor of electoral campaigns carried out by party 
organisations. More than anything else party organisations need party members, 
officers, volunteers and political activists who are willing to give their time and 
talents, for the success of the party and its candidates (Bibby, 1987, p. 108). 292 
282 For elaboration on membership see chapter 3.1 have discussed party membership, especially 
grassroots activism extensively in chapter 3. 
272 
7.2.3 Why Does Party Organisation Matter? 
If the main purpose of political parties is to contest elections in order to gain control 
of public offices, and organising government (See Huckshorn, 1984, p. 21) then 
winning election contests becomes the most important condition that every aspirant 
party must achieve/fulfil. 
There is no doubt that electoral campaigning is the most significant aspect of political 
party activities. Frendreis, P et al (1990) asked does party organisation matter? In this 
study they looked at two things: first, was the position of local party organisations 
within the electoral process and second, they examined the relationship between local 
party organisational activity and electoral outcomes for the 1980,1982, and 1984 
elections (1990, p. 226). 
The role of organisations in the process of mobilisation has always been considered as 
important (Pickvance, 1976, p. 212). Organisations, argued Pickvance, "are the means 
by which social forces develop and contradictions are expressed, and linked. "(1976, 
p. 212). Party organisations within the electoral process are seen as central actors in 
this process. It is argued that: 
As a starting point to analysing party organisations as independent electoral 
actors, political parties should be seen as strategic actors operating within 
particular environments. Like Schlesinger (1984), we assume the goals of 
political parties are to contest (and ultimately win) elections. (Frendreis, P et al 
(1990, p. 227). 
As the second part of their study Frendreis, Pet al (1990) investigated the relationship 
between local party activities and electoral results. In this section it was concluded 
that at local level, party organisational strength and activity "... can make a difference 
for the electoral fortunes of the parties. " (Frendreis, P et al, p. 232). 
Another similar study from America by John Bibby asked the key question 
concerning party organisation of whether or not they can make a difference in 
determining election outcomes. He argues, "The journalistic reports and scholarly 
case studies provide evidence that the party organisations can have a critical impact". 
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He Frendreis, Pet al (1990 p. 107) sums up: 
... studies have 
demonstrated that party organisations do influence election 
outcomes. Cotter and his associates, in a study of thirty-two nonsouthern states 
during the last half of the 1970s, found that there was a strong correlation (+ 
. 46) between the ability of parties to 
increase their share of the vote and their 
holding an organisational strength advantage over the opposition party. 
It appears that the level of party organisational strength and activity makes a positive 
contribution to the electoral outcomes of a particular party. The organisational 
strength is determined by a variety of variables such as the organisational structure, its 
typology whether it is democratically run or not, the membership composition, the 
degree of commitment and beliefs of the members, the principles and rules that the 
organisation run by. 
The level of party activity is also determined by a wide variety of factors such as 
financial, intellectual, organisational, technological and political resources, strategy 
and tactics, past experiences, leadership skills, the degree of conviction and 
commitments shared by the majority of grassroots activists, members attitudes and 
political aspirations. According to Scarrow, S (1996: 42-45) party members, the 
indispensable component of the mass parties, should be seen as assets in terms of 
direct electoral benefits, outreach benefit, financial, labour, linkage and innovation 
benefits and personnel benefits as well. Inevitably, one of the key questions we are 
facing is how party organisation affects the electoral process. 
7.2.4 How Party Organisation Makes A Difference? 
Parties have a variety of functions. A party should inform the electorate about the 
party's policies, goals and ideology. It helps to create an identity, unity and 
strengthens the party attachment and commitments among the grassroots activists. 
Finally, the most crucial role of the campaigning is to influence the electoral outcome. 
To achieve that campaigning aims to make sure that party supporters will turn out and 
vote for the party as well as to convert other voters to increase the party's share of the 
vote (Pattie, C. et al, 1995, p. 969). A well-organised party organisation is perhaps the 
first condition for any kind of electoral achievement. Even if the party leader is 
successful to use sophisticated means of communication, without a committed 
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grassroots organisation he wont be achieving much more than what his closest 
opponent can also do. As election campaigns are increasingly being carried out by 
nationwide professional corporations competing parties would have the chance to 
match each other by increasing the funding for campaigning. But this is not true for 
local party organisations. The local grassroots organisations cannot be set over night 
to perform vote canvassing or provide services for the candidates. To establish an 
effective local party organisation takes time and requires an ideological closeness and 
a common identity. 
It is not the numbers of grassroots organisations but their resources: political 
information and knowledge, time, finance; attitudes, beliefs and ideology, degree of 
commitments; social background etc., which have an impact on the vote turnout and 
election results. 
It can be argued that the human face of politics and political parties is represented by 
grassroots organisations. One of the advantages of having large and active grassroots 
organisation is to go out and meet with the electorate not just the party members but 
ordinary citizens who may or may not vote for the party but still to contact to those 
and spread the party's policies, aims and ideology. During an election campaign one - 
to -one meetings and door-to-door canvassing can be invaluable. In highly developed, 
individualised societies because of the high level of alienation one-to-one contacts 
yield results, and in traditional, close communities where personalised contacts are 
valued and trusted. 
Party activism becomes much more important where there is a weakening of partisan 
attachments and a high level of electoral volatility. It has been extensively 
documented that partisan attachments have been weakening in the USA. This trend 
reflects itself through various kinds of attitudinal and behaviour manifestations such 
as an increase in the numbers of independent candidates, `a rise in split ticket voting' 
and declining individual partisan identification (See Frendreis, J et at 1990: 225; 
Whiteley and Seyd 1999: 7). Dissatisfaction with existing political parties is 
widespread throughout Western Europe and North America. Similarly national 
surveys conducted in 1990 and 1991 show a widespread dissatisfaction with Canada's 
federal political parties (see Clarke, H. et al 2000: 77). 
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According to Whiteley and Seyd (1999) the strength of partisan attachment has been 
declining in Britain too. In fact before the 1997general election reached a very low 
level. Whiteley and Seyd make a direct connection between the weakening strength of 
partisan attachment among voters and local election campaigns' importance in 
influencing the vote (see ibid 1999, p. 7). In Western Europe and Turkey there has also 
been widespread disaffection with mainstream political parties. Following the 
military coup of 12 September 1980 in Turkey there has been a very significant 
partisan realignment and electoral volatility since the mid 1980s. (See Kalaycioglu, 
1997, pp. 4-5; Özbudun, 2000 and Tosun, 1999). 
In fact in the last two decades electoral volatility and partisan realignments were 
partially responsible for Refah's sudden rise first in the local (in 1994) then in general 
elections (in 1995). In other words this electoral volatility and widespread 
dissatisfaction with the mainstream centre right and centre left parties provided fertile 
ground for Refah's militant, truly committed, energetic, hardworking men and women 
in the grassroots organisations to win the support of the disillusioned masses 
throughout the 1990s. 
I will return to this point shortly. For now let us look at grassroots activism and its 
importance to the pro-Islamic WP/VP in the mid 1990s. In this study 1 am aiming to 
investigate the role and effect of grassroots activists on the unprecedented rise of 
Political Islam in Turkey in the recent years. This is a striking feature of the WP/VP 
and has been pointed out by some of the students of Turkish politics as well. It 
illustrates how in a short period of time grassroots activists made such an impact on 
the electoral success of the WP. Refah claims to have over four million registered 
members and this figure alone makes the WP the biggest political party in terms of 
membership. 
Throughout the 1990s, some Turkish students of politics have acknowledged the 
influence of local party activists on the electoral outcomes. Despite this recognition 
of the WP/VP's very well organised, highly motivated, missionary-like grassroots 
activists and their influence over electoral outcomes, this area has not been seriously 
studied from a sociological perspective 
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More than any other mainstream political parties, the NSP and later the WP has 
always maintained the face-to-face relationship as the communication model at the 
grassroots level (Sen, 1995, p. 83). As part of their party activism the WP's grassroots 
activists organise donations, set up community help centres in the neighbourhoods, 
and make regular visits door-to- door, to disseminate the party's goals, ideology, 
program and messages. They also listen to the comments; suggestions, grievances and 
demands of their potential voters rather then merely rely upon mass communication, 
as the other mainstream parties do. (Sen, 1995, p. 83). It seems that this approach 
gives a considerable advantage to the Welfare Party compared to its rival secularist 
parties. 
With its claimed 4 million registered members, the WP was Turkey's only mass based 
political organisation (See Berkey, 1996, p. 45; cakir, 1994, p. 216-232; Darnton, 
1995; Kalaycioglu, 1994; Özbudun, 2000; Sayari, 1996, p. 36; Sen, 1995, p. 82-91). 
Of course in this case because of the closure of the WP and foundation of the VP to 
replace it we need to examine whether this membership performance and more 
importantly the grassroots activism will continue with the Virtue Party or not. 
7.2.5 The Turkish Discourse on Grassroots Activism 
It has been observed, through literature reviews that there is little research on the 
question of who grassroots activists are? We do not know much about their 
socioeconomic, demographic and political backgrounds or ideological beliefs. Also 
we do not know much about why they are drawn in to this ideology and why they 
have become political activists. And more importantly we do not know what the 
specific features of the grassroots activists are. I am going to investigate whether they 
are distinct in any way from the other party activists or not. 
If we return to the issue of grassroots activism or local party campaigning in Turkey 
we will see that it has been utilised often by the pro-Islamic WP than by other 
political parties (See Özbudun, 2000 and Kalaycioglu, 1998). There is no doubt that 
other parties have membership organisations and do organise local election campaigns 
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during the election periods but none of them match the scale of the WP's grassroots 
organisation. For example Ersin Kalaycioglu (1997: 36) points out that: 
On the eve of the 1995 elections, numerous party activists, at the grassroots 
level, kept track of every voter deemed critical to the party's victory. They 
visited each voter before the elections, and, on election day, provided 
transportation to and from the polling stations for those who needed it. 
Compare to Kalaycioglum, Sayari (1996) takes a much wider perspective on 
grassroots activism. According to Sayan WP's dedicated grassroots activists are one 
of the most important causes of Refah's growing popularity. 
Refali owes its increasing electoral support to an efficient, disciplined, highly 
motivated, and well-financed organisation. The Islamists have the largest 
number of party workers among all Turkish political parties. Refah's 
grassroots organisations staffed with dedicated cadres, male and female, who 
work with a missionary zeal and benefit from advanced technology, such as 
computers with voter registration data. Tightly organized in cell like units in 
each neighbourhood, Refah relies less on the media for disseminating its views 
and more on face-to-face contacts with the voters. (Sayan, 1996, p. 36). 
One of the best-known Turkish writers on political Islam is Rusen cakir. cakir with 
his objective approach has become the most celebrated writer on the Islamic 
movement. For him the main strategy of the WP's membership organisation is 
focused on the elections. As a part of this strategy the party aims to mobilise all of its 
members for the election campaigning and to recruit new members as much as the 
party's votes at the last elections. Refah's model of organisation is unique: it is called 
teshih (rosary) and it appoints representative to every single neighbourhood and these 
representatives would appoint other representatives to every street, quarter and every 
apartment. "teachers" have carried out the education of party members. In the sub- 
districts there are "head teachers". In the district and regions there are "general 
inspectors" and "head teachers" who are responsible for educating the members. 
Refah, as a parallel to its main organisation, mobilises the hanim komnisyonulaº-i 
(commission of ladies). Right after an election, the WP's highly motivated grassroots 
organisations start to campaign for the next election as if it were going to be held 
tomorrow (fakir, 1994, pp. 51-59). The way that a party organises itself is very 
important for an effective and successful election campaign. Beside the youth and 
men commissions women turned out to be very effective campaigners. They go street- 
to-street in their respective neighbourhoods, and canvas building-to-building, 
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apartment -to-apartment, door-to-door and meet people mostly women in their private 
living spaces in a friendly manner. They organise house meetings where a hatip - 
good speaker or agitator- man or woman would speak to 30 to 50 people at once. 
In a similar vein Sencer Ayata (1997: 52) emphasized two key aspects of the 
WP/VP's party organisations, which are crucial to its unprecedented rise. The first of 
them is the strong, well organized and militant characteristic of grassroots 
organizations. Second is what these organisations are offering to potential voters. 
The WP's organisational strength has been highlighted by another writers as well. For 
instance Ziya Öniý (1997, p. 755), after highlighting the WP's great organisational 
strength, stresses how in an age of TV oriented communication the WP concentrated 
on grassroots organisations and face-to-face contact with the electorate. The WPs 
representatives apply a step by step mobilisation strategy at the local level. 
Computers were employed to great effect for campaigning purposes. In his analysis 
he finally emphasises that material benefits were offered to the poor people-potential 
voters- in the gecekondu areas (ibid: 755-756). Although Önis approaches the 
question of the rise of the WP from an economic determinist perspective, lie finally 
recognises the importance of the WP's organisational strength which, is not less 
important then the economic conditions of it. And finally Margulies and Ergin also 
point out that the WP is the only party with a local grass roots organisation among the 
Turkish political parties (1997, p. 151). 
There are Western commentators who also emphasised the outstanding role of the 
grassroots activists in the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Henri Barkey (1995) points 
out that the success of the Islamist party on 24th December 1995 was partly due to 
efficient utilisation of their capabilities and the complete failure of the rest of the 
mainstream parties to maintain consistent messages. For him there is one distinctive 
aspect of the Islamist Welfare Party that it has a nationwide grass-roots party 
organisation. 
The Welfare Party did as well as it did because it had been labouring for years 
to build a nationwide grass - roots party organisation. Its local cadres have 
worked their respective districts street-by-street and building-by-building, ... 
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With its claimed 4 million registered members, Refah is Turkey's only mass - 
based political organisation... (Berkey, 1996, p. 45). 
Also a New York Times journalist wrote that: 
No political machine can beat the Welfare Party when it comes to grass-roots 
organisation. Women wearing headscarves go door to door in the slums 
proselytising and meet inter city buses to take new arrivals in hand. (Darnton, 
1995). 
Islamists in Turkey combine their community work: charities, schools, clinics, and 
cooperatives, with electoral canvassing. Other political parties concentrate on high- 
powered media campaigns and enlisting celebrities to support them in public 
meetings, but they are far more deficient in campaigning and canvassing at the grass- 
roots level. The WP also makes use of media events and high - profile personalities, 
but they mainly operate through local party machines involved in clientilistic 
networks at the grass roots level (Zubaida, 1996, p. II). 
"In its grassroots approach, the RP fields a devoted body of cadres from all 
walks of life. In Istanbul one is impressed by the enthusiasm, friendliness and 
optimism of the many young men and women who have established networks 
in the localities and work through them. Candidates accompany local cadres 
on home visits. They offer advice on how to deal with complicated 
bureaucracies, provide support during family celebrations and crises, such as 
weddings and funerals.... Women cadres play particularly important roles in 
gaining access to homes and establishing female networks". (Zubaida 1996, 
pp. 1 1-12). 
Contrary to the general trend in America and Europe the WP/VP maintains its large 
party organisations. And through its well-organised, highly committed, militant 
grassroots organisations the WP/VP has been making considerable electoral gains. In 
the following section of this chapter I will be introducing my empirical data and 
interpreting it in relation with the grassroots activism. 
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7.3 Not Like Any Other Party: 
The VP Grassroots Activists In Perspective 
"We are not like seasonal workers, we don't get in touch with people every 5 years but we are 
always among the people. As a representative of the neighbourhood I attend the 
neighbourhood's committee meetings every week regularly. I send flowers or visit if there is a 
wedding. " 283 
As was already argued in the first half of this chapter among the mainstream parties 
only the Welfare, the predecessor of the Virtue Party, came near to being classified as 
a mass membership party in Turkey. The rest showed the characteristics of it cartel 
party. 284 As a mass political party the WP and VP have maintained rather large 
grassroots organisations consisting of very active, devout, highly informed, highly 
motivated, ideologically oriented members. There is a group of people within the 
VP's file-and-rank members, what f call grassroots activists, who are highly distinct 
from the rest with their many distinct qualities: well educated, highly skilled, better 
paid, high social status, high ideological conviction. Above all this group has better 
resources to dispense for political purposes (See Chapter 6). 
Throughout the 1990s the WP/VP's party organisation with its electoral and 
campaigning qualities was acknowledged and admired by many of its opponents. 
According to media reports during the last general elections (in 18 April 1999) 
campaign the Motherland Party drew their campaigning strategy and tactics from past 
election campaign strategies of the WP. 285 This report was highly significant to 
indicate how the WP/VP's campaigning style was emulated by even its worst 
opponents. Before moving on to grassroots activism I shall reiterate that in Turkey 
since the 1980s election results have been decided by big metropolitan cities (Sec 
Chapter 4). 286 In this context the characteristics of the city developers needs to be 
remembered. As was said in Chapter 4 the population of the metropolitan cities is 
283 See interview with representative of the $ehit Kubilay Neighbourhood. 
284 Sec Özbudun, 2000. 
285 See Istanbul daily Milli yet 28 January 1999. 
286 See Istanbul daily Cwnhuriyet, "Birinciyi varoslar belirleyecek" (16 April 1999) (Squatters will 
decide the winner); Also see Istanbul daily Milliyet 7 Ocak 1999 (7 January 1999); Istanbul daily 
Milliyet 20 Nisan 1999 20 (April 1999). 
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highly heterogeneous. There is a big gulf in income and living standards among the 
city populations. As is frequently cited in the Turkish media there are two Turkeys. 
The first is group is a small minority which has the living standards of major western 
European countries. The `other Turkey' as it is called lives at the standard of Third 
World countries. In these big cities the two Turkeys live side by side. The `other 
Turkey' lives in the gecekondus (shantytowns) and consists of over 50 percent of the 
population in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. As I also pointed out in chapter 4 the bulk 
of the WP/VP's popular support comes from gecekondu areas. Thus the gecekondus 
and grassroots activism in these areas deserve special consideration, which I intend to 
elaborate in the following pages. 
First it needs to be established how grassroots activists are working on the ground and 
how active they are. How much time do they spend on average a month? How much 
contact do they have in a week? Where do they meet with potential voters, supporters 
or their own constituencies? What strategy and tactics are being used? What are the 
tools being used? What are the methods of their activism'? What do they do for 
example before, during and after the election campaigning? What are the main 
patterns of election campaigning? Where do they get the money they need for 
campaigning? Do they raise money during their campaign? 
7.3.1 How Often Do They Meet the Potential Voters? 
As a grassroots activist how often do you meet with those people who are potential 
voters, supporters or would be persuaded to join the party? 
As table 7.1 indicates one fifth (19 %) of my informants have always plenty of 
opportunities to meet people. This means they have no preset time frame but admits 
there are always plenty of opportunities for party activism. Another one fifth (19 %) 
of them meets with their constituencies every evening but more often during the 
election campaigns while ten percent meets potential voters and supporters everyday. 
Forty (40 %) percent of them to do so at least once a week while seven (7 %) percent 
canvass 3 or 4 ties a week and 5 percent of them which is a very active section meet 
20 to 25 people everyday. Table 7.1 indicate that the VP's grassroots activists are 
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highly active in their respective neighbourhoods. The majority (60 per cent -if 
aggregated) said they interact everyday with someone for canvassing purposes. 
Table: 7.1. How often do you meet with the potential voters? 
HOW OFTEN DO YOU MEET? FREQUENCY OF 
OCCURRENCE 
% (PER CENT) 
There are always plenty of opportunities to 
meet people 
8 19 
Every evening (but more often during the 
election campaign i ng). 
8 19 
Everyday 4 10 
At least once a week 17 40 
At least 3 to 4 times a week 3 7 
I see approximately 20 to 25 people every day. 2 5 
Total 42 100.00 
Source: Fieldwork 
It must be noted that, the way in which social life is organised in the gecekondus is a 
very important determinant for campaigning. The organisation of a community, its 
main characteristics of social relations, socioeconomic and demographic factors are 
all important variables in the electoral process and are equally so in terms of election 
campaigning. Social life in gecekondus is similar to primary relations. 287 The sense 
of community, unity and solidarity is highly effective and consistent. The majority of 
people in a neighbourhood know each other very well. They know each other by 
name, their occupation, where they come from, their families, kin relations, income 
and political inclinations. All is common knowledge in the gecekondus. 
In most cases gecekondus were established as a result of chain migration from the 
same district. What Turkish sociologists termed as hemvehrilik (See chapter 4) has 
provided a strong communal identity for those migrants who are surrounded by a 
totally alien city full of `others'. Some writers pointed out that in the big cities the 
hem. }"ehrilik ties provided bases for extensive social solidarity networks in poor urban 
areas. 288 It has been part of a survival strategy for the gecekondu population. 
287 For some information on social relation and living conditions in gecekondus see Acar, F 1994, pp. 
313-324; Ayata, A 1994, pp. 325-340; Demir, E 1994, pp. 357-366; Kurdoglu, A 1994, pp. 367-384; 
Gökce, B 1994, pp. 283-294 and Ozer, I 1994, pp. 303-312. 
288 For the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of'gecekondues a research done by Devlet 
Planlama Te$kilati (1991) (State Planing Organisation on Gecekondu population), DPT Matbaasi, 
Ankara; Also see Istanbul daily Miliyet, "Gecekondu 1999' 31 March 1999 and I April 1999 Bütiin 
umutlan 4ocuklari (All their hopes are their children). 
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Although these neighbourhoods are not always populated by people from the same 
ethnic, religious or district background but there are other issues that bring them 
together usually the sense of `us' as opposite to `others'. Sharing the same 
socioeconomic conditions, facing the same problems regarding the lack of services 
etc., brings people closer. Given the close community ties in the gecekondu areas 
party campaigning would be carried out in an effective and informal way. Some of 
my informants talked about their canvassing activities. Here are some of them: For 
example a representative of Bahcelerici neighbourhood describes his canvassing 
activities as follows: " Every evening I go to visits in the neighbourhood. This is a 
gecekondu (squatter) area so everyone knows each other and, for this reason, there are 
always plenty of opportunities to meet people" A similar point was made by Yrlmaz 
Dogan: "We live side by side with our people and always interact with the local party 
organisation as well as the local people" (Neighbourhood of Türközü). Mehmet An of 
Hürel neighbourhood describes how he meets people: "Almost every evening, after 
work I would come together with people in the neighbourhood. " 
On the other hand some of my informants made a distinction between the election 
campaign period and between the elections. `Since the election atmosphere began f 
see people on a daily even hourly basis. 
KD How about the normal times? 
RO During the normal times we have got meetings every week. Our 
routine activities continue whether it is election time or not. After election too 
we will carry on our activities in the same way. With God's permission we 
have political or normal social meetings in our neighbourhood (Rernzi Özcan 
representative of Misket Neighbourhood). 
Most of the informants I talked to see themselves as a part of the community and 
spend most of the time doing community work without even realising it. It is apparent 
from their accounts that their campaigning takes an informal style. In this case the 
way in which a community lives is very important. The way the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods have developed, socially as well as physically is very conducive for 
political activism. 
The second group, again another 19 % of my informants said they meet at least one 
person in their neighbourhood every evening. "I meet people from our neighbourhood 
almost every evening after work (M. An, Hürel Neighbourhood). Another activist 
said: "During the election campaign I canvass 3 to 4 hours every evening. " The 
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reason that this group is active during the evening is because they are working during 
the day and meet people after dinner in their immediate neighbourhoods. 
Social life in Turkey as in many other Mediterranean countries is predominantly 
organised out-doors within a community rather then in-doors within a family. For this 
reason it is much easier for activists to get in touch with the people not necessarily in 
the daytime but evenings or sometimes nights as in the case of house meetings 
They usually meet people in teahouses a very common characteristic of Turkish 
community life. In addition to teahouses these activists would visit houses to canvas. 
In fact many said it is mostly what they prefer. Usually, they ask a supporter, member 
or voter of the VP to invite some people from the neighbourhood for it meeting in the 
evening. It is common to have around 10 to 15 people in these meetings where the 
host would serve tea, or coffee and the speaker would make a speech. In these house 
meetings politics is the dominating factor. Communal demands at the local level are 
raised and proposals discussed. 
Some 10 % of them carry out political activities every day. This group consists of 
retired workers, civil servants, shopkeepers or the self-employed person who has free 
time during the day and spend some of that on political activities. As the 
representative of Derbent neighbourhood said: "We have got a daily programme and 
I visit those places where there is a wedding, an ill person or a funeral" During the 
election campaigns there are usually daily activities but after the campaign period 
there are weekly meetings and activities. 
The largest group consists of 40 percent of all informants. This group attends weekly 
meetings that takes place in every neighbourhood's committee and canvasses 
someone at least once a week. Melih Demir from G. ZekiDogru neighbourhood 
explains: "I do meet people at least once a week but it depends on the situation it' 
someone is ill or there is a funeral then I visit those households. " 
It has been observed that for a VP activist to attend weekly meetings is the minimum. 
As Mustafa $enyurt puts: 
The neighbourhood committee, which consist of 17 members, gathers once a 
week. If there are ill people in the neighbourhood or someone has died then a 
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delegation from the committee would go and visit these households to offer 
condolences. Then come the street activities where we go and visit different 
streets. Before we do that we clearly know who votes for which party in these 
streets it is all in our computers. 
In some cases my informants said they attend one formal meeting a week but at the 
same time they said there could be several face-to-face individual meetings in a week. 
"As I don't work much during the winter time I spend some of my time going to the 
neighbourhood committee and give some help and training to them. " In addition, 
there are some activists who reported meeting fifteen to twenty people every day. 
Those are usually party administrators, secretaries or other full time party workers. 
So far I have tried to find out how often my informants meet with people from their 
local constituencies and people who are potential voters. Table: 7.1 indicated that the 
VP's activists are highly active. The majority of them meet someone everyday or 
evenings, and the rest meet at least one person a week. 
7.3.2 How Much Time Is Spent on Activism? 
It can be argued that the amount of time devoted to party activities by party activists is 
one of the key indicators of the influence of the grassroots activism on the electoral 
outcomes. The prime purpose of grassroots activism is to increase the influence and 
strength of a particular political party. Therefore, I believe, it is very important to 
establish how often and for how long an activist undertakes that activity in his/her 
local branch or constituency level. To this end I have asked the following question. 
How much time do you normally devote to political activism in an average month? 
As table 7.2 shown there is an uneven distribution of political activism among the 
VP's activists. More then a quarter (26 %) of my informants devoted between five to 
ten hours to party activism in an average month during the `normal times'. "Normal 
times" is exclusive of the period of the election campaigns. During the election 
campaign many of them stressed that this time would increase as much as four times. 
Some 15 % of them spent eleven to fifteen hours a month working for their party, 
while another 13 % devoted up to twenty hours to political activism. Some 15 % of 
my informants spent twenty to thirty hours in an average month. The largest group, 
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which is around one-third (31 %) of respondents, devoted more then 35 hours in a 
month for activism. This is a quite impressive amount of devotion and significant sign 
of the VP's influential grassroots organisations. 
Table: 7.2 Time spent on party activism 





5 to 10 10 26 
11 to 15 6 15 
16to20 5 12 
20 to 30 6 15 
35 and + 12 31 
Total 39 100 
Source: same as above. 
Since they are highly committed and ideologically driven (almost 60 %) they do not 
see party activism as a costly activity as many scholars describe it (Sec Scyd and 
Whiteley, 1992, p. 86) but something that they see as an important part of their 
ideological beliefs and social values. As stated in chapter 5 many of them joined the 
VP in order to support what they call the Islamic dava (Islamic cause). 
As stated above almost every one of my informants made a distinction in terns of the 
time they normally devote for party activism. The intensity changes between actual 
election campaigning and post election. For example 33 % of them said that their 
activity would normally increase four fold during the actual election campaigns. If 
one said that he spends up to ten hours in a month this means he would spent as much 
as forty hours during the election campaigning. Indeed in my own experience the 
majority of them put long hours and a lot of energy into campaigning. It was 
expected of the activists to take days off from their workplaces or use their annual 
holidays during the campaign period. I have witnessed people say they were closing 
their shop most of the time for two months like Silha celik from the i/ce of Kcgiören, 
in order to participate in the campaigning. 
There were others like Hasan from the youth committee of Mamak ih"e who had to 
find someone to keep his shop open while he was doing errands as member of a youth 
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committee. There were even people who were workers in Western European countries 
like Holland, Germany or France coming to Turkey on their annual holiday for the 
purpose of campaigning with their Islamic brothers. I met such people though not as 
many took part as during previous election campaigns. 
The Islamists are very well organised among the Turkish workers in the Western 
European countries. The Milli Gdriis Teckilati (The Organisation of National View) 
is the motor of these organisations. It has been reported over the years by the media 
that the National View has been organising an army of canvassers, political activists 
with their latest model automobiles and a considerable amount of financial resources. 
In addition to that it organises charter flights and sends thousands of guest workers to 
Turkey to vote for the WP/VP providing free or some times cheap tickets for them. 289 
The importance of these activities organised by the National View abroad is to show 
the scope and extent of organised election activities. Otherwise the bulk of the 
election campaigns are run by the local party organisations throughout the country by 
the local actors. 
I have observed committed, devout and hard working activists in every 
neighbourhood throughout the election campaign. They turn every occasion and every 
place into an arena for political activity. The activists appeared very competitive, well 
informed, energetic and ready to work long hours. You would see them organising 
house or teahouse meetings until very late at night. The members of the youth 
committee would put party flags all around the neighbourhoods, put the party posters 
on all available walls, electricity and telephone poles, hang massive portraits of the 
candidates on cotton banners until I or 2 am if not later than that. 
I shall now move on to the question of how they meet the people, the potential voters 
on the ground. It has been assumed that as the VP is a pro-Islamic party it must have 
289 Sec Daily Milliyet 24 Mart 1999 (24 March 1999) ' Secinen havavollari' (Voter Airlines) in this 
article it was reported that one of the frontrunner champion of the Islamic capital the Kombassan 
Holding was organising charter flights from various European countries to bring around 4 500 voters to 
support the VP in the general elections of 18 April 1999. In another article in the same newspaper it 
was reported that among the Turkish workers the most influential organisation is the MGV those and 
their supporters will come to Turkey to vote. It continued "At the last general election the Organisation 
of National View raised around 2 million DM to send to the WP (Milliyet, 24 March 1999). 
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been utilising the religious institutions like mosques for propaganda and as a 
recruitment ground. But my data showed that was not the case at all. Rather they 
prefer house meetings, which they successfully utilise for their political activism. My 
findings are as follows. 
7.2.3 Where Do They Meet With Potential Voters? 
VP activists canvass people in diverse ways. Perhaps this diversity reflects the 
militant characteristics of their political activities in their constituency. Table 7.3 
shows that 23 % of the VP activists meets people for political activism in the weekly 
meetings held by the neighbourhood committee. I will give some details about the 
neighbourhood committees in the following sections. 
Table: 7.3 Regarding your grassroots activism, where do you meet people 
usually? 
Where do you meet? Percentage 
Weekly meetings in neighbourhood 23 
Visits for various occasions: weddings, engagements 
Celebrations, visiting sick, elderly or funerals and like. 18 
House meetings 16 
In Mosques and after the Friday prayers II 
Where ever there is an opportunity 11 
In the teahouses 9 
Work place 7 
At the face-to-face meetings 5 
Total 100 
Source: Same as above 
These committees are the backbone of the local party organisation and number from 
14 to 17 members. As mentioned above they have got weekly activity programmes 
prepared, implemented and assessed by these same committees every week in co- 
operation with the ilce party organisation. 
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Salih Bagci tells about these weekly meetings: 
There are weekly meetings usually on Thursdays. The neighbourhood 
committee meets to discuss the agenda, assess the last weeks' activities and 
prepares next week's plan. And above all members are called on to make visits 
and canvass in the neighbourhood. 
Some 18 percent of my informants meet people for political activism in a peculiar 
way that not is developed as a means of canvassing in Western European countries at 
all. This form is much sociable and less political, at least at the outset. Activists 
regularly and persistently attend any occasion for celebration, mourning, or any kind 
of social gathering. They visit ill or elderly people either in their home or in hospital. 
Idris Erdogru the representative of Uyamý Neighbourhood explained how he has been 
actively campaigning and therefore increased party membership by seven and half 
times in his neighbourhood: 
I go everyday. I am the representative of the neighbourhood of Uyanis. While 
I am visiting I recruit new members and visit the ill. I wish them well, who- 
ever they are whether our neighbour or friend or someone totally unknown. I 
go to their weddings or funerals. So they accept us. More correctly we go there 
to introduce ourselves, e. gI am X from the VP's Uyanis neighbourhood party 
committee. We are here to congregate for your wedding God my bless it. Or 
lets say we heard that there is a funeral we go there read the Koran and make 
friends with them. So they like it because we are there in their bad or good, 
easy or difficult days. This way I increased the number of members from 200 
to 1500. At least ten times I have won the award of high achievement in the 
neighbourhood. 
I think the best way to meet people to talk politics is during engagement and 
wedding celebrations. There you can talk one to one. Then I would visit those 
houses where there is someone who is ill or has died. You could not talk 
politics especially at funerals but it gives us a change to make publicity, and 
talk some non-political issues. When we go to this kind of occasion I usually 
take a present, nothing too expensive, but it is just good to take something 
with you. Our people like this if you turn up to their parties, celebrations to 
share their joy or problems. 290 
The community ties are much stronger in the gecekondu areas. One of the reasons for 
this is because the majority of the gecekondu settlers came from rural parts of the 
country. Thus the political activism has to take a social or an informal form. The 
visits organised by the local party organisation are functioning on several levels. 
290 See interview with Mustafa $enyurt, member of the municipality's parliament in Mamak ilce. 
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Being there sharing the mood with people in the neighbourhood is certainly an 
effective form of political activism. 
Obviously, gift exchanging is a worldwide cultural phenomenon and studied by many 
anthropologists. It has a very important role in community life. The VP leadership 
seems to be aware of this fact, because, according to the VP handbook called: Halkla 
Iliykiler Nedir? (What is Public Relations? ) In there the party activists are being 
strongly advised not to go empty handed on those visits. 291 
Some 16 % of them said they meet people in the house meetings. As the 
representative of Aýagi Ayranci neighbourhood, puts it: 
We have house meetings every week. In there everyone talks one by one. 
Also, there are meetings once a week in the neighbourhood, in the ilc: e (sub- 
district) and in the it (district) and there all the problems are discussed. 
These house meetings vary in themselves. Most of them arranged by using the 
family, kinship, hem§ehrilik, or ethnic ties. The activists are usually visits such houses 
and if the host were willing they would ask him to invite some people from the same 
neighbourhood as an audience. Sometimes he would visit a particular household for 
tea. In some other case he would invite a group of people to his own home for tea and 
there he would talk with them. These house meetings are sometimes attended by 
middle ranking politician like the candidate for the municipality, local parliament, or 
the chairman of the VP's ilce (sub district) organisation invited as it speaker. This 
kind of house meetings are usually organised during the election campaigns. Where 
else do they meet the people? 
Over one in ten (1 1 %) of them said they meet people in the Mosques or after the 
Friday prayers. In this case, as one would expect, the religious institutions are 
providing a fertile ground for canvassing. But what is more important is that this 
religious arena is open to the VP in an unequal term as no other party would utilise 
Mosques or Friday prayers as the VP does. Therefore it can be argued that the VP has 
a monopoly over the using of religious institutions to canvass. From this aspect the 
religious ideology, rhetoric and religious institutions are important assets of the VP. 
291 See (1998) Pari let Partisi Halkla IIiýkiter Baýkanllg, Halkla lliýkiler Nedir? (Virtue Party Chairmen 
of the PR Affairs, What is Public Relations ? ), Ankara, '98. 
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However, keep in mind that only a small minority (I l %) of the VP activists chose to 
meet people in the Mosques or Friday masses. The vast majority (90 %) prefer non- 
religious arenas. 
Another II % of my informants said they meet people wherever they get an 
opportunity. This group is a very interesting one and must be the most active group of 
grassroots activists of all. As theoretically speaking, there must be an immense 
possibility for such opportunities. As one activist put: "Even on the bus, or while 
waiting in the queue for a doctor, no matter where I am, I explain our political ideas to 
other people. ' 292 M. Balci of the $enlik neighbourhood takes the same attitude on 
canvassing "Wherever I find people I talk politics. " M. Karaagac from the Kutlu 
neighbourhood too takes his chance for political activism where there is a right 
moment. He answered the same question with "wherever I got an opportunity I talk 
to people". 
Many of the activists I interviewed or observed in action seemed outgoing, confident, 
were good communicators and highly informed on current political issues. With these 
qualities they are able to bring political dialogue into many occasions. They interpret 
current political issues from their own perspective as a way of informing others. 
What is more they usually do not hesitate to talk to people they are not so familiar 
with. 
There is another group consisting of 9 per cent of the activists that prefers to meet 
people in the kahfehane (teahouses) in the neighbourhood. As mentioned above the 
teahouses play a very central role in Turkish community life. It is very common for a 
Turkish man to spend on average 4 to 5 hours everyday in teahouses discussing 
everything from daily events to economics, from football to politics. 293 The 
teahouses are centres where the majority of men congregate to chat, play cards watch 
football, listen to the news and reflect or sometimes especially during the election 
292 See the interview of representative of $ehit Kübilay neighbourhood. 
293 See Istanbul daily Milliyet I Nisan 1999 (I April 1999). Before the last general elections in April 
1999 the daily Milliyet looked at various aspects of the social life in the gecekondu areas and the writer 
made similar observation on teahouses. 
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campaigns host political candidates to listen and discuss. They are usually open until 
very late including weekends, and serve as a platform for politics. 
During my fieldwork in Ankara I attended, as part of my research, many of the 
teahouse meetings organised by the neighbourhood party branches and usually the 
candidates were asked to make speeches. The teahouse meetings are the commonest 
way of canvassing during the election campaigns in Turkey and candidates have the 
chance of meeting an audience of around 40 to 50 -for a small - or 60 to 100 people - 
a large teahouse - at once. 
Around 7% percent of them meet people canvassing in their work place, while 5% 
said they meet people one to one in different environments. Workplace canvassing is 
very important as contrary to the majority of the VP activists this group is actually 
active outside the boundaries of its own community, some times beyond the i/ce (sub- 
district) boundaries. In this case they are the ones that carry the ideology and policies 
of the VP much further than many of their colleagues do in the local party branches. 
Such activity is also valuable because of the community structure in the work places. 
It is very heterogeneous unlike the neighbourhood's homogenous community so the 
ideas, policies and political messages of the VP reaches and spread to much wider 
audiences via this group of activists. 
The last group, who prefer to meet people one to one, is very influential too. 
Although, their numbers are much lower -5 percent-, because of their special tactics 
they reap much better results from their activism than their colleagues in the local 
branch. As has been pointed out by many political scholars face-to-face meetings are 
always a much effective way to influence someone's voting behaviour. 294 
7.3.4 What Are Their Perceptions About Their Activities? 
The majority of the VP's grassroots activists believe that their political activism is 
vital to the party's electoral performance. 74 % of them viewed their role as `very 
important'. This is no surprise at all as of course activists most value their effort on 
294 See Milbrath and Goel, 1977, p. 37. 
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behalf of the party. (See chapter 5) They must feel that what they do is good for the 
party and essential for its success. Here is how a party worker describes their work: 
"The local party branches are the central pillar of the party. " Another activist 
underlines their role as: "Without local organizations no party can stand up on its feet 
nor survive. Local organisations keep the party running. " Many of my informants 
acknowledged the crucial role of the party activists at local level. One of them Melih 
Demir is a member of the executive committee of G. Z. Dogan neighbourhood. For 
him local organisations are very important and without them nothing would happen. 
At most, he says, the party would only exist on the signpost. It would not reach out to 
people. To reach out it must have an organisation behind it. 
Around 19 percent of them regarded party activism as `important'. For this group 
their activities are an important variable for party's success but there are other issues 
such as party policies, leadership, nationwide campaigns are important as well. The 
number of those who did not think that grassroots activism was significant for the 
party's performance is very small. Just 2 percent of our informants assessed their role 
as `not so important' and another 4 per cent put alternative arguments for party 
performance rather than party activism. After having their opinions on the effects of 
the grassroots activism I wanted to find out how they think they affect the electoral 
chances of the VP. 
7.3.5 How Do They Improve Their Party's Electoral Fortune? 
In this section I want to bring out what my informants said about the role and effects 
of their own activities. First, Mustafa Senyurt from Mamak ilce explains: 
"From 1984 to 1991, because of their conformist approach the WP's 
neighbourhood representatives could not reach out to the people at all. As the 
WP developed and improved its lice (sub-district) organisations, extended its 
organisations in the mahalles (neighbourhoods) as well as into the streets as 
street representatives, its share of the votes increased. After 1989 the WP 
started to visit teahouses and ineyhaneleri (pubs) so it increased its share of the 
vote. We would go there greet them and sit at the tables of those who were 
drinking or gambling. So they saw that we are not what the media reports say 
and they voted for us. We have adopted the tactic of `shameless politicians'. I 
mean if someone turns one of us down another went there to canvass him. If it 
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did not work then we would find someone close to him, a relative or 
sometimes his wife through our lady activists. " 295 
He continued: 
The main point is not to win extra votes. This problem is secondary. But we 
have developed solidarity. Trade co-operations like Kombassasn, YtMPA$, 
GIYDAS have been growing on the basis of this spirit of solidarity. In 
addition to that there have been small funds established to provide credit for 
small size investments like the Yutong firms in Yozgat... 
Mustafa $enyurt drew our attention to the relationship between the party 
organisations and the campaigning: meeting or reaching the people. Rightly, he says 
that between 1983 and 1991 the WP could not reach people because of two factors. 
First, was the conformist approach of the party organisations and second was the lack 
of local organisations. From 1991 onwards the WP expanded its organisation 
networks vertically as well as horizontally. It extended its branches to the 
neighbourhood level and appointed representatives to every street and apartment 
block. Also in terms of the canvassing strategy and tactics it developed a twin head 
strategy. On the one hand its local organisations turned into social care units 
providing material benefits like food, fuel, clothing, bursaries for poor students or 
networking for jobs, hospital beds for patients or helping out in a crisis like for a 
funeral. On the other hand it used very assertive canvassing and propaganda tactics 
like `shameless salesman' who tries to sell goods to an uninterested household. As 
well as the solidarity networks and assertive canvassing tactics a good party 
organisation needs consistency between its activities' two elements. 
A party can have a great programme and the entirely right policies but if it is not 
consistent and coherent then it will not have credibility in the public eye. A 
representative of the Bahcelerici neighbourhood brought this issue up. "That is 
exactly where the difference between our party and the others lies. " "The other parties 
are only active for one or two months from election to election but our party is active 
295 There were some media reports titled like: "Faziletin Secim Taktigi : Kot'uldn'tuiur. Ka nya Mal 
Satin (Virtue party's Election Taktic: Saling Goods to Door That You Were Turned Down)" 13elore 
the last general and local elections (1999) the VP organized a preparation camp in Antalya. In that 
education seminar the delegates were lectured about some new election tactics. It was stressed that a 
good salesman is one who sold good to the door that he was turned down. The camp designed to 
educate the heads of the election committees from all 80 districts. They're those delegates trained and 
asked to go to bars, pubs, weddings and funerals for canvassing. See Istanbul Daily Radikal 26 Ekim 
1998 (26 October 1998); Sabah 26 Ekim 1998 (26 October 1998). 
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for 12 months. Our party activities are not bound to the election campaigns but are a 
year round event. We listen to everyone whether our member or not. In house 
meetings we go and listen to people then report the problems up to the rl(, e branch. 
Contrary to our attitude other parties forget people right after the election campaign. " 
Representative of Bahcelerici neighbourhood noticed the consistency of their 
activities as opposed to other parties' activism, which are scattered from one election 
to other. As he stressed the VP's activists undertake a year round activity. 
It was observed that VP's activists are very conscious of their own role and influence. 
When I asked what my informants thought about their contributions one of my 
informant replied: 
Actually the election result decides our contributions. At the last election our 
party [WP] became the number one by obtaining 33 percent of the votes in our 
neighbourhood Yeýiltepe. That time we did not have even an election bureau 
but this time we have got one and that is a sign of our success. If you work 
hard you will get the prize. You won't be paid if you did not go to work. (Fazli 
Dalkiran, Ye*iltepe neighbourhood). 
Maybe the best answer to my question about whether grassroots organisations make 
any difference or not came from Fazli Dalkiran. As he put it clearly the proof of the 
effectiveness of local party campaigning lies in election success. In other words what 
counts is deeds not words. The WP received a third of all votes at the last elections (in 
1995) in Yesiltepe neighbourhood. He also emphasises the basic principle of `no pain 
no gain showing how aware he is of his role as a political activist. He is especially 
proud because this time they have an election bureau that they use as a base during the 
election campaign. As he continues 
"We play a very important role here. We are the mirrors of the party at the 
local level. As the people at the bottom end of the party we take the biggest 
share of the responsibility during the election campaigns ". (Erdogru Aydin) 
The VP's activists work voluntarily with great passion knowing that theirs is the only 
party that has a well-structured party organisation: 
Other parties lack this [organisation]. In the past the TTP tried it but failed, the 
NAP also tried and failed, because our activities are voluntary. Today some of 
our friends have no money in their pockets for the bus fare but they walk here 
every day. If they were not volunteers, you would not get them here even if 
you paid for them. The Secret behind this commitment is the ideals that 
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people [party activists] share. These people [activists] say, "We are here for 
the service of the community". It is for everyone regardless of their party 
affiliation whether they are from the Motherland Party (MP) or Republicans 
People Party (RPP). (Representative of Aýagi Ayranci neighbourhood). 
What we see here is that a strong sense of commitment to one's ideals among the 
activists and the significance of doing it voluntarily. 
In Idris Erdogru's words the party activists can be described as the foundation of the 
party, because, he says the activities in a neighbourhood depend on the representative. 
IE I mean our activities are very important. Representatives follows the 
things, go around to register new members and so on. Everyone including our 
leaders at the top knows that our work is valuable. Because, first of all, 
nobody but us who know everything goes around in the neighbourhoods. 
KD What can you say if you compare your activities with other parties? 
IE "Yes, we have got our special methods. Other parties cannot work like 
us". 
KD Why not? 
IE "I do not know. This is a matter of belief and a method of working so 
no other party would work as much as we do. " 
Salih Bagci from Tepebasi neighbourhood puts their role on the increased electoral 
support to the WENP this way: 
In our neighbourhood there was a2 per cent increase in our votes from 1994 
to 1995. We all as the members of the neighbourhood executive committee, 
youth committee and commission of ladies have been doing one-to-one 
meetings in our neighbourhood. Consequently we now have a very good 
potential voter turnout for our party... Personally I have not seen any other 
party work as we do: one-to-one meetings and door-to-door canvassing in our 
neighbourhood. They have got some voter support but not an organisation like 
ours. 
Similarly, Aydin Yürür the representative of caldiran neighbourhood points out that ` 
the activities of the neighbourhood organisation play an important role in the rise of 
the VP. "We are the party in here, " he says. 
"If our activities are not approved by the people no one would vote for us. We 
are in constant contact with people. Whatever the occasion first we run for the 
help of the needy because of our closeness and genuine friendship people trust 
us". 
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In the same vein Mehmet Ari (HUrel neighbourhood) stresses the direct connection 
between the local and national level. 
Since the days of the WP we are the most active party in Mamak. We 
organise weekly meetings. If you are not successful in the local elections you 
are not going to succeed in the national elections either. So we explain 
0000ourselves to the people in greater detail. We do correct the wrongs that 
are said about us. We are putting in great effort to pre-empt the media's 
attacks on our party. 
The connection between local and general election comes up time and time again. It is 
not without good reason. It is where the grassroots organisations exist and carry out 
daily activities. They are all well aware that whatever they do in their particular 
locality it has an impact at the national level. As M. An's view reflects how lie 
perceives his role in his locality. He, rightly and consciously, equates his effort in the 
neighbourhood with the nationwide electoral success of the VP. He also emphasizes 
another vital aspect of the party activism that is the propaganda and counter- 
propaganda in the neighbourhoods. Propaganda is the prime objective of the 
campaigns but so far has not been brought out by my informants. The reason for this 
may be the negative connotations that the concept of propaganda carries or it may be 
they see their activities as more effective than propaganda itself. However as was 
observed the media had a very negative approach towards the pro-Islamic party 
WP/VP. In general this undermining of the VP is going on in the mainstream press as 
well as by the many privately owned TV channels. So propaganda and counter- 
propaganda is an essential part of the grassroots activism to counter balance this 
negative attitude. 
$uaip a member of the youth committee in Marnak see their role as very important for 
the VP's success in elections. He emphasises that: 
Via our activities the leadership holds the `pulse of the public'. They get 
feedback about the people's needs and feelings, plus our youth committee 
organises activities designed for young people in the neighbourhood. By 
doing this we recruit young people into our ranks. 
It is very interesting to see how $uaip despite his young age sees his position between 
the party and the public. For him the local party organisation is a kind of organ that 
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communicates between the party and neighbourhood community. It is kind of a nerve 
to pass the demands and feelings from community to the party. On the other hand he 
points out the activities designed especially for young people. Indeed at the last 
general election the VP developed some very clever tactics and strategies to attract the 
young, especially the unemployed young people. For this reason the VP set up 
teahouses in every neighbourhood where they provide free facilities like table tennis 
or snooker. The tea is very cheap and those who have no money are entitled to free 
tea. 296 Naci Tunalr from Ekin Barak neighbourhood also emphasised that some of 
their activities like football are directed at the youth in their locality. 
Yilmaz Dogan from Turkozu neighbourhood puts their role and duties as: 
No doubt that our activities have been very instrumental for the electoral 
success of party. Our duties are: providing ready information to the ilce branch 
and organising coffeehouse and house meetings and like. There are sixty-two 
neighbourhoods in Mamak and there is no way the administrative committee 
of the sub-district, which consists of 24 people, could cope with all 62 
neighbourhoods. There simply are not enough people to do that. So without us 
they would not know what is going on here. However when we as 
neighbourhood committees each have got 14 people that makes 900 in all 62 
neighbourhoods and provides a bridge between sub-district and 
neighbourhoods. We provide organisation. If there is a meeting we organise it 
and let the sub-district committee know so that they would send some 
representative. We are 900 people in total and all the work is done by us 
without any payment. 
Y. Dogan rightly says that without them the party branch in the ilc"e of Mamak simply 
cannot know what is going on in all 62 neighbourhoods of Mamak. For him they act 
as a bridge between the ilce branch and the neighbourhoods. It is manpower as well 
as of resources that are needed for activism. The lice executive committee is made of 
24 people compared to 900 people in all the neighbourhoods and they all work 
voluntarily without any payment, something that reflects the nature of their 
relationship with the party. 
In fact the numbers are much higher then he thinks. Neighbourhood organisations, 
mainly the executive committees, are organised in the image of the the organisations. 
The il4c executive committees consist of 30 people. A chairman and his deputy head 
296 See Istanbul daily Milliyet 23 January 1999. 
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them. Fourteen of them are chairpersons of various sub groups like election affairs, 
public relations etc and equal numbers of their deputies. Plus there is a ladies' 
commission and youth committee. I observed that the neighbourhood committees 
usually consist of between 20 to 30 members, which means that in Mamak there are 
1240 to 1860 party members in the neighbourhood executive committees. If we add 
the ladies commissions and youth committees this figure goes much higher. I am not 
suggesting that the entire neighbourhood have got active ladies commissions but they 
mostly have the youth committees actively involved. When added to the Keciören 
lice, which has got 43 neighbourhoods, and between 860 to 1290 members in the 
executive committees it makes a considerable number of (between 2100 to 3150) 
grassroots activists in Ankara's two sub-districts. Plus, there are many other activists 
that are not necessarily members of these committees. It all adds up to a considerable 
number of people who are playing a very constructive and influential role in their 
localities every day, `every hour of the day' as they would say. 
7.3.6 The Main Points Emerging From The Interviews? 
It appears that grassroots activists perceived the role and the effects of the political 
activism as very important for the party's electoral success. These points can be 
summarised as follows: The grassroots activists see themselves as messengers of the 
party reaching out and spreading the party's messages across society. As well as 
carrying the party messages to the voter they also behave like a nerve relaying 
information from their particular community to the upper levels. For some the success 
of the WP during the 1990s was due to the expansion of the local party branches at 
the sub-district, neighbourhoods and street levels. This point is especially important to 
the expansion of the grassroots organisations from top to bottom that made the 
WP/VP the only mass membership party. 
For some of my informants continuity is the key aspect of their activities. Many 
stressed that their activity is a year round campaign. They carry on their tasks 
routinely, regardless of the election campaigns. Unlike the other parties in Turkey 
many of my informants said they carry out their conduct all year round that in turn 
helps to build public trust in them. 
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Another common recurring factor is that the activists are working voluntarily. In 
many cases the VP's activists are a hundred percent volunteers. Of course there are 
some who expect some gain, material or otherwise, out of their activism but it is not 
the driving force for the majority of the VP's activists. 
Beside the voluntarism they carry out a lot of community work. For many this is a 
way of serving the community. The notion of being at the service of the community or 
society is one of the defining characteristics of the WP/VP. This is especially 
important because politics in Turkey has been dominated by elite who sees it as not 
being at the service of the society but dictating or governing the society. This aspect is 
apparent from the outset too. None of these mainstream parties has ever undertaken 
community work, or organised a charity for the poor or needy. But the WP/VP has 
been doing it extensively. 
As was argued previously no party could match the size and quality of the WP/VP's 
grassroots organisations. The grassroots organisations are given real meaning and an 
open space to perform on the ground. This situation is closely connected with the 
party structure as well. In the case of the cartel parties the membership and local 
organisations carry little weight. This is because everything about campaigning like 
election campaigning, found raising, advertisement and so on is carried out by the 
central office or by a professional campaign expertise group under the leadership so 
there is little room for grassroots activism. But because the VP is a mass membership 
party the local party organisations are doing the bulk of campaigning. 
The last pattern that emerges is the special tactics and strategies that the WP/VP 
developed. In one account it can be said that because the VP is the only mass 
membership party its campaign strategy and tactics must be different from then the 
rest of the political parties. This is true to a degree but other parties also have party 
activists and local organisations. However since the beginning of the 1990s the WP 
has introduced different creative tactics like utilising the ladies commission as one of 
its main campaigning forces. Initially it looked very unlikely given the party's 
attitude towards women in general and the status of Muslim women in particular. It 
was unthinkable to have women as one of the main campaigning forces in a male 
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dominated religious conservative party. Until 1999 the party did not even have a 
women candidate for parliament. Despite this it has been successfully integrating 
women into its rank and file and currently there are three women MPs in parliament. 
When asked how do you think your activities contribute to the VP's success'? The 
answers come, as what they think is most effective way of contacting people, winning 
their hearts and friendship, their trust and later may be their vote. 
7.4 What They Do And How They Do It? 
` How can I vote for you while I am eating the meal and bread that is 
provided by the VP? ' 
In this section different dimensions and methods of the VP activism will be discussed. 
As noted earlier since the early 1990s the WP and later the VP displayed a wide range 
of political activism. Surprisingly many of those activities are happening outside the 
political sphere like charity work, visiting people socially for occasions from wedding 
ceremonies to funerals. 
There are various kinds of activities carried out by the local party organisations. 
They are as diverse as distributing roses in the more affluent non VP neighbourhoods 
-like in Tipfakiiltesi Caddesi- to organising charity work such as distributing clothing, 
food, coal, or even bursaryies for poor school children in the gecekondu areas (like 
Hürel or Türközü). The VP concentrates especially on the poor gecekondu areas in 
where high level of unemployment, poverty, low quality housing, low income, low 
quality of public services, etc., are the defining characteristic. 297 It has been noticed 
by many Turkish political writers and reported by the media that the WP/VP has been 
concentrating its activities in the gecekondu areas. 298 
297 For a detailed analysis of the gecekondu (squatter) areas reader may consult chapter 4. 
298 See Ayata (1997: 52); cakir (1994: 51-59); Kalaycioglu (1997); Öni$ (1997: 755-756); Özbudun 
2000); Sayan (1996: 36); $en (1995: 82-91). Also see media report "VP Gecekondularda Devlet 
Baba", Milliyet 23 Ocak 1999 (The VI' is the Father State in Squatters), Istanbul daily Milliyet 23 
January 1999. 
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Beside its political activities the VP's local organisations provide various kinds of 
material aid for the poorest sections of the gecekondus. From my observations and 
interviews I can say that most of the time these activists see themselves as charity 
workers who are there to help the poor, ill, elderly, disabled, orphans and widows. 
When asked what kind of activities they carry out as neighbourhood organisations the 
majority of them would speak about this charity work. Here we will examine what 
sort of charity work they undertake. 
Table: 7.4 What are they doing, as political activism 
What they do? The Activities Percentage 
Charity work (providing material aid (food, clothing, fuel, etc., ) 
and social services) 37 
House visits (house meetings) 19 
Attend weekly meetings of local Party Organisation 15 
Visits for any social occasions (Weddings, funerals, 
Patient visits) 12 
Developing and maintaining good relations in the 
Neighbourhood 10 
Educating people (propaganda, counter propaganda, 
Putting up posters, etc., ) 8 
Total 100 
Source: Same as above 
Table 7.4 indicated that 37 percent of my informants reported that their political 
activism is dominated by charity work; provision of some material and nonmaterial 
commodities, guidance and other kind of assistance. Some 19 percent of them said the 
house visits or meetings are most favourable for them while (15%) of them said the 
weekly meetings in the neighbourhood branch was the most common form of 
activism they perform. Some 12 % of them prefer social visits to these households in 
where there is that something celebrated or mourned. They often attend wedding 
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celebrations; visit the ill, attend funerals and so on. For 10 % of them developing and 
maintaining good relationship with the voters is the most favourable type of political 
activism. Now I shall elaborate these points a bit more. 
It appears that the provision of material benefits and social services or we 
called `charity work' or community work comes first among the activities 
of the VP's grassroots activists (Table 7.4). Some (37 percent) of my informants 
placed `charity work' at the top of their political activities. Community work 
combines various kinds of activity directed at the provision of material as well as non- 
material benefits for the poor; the people who live in those rundown, poorest sections 
of the gecekondus. These people can be described as the poorest of the poor for whom 
without this kind of aid work survival would be much tougher. For example I-Ialis 
from Aktepe neighbourhood explains: 
We help those health workers who come to our quarter to carry out medical 
checks. We give a hand with the distribution of meal, coals, or coats for school 
children aged between 9 to 12. This year there were a lot of coats given to 
children. The meals are stopped now but bread is coming from the 
metropolitan municipality. We give some help for those poor who cannot pay 
their rent regardless of their party inclinations. Also this year there have been 
big quantities of dried food given away in the neighbourhood. One of my 
neighbours told me what he said to an activist from an other party who was 
canvassing in our quarter ' How can I vote for you while I am eating the meal 
and bread that is provided by the VP? T 'We also visit the sick and give a lot 
support if there is a funeral. In addition to these we as the neighbourhood 
committee take care of asphalting the streets. If there is problem we call help 
from the metropolitan municipality. No doubt that all of this work helps our 
party's election performance in the quarter. 
What we see from Halis's activities is that party activists are actively involved with 
very diverse elements of social work from helping, guiding the health professionals 
through the neighbourhood to distributing food or clothing aid from the municipality. 
By no means is Halis alone, Rernzi Özal too talks about a wide variety of activities. 
For example, we try to help those needs in material kind as well as in 
nonmaterial (spiritual) ways. If someone were very poor you would not do 
any thing spiritually. First you must feed him. At this moment in our 
neighbourhood bread has been distributed. The halk ekinek (people's bread) 
continues. It is not just for the election. It was there before the election 
camping as well. What we are doing is searching for those poor people to 
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provide them at least bread and some hot meal. While we give this it is not 
that we are expecting anything from anyone. It is because they are human 
beings. If he gets food he can think then. The hungry cannot think at all. In 
these circumstances he would steal, deceive even rob to feed his children. 
KD What else are you doing? 
RÖ "We organise food give-aways every year round Ramadan. There are 
those who want to give their alms, so we collect from them and pass them onto 
the poor who are our brothers. Plus, this year there are sonic bursaries for 
school children. They can be given from primary to university level. It is 
around 3 Million TL for primary, 4 million TL for elementary, 6 million TL 
high schools and 7 million TL for the university students. 
KD How about fuel; coal and wood? 
RO Yes around half a tonne of coal and ten sacks of wood per household'. 
As Özcan described their activities in the neighbourhood committee consists of some 
material benefits -food, fuel, clothing, bursaries as well as nonmaterial benefits like 
helping to fine jobs, solving problems with the government offices. In a similar line 
M. Karaagac from the same ilce pointed out that: 
As VP devotees we meet like-minded people in our neighbourhood, hold 
discussions. Then those who have got some need come to us, because the 
metropolitan municipality governed by the VP people comes to us. Our 
neighbourhood is a very poor one. Most of its population are labourers. At 
least 50 per cent of them are day labourers. For this reason it is very poor and 
half of the households are tenants, renting houses. The rest has one gccekondu 
or nothing. Many people are unemployed. For this reason this community is 
in need of everything. People usually, do not want to ask for help, because 
they feel embarrassed but we know them and try to help them whatever we 
can. 
In this first half M. Karaatac gave some background information about the 
socioeconomic and demographic situation in his neighbourhood. The location of 
Kutlu is not so far from the wealthiest districts of cankaya where the presidential 
palace and the high-ranking bureaucrats reside. Despite this physical closeness these 
districts are living on different planets. On the contrary to Kutlu's Third World 
standards, cankaya has the living standards of major developed countries. As he 
stressed high unemployment and low income, and bad housing is common 
characteristic in Kutlu. Because of this bad socioeconomic situation many households 
are in constant need of basic materials like fuel during the winters, clothing, or food 
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and services. As he will explain using the resources of metropolitan municipality he 
and his friends organise charity work to ease the situation a little bit. 
KD Approximately how many households received fuel (coal and wood) in 
Kutlu? 
MK Last year it was approximately fifty families but I do not know for this 
year. This year rather than the neighbourhood executive committee the 
headmen are being giving more. Our neighbouring quarter of Mutlu received 
much of it this year. It all comes from the metropolitan municipality. At least 
ninety percent of this material- coal, wood, food comes from there. 
KD How about the food? 
MK The food packages include pasta, margarine, sugar, chickpeas, baked 
beans, rice, bulgur and tomato puree. In last year's list there were thirteen 
different items including omo [detergent] listed. The food bags usually, weigh 
around 30 kg or so. I gave them to people with my own hands last year. They 
would be enough for a month for a family, maybe more. 
Also we got some bursaries and winter coats for children last year. For 
example, I myself registered fifty people alone last year. I gave fifteen of 
them in this school and also gave the rest of the forms to school. Poor people 
benefited from them a lot. The metropolitan municipality gave 20.000 
bursaries last year. This year too, students will start to receive them. It was 
said that it will be up to 75.000 students but I do not know for sure. The 
amount of bursaries will be 7.5 million TL for university, 5 million for high 
schools and 3 million TL for primary schools. 
KD Err it is very good that the municipality can afford it 
MK Yes as I said the pious Muslims will find resources. If you employ 
19.000 workers instead of 26.000, so he says I would use the money that 
previously paid for extra 6 to 7.000 workers. It makes much money. He [the 
mayor] says I will use that money for this kind of services. It has been said 
that there are around one thousand people that are paid but never come to the 
workplace. When you cut this vested money it will directly go to the 
municipality's safe. Plus there are businessmen who are good Muslims and 
want to help... 
It is apparent that the VP's local organisations have been carrying out extensive and 
expensive charity work throughout the Ankara's gecekondu areas. The above three 
cases covers both sub-districts Keciören and Mamak. As stated already the charity 
work is the highest scoring activity among the VP's political activists. The provision 
of certain e. g. goods food, fuel, clothing, bursary, and other non-material services and 
assistance seem to be unified across Ankara's many gecekondu areas. This indicates a 
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pattern of most fundamental needs of an ordinary gecekondu household. It is the very 
bad economic conditions in the gecekondu neighbourhoods that make them so 
dependent on this kind of community work. 299 
The welfare state, as in many other developing countries, is still very weak in Turkey. 
Provision of basic services from education to health, to electricity, roads, water etc., 
has been hampered by the neoliberal policies. The cities expended beyond their 
physical boundaries. It was a direct consequence of rapid urbanization that started 
from the early 1980s. The influx of mass migration exhausted cities' industrial and 
services sectors. Already scarce resources for housing, health, education and so on 
are drowned by these waves of migration. 300 
In addition to this, with the implementation of the IMF's restructuring policies 
immigration from rural to urban has been accelerated. At the same time as if things 
were not bad enough the state reversed its traditional role in the economy in general 
and made huge cutbacks from its social policies. Everything was left to the correction 
of the `market forces'. As the neoliberal policies progressed it badly affected millions 
of these new migrant families. 301 But we need to ask to what extent has this charity 
work of the VP grassroots been affective? Is it really significant and doing well for 
the poor as well as for the VP's electoral success? 
7.4.1 A `Messiah in the Making' 
It seems that yes it does. According to Fazli Dalli an activist from one of the poorest 
quarters of Keciören, by organising charity work the VP shows that they are interested 
in people's daily problems. As he explains: 
299 "The unemployment rate in cities reached 13 percent in April 1994; in October 1995, it was 10 per 
cent: State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1996 (Ankara: SIS Publication, 1997), 
280; many of the unemployed live in squatter settlements. In metropolitan cities, the wealthiest one- 
fifth of the population receives 57.2 percent of the national revenue, whereas the poorest one-fifth of 
the population receives only 4.8 percent of the national revenue: State Institute of Statistics, Statistical 
Yearbook of Turkey 1996, and 629. " (Quoted in Erman T, 1998: 561) 
300 For a detailed account of migration from rural-to-urban and its socioeconomic and political 
consequences see CHAPTER 4. 
Sot There are writers who saw a vary strong connection between the neoliberal restructuring in Turkey 
in the post-1980 are ant the rise of the Welfare party to power. See for example Oniý, Z (1997). 
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Our approach to people is to make friends, and show compassion. As a 
neighbourhood organisation we get some goods for charity, and distribute 
them regardless of the party affiliations. Usually we get coal, food, bursaries 
and clothing for the students and bread to distribute in here. In our 
neighbourhood there are currently 300 families, which get four loaves bread 
per family a day. So it makes 1200 loaves of bread per day. For instance 
there are many people who wait for long time in the cheap bread queue. It 
shows that those people need to buy bread cheaper than they normally do 
elsewhere. Now if it was the ANAP (Motherland Party) not us who were 
distributing this aid they would vote for them not for us. But by doing this you 
show that at least you are interested in their problems. 
The impact of these charities can be interpreted in many different ways. The material 
benefits- food, fuel, medical aid etc., - must carry a variety of values within. Surely, 
these charity works contain basic values like use-value, exchange value, but there is 
more in them such as the `social use- values'. 302 Also, it must be valuable for the 
VP itself because in return it will reap the benefit in terms of votes. On the one hand 
those material benefits contribute to ease the daily struggle of the poor households for 
a while, however small and palliative they may be. On the other hand they show that 
there is someone who cares about the lives of these poor families. At least someone is 
interested in his or her life conditions 
It also credits the VP as being the party of the poor. It creates a future vision where 
the VP that already helps or seems to be concerned with the problems of the poor, will 
bring the justice, equality and prosperity that has been denied them for so long. What 
the opponents of the VP have been doing at most is proposing a free market economy 
that is not addressing the pressing economic problems of large sections of society But 
the VP not only has its charity works but also its unique economic program called 
Adil Düzen (Just Society). The rhetoric of the Just Society appeals to the millions of 
the lower middle and lower classes from right and left. With this program the WP 
has managed to get the support of the traditionally leftist voters who have been 
disillusioned with leftist parties since the mid-1980s. As is evident from community 
work in the neighbourhoods the VP is not just promising but also doing it as much as 
it can, even before it is in government. In one sense the charity work seems to provide 
double- benefit for the party: it doing something in the present yet promising much 
more in the future. 
302 For the concept of value and its varieties see Marx, K Capital Vol. 1: 131. 
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It can be argued that social solidarity is always seen as one of the most precious 
aspects of social life and always seen as the first condition of a `good society'. As 
societies change, and advance from one form to another the aspects of solidarity 
change too but interestingly enough there is always a common and constant desire for 
more of it. In the case of the VP, solidarity takes material as well as nonmaterial 
forms. 
By no means this is unique to Turkish Islamists. Many Muslim countries have been 
facing similar social problems to those of Turkey in terms of rapid urbanisation and 
population growth. 303 Throughout the Muslim world, Islamic parties and groups are 
well aware of the problems of the majority of the population and are organising 
charity work to provide similar material benefits; setting up health clinics, schools, 
soup-kitchens shelter, and so forth. 
The source of the financing of the WP and later its successor the VP has been 
discussed and speculated about a lot. It must be said that one of the main financial 
sources of funding of the political parties is the state itself. According to the Turkish 
constitution (1982) and the article 69 of the law of political parties (2820), parties are 
entitled to receive state funding. The conditions and the amount of the financial aid 
that parties would be entitled to and granted have been changing considerably 
however it is usually those parties which received at least 7 percent of the total votes 
which are eligible to receive the money. It has been calculated that between 50 - 90 
percent of the parties' total income comes through the state funding. 304 Because the 
largest parties in the parliament have often changed the conditions and amount of the 
financial aid, it is they who benefit most of it. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that, 
throughout the 1990s, as one of the largest parties in the parliament the WP/VP has 
been benefiting considerably from this state funding. 
Another serious source of the finance has been the transformation of the traditional 
Anatolian bourgeoisie that had a massive impact on the rise of the WP via financial as 
303 See Roy, 1994, pp. 5 1-55; see also, Moussalli, 1998; KePel 1994: Chapter 1 
304 See h: iww. teagv. orci. tr/l)roielerZ5iyasi arti m tin t bli 24. h. 
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well as political support. Throughout the 1980s Turkey developed a much closer 
connection with the long neglected Muslim countries. In particular, the Arab countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar who were very instrumental for 
financial reasons. During this period for the first time `green Dollars' were given a 
green light to come for investment in various sectors. Islamic Banking like Al Baraka 
Turk a Saudi Turkish financial venture started to operate. The Saudi authorities were 
especially generous in supporting new Mosques, Koran schools, Student hostels run 
by the religious Vakifs and brotherhoods and religious colleges. In short the Saudis 
generously supported anything in the name of the religion of Islam. The Islamist 
business circles also opened up for credit or joint investment through their long 
existing but weak ties with their rich religious brothers in Arab countries. 
The second leg of the rise of the Islamist bourgeoisie was the well-managed flow of 
the savings of the Turkish migrant workers in various European countries via various 
religious groups, brotherhoods and Islamic business associations. The `Petrol -Dollar' 
connection with the rich Arab countries and the savings of the Turkish migrant 
workers were two crucial external factors for the rise of Islamist capital. At the same 
time during the 1980s and 90s there were internal factors also contributing to the 
transformation of some elements of the Anatolian bourgeoisie. 
What can be said lastly is that these charity works also indicate a widespread 
networking including metropolitan municipality, district municipalities, Islamic 
business groups, various political and non-political groups, brotherhoods, Islamic 
trusts, trade unions and associations. In other words through these networks the VP 
has been financing its activities as well as its charity works. 
Around one fifth (19 %) of my informants said that they attend the house meetings 
(visits). Although my findings show otherwise, house-to-house or door-to-door visits 
are actually the most common and most reported type of canvassing by the VP. 
Obviously door-to-door canvassing is like face-to-face contacts, which are the most 
effective way of affecting someone's party preferences. As Metin Toker one of 
Turkey's most prominent political commentators observed, during the 1999 election 
campaign, `the most effective election campaign activity of a candidate in Turkey is 
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still to go around shop-to-shop, door-to-door, teahouse-to-teahouse to shake voters' 
hands. ' 305 
The house meetings are valued as a more intimate, informal and private way of 
meeting potential voters. As mentioned according to its public relations booklet the 
activists are encouraged to make visits and organise house meetings. The 
neighbourhood representatives or members in the neighbourhoods usually arrange 
them. It was observed that house meetings increase considerably before the elections. 
I have on occasion attended four of such meetings in one night from 7 pm to 12 pm. 
Especially during the election campaigning these meetings are attended by the 
candidates for various posts and he/she makes a speech explaining policies and 
appeals for support. In return those who attended would ask a variety of questions 
about his policies, employment opportunities in the municipality, the needs of the 
particular gecekondu settlements road, asphalt, water etc. It sometimes turns into a 
kind of negotiation between the candidate and the residents of the neighbourhood over 
the services that would be provided if he gets elected to do this lie needs their votes. 
But this is more likely during the election campaigning. In normal times these house 
meetings are more educative. Normally they are like a sermon where a hatip 
(preacher/ good speaker) would be invited to talk about daily political or economic 
issues. He would start off with religious matters and explain some issues if asked by 
the audience. As well as the house meetings the VP's activists are very keen to make 
social visits and attend mourning gatherings. 
Fifteen percent of my informants said that most of their political activism consists of 
weekly meetings. Weekly meetings are the meetings that the neighbourhood 
executive committee held every Thursday or Sundays. It lasts about two and a half 
hours. All members of the neighbourhood committee attend these meetings, where the 
previous week's action plan is assessed. The daily issues are discussed and the next 
week's action plan is prepared. All activists in the neighbourhood have been carried 
out in cooperation with the ilce's excuitive coommittee and usually a representative 
attends these weekly meetings. After the plan and assessment, the urgent tasks e. g. 
305 See Istanbul daily Milliyet, 13 Nisan 1999 "El sikmamn 1001 fazileti' (13 April 1999, The 1001 
virtue of the shaking hand). 
311 
visiting the sick, attending funerals, weddings etc are allocated among the members. 
Although it seems this activisim is less active, the planning and coordination are 
carried out in these meetings. 
Some 12 percent of my activists said the commonest form of activism for them was 
through social visits. If there is a wedding or engagement celebration, celebration of 
circumcision of the young boys, someone goes to the military service, someone is ill 
or there is a funeral, they would visit these households to join the celebration or share 
the grief. As Yahya Konuk pointed out, these activities such as visiting the ill 
attending the wedding ceremonies or visiting those households where someone is 
going to join the army to say goodbye' are the `things that people like. '(Ibid). As the 
gecekondu population consists of new migrants from rural areas, they are used to 
close communal ties and seeking to simulate these relations in the gecekondu areas. 
As can be expected the gecekondu population is not an urbanised community but 
more like a rural community. They are in transition in most cases and for some 
writers they are `in-between -neither villagers nor urbanites'. 
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It must be said that the VP's grassroots activists are well aware of the centrality of the 
traditional rural values for the gecekondu dwellers and the importance of following 
rural traditions and costumes. When they attend these gatherings they usually take a 
present for the bride and groom, at least a flower. If they visit a patient they take 
something to eat, some flowers or a cologne and so on. Among their visits the most 
important one is their help with funerals. None of the other parties are as well armed 
to cope with death as the VP's grassroots. In fact most of the centre-right and leftist 
parties are secular and their activists do not have any coping mechanism against the 
death. On the contrary, because of their Islamic identities, VP activists are very good 
at coping with this kind of crisis. 
But more than that they are instrumental in organising the funeral itself. As some of 
them said, they do not think it is a trivial issue at all. Today, it is very difficult to find 
a convenient and inexpensive grave in Ankara. It costs at least half a billion TL (, f
750) and most of these people are unable to pay it at all. What we do is done through 
306 See Erman, 1998, pp. 552-553. 
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our friends and with the help of metropolitan municipalities we arrange gravesites, 
and help with expenses, transport as well as feeding the crowd afterwards. When 
someone dies in a family people are almost incapable of doing anything so by offering 
this kind of help we win his or her hearts and friendship. `People say you are closer 
to me more than my brother' says the representative of $ehit Kubilay neighbourhood. 
The fact that activists are themselves from rural Anatolia who came usually at a 
young age and never left the gecekondu communities. This may make it much easier 
for them to know the importance of the traditional, cultural and religious costumes in 
their own surroundings. Being familiar or growing up with the same customs, 
traditions and certain regional codes gives them an advantage compared to the other 
party activists. In fact social visiting on the whole is a part of the good relations that 
activists are very keen to maintain. 
10 percent of my informants give priority to developing and maintaining good 
relations with potential voters. This aspect is very important in various ways. Having 
a good relationship is itself a very effective means of influencing people's attitudes. 
As already mentioned the gecekondu communities have predominantly rural 
characteristics and first group relations and close community ties are still the 
dominant form. In this context developing good, close friendly relations are a 
prerequisite for a successful local party organisation. 
The VP has been building its success through its skilful approach to voters. To do 
this the community leaders- neighbourhood representatives have been chosen often 
through examination. Those who are known for their qualities of seriousness trust- 
worthiness and religious devotion are encouraged to come forward as neighbourhood 
representatives. The members of the executive committees are also chosen from 
among respected members of the community. In addition the VP has been paying 
special attention to wining the hearts of people before winning their minds and 
possibly votes. Its strategy is to build bedrock of good relationships with the 
electorate slowly but steadily. 
A good relationship is more difficult to achieve than it sounds for a political party 
competing with many others. In order develop a good relationship in a community the 
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activists must have very good communication skills, be good at observing, caring and 
willing to volunteer, devoting much time and energy to political activities. 
Some eight percent of my informants gave priority to educating people as a political 
activity. This method of campaign activism is more in line with the new ways of 
campaigning. This activity consists of propaganda, counter propaganda, displaying 
posters, party flags, distributing leaflets etc., all around the sub-district. 307 They are 
predominantly from the partys youth committee and these activities require more 
energy than others. The other neighbourhood committees also carry out these tasks 
when needed. particularly during the election campaigns these activities intensify. 
After the election the youth committee adopts more community work type activities. 
As Hasan stated "In two years the number in the youth committee increased from ten 
to 450. They organised charity work worth 7 bn TL (£ 10.000) in eight months. There 
is no street that they have not been to in all of 62 neighbourhoods in Mamak. ' (Hasan, 
member of Mamak Youth Committee). This itself shows how the youth committee 
are active and engaging in similar activities as the other activists do outside election 
times. 
To make sense of this data we need to compare it with similar material from other 
countries and with other academic studies. Unfortunately there is no single Turkish 
study of grassroots activism or study of the effects of the party organisation on the 
electoral process. Giving this practical difficulty I must compare my findings with 
studies from Britain and America. 
7.5 Comparing British, American and Turkish Activists 
A study on the British Labour party revealed that only 44 percent of the Labour 
party's activists said they frequently had contact with each other. Some 10 percent did 
not do anything at all while 17 percent did and 29 percent met people occasionally. 
Another criterion for party activism is the frequency of attendance at party meetings. 
307 See interviews with Remzi from $irintepe neighbourhood and Hasan member of the Mamak lice 
youth committee. 
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Compared to their level of activism in their local branch or constituency, Labour party 
activists attended far less Labour party meetings. Some 36 percent of the activists 
said they had not attended any Labour party meeting in the last year, while only 30 
percent said they attended frequently. Twenty percent said they attended these 
meetings occasionally and the other 14 percent replied that they did so rarely. (Seyd 
and Whiteley, 1992, p. 89). 
Again when asked "how much time do you devote to party activities in the average 
month? " Fifty per cent of them replied none, less then one-in-three (30 per cent) said 
Table: 7.5 what did you do before 1997 General Elections? 
`Thinking about the 1997 General Election, we would like to ask you about your 
activities during the campaign. Did you: 
Percentage of Respondents saying `Yes' 
Activity 
Display an election poster 
Donate money to party election funds 
Help to run an election day committee 
room 
Drive voters to the polling station 
Take numbers at the polling station 
Remind voters to vote on polling day 
I Attend the count/celebrating party 
Source: Whiteley and Seyd, 1999, p. 30. 
Labour Lib Dems 
78 (70 
164 71 
19 ; 17 
17 19 
! 26 36 
45 27 
12 22 
up to five hours, while 10 percent replied between five and ten hours. Only 4 percent 
said they spent ten to fifteen hours, while as few as 2 percent said fifteen to twenty 
hours and just 4 percent spent more then twenty hours on party activities in the 
average month ([bid, p. 88). However the Labour and the Liberal Democrat party 
activists did much better during the last general election campaign in 1997. 
Table 7.5 shows that both Labour and Liberal Democrats activists were involved in 
various sorts of campaign activities. Some of them were highly active. Over three- 
quarters of both party's activists displayed an election poster and around 70 percent 
donated money to their party. But when it comes to the more costly, in terms of time, 
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activities the rate falls to one-quarter or lower. For example a fifth of activists from 
both parties drove voters to the polling station. 
Table: 7.6 How active they were during the 1997 election campaign? 
`Again, thinking about the 1997 General Election, did you: 
Activit 
Not at all once or more 
Labour Lib Dem Labour Lib I)em 
Telephone canvass voters 90 94 10 6 
Canvass voters door-to-door 76 76 24 24 
Help with a fund-raising event 80 74 20 26 
Deliver party leaflets 52 46 48 54 
Attend a party rally 78 78 22 22 
Helped organise a street stall 91 96 9 4 
Help with party mailings 79 75 21 25 
Help with telephone fund-raising 98 98 2 
Source: Same as above 
Table: 7.6 shows that 10 percent of the Labours and 6 percent of Lib Deny activists 
telephone canvassed voters once or more. In the case of door-to-door canvassing the 
figure roses up to a quarter. Some 24 percent of activists from both parties canvassed 
voters by going door-to-door which is a very effective way of influencing people's 
political preferences, while 20 percent of Labour's and 26 percent of Lib Dem 
activists helped with a fund -raising event. More then 
half (52 %) of Lib. Dem and 
48 percent of the Labour activists delivered party leaflets while 22 percent of both 
party activists attended a party rally. Another (2l percent Labour and 25 per cent Lib. 
Dem) of them helped with party mailings. There are activities that attracted very low- 
level of attendance. Nine (9 %) percent of Labour and 4 percent of Lib Dem activists 
helped with party mail shots. 
It seems that except for `delivering party leaflets' three quarters of party activists from 
both parties stayed inactive, while 25 percent of them were active. Nevertheless this 
25 percent comprises thousands of party activists who, as shown in both Tables, are 
highly active. For this reason as Whiteley and Seyd (1999) argued they had a very 
considerable impact on Labour's landslide election victory in the 1997 general 
elections. Nevertheless, which as in the British context they seem very active 
compared to the VP's activists they lagged far behind. 
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In America most parties are not bureaucratic or hierarchically run organisations. 
Their leaders and activists are part time volunteers; there is no permanent 
headquarters or paid staff. Unlike the VP's activists in Turkey their activity is not a 
year round phenomenon, but rather cyclical, and concentrated around the campaign 
season. However, contrary to the common belief that parties have been declining or 
may even be dead, case studies of local parties proved otherwise. `A case study of 
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio, showed that pericient leaders were at least as 
active in 1981 in attending meetings, registering voters, distributing literature, and 
getting out the vote as they had been in the mid-1970s. Similarly in Middlesex 
County, New Jersey, two thirds of the district leaders reported that they worked at 
least six hours a week for the party during campaigns and over 40 percent indicated 
that they often engaged in voter registration, telephone canvassing, and door-to-door 
canvassing. ' (Bibby, 1987, pp. 104-105). 
While these figures are higher than conventional wisdom would suggest (Seyd and 
Whiteley, 1992, p. 90) they are not as impressive as the level of political activism 
carried out by the VP's grassroots activists. If we compare the amount of party 
activity carried out by party activists in Britain, America and Turkey it is clear that the 
VP's activists in Turkey are far more active than the British and American party 
activists. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to examine the affects of grassroots activism on electoral 
outcome. The first half of this chapter is devoted to the theoretical arguments. It was 
argued that there is not a unified approach but instead two distinct competing 
approaches. According to the proponents of the `counter' argument political parties 
have lost their historical role as the means of electoral canvassing. Many explained 
the decline of party organisation as the result of technological television - candidate 
centred campaigns built on the polls and run by the media and public relations experts 
(see Crotty and Jacobson, 1980, p. 65). Others like Huckshorn (1984, p. 130) argued 
that this change came not only from technological changes but also socio-political 
changes since the Second World War. It was argued that instead of large membership 
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parties the parties have fewer members, even in many cases without a membership 
organisation at all. For them politics is evolving from `party centred' to `candidate 
centred' politics. So in this new era the candidate is expected to perform whatever the 
local party organisations have been doing. However many political scientists have 
challenged this approach. They argue that contrary to the counter argument party 
organisations have continued to be very influential on the parties' electoral fortunes. 
(See Crotty, 1971; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992). In line with the theoretical 
explanations there is substantial empirical evidence supporting the claims of the 
continuing effectiveness of party organisations. For example Whiteley and Seyd 
(1998) discovered that Labour's landslide election victory in the last general election 
(1997) was in fact the work of Labour's renewed energetic militant grassroots 
activists. 
Also I have reviewed other case studies from Canada (see Clarke, H et al 2000) and 
the United States (see Crotty, 1971; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992). In addition to 
these studies from different Western countries my own observations have led me to 
think that there is a strong correlation between a party's electoral fortunes and its 
grassroots activism. As discussed already, having a large membership organisation 
would only contribute to the strength of that party not the other way around. The 
arguments like the high cost of maintaining larger membership organisations are 
unconvincing. 
Wherever it is fought and whatever technologies are available every election 
campaign needs manpower to canvass door-to-door, deliver party leaflets, post the 
party mail, attend party rallies, telephone canvass voters, drive voters to polling 
station and the like. Every party needs party activists to go door-to-door canvassing, 
recruit new members, and listen to people and report back, to spread the party's 
message, policies and ideology. All this requires active members ready to spend long 
hours and energy for party causes. 308 
308 As the latest (2000) closely fought Presidential election in America showed however developed a 
country is and whatever sophisticated campaigning technology is available without the active members 
who are actively and devotedly putting their effort the election will not be won. 
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The influence of local party organisations is especially enhanced under certain 
conditions: declining partisan attachments, declining party loyalties, and increased 
electoral swings. In other words, if there are many people leaving their parties for one 
reason or another, they will chose other parties. In this case a party with a large 
grassroots organisation will be in a better position to persuade new voters through 
face-to-face encounters. We know that those who are personally contacted are 
inclined to be more active and change their party preferences (See chapter 5). 
Returning to the central issue of the effects of the VP's grassroots activists on the 
party's electoral outcomes, I shall start with levels of activity. Turkish activists tend 
to be more active than British and American activists. Although there are differences 
of technique it is possible to gauge the frequency, duration and effectiveness of 
political activism. Compared to the British and American activists my informants 
contact potential voters more frequently and they spend much longer hours in an 
ordinary month on political activities. Obviously the type of campaign activities 
differ between Turkey, Britain and America as this is to be expected, but British and 
American activists are far less effective or essential for vote canvassing. For 
canvassing method and strategy the VP's activists choose more intimate, less formal 
ways of meeting with people from their constituencies. For example rather then 
distributing leaflets they organise house meetings and instead of telephone canvassing 
they prefer face-to-face meetings. 
Why are the VP's activists more active? In chapter 5,1 examined the most important 
reasons for an activist to become a member of the VP. It was observed that 62 
percent of them gave religious and ideological reasons. These findings suggested that 
the majority of them are ideologically radical. For many it is actually a way of 
serving their ideological goals, and for others it serves to their Islamic cause. So this 
conviction makes them more active than ordinary members or other party activists. In 
addition to religious and ideological reasons I have also identified other 
socioeconomic and demographic predictors of political participation such as family 
orientation, regional differences, education, and residential characteristics. The 
incentives for becoming members also drive them to become activists. Again it is a 
well-known fact that those with strong ideological convictions tend to participate 
more in various forms of politics and political activism is one of them. 
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It is already established that they are very active but is this enough to boost the party's 
electoral fortunes? The answer is no, not by itself. What is also important is what 
they do and how they do it in their respective constituencies. It has been argued that 
the VP's activists combine different methods, techniques, strategy and tactics to will 
people's hearts, minds and then their votes. Actually this order is very important. As 
some of my informants asserted they are among the people. They are not like other 
parties that knock on people's doors once every four or five years, but are always with 
the people. Their activism is a year-round activity rather than merely during the 
election periods. They visit households on many social occasions; offer help in times 
of crisis show solidarity, compassion and sympathy. 
The provision of material benefits; food, coal, clothing, bursaries for school children, 
health care and medical aid, assisting people to find jobs, or solve problems in the 
government offices, is the primary activity (37 per cent) among the VP's 
neighbourhood committees. 
The gecekondus are the poorest sections of the urban areas where high rates 
of unemployment, poverty, high birth rate and infant mortality, and high rate of petty 
crime, combined with low levels of education and income, bad housing conditions, 
poor provision of basic public services - health care, school, roads, electricity and tap 
etc., are common characteristics. In those areas those lucky enough to find 
employment mostly work for very low wages covering only a third of the minimum 
food cost of a family of four in a month. 309 Hence the methods and means of party 
3cx9 According to a recent Turk Is economic report the minimum wage covers one third of the minimum 
food expenses of a family of four. In this report it was calculated that for a family of four the poverty 
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activism are a reflection of the socioeconomic conditions of the electorate. I do not 
think that the choice of charity work is contrived by the VP's local organisations but 
has developed out of necessity. 
It appears that social work and political activism go hand in hand. The VP's 
grassroots activists effectively combine social work and political activism. They are 
well balanced and complete each other. Due to their community work they are viewed 
as compassionate really caring about the problems of the community. Activists visit 
government offices, solve bureaucratic problems and improve services through the 
municipality and other agencies. On the other hand because of social work and caring 
image the WP/VP has been elevated to the level of the messiah; `a messiah in the 
making'. If the VP's representative were a real professional social worker he might 
have done a lot better for the welfare of the poor and needy, but he would not be the 
same person who would possess, via elections, the governmental power able to create 
a `better society and a better future'. After all a social worker is a social worker but a 
VP activist is a social worker as well as someone who can change everything through 
political means. So he is in fact up to a point `a -would be Messiah in the making. 
Finally it can be argued that one of the most unique characteristics of the WP/VP's 
party organisation is that it combines both the `modern' and `traditional'. In very few 
areas is the mixture of modern and traditional so effectively used to create such a 
positive and effective outcome? 
line is 668 in TL (f417.50) and minimum food expense for family of four is 228 m TL (£142.50) but 
the current minimum wage is 78 in TL (See ntvmsnbc. com. News room 28 and 30 th May 2001). The 





NEOLIBERALISM, GROWTH OF GECEKONDUS 
AND THE WP/VP AS THE `CHAMPION' OF 
EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 
8.1 Islamic Fundamentalism: A Misplaced Categorisation 
The unprecedented rise of the Welfare Party in the local elections (March 1994) 
created an atmosphere of shock and fear across the political spectrum from 
conservative, neo-liberalist circles on the right to the extreme radical end of the left 
the Maoist and Stalinist groups, from the poor working girls of the textile factories, to 
the most prominent ladies of Turkish high society it caused a shock and anxiety that 
would only be caused by an avalanche or a landslide" 310... In that election the WP 
won astonishing numbers of municipalities including the largest metropolitans 
Istanbul and Ankara. 
The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented rise in 
religious fundamentalism. Fundamentalist movements have been on the rise in all 
faiths of the world (Jurgensmeyer, 1993, pp. 11-18; Kepel, 1994, pp. 6-7). Among 
them Islamic fundamentalism has been given a very special place (Halliday, 1996). 
For many, Islamic revivalism poses a multiple threat; from political to military; 
cultural to demographic and because of the oil reserves concentrated in the Middle 
East an economic threat as well. For some conservative, rightwing writers like 
Huntington (1994) and Lewis (1990) Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to Western 
310 Ladner, 1994, pp. 3-4 goutcd in Tosun, 1999, p. 186; See also Heper and Demirer, 1996, pp. 109- 
123. 
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interests and civilisation. It is the Green Menace that has replaced the Red Menace of 
the Soviet Russia (See Esposito, 1995, p. 5). For some other writers, these 
fundamentalist movements are anti-modernist living in a bygone age and wanting to 
turn the clock back to 700 AD the time of the Prophet Muhammed. According to 
postmodernist students of political Islam, Islamist movements are the product of post- 
modern conditions (Akbar, 1992 And Gulalp, 1995). 
However many of these approaches and studies have misinterpreted the reactions that 
these movements demonstrate and totally neglect their preconditions by focusing 
entirely on an `imagined threat' from these movements. In other words the majority of 
writers and the western media have been portraying these movements as `extremist', 
`terrorist', "intolerant, " or `irrational' without paying any attention to the sociological 
realities and conditions in which they emerged. Mostly readers are informed again 
and again about how they are religious zealots, intolerant villains, Islamic 
fundamentalists, without having a glimpse of the conditions that bred these 
movements or what their aims and ideologies are. As Halliday (1996) and Esposito 
(1995) point out they are often not a threat to anyone or to western civilisation and the 
western way of life, nor are they made up of extremist, intolerant zealots, but are a 
reaction to their own governments, which are often antidemocratic, corrupt and 
incompetent. They are also a reaction against the foreign domination and influence 
that the Muslim societies have been subjected for a long time (Halliday, 1995a, p. 48; 
see also Demirer, 1998, pp. 66-69). 
I am not suggesting that the rise of political Islam is entirely independent from the 
trend of religious revivalism across the Muslim world. It is not, but in connection with 
the unprecedented rise of the political Islam in Turkey the effect of religious 
revivalism is much smaller compared to the effects of grassroots activism on the 
WP/VP's electoral success. 
There are scholars of Islamic movements who disagree with mainstream western 
approaches and suggest that the Islamic movements are not simply engaging in re - 
Islamization or restoring religious fundamentalism. Rather they are rising in the 
context of economic and social crisis; unemployment, poor income dispersal among 
the lower and middle lower classes, the growing gap between poor and rich; rapid 
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urbanisation, and inadequate government services. In addition, these countries are 
notorious for their oppressive, corrupt, anti - democratic nature and bad human right 
records. (See Caplan, 1987, p. 5; Halliday, 1995a, p. 49; Keddie, 1981, pp. 244 - 245; 
Bulliet 1993, p. 39; Salt 1995, p. 24; Roy, 1994, p. 4, and 48 - 53). 
At the beginning of this study it was said that the majority of the Turkish elites have 
failed to correctly identify the underlying causes of the rise of political Islam. Instead 
they labelled political Islam as Islamic fundamentalism and concentrated on its 
supposedly "extremist", "irrational", "intolerant", "anti modern", "anti secular", "anti 
Kemalist", or "anti positivist" characteristics. It can be argued that the majority of the 
Turkish elite, of all political persuasions; Kemalists, secularists, radicals, socialists, 
liberals and even the conservatives have miss conceptualised and misdiagnosed the 
rise of political Islam as purely Islamic revivalism. 
In Turkey the discourse of political Islam has revolved around the axis of laicism- 
anti-laicism (secularism- anti-secularism), modernism-anti modernism, positivism 
versus idealism that found its roots in Enlightenment philosophy and the French 
revolution. 
The foundations of the Turkish secularists' arguments come mainly from Kenialist 
ideology and its positivist philosophy limited to a few basic principles like the 
dismissal of the existence of God and holding religion responsible or blaming Islam 
for the underdevelopment of Turkish society and economy. It sees a simple 
continuation of the historical contention between progressivism and traditionalism. In 
like manner, Turkish leftists and Socialists writers take the same line and are far from 
contributing a new dimension into this old discourse. 3' 
As stated before the rise of the WP created enormous anxiety, disbelief and dismay 
among the secularist elite and led to political tension in the country. Some argued the 
rise of the WP posed an immediate threat to the century old modernisation project, the 
fundamentals of modern Turkey: modernisation, Westernisation, secularisation and 
the modern way of life. As in the West, so in Turkey the rise of the Islamic 
311 Akqam, 1994, pp. 7-8. 
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movement has been seen as anti-modern, irrational, extremist, and a threat to the 
Kemalist republic. For instance according to Ilhan Selcuk, one of the most prominent 
Kemal Ist writers of the centre-left daily Cumhuriyet (republic), Islamic 
Fundamentalists are the biggest threat to Ataturk's laik (secularist) republic, Kemalist 
modern revolution, and Ataturk's principles; democracy, nationalism and the 
Enlightenment of Turkish society, rights of Turkish women, progress of science and a 
progressive education system (see Cumhuriyet, 20 January l996). 312 Another 
Cumhuriyet writer Hikmet cetinkaya (1996, p. 47) points out that fundamentalism has 
been rising in all Middle Eastern countries. As in Egypt, Algeria and many other 
countries the Islamic extremists' organisations have been gaining speed. But there is 
an effort, he says, to cover this development and our ex-socialist traitors are 
collaborating with Islamic fundamentalists to take Turkey into the dark ages. He 
argued that there are some liberal intellectuals who see the WP as moderate Islam but 
they are being deceived. 
Similarly, Sara Gul Turan, in her book Köktenrefah (Fundi-Welfare), complains to 
Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, that reactionary conservatism and Islamic 
fundamentalism has been rising in the country not step by step but in a fast marching 
tempo. She adds that Turkey has been drawn into the quagmire of religious 
reactionarism by right wing governments. (1996, p. 17) Some argued that once the 
WP comes to power it would not relinquish it. 
Server Tanilli (1996) a prominent intellectual of the left views the ascension of the 
WP in the context of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism occurring in many other 
Muslim countries. For him some of these movements are refusing to compromise on 
their principles to live in peace with the secular republican regime. So, lie says, the 
time has come for an ideological battle to save not only the institutions of the 
secularist republic but also all of the values of the 150-year-old Turkish 
Enlightenment movement, because they are under threat from Islamic movements. 
(1996, p. 9). For Tanilli there is no democracy in Islam and wherever Islamic 
fundamentalism thrives freedom, democracy and pluralism have suffered (ibid, p. 
312 Also see his two other articles on Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey: Selcuk, i (20 July 1996) Daily 
Cumhuriyet; "Siya/wi da Sivaht Var"(There is black of black); (6 August 1996), "Mlirieci He 
Miisliiman" (Fundamentalist and Muslim). 
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212). In his book Tanilli takes an eclectic Marxist and Kemalist approach toward 
religions in general and Islam specifically. One may agree with some of his critique of 
religion in general but it seems Tanilli makes no effort to identify the sociological 
basis of the rising popularity of political Islam in Turkey and elsewhere. It seems that 
Tanilli explains the rise of Islamic movements in many Muslim countries including 
Turkey almost as a matter of conspiracy plotted by the USA during the Cold War era 
with the local collaborators chiefly Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other governments to 
prevent the Enlightenment/ awakening and progress of the people of these countries, 
crush the leftist movements and keep the USSR out of the Middle East. However, he 
seems to forget that although external factors are important, in reality very rarely are 
they the defining factors of a social phenomenon. 
He argues that "Actually, the one and only thing that this [Islamic] ideology and its 
followers have been doing is to resist progress and try to turn the clock back, to take 
the society backward. " (Ibid: 173). Regarding the situation in Turkey, he points out 
that the real agenda of political Islam is not the freedom of belief or religious 
practices, which in the first place must be kept in the individual/private sphere. Their 
real aim is to destroy the democratic and secular republic, civil code, and other 
reforms; chiefly women's rights and other gains of the 150 year old movement of the 
Enlightenment. (Ibid: 181). It must be said that this is a point universally shared by 
leftists, socialists, liberals and radical secularist intellectuals in Turkey. Tanilli's point 
of view is very important because as an established academic and thinker of the left, a 
Marxist with a heavy Kenialist influence he reflects quite clearly 
both the Marxists' 
and Kemalists' standpoint in relation to the rise of political 
Islam in Turkey 
For many other radical secularist 
intellectuals the rise of the WP in the 1990s 
represented nothing but the threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism. For them the biggest 
threat to the republican regime cones 
from Islamic fundamentalism. One of the most 
common causes of the rise of political 
Islam, for this group, is the promiscuous 
policies of consecutive right wing governments toward Islam since the 1950s. lt 
argued that these governments 
have been nurturing, protecting even encouraging 
Islamic ideology for electoral purposes and political manipulation. For them in a true 
secular state religion must be separated 
from the state and this has not been the case in 
Turkey. They usually argued that 
the last fifty years right wing parties have 
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dominated the Turkish polity and they all compromised the principle of secularism for 
the sake of votes (See cetinkaya, 1996, pp. 91-92; Ek§i, 1995, p. 15; Tualp, 1994, p. 
23). It is true that right wing governments especially after the 1960s gave some 
concessions to the Islamists' demands like opening Imam-Hatip (religious) schools, 
Koran courses but it can be interpreted as the reason rather than as a result of an 
ongoing process. 
Traditionally, Turkish `progressive' intellectuals comprise a wide range of radical 
secularists, liberals, various socialists' tendencies, and radicals have regarded religion 
merely as a relic of the past. By doing so they underestimated the historical, cultural, 
political and social importance of Islam as one of the key elements of society in 
Turkey. Maybe this dismissive attitude prevalent among the Turkish elite has been 
due to the militant secularism of the state itself since the 1920s. As is well known the 
principle of secularism has always been the most sacred principle of republican 
Turkey. It has been given the status of the foundation stone of the republic and has 
been protected by a special decree in all constitutions. 
At this juncture it is important to recall that the Turkish modernist approach or radical 
secularist approach toward political Islam has been shared by most sections of the 
ruling classes: influential military and bureaucratic elites and upper classes ofTurkey. 
It appears that Turkish modernist interpretations share the same wisdom with the 
Western modernist approaches of political Islam. Both approaches have been unable 
to correctly diagnose the nature of political Islam, or to grasp the underlying causes 
behind its increasing popularity. The first problem they face is their lack of 
understanding of the modern character of political Islam. Secondly they fail to see the 
causes of discontent of the masses with the present establishment. In other words they 
defend the values of modernity, secularism, and the principles of Ataturk's revolution 
but fail to discuss the particular socioeconomic and political preconditions of the rise 
of political Islam (Delibaý, 1996, p. 27). 
Another common characteristic in their writing is a visible, blunt sense of fear, 
anxiety and shock due to the unprecedented success of the WP in the local elections 
of 1994 and a year later in the general elections of 1995. Again instead of critical 
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analysis of the conditions in which this widespread disillusionment of large sections 
of the society with the current political parties of centre-right and centre-left the 
discourses have concentrated on distrust, fear and a confrontation between modernist 
secularism and Islamic fundamentalism. 
According to Metin Heper "The radical secularists in Turkey view as "irrational" 
virtually any kind of preoccupation with Islam. They perceive Islam as the antonym 
of enlightenment, and have adopted a hostile attitude towards it. ... 
Not only have the 
radical secularists in Turkey failed to realise the significance of Islam for the people- 
inter alia, as a source of belief, ethics, identity and/or consolation- but they have also 
exaggerated the Islamist threat to the Turkish secular democratic state. " (1997, p. 42). 
As highlighted above the radical secularists tend to see the relationship between the 
masses and religion as merely a hobby. 313 Therefore any kind of preoccupation with 
Islam seems to be irrational. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this process is that 
the rise of the WP in the mid 1990s has been seen as an exaggerated Islamic threat to 
the secular republic. As this view has been prevalent among radical secularists, the 
bureaucratic and military elite and other elements of the ruling classes, it has caused 
one of the deepest political crises of recent history in Turkey. Due to a largely 
unfounded fear of Islamic fundamentalism the secularist elite reacted fiercely to the 
Islamist led coalition government and this confrontation caused a serious political 
crisis that ended with the 28 February process: a postmodern coup. 
The majority of Turkish elites as the only organised representative of political Islam 
in Turkey has equated the Welfare/Virtue Party with religious fundamentalism. It can 
be argued that the categorisation of political Islam as fundamentalism has been a 
misplaced conceptualisation and it shows how the Turkish elite makes sense of 
political Islam. 
The concept of fundamentalism does not explain much about the movements itself' but 
demeans them as fanatics, extremists or reactionaries. As Frank Furedi (1995: 18-19) 
points out that: 
313 Qakir, 1994, p. 108. 
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The uncritical acceptance of the term fundamentalism by conservative, liberal 
and radical commentators is symptomatic of the way in which a `them' and 
`us' outlook on the world has become intellectually plausible. At its most 
banal, this outlook proposes that they are irrational while we are rational or 
that they are intolerant while we are permissive. The fundamentalist label 
provides a moral and cultural condemnation of millions of people... At its 
simplest, the fundamentalist label helps to recycle the old Orientalist 
stereotypes about fanatical, frustrated people. 
First of all the usage of the concept of fundamentalism has been highly contentious. 
These scholars such as Bruce Lawrence, Henry Munson, Leonard Binder, and 
Bernard Lewis have used `fundamentalism' as a key descriptive concept however, as 
Campo (1995) argued these scholars are not in agreement about the term 
"fundamentalism". Moreover, those who have been using the term fundamentalism, 
and applying it to `Islamic fundamentalist' movements, have so far been unable to 
produce a satisfactory answer to the major criticism about using a term that originated 
from the 1920s American Protestant fundamentalist movement. 314 
8.1.1 What purpose does labelling serve? 
Labelling political Islam, one of the main political movements in the country, as 
Islamic fundamentalism or as the threat of Sharia acutely has taken away any 
`legitimacy' that these movements may have and put them under the spotlight. 
Labelling such an important political opposition confuses the people, creates 
unjustified suspicion and tension in the society. 
At best it distracts people' attention from the real social economic and political issues. 
In other words the whole issue of the `threat of Islamist fundamentalism' has hijacked 
real politics in Turkey. It has been artificially dominating the political agenda by 
pushing away fundamental problems such as the high inflation, high unemployment 
rate, increasing inequalities, deepened poverty, lack of provision of the basic services 
and elusive democratisation and like. 
314 See Munson, 1995, p. 152; Eduardo J. Campo, 1995, p. 169. 
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It seems that labelling such movements as Islamic fundamentalist, communist, 
nationalist, separatist or extremist makes it easier for the authorities to deal with them. 
Labelling strips them of their socioeconomic or political bases and reduces them to 
almost a security matter, and its followers to suspects, criminals or convicts. Usually, 
by demonising a movement the authorities acquire legitimacy to use force against 
them. The Islamic fundamentalism threat of the 1990s mirrors the 1970s 
preoccupation with the Communist threat when the left was perceived as the major 
threat to the country's security and leftist groups demeaned. Ironically, at that time the 
Islamists played the same card, attacking the left as a red menace without realising 
that one day they would be seen as the green peril. 
Despite the fact that there is a general disagreement about the categorisation of 
political Islam as fundamentalism it has often been regarded as a major threat to the 
West and stability in the Middle East (Esposito, 1995, p. 4). Also there are writers 
mainly in the West who have equated political Islam with "terrorism", "extremism", 
"irrationalism", "intolerance" and so forth. 315 The long-term consequences of this 
uncritical acceptance of the term fundamentalism by western intellectuals has caused 
an unjustified, harsh treatment of anything to do with Islam whether political, social, 
cultural or religious in the West as well as in Muslim countries. Frank Furedi has 
argued that in the long-term there would be more and more authoritarian measures 
being introduced to deal with this new plague of Islam, as the West sees it, and this 
will have repercussions both in the West and outside. It is very likely that Western 
governments will demand Muslim governments keep a close eye on the `imaginary 
Muslim enemy' and make sure it is kept at bay (Furedi, 1996, p. 13). It seems that 
there has been a stigma attached to Islam and it has led to complications in the West 
and outside. There is no doubt that there are Islamist groups and movements involved 
in radical, extremist politics, terrorist activities- like al-Qaida or Hizbullah and other 
extremist Islamist groups in Turkey and elsewhere-exhibiting irrational attitudes and 
intolerant behaviour e. g. the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, however, it must be 
questioned whether or not those separate groups and activities justify such 
generalisations about all movements with an Islamic tone. 
315 See Huntington, 1995, pp. 22-49; 
Lewis, 1990, pp. 47-60; Miller, 1993, pp. 43-56. 
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For some like Esposito (1995) and Furedi (1996, p. 12) they are, often, neither a threat 
to western civilisation, nor extremist, or they are intolerant zealots who are reacting to 
their own governments that are often antidemocratic, corrupt and incompetent. For 
others like Roy (1994) these movements can be seen as Third World Movements 
rising against foreign domination in their countries. There is little doubt that these 
movements are a symptom of the modern world. Contrary to common wisdom the 
militants are rarely mullahs; they are young products of the modern educational 
system, and university educated. They are often raised in recently migrated families or 
impoverished middle classes from the fringes of the big cities. Islamist intellectuals 
gave a new dimension to Islam. It is now an ideology as well as a religion. The 
Islamist intellectuals were influenced heavily by the militant Marxists in the 
universities and often borrowed concepts from them. They do not seek to return to 
what existed before but want to reappropriate society and modern technology based 
on politics (Roy, p. 3). 
It can be suggested that there is not one Islam but several Islams. In a general sense 
the Muslim world is divided into three geographic and cultural spheres: the Sunni 
Arab Middle East, the Sunni Indian subcontinent, and Irano-Arab Shiism. Turkey is 
totally different from the Arab world and has its own organisations. These groups are 
different from each other geographically and politically. Therefore it is not plausible 
to talk about an Islamic union (Roy, 1994, p. 2). The great diversity of Islamic parties 
and movements is another factor that dismisses the myth of a unified Islamic 
fundamentalism. As Karabell (1996, pp 78-79) argued, from Harnas Palestine; 
Hizballah in Lebanon; the Refah (Welfare) party in Turkey; the armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) in Algeria; the Jemaat-i - Islam in Pakistan all of these Islamic groups are very 
different in many dimensions from each other. Therefore it is not realistic to 
conjecture about a unified, universal, aggressive Islamist fundamentalist threat neither 
to the West nor in those Muslim countries where political Islam is visible. 
The above discussion shows that despite the widespread suspicion, anxiety, and the 
perception of an exaggerated Islamic fundamentalist threat such groups arc not in a 
position to pose much danger to the West and its institutions. Nor necessarily should 
their rise be interpreted in that way. In general they are developing as a reaction to 
their own governments out of long-term dissatisfaction, corruption and the 
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inadequacy of government policies in preventing poverty, unemployment and to raise 
the living standards as well as against foreign domination. 
Esposito (1995, p. 5) argued that unfortunately, American policymakers 
have too often 
proven to be myopic, seeing the Muslim world and Islamic movements as a monolith 
and viewing them only in terms of extremism and terrorism. 
For him (1995, p. 77) 
`the term "Muslim fundamentalist" has become a convenient but misleading way for 
the Western media and Western governments to identify wide-ranging Islamist groups 
in Muslim countries as well as a ready "bogey" for Muslim regimes wishing to 
degrade and demean their opposition'. The same observation is true in the case of the 
Turkish policymakers, the elite, and the media who view political 
Islam as nothing 
but religious fundamentalism seeing it solely in terms of religious extremism or as a 
threat to modernity, secularism and democracy. 
It can be argued that the fundamentalism categorisation in this case appears to be 
misplaced. Although the rise of the WP/VP has overwhelmingly been viewed as the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, neither the WP/VP's leading cadres or the majority of 
its voters seems to be religious extremists or fundamentalists. Contrary to the many 
Islamic movements in the Muslim world the leaders of the Turkish Islamic parties 
Erbakan and his close associates are not clergymen but have professional or business 
backgrounds. (Heper, 1997, p. 35). Erbakan is not an Islamic thinker; he is a professor 
of engineering graduated from a German university. Furthermore, in contrast to some 
other Islamic movements the tradition of NOP-NSP-WP/VP has not been able to 
produce original Islamic thinkers like Jamal al Din al -Afghani, Mawdudi, Qutb, All 
Shariati, or Ayatollah Khomeini. 316 
N. Göle (1997, p. 53) developed an explanation for the Turkish Islamic movements by 
suggesting "Islamic movements are not solely a reaction to a given situation of class 
and cultural domination, but also present a counter-cultural model of modernity, and a 
new paradigm for self-definition that has led to the formation of Islamic counter- 
elites". (1997, p. 53). For We "Islamism, both in its ideological formations and 
sociological practices, has created new hybridizations between tradition and 
3 16 ll: akir, 1994, pp. 126-127. 
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modernity, religion and secularism, community and religion. " (ibid: 54). She argued 
that these new agents of change represented the move of Islam from the periphery of 
the system to its centre, and yet were themselves a product of that centre, of its 
educational institutions and its urban life. " (Ibid: 54). What this hybridisation process 
tells us is that the identification of the leaders of the WP/VP (Erbakan and his 
associates) as Islamist fundamentalists is not an accurate one. They are not truly 
modernist elites either. That is why they would easily be charged with having an 
ambivalent attitude toward important issues: Islamist ideology, democracy, secularism 
etc. For instance the Islamists' attitude toward democracy has been one of the hottest 
discussed topic. 
It has been observed, by several authors, that the WP's views toward democracy have 
been ambivalent. 3t7 The WP called the present Turkish system a "fraud", a "guided 
democracy", and a "dark-room regime" and announced the WP's intention for a "real 
democracy" (Özbudun, 2000, p. 87). So far, the intention of a "real democracy" 
remains elusive therefore one cannot decide on this issue. However, in the past the 
WP/VP has failed to show a strong democratic instinct. 318 But then the credentials of 
the Turkish democracy in general and other parties' democratic instincts have not 
been well developed either. 
In terms of party activists even though they seem to be more radical than ordinary 
WP/VP voters, the difference seems slight. 319 The ideological attitudes of the local 
or `middle elites' as they have been called by some students of politics, or as I have 
preferred to call them throughout this thesis, the grassroots activists, have been 
important to bring into account. It was noted, in Chapter 5, that compared to the 
WP/VP's voters grassroots activists seem to be a little bit more religiously (40 %) and 
ideologically (21 %) motivated than the voters. Some 40 per cent of them were 
motivated by religious reasons, while 21 per cent of them joined the party for 
ideological reasons. In their outlook although they want Islam to be given some sort 
of say/place in everyday life in the public sphere the majority of them wanted 
separation of state and religion. Very few opposed the idea of secularism altogether. 
317 See Özbudun, 2000, p. 87; (; aktr, 1994, pp. 127-130; Heper, 1997, p. 35. 
318 See Cakir, 1994, p. 129; Özbudun, 2000, pp. 87-88). 
319 This point has been discussed extensively in Chapter, 5. 
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Equally, however, the overwhelming majority of them wanted a Western style, 
Anglo-Saxon model rather than the French model of secularisation. 
It has been argued that behind its radical rhetoric, the WP often shows signs of 
pragmatism and flexibility. 320 This pragmatism and flexibility is reflected in its 
electoral bases as well. The general characteristics of a political party cannot be 
separated from its social bases. In terms of `political Islam and support for the WP a 
recent survey showed that the WP combines religious and class appeals. A survey in 
December 1996 revealed that 60.6 % of WP voters favoured including some Islamic 
principles in the constitution. However, when the voters were asked why they voted 
for the WP only half gave ideological reasons, like the WP's defence of religious 
values (20.9 %), its promise of a "just order" (13.4 %), and its respect for "national 
and moral values" (12.5 %). Some 29.6 percent of them voted for the WP because 
they believed it were an honest and reliable party. What these findings show is that 
there is a strong religious appeal and between one-third and one-half of the WP's 
voters have been voting for non-ideological reasons' (Özbudun, pp. 89-90). The fact 
that half of the WP voters vote for the WP not for ideological/religious reasons is a 
very important indicator that the WP/VP cannot be defined solely in religious terms. 
Other surveys indicate far less religiously motivated voting among the WP's voters. 
For example, according to a 1994 survey only one-third of the WP's voters voted for 
the party because it was an Islamic party (Heper, 1997, p. 35). What is common in 
those survey findings is that the WP/VP's social and electoral supporters are far from 
being religious extremists or radicals. 
Why then did the 1994 and 1995 election results cause such a reaction among the 
Turkish elites? And why has the WP/VP continued to be seen as an Islamic 
fundamentalist party rather than a pragmatist mass party? How can this overstated 
reaction of the Turkish elites that led to the 28 February process be justified? It seems 
this situation can be explained in terns of two different but related dimensions. 
The first dimension is the mystified notion of secularisation that has been embedded 
deep into the public consciousness; the political and popular culture while the second 
320 Özbudun, 2000, p. 89. 
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is the very special and central role of secularisation in Turkish politics since the early 
1920s. Both dimensions are extremely important to define how Turkish elites make 
sense of the threat of fundamentalism. 
The perception of political Islam's ascendancy as a threat to secularism, modernity 
and democracy is closely associated with how the concept of secularism was defined 
in the first place. The definition and implementation of secularisation was an 
ambivalent process profoundly underscored in the popular culture and official 
ideology. This ill-defined concept of secularism has led in time to some mystification. 
The application of this concept into politics has proved problematic as can be seen in 
Turkish politics throughout the 1990s. 
Turkey's current political crisis has shown how a social myth could continue to 
distract from the development of a healthy, stable democracy. The latest 
confrontation between the secularists and Islamists began with the 1994 local 
elections. In these elections the Welfare Party gained an unprecedented result by 
winning the majority of the municipalities including Istanbul and Ankara. This trend 
continued in the general election of the 24`x' December 1995. The pro Islamist WP 
emerged from these elections as the largest group in the parliament achieving 158 
seats out of 550. 
In many ways the process of 28 February sets the best example for the mystification 
of a concept and its long-term consequences upon political life. First of all, it has 
created an illusion among the influential military and bureaucratic elites, 
intelligentsia, and the secularised and modernised strata, of a `purely and completely 
secularised' society, which never existed. Once political Islam, i. e. the WP/VP, 
became visible in politics that illusion seemed shattered. It appeared this purely 
secularised modern society came under attack from the rise of political Islam. 
As the rural masses moved, a consequence of the restructuring policies, to the cities 
in their hundreds of thousands every year seizing the opportunity for political 
participation with the WP, the dogma of secularism was challenged by politically 
emancipated masses. However moderate this challenge there has been a very serious 
counter attack to destroy its social and political foundations. Immediately after the 
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elections in 1995 the country was shaken by the growing electoral support for the pro- 
Islamist WP. The principle of secularisation a modern taboo was seen to be 
threatened. The headlines read: " Shariat is coming"; "seriat tehtidi" (threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism)"; " religious threat against the contemporary, modern and 
laik (secular) republic", " fundamentalism is the enemy of democracy and 
contemporary civilisation" and so on. 
Needless to say there have been very few issues in Turkish history that have united 
political and social organisations of all different political persuasions all parties of the 
centre-left and centre-right, various civil society organisations, military, trade unions, 
major universities, various pressure groups, women organisations, political 
commentators and columnists, all rallied around the issue of fighting the threat of 
Islamist extremism. 
The military, which views itself as the ultimate guarantor of the secular establishment, 
has stepped in to press the Islamist-led government to step down. The threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism reached a point where for the first time the military changed 
its security concept- the perception of risk- and put the internal threat before the 
external one. According to the daily Milliyet the military has changed its Concept of 
Defence by saying " We must be very careful the internal threat is now ahead of the 
external one. " 321 This was an historical turning point and the internal threat was, of 
course, the rise of political Islam (, s'eriat) namely the Welfare Party. 
After openly charging the WP as the biggest threat to the secular republic, the military 
via the National Security Council (NSC), increased its pressure to a point intolerable 
to the Islamist led government which soon decided to step down. However, the 
tension between the pro-Islamist WP and secularist elites did not stop there. Erbakan 
the leader of the WP was not just about to lose the government but his party too. The 
largest party in the Turkish parliament was closed down by the Supreme Court for its 
actions against the principles of the secular republic. 322 
321 Sec Milliyet, 30 th April 1997. 
322 Chris Morris, The Guardian, 16 January, 1998. 
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Although the Islamist party was not a newcomer to Turkish politics, the election 
successes of Refah triggered a flood of suspicion and paranoia among Turkey's 
secularist elites. Refah's narrow success with 21.3 percent of the vote created shock 
waves not just at home but abroad too. (Sayari, 1996, p. 35). The phobia of Islamic 
fundamentalism (Irtica. fbbisi) was set to dominate the daily reports. Some urged an 
immediate action against the seriatci yukselis (the rise of fundamentalism) while 
others urged the military to intervene to restore the principles of the secular republic. 
It can be claimed that all this anxiety confirms a deep confusion over the concept of 
secularisation used for so long without a proper understanding of it. Furthermore, it 
indicates a deep-rooted Islam phobia, among certain groups, fed by the media 
throughout the 1990s. 
It is argued that there have been four phobias that shaped official ideology throughout 
the Republican political history, namely, Islamism, Kurdish identity, leftist ideology 
and liberalism. They also constitute the biggest obstacle to the development of civil 
society (Gö1e, 1996, p. 20). Two of these ideologies: Islamism and Kurdish identity 
challenged the new regime in the first years of the Republic so the modernist secular 
elite has legitimate grounds for this fear. But, it can be argued that the response to the 
Islamist challenge was disproportionate. This suspicion about religion's position and 
potential in the political sphere meant that the process of secularisation automatically 
became an ideological issue and an instrument in the hands of modernist secularist 
elites. This point brings us to our second dimension the very special role of 
secularisation. 
8.1.2 A Very Politicised Notion of Secularism 
The second dimension is the overly politicised term of secularisation. It seems that 
very few commentators questioned the basic assumption of whether political Islam 
constitutes an immediate threat to the secular order or not the majority believed it. 
However, there are writers like Y. Demirer (1998) N. GÖle (2000) and E. Özdalga 
(1997) who question whether this widespread fear of Irtica (Islamist fundamentalism) 
was well founded or not. For instance, E. Özdalga (1997, P. 21) asks: "Does the fact 
that this political movement scored little more than one fifth of the votes in the last 
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elections (December 1995) constitute a threat to the very foundation of the secular 
republic? " The answer to this question she suggests is very much related to how the 
concept of secularism is defined. It is evident that it is the very definition of the 
concept of secularisation that really creates the problem. And brings the country to a 
standstill creating a political crisis that felled the elected Islamist government. It 
didn't stop there the parliament; political parties and elites lost their credibility. 
Özdalga (1997, p. 23) argued that the propaganda put forward by those groups 
seeking to curb the growing influence of Islamic groups, which claim the secular 
nature of the Turkish regime is being threatened, is untrue. Hence the characterisation 
of the present situation is based on false consciousness in the Marxist sense. She 
adds: 
A secular and relatively stable regime has been presented as if it were on the 
verge of collapse, due to, a heavy onslaught by radical Islamists. The actual 
state of things is hidden in order to legitimate the power ambitions of the Old 
Kemalist Guard, based as it is on an unholy alliance between the military, the 
leftists and such groups on the right that are too weak to make a successful 
political performance of their own. The effect of their scare mongering 
propaganda is disastrous. It sows mistrust and suspicion between different 
groups in society, and, operating like a self-fulfilling prophecy, impedes even 
further the chance for sound development of democratic practices. (Ibid: 23). 
One can agree with the first half of Özdalga's assessment about the stability and 
strength of the secular regime in Turkey and it is true that it was presented as if it 
were about to collapse due to the rise of the WP. It is also correct that such 
presentation or scare mongering has created mistrust, suspicion and social tension. 
However one cannot agree with the assumption that it has been played out in this way 
because of the power ambitions of the military and bureaucratic elite with the leftists. 
What I would argue instead is that more than their power ambitions it is the notion of 
mystified secularisation causing such reaction from the military and bureaucratic elite 
and other modernised secularised sections in society that led Turkey to the 28 
February process. 
Undoubtedly this kind of intervention in politics was a serious blow to the country's 
fragile democracy. It seems that democratic stability and civil initiative has once 
more gone down the drain. Since the 1995 general elections four consecutive 
governments have come into office and have lasted on average one year. The political 
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crisis is so deep that the process of 28 February (1997) has not been reversed. Turkish 
politics is still in turmoil and the early general election of 18 April 1999 produced 
more fragmentation and volatility. The biggest losers since this crisis began are 
democracy and the people of Turkey. It has come to a point where millions of people 
are forced to choose either the military coup or religious fundamentalism as if they 
were the only alternatives. The only real alternative to this political confrontation 
should have been democracy itself. 
It seems the paradox of putting secularisation before democracy continues to create 
social tension. Göle (1996, p. 19) argued that the modernist elite has always feared 
that if religious values were allowed to be represented freely in the public sphere it 
may some day become too influential in politics and threaten the principle of 
secularism. To prevent this happening the principle of secularism was upheld while 
the democratic representation was restricted. Thus state authoritarianism, "enlightened 
despotism", or single-party regimes often become the only choice for secular 
westernised elites. Her generalisation seems to reflect the relationship between the 
principle of secularism and democracy in Turkey until the 1950s. From then on single 
party rule ended and the country adopted a multi-party regime with parliamentary 
democracy but still the principle of secularism has priority over democracy. 
The (1995) election results showed that the WP was the largest party yet it only 
received less than one quarter of the votes. This means that the majority of the 
electorate does not support the WP's politics. The majority of its voters had does not 
vote for the WP/VP for Islamic reasons. 323 Also, the pro-Islamic parties have been 
part of the Turkish polity for the last three decades and so far there has been no 
compelling evidence that the radicals are the stronger faction of this movement. 
Individuals like $evki Yilmaz who are the strongest proponents of Sharia laws appear 
to remain marginal or have been expelled for various reasons while the majority of 
Islamists are in favour of the present constitutional order. 324 How, then, do we make 
sense of the expression of religion and religious values in the public arena? One could 
323 See for reasons of voting for the WP/VP the survey results Chapter, 5. 
324 Özdalga, 1997, p. 22. Also my own observations from the field confirms Özdalga's claimes, that 
the majority of voters and 40 percent of political activists voted or joined the WP/VP with other 
reasons rather that the religious or ideological incentives. See Chapter, 5. 
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see it as part and parcel of the expansion of the civil society, rather than a reason for 
interrupting the democratic process. 
In chapter three I demonstrated the emergence and transformation of political Islam in 
Turkey. It was observed that its emergence was closely connected to the clash of 
interest between the Anatolian petit bourgeoisie and big business in Istanbul and since 
then it has been evolving constantly. It has evolved from a small cadre party with a 
rigid, religious conservative outlook in the 1970s to a mass political party of the 
1990s. To avoid repetition it can be said that all major policies and membership 
criteria have changed beyond recognition. Today's VP is a modern mass party with a 
modern organisational structure, party policies and campaign methods. 
So if it isn't religious reasons or fundamentalism, what is the driving force behind the 
rise of political Islam in Turkey? What the above analysis indicates is that the rise of 
the WP can be understood not necessarily as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism but as 
the estrangement of significant sections of Turkish society from the mainstream 
political parties. It was argued in chapter 2 that throughout the 1990s parties faced a 
real problem of the erosion of public confidence in them. According to a survey 
political parties are the least trusted institutions in Turkey. 325 
Can we exclude the possibility that religious reasons are behind the rise of the welfare 
party as well as more practical socioeconomic reasons? The answer is `yes' and `no'. 
It is `yes' in the sense that the WP more or less preserved its core or ideological voter 
support almost intact since the 1970s. For example, throughout the 1970s WP's 
predecessor the National Salvation Party (NSP) had around 10 percent of the vote. 
The NSP had received 11.8 percent of the vote in its first election in 1973 and, 8.1 
percent in the 1977 general elections. Although it received 4,000 more vote 
(1.269.918) in 1977 elections compare to the 1973, due to increased rate of voter 
participation, its share dropped to 8.1 percent (cakir, R 1994, pp. 216-217). After the 
military coup of 1980 the WP had a slow start but in 1987 general elections its share 
increased (7.16 percent) near to its core/ideological voter support. The period from 
1973 to 1987 shows that traditionally the NSP/WP/VP have around 10 percent of 
325 See Strateji MORI 1998, p. 35 (cited in TESEV (20(0, p. 16). 
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hard-core supporter. However from the early 1990s it has changed. The WP changed 
its main policies such as "just economic order", changed its organizational structure, 
strategy and tactics, and adopted new rhetoric therefore managed to combine religious 
and class appeals. 326 Thus, the WP/VP expanded its electoral support considerably 
among the newly migrated urban poor in the big cities. 
From the 1991 general elections the WP's support bases changed. The studies 
indicates that the increase in the WP's votes has not been due to the rise of religious 
fundamentalism, or religious sentimentalism. How do we know this is simply by 
asking the voters about their incentives to vote for the WP/VP. The studies found out 
that between one-third and one-half of the WP/VP's voters voted for the party 
because of their religious or ideological reason but other half' voted other than 
religious or ideological reasons (See Özbudun, 2000, pp. 90-91) When this figure 
compared with the WP/VP's share of vote which was 21.4 percent (in 1995) and 15.5 
percent (in 1999) it shows that there has not been much change in its traditional, hard 
core religious/ideological support, but this is not true for the other half of its electoral 
support. They are not supporting the WP/VP for religious or ideological reason but for 
"just economic order", for it's clean image for its protection of poor and like. 
In the main time it can be argued that the rising tide of religious revivalism has been 
playing some role in the rise of the WP/VP in Turkey as well. As argued in chapter 
one religious movements have been on the rise all around the world. Although the 
Islamic revivalism has been most extensively discussed and attracted enormous media 
attention, all forms of religious revivalism has been rising across the glob. From 
Hindu fundamentalism in India to Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, Christian 
fundamentalism in the US to Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim world, religious 
fundamentalism thriving in all faiths. It has been acknowledge by the several scholars 
that since the 1970s especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979 Islam re-emerged 
as a potent global force. (Esposito, 1995, p. 11). 
Although it is logical to argue that the rise of religious revivalism in across the 
Muslim world must have contributed at a certain extent to the rise of' the WP/VP 
326 Ozbudun, E 2000, p. 87. 
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during the 1990s in Turkey, there isn't much empirical evidence of it. What seems 
instead has happened is that the WP/VP retained its traditional strong 10 percent of 
religious/ ideological support and added another 10 percent from non- 
religious/ideological voters. Nevertheless we cannot rule it out the impact of this 
rising tide of religious revivalism on the rise of the WP/VP all together. It might have 
helped in other ways such as by helping to the WP to retain its core support of 10 
percent. It is plausible to argue that if the religious revivalism had not been rising 
steadily as it has been doing since the 1970s the WP/VP might have lost some of its 
religious/ideological support since than. 
8.2 Islamic Fundamentalism Demystified 
8.2.1 The Role of Party Organisations 
At the beginning of this research it was hypothesised that the rise of political Islam 
could not be described simply as religious revivalism or Islamic fundamentalism, but 
rather, there have been other `worldly reasons'-social problems- responsible for its 
popularity. If not Islamist fundamentalism then what does the WP/VP owe its 
electoral success to? The success of political Islam has resulted from a combination of 
various factors none of which, apart from the grassroots activism, individually 
dominates the others. It is a combination of various factors in which the local party 
organisations and grassroots activists play the role of a catalyst to activate the process. 
And if the mixture was lacking one of its several elements it might not produce the 
same result. 
In this section I intend to demonstrate that the rise of the WP/VP throughout the 
1990s was not the rise of fundamentalism as such but was something the pro-Islamic 
WP/VP achieved through hard working, highly committed, resourceful grassroots 
organisations. Maybe it is time now to briefly reiterate these factors that made this 
wining formula. In this context, maybe the most important factor has been the decline 
of the political party system that caused a significant process of estrangement of large 
sections of voters away from the mainstream political parties. 
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It has been argued that from the 1980s onwards the Turkish political party system has 
experienced high levels of party fragmentation, electoral volatility and ideological 
polarization. Individual parties have suffered a decline in organisational capacity, 
party identification and public support from the citizens. 327 Turkish politics has 
endured a long-term impasse and the state of the Turkish political parties has been 
responsible for this situation. 
Especially from the late 1980s onwards more and more people become disillusioned 
with their political parties and started to look elsewhere for a better alternative. 
Fragmentation and volatility is much higher in Turkey compared to developed 
countries. It was estimated that between 1954 and 1999 the average volatility was 21 
percent from one election to the next (TESEV, 2000, p. 12). There have been several 
sociological reasons for this ongoing political alienation of the masses from 
mainstream Turkish parties. 
It has been noticed that contemporary Turkish politics has been shaken by a series of 
disturbing factors that redefined the spectrum of the traditional party system as well as 
party loyalties and values (Kalaycioglu, 1998, p. 1). The first major event was the 
military coup of 12 September 1980 that effectively banned all political activities. All 
parties were closed down and all leaders and cadres in the higher echelons of the 
parties were interrogated and imprisoned for several months or years in some cases. 
It meant a total breakdown in politics and nothing was going to be same ever again. 
Following the coup the military elites wanted to reshape the Turkish polity by 
introducing new electoral laws and political agents -political parties- and vetoing 
some of the old elements. The aim of this plan was to discredit the multiparty politics 
of the 1970s and return to the two party systems of 1950s. Military elite thought that 
the multiparty polity was causing the political disarray and that two party systems 
would prevent high fragmentation and volatility. For this reason all pre 1980 parties 
or their successors were banned or vetoed by the military government. Toward the 
1983 elections two parties the People's Party (PP) and the Nationalist Democracy 
327 See Özbudun, 2000, p. 73. 
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Party (NDP) were prepared to take part in the first elections of 1983 but a third party 
the Motherland was involuntarily allowed to take part in elections as well. 
However, the military elite's ambitious plan for two party system politics did not 
work out very well. In fact, effectively it was over with the return of the pre 1980 
political leaders like Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan and Turkes, into politics in 1987. The 
Turkish party system became much more fragmented and the restrictions led to a 
process of `party duplication' on the centre-left and centre-right. The duplication of 
the centre parties has been one of the most significant factors in the high level of 
fragmentation. 
Increased electoral volatility and organisational decline have played an important role 
in the process of declining party attachment and identification among the electorate. 
The military's intervention and subsequent restrictions were partially responsible for 
the institutional decline of the Turkish party system. Along with the frequent closure 
of political parties this meant none of the parties enjoyed the support of more than two 
generations. So there have always been interruptions and breakdowns creating a 
cycle of discontinuity in the social and electoral bases, organisational structure, 
membership, party identity, policies and party ideology. In a sense they have to start 
from scratch whenever there is an intervention from out side politics. However, these 
interventions are not the only cause of the decline of the Turkish party system. 
The organisational structure and characteristics of the mainstream political parties are 
an important factor. It has been pointed out that with the exception of the WP Turkish 
political parties have been `described as cadre or catchall parties with strong 
clientelistic features'. Many of them developed features of the cartel parties with 
strong sultan like authoritarian leaderships. 328 A common characteristic of the cadre, 
catchall or cartel parties is the diminished role and status of the party membership 
from within the party. The second is the reduced role of the local party organisations 
in the election campaigns. The exclusion of membership and local party organisations 
appears to be standard in most centre right and centre left parties in the post 1983 
period. When this current state of parties is combined with Turkey's long-term 
328 Özbudun, E 2000. 
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ongoing multiple socioeconomic problems it prepares a perfect recipe for more party 
fragmentation, electoral volatility, party organisational decline, and lessened party 
identification and loyalty among the voters. 
Over the last fifteen years, excepting the WP/VP all Turkish parties suffered a decline 
in their party organisations and a weakening of party identification. The demise of 
party identification has been a problem in developed countries and new democracies 
as well (see Corrty, 1973; Özbudun, 2000, p. 79 and TESEV 2000). Nonetheless, the 
Turkish case has been significantly different in many ways. It has been distinct 
because electoral volatility has been very high. More than one in five of the electorate 
has been voting for a different party from one election to the next. For this reason a 
different party came to the top in the each of the last four elections. In the search for a 
better alternative the electorate has swung from one party to another, but the situation 
has been deteriorating. A recent survey show that on the whole no party seems to be 
appealing to more than 10 percent of voters in the country (See Chapter 2). 
The organisational decline is rooted in the characteristics of the Turkish political 
parties. Apart from the WP/VP they are not mass membership parties but mostly 
cadre or catchall parties with common clientilistic characteristics. Therefore the 
major Turkish parties of the centre-left and centre-right have not developed 
widespread party organisations throughout the country. Instead of cultivating well- 
organised horizontal party networks their organisational network is based on vertical, 
clientilistic ties. 
Party directed patronage was the main characteristic of pre 1980 parties and despite 
the breakdown in 1980 it has not changed. Even the new parties of the post 1983 
period like the MP, which governed the country for two terns, did not want to 
develop modern, effective, vibrant and horizontally organised party organisations. 
Instead it did choose to use pork-barrel patronage to sustain its electoral support. 
The organizational weakening of parties and party identification ties has been closly 
connected to the disillusionment of millions with political parties. This process was 
due to the country's long-term economic problems -high inflation, a huge foreign and 
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domestic public debt, growing inequalities, increased unemployment, hugh budget 
deficits, and cutbacks in social policies. 
In addition to that, widespread political coruption involving many party leaders has 
caused disappointment and anger among the citizens. 329 In many ways the economic 
problems of the late 1970s have been worsened by the neoliberal restructuring 
policies of the 1980s and 1990s. What was intended to be a solution led to far more 
serious problems. The high rate of inflation, unemployment, social inequalities and 
poverty have been far more prevalent since the 1980s when the IMF backed 
neoliberal restructuring programs started to be implemented. 330 
The fact is that since 1983 all of the political parties on the centre-right and centre-left 
have been tried more then once and none of them achieved the smallest success in 
alleviating any of the country's burning problems. Their clientilistic structure makes 
them much more vulnerable to losing party attachments and party identification 
among their followers. . 
It has been observed that there is exception among the Turkish political parties that 
despite this downward trend the WP increased its share of vote and became the largest 
party in the parliament and came to power following the general election in 1995. The 
Welfare party has escaped this trend of increasing fragmentation, electoral volatility, 
party realignment, and declining party identification and party loyalty; the declining 
role of local party organisations etc., achieving quite the opposite. The WP/VP 
emerged as the main beneficiary of this process. 
Answering the following question will help understand another part of the mystery 
that surrounds the unprecedented rise of political Islam in Turkey: How did the 
WP/VP buck the trend of party decline in Turkey, and become the largest party while 
the other political parties were disintegrating and loosing their electoral support? The 
answer must be the WPIVP's organisational strength and efficient, highly committed 
and informed grassroots activism. 
329 See Özbudun, r- (2000: 79) 330 For a detailed account of the neoliberal economy policies and its long-term consequences in Turkey see Chapter 4. 
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Despite the general trend moving away from party centred politics to candidate 
centred politics the party organisations proved to be significantly influential in 
contributing to the party's electoral successes. If the party organisation is the first 
condition for a successful election campaign the second condition must be grassroots 
activism. 331 
Political parties have been one of the most distinctive, successful forms of political 
organisations. They are the bridge between society and governmental power and a key 
component of the representative democracy. As they are the means of acquiring or 
influencing governmental power they need sufficient public support behind them. To 
achieve these parties need to mobilise voters through party organisations and party 
activists. Although there are various ways of election campaigning for mobilising 
social support and canvassing votes, my findings show that the local party 
organisations and grassroots activists have proven to be very influential on the 
election results. From its foundation to its closure, the WP developed nationwide 
membership organisations and thanks to its mass grassroots activism won 
unprecedented election victories. 
8.2.2 The Foundation Stones: Role of Grassroots Activists 
One of my main objectives was to find out whether grassroots activists and party 
organisations had any effect on the increase of the WP/VP's share of votes during the 
1990s or not. As argued above, despite the current trend political parties still need 
members for the traditional electioneering functions of canvassing and leafleting 
voters and persuading supporters to go out and vote. Grassroots activists are elected 
representatives of the party and carry out electioneering. More than that they are often 
the key opinion-formers in the neighbourhood. They provide a voice in the 
community and help to set the political agenda, legitimising certain opinions in 
comparison with others. 332 
331 Although there are writers who doubted the benefits of grassroots activities on the parties' electoral 
fortunes, there is compelling evidence from case studies that done in different countries suggested that 
party organisations and grassroots activism is very influential on the parties' electoral ti manes. For 
both views see chapter 7. 
332 See Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, pp. 219-220. 
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One of the major findings of my study is that the effect of the local party 
organisations on election results has been highly significant. It has been observed that 
becoming mass membership party organisations can prevent the major problems 
suffered by contemporary political parties. As the WP/VP has shown with its mass 
party characteristic, strong local branches and committed, active party members it is 
possible to distinctively buck the trend of party decline severely undermining all other 
mainstream parties in Turkey. 
Presently except for the WP/VP none of the parties have active membership 
organisations or membership activities. A survey in 1996 showed that 12.1 percent of 
the voters are party members, but membership in Turkey as 
Özbudun (2000, p. 80) 
argued is often little more then being a party supporter. In contrast to the rest of the 
Turkish parties the WP/VP has the largest grassroots organisations. Especially after 
the 1994 local elections the WP launched a massive recruitment campaign and it 
reached 4.5 millions members before its closure in 1998.333 
It has been observed that in these parties the role of party membership and grassroots 
organisations has been reduced significantly. Thanks to technological and social 
innovations, developments in the communication technology - TV and computers, 
and emergence of certain expertise in social sciences like PR experts, pollster, 
campaign managers and professional fund raisers the party leadership can launch 
election campaigning without the support of large numbers of party activists. But the 
role of party membership is not limited to the election campaign only. The grassroots 
organisations and party activists have got many other important functions essential 1'or 
political parties and electoral process. 334 The empirical analysis from Turkey shows 
that the WP/VP's grassroots activists value their activities as essential For their party's 
electoral success. 
Grassroots activists act as a mediator between the neighbourhood-the constituency- 
and the ilce -sub-districts-. As an organisation they carry the opinions, demands and 
the expectations of the local people-, as influential agents of the party on the ground 
333 See cahir, 1994, pp. 51-52. 
334 The functions of the party membership discussed in Chapter, 5 and 6. 
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grassroots activities are very influential. They are opinion leaders influencing and 
forming opinion in their localities and are the pillar of the party holding it together in 
especially difficult, turbulent times. As the arms and the muscles' of the party they 
carry out day-to-day party activities. 
Chapters 5 and 6 have revealed some important aspects of the VP's grassroots 
activists. In chapter 51 have looked at the patterns of participation. It appears that 
regional disparities and family played a significant role. The majority (76 %) of my 
informants came from less developed regions while 79 percent of then have at least 
one person who are also members/supporters of the VP. Around 40 percent have 
expressed religious and 21 percent ideological incentives as the most important factor 
for their membership. The remaining 38 percent joined the VP with non-religious Or 
ideological reasons. Some 14 percent said it is the best party 
for the country, while 16 
percent saw it as trust worthy, and the other 7 percent joined the VP as a reaction to 
other parties. In chapter 6I have attempted to have a portrait of the VP's activists. The 
results are very interesting and important in many respects. I have discovered striking 
similarities between the VP's grassroots activists and activists elsewhere. Despite the 
fact that the WP/VP has been viewed as an Islamic fundamentalist party by many 
commentators, my findings illustrate its activists share a lot with political activists 
from around the world. They, as their counterparts in Western Europe and North 
America, have similar socio-economic and demographic backgrounds: they have 
better educational qualifications, doing better jobs and earning more money. They are 
in the same (40-50) age group (average is 43 years old) married with 3.07 children on 
average. 
In chapter 71 have examined the effects of grassroots activists on the VP's electoral 
successes. I analysed what the VP's activists are doing and how they do it. I have 
discovered that the most common (37 percent) type of party actlvlsnl they undertake 
is charity work. They provide material and nonmaterial benefits: food, coal, clothing, 
bursaries for the needy in the neighbourhoods. It is observed that this kind of 
grassroots activism is the most effective way of canvassing. Because of their 
community work, they are viewed as people who genuinely care about the poor and 
therefore the community's problems. Also via this social work and caring image, the 
WP/VP has been elevated to a messiah-like position. 
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Besides charity work, the VP's grassroots activists meet people on an almost daily 
basis showing sympathy, friendship and appreciation. They share the worries and 
problems of the ordinary people, and are there sharing the joy and sorrow of their 
fellow neighbourhood dwellers. The VP has distinguished itself as a mass 
membership party from other parties by its organisational structure, its well organised 
nation-wide local party organisations, highly committed and ideologically orientated, 
highly resourceful, and militant-like grassroots activists. 
It must be borne in mind that the VP has not totally neglected high tech, media-led 
nation-wide election campaigning methods either. Instead it has been employing both 
`labour-intensive' and `capital-intensive' campaigning methods, although the former 
is to a lesser extent. 335 In other words the VP is not just concentrating on grassroots 
activism, door-to-door or face-to-face canvassing on its own. It carries out nation- 
wide, centrally organised election campaigns through the media, television, radio as 
well. The VP's election campaigns are planned, organised and monitored rigorously 
by a computerised Centre of Election Issues are set up in every district centre. 
It appears that being the only mass membership party gave superiority to the WP/VP 
over other parties. While all other parties of the centre-right and centre-left lost touch 
with the people, and their electoral support, the WP/VP increased its public support 
by utilising its membership organisations, youth and ladies commissions. 
So what makes the WP/VP so distinct'? As it was illustrated in chapter 7 the VP's 
grassroots activists are more active compared to British or American party activists. 
They spend long hours in an ordinary month for canvassing and their party activities 
are not only geared towards the election campaigns but are a year round activity. They 
seem to be with the people on the ground talking to them, listening to their problems 
and grievances. The way that they contact people and the activities that they organise 
are unique in many ways. They behave like a social security organisation in the 
neighbourhoods, providing material and nonmaterial aid for the gecekondu (slung) 
poor. Maintaining close relationships, they regularly visit those households where 
335 For definition of the term `capital-intensive' party organisations sec Mair, 1997, p. II. 
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there is a social occasion a celebration or a death. They appear to be very active in 
many ways, living within the community as one of them, as well as organising charity 
works, political meetings spreading the party's message, but mostly forming opinion 
in the community. 
8.2.3 Blending The Modern With The Traditional: Hybridisation Of 
The Party Activism 
It seems there are very few areas where the mix of modern with traditional can 
generate such a positive, creative and effective outcome as the WP/VP's campaigning 
strategies have. To mix modern with traditional has always been seen as something 
confusing, impossible or as an obstacle for any kind of progress in any area of social 
life, but the WP/VP's strategy and tactics have proven rather the opposite. The ability 
of the WP/VP's cadres and grassroots activists to tap into the historical, traditional 
and religious networks and readily available relations, cultural and local customary 
codes, the local common knowledge, utilising the linguistic richness of Islam, Islamic 
knowledge and culture in the service of daily politics all of these rather clever creative 
combinations have provided a leading edge to the WP/VP in electoral competition. 
They have ingeniously combined traditional and local relationships and networks with 
the nationwide modern communication technologies, methods and strategies in their 
day-to-day party activities. 
The WP/VP has employed both very sophisticated campaigning methods with 
traditional aspects of community work: On the one hand the VP's party organisations 
stage a fully fledged modern election campaign with the usage of various experts for 
public relations, opinion polling, media professionals, fund raisers and image experts. 
The VP makes extensive use of computers, opinion polling, using mass media 
techniques, TV, radio and numerous newspapers at local as well at national level. The 
VP combines all latest campaigning methods, techniques and strategies with the most 
traditional human relations. it utilises traditional culture religious rhetoric and 
traditional-religious networks existing for centuries very successfully in its daily 
political activities. In other words the WP/VP developed a style that melded modern 
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with traditional producing a hybrid campaigning method that has been very effective. 
It is also a unique style that is predominantly local without neglecting the national. 
8.2.4 The Extraordinary Ability Of Islam To Tap In To The 
Popular Culture 
In addition to the innovative nature of the WP/VP's leading cadres and grassroots 
activists in tapping into readily available local, traditional and religious networks and, 
utilising them into daily politics, the religion of Islam is also highly adaptable to tap 
into popular culture and has become a political ideology to mobilise the masses in 
many Muslim countries. 
In Islam, religion and politics are not separate spheres, as some writers may think. 
Although there are traces of such separation between the religious authority and the 
ruler: the king, this separation has been very thin in many cases and none-exists in 
some others. As Lewis (1988, p. 2) argued in classical Islam there was no distinction 
between Church and state. Throughout the history of Christendom, he argued, there 
have been two powers: God and Caesar representing the church and state in this 
world, but in Islam there is no such separation. 
From its birth to the present century, Islam has occupied an important place in the 
ideology of the state and in Muslim politics. Therefore, the present revival of Islam in 
Muslim politics should not be all that unexpected (Esposito, 1983, p. 3). 
"The Islamic state is a community of believers. Allah is the ultimate sovereign 
of the state and, indeed, of all creation. Political and religious leadership was 
vested in Muhammad, God's messenger on earth, who served as both Prophet 
and political leader of the Islamic community/state. " (Ibid: 4). 
After Muhammad's death, this political and religious leadership persisted Under the 
caliphate. But, within time, especially during the Ottoman Empire, a duality of 
religious and political leadership emerged. However this duality never was meant to 
be a withdrawal of Islam from politics or any other aspects of the socio-economic or 
cultural life. 
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From the mid-nineteenth century onwards due to Western influence and colonial rule, 
modernization had begun in some Muslim countries. In a general sense they followed 
a path of Westernisation and secularisation as they increasingly adopted Western 
models in politics, law, and education. Nevertheless, during the twentieth century, 
religion re-emerged in the politics of the Muslim world, inspiring anti-colonial, 
nationalist movements and their struggle for independence (Esposito, 1983, pp. 5-6). 
Islamic movements have been on the rise throughout the Muslim world and the role of 
Islamic ideology has risen ever more so. In many cases, Islamic rhetoric provides a 
whole set of ideological objections to secular nationalism and Westernisation in 
Muslim countries like Turkey. As stated politics in Muslim countries are dominated 
by Islam and in some case such as Shi'ism in Iran the tradition of struggle against 
oppression is embedded into the very heart of religious ideology. As Juergensmeyer 
(1993, pp. 50-51) suggests nowhere in Islam is struggle more a part of its tradition 
than in Shi'ite society. Struggle against oppression is part of Shiism. 
It is a well-known fact that religion is one of the most successful predictor political 
preferences. 336 Islam in particular presents a far ranging influence on politics. As 
several students of Islam pointed out "Islam" constitutes the language of politics in 
the Muslim world". (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996, p. 12). The language of Islam is 
much more than simply a vocabulary. It is made up of both symbols and mediators- 
those who modify and rework the symbols in specific circumstances and for particular 
purposes (ibid: 13). 
It can be argued that the language of Islam is one of the most developed and effective 
means of communication packed with symbols and mediators that are universally 
recognisable across the Muslim world. In addition to its universally (in the Muslim 
world) recognised linguistic abilities, the religion of Islam is for many millions in the 
336 See for example Jennings, K et al 1979: 463; Verba and Nic, 1972, pp. 97-101; Dalton, 1988, p. 
148. 
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Muslim world a way of life, an ideology, and a belief that covers every aspect of life 
not just in this world but also beyond. This fact has been confirmed by my findings on 
the ground. 337 
As Esposito (1995, p. 249) emphasised "political economy is essential in understanding 
the rise of Islamic movements. However, the force of political Islam cannot be simply 
reduced to the socio-economic failures of society. " `Not all but for many activists, 
"Islam is a motive force, a source of guidance for this life as well as the next". It 
seems there are similarities between Esposito's observations and my findings in 
Turkey. The majority (62 %) of the VP activists joined the party for religious (40 %) 
and ideological (21 %) reasons. The WP and its predecessor the VP have been 
described as the religiously oriented or pro-Islamist party and this fact, it seems, 
played a very significant role on the process of membership. 338 Religion as the most 
eminent feature of culture also inspires political ideologies. 339 It has acted as a source 
for various political ideologies. In this sense Turkey is not an exception. "(Turan, 
1994, p. 42). 
It has been observed that the stronger the ideological conviction the more the 
individual spends effort for the party activities. A strong ideological incentive is very 
likely to lead an individual to take the initiative to join the party rather then passively 
waiting for a call from the party. "Ideological radicalism should motivate party 
members to become more involved than the voters or inactive members". (Whiteley, 
1995, p. 222). 340 The empirical evidence also shows that the rate of political 
participation is positively influenced by the degree of political sophistication. 
(Klingemann, 1979, p. 281). It can be concluded that the high level of ideological 
sophistication and ideological conviction, which the VP's activists possess, leads to it 
high level of political activism. 
8.2.5 Not like any other Party: Distancing Itself Apart 
337 For elaboration see Chapter 5. 
338 See Kalaycioglu, E., 1998: 15. 
339 For this see: C. V. Dijik and de Groot, A. H 1995; Cakir, R 1995; calislar, 0 1995; Lewis, 13 
1974; Daniel Price 1999, Chpter 2; Tapper, 1993 chapters I-7; YÜcekök, 1997. 
340 Also see Ashford, 1972; Barnes and Kasse, 1979; Dowse and Hughes 1986; Marsh, 1990. 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the WP had a rather clever, effective strategy of 
creating a clear line between itself and the rest of the political parties in Turkey. It 
was a very deliberate and conscious campaign to label any other parties as one, under 
the label of taklitciler (imitators) of the West while portraying the WP as the genuine 
adherent of national and sacred values, and the true representative of the Turkish 
society. 
In many ways the WP seemed to succeed in this issue of labelling, degrading others 
and distinguishing itself from the rest. One of the most significant reasons 
for this 
was the anti-system rhetoric of the WP until its fourth congress in 1994. 
Although it 
was not a totally anti-system party, it adopted an anti system rhetoric and opposed 
Kemalist ideology the principle of secularism and close relations with the West: the 
membership of the NATO and the EU. 
In terms of economic policies too, the WP distinguished 
itself from the rest. As 
mentioned in chapter two there has been a policy convergence among the mainstream 
political parties. All become staunch proponents of global capitalism, restructuring 
policies, and the free market economy. The WP put forward a different social and 
economic policy called adil diizen (just order). As expected the promise of a just 
society and just economic order attracted considerable support from the lower classes, 
poorest sections of society and traditional centre-left voters as well. The process of 
convergence meant that the parties of the centre-right and the centre-left parties began 
to resemble each other. This convergence of policies immensely helped to the WP in 
distancing itself from other parties as well. 
Distancing from the other parties occurred in many other areas. The issue of 
widespread political corruption that many of the other parties deeply involved with 
was one area from which the WP distanced itself. Throughout the 1990s corruption 
become a very common part of Turkish politics. When combined with the political 
clientilism the corruption, nepotism, bribery scandals melted away the public trust in 
the Turkish parties. As I pointed out in chapter 2, since 1983 all of the mainstream 
parties: the MP, TPP, SDPP and later the RPP that came to government where rocked 
by corruption scandals as well as by their incompetence in solving the country's acute 
problems. Since the mid 1980s the WP stressed better moral practices, opposing the 
erosion of religious and traditional moral values. With the support of its Islamist 
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rhetoric the WP/VP appeared to be holding the moral high ground and this helped to 
distance itself from the others. 
As the WP/VP is the only mass political party, it has successfully survived the 
irresistible trend of party decline that effectively wiped out all centre-right and centre- 
left parties in Turkey. The VP have escaped from this process of party fragmentation, 
electoral volatility and organisational declining as well as declining party attachment 
and party identification among voters by developing nation-wide effective party 
organisations and attracting very well informed, highly committed, militant-like large 
party membership actively engaging with politics in their localities. 
8.2.6 An Urban Based, `Anti-Neoliberal/Globalisation' 
Movement, Under An Islamic Veil? 
In Chapter 4,1 examined the urban roots of the Islamic movements. I argued that 
contrary to the common perception that Islamic movements are part and parcel of the 
modernisation process influenced by the rapid phase of urbanisation. They emerged as 
a reaction against the failures of a modernising, secular state, perceived as corrupted 
and unable to solve socio-economic problems, and are often dictatorial. In addition 
these movements emerged as a reaction to the problems of over-urbanisation, 
unemployment and foreign domination in Muslim countries. (Halliday, 1995a, p. 48). 
It seems that Islamic movements have no problems whatsoever in adapting their 
ideology and organisational structures to contemporary conditions. 
As observed the grassroots activists are educated in the modern schools, raised in 
recently urbanised families, and come from the impoverished middle class. The 
WP/VP elite adopted the traditional leftist policies, slogans, and campaign techniques. 
Also the majority of the WP/VP supporters are not "traditional" or "traditionalist" 
either. They by and large live with the values of modern city life, which has adopted 
the current trend of consumerism. 
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In Turkey the process of urbanisation started from the 1950s but this process 
accelerated with IMF designed restructuring programs since the 1980s. This process 
triggered a massive influx of immigration from rural to urban areas and this led to a 
rapid and uneven urbanisation in the last two decades. Since the 1970s, like Turkey, 
many other Muslim countries Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, witnessed a rapid growth 
of urban population beyond the cities' capabilities to absorb them into the mainstream 
urban life. (Kepel, 1994, pp. 6-7). As table 6.1 illustrated the vast majority (76 %) of 
the VP's activists themselves had migrated to Ankara. 
Not only has the rapid urbanisation facilitated more political participation but it has 
also deepened the dissatisfaction of the urban masses. As the millions pushed by the 
`push factors' of the rural Anatolia into a few metropolitan cities, the gecekondu 
(slum) areas expanded enormously. It has been estimated that around ten million 
people live in gecekondu areas, in other words 35 per cent of the total urban 
population (Kongar, 2000, p. 566). This ratio is even higher when the five largest 
cities are taken into account. In Ankara, for example, 58.4 per cent of population live 
in gecekondus (See Table 6.5). These new migrants faced unemployment and 
poverty; lack of housing insufficient basic services e. g. health and schooling 
shortages. Against this background the WP/VP developed peculiar socio-economic 
policies- e. g. the Adil Düzen (Just Order and Just Economic order) that voiced the 
concerns of the urban under classes, lower and lower middle classes, artisans, 
merchants and shopkeepers. Also through its nation-wide grassroots organisations the 
WP/VP runs charity work providing material and nonmaterial profits for the most 
needy in every neighbourhood. 
As mentioned before the WP/VP have been successfully tapping into the existing 
traditional, religious and cultural resources. From the early days of its establishment 
the WP and after that the VP ingeniously made use of the traditional religious 
networks, relationships, traditional associations, groups and cultural resources as well 
as utilising traditional, deep rooted forms of solidarity organisations that have been 
around for centuries. It also creatively reconfigured the old, traditional political 
culture especially in relation to religious issues, social justice and equality, e. g. the 
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rhetoric of Adil Dii: en 341 (Just Society), greater emphasis on Islamic brotherhood, and 
the like. The WP/VP, in its political campaigning, drew upon a certain type of 
language and phrasing that most people identify with, and it has been very affective in 
yielding results at the level of recruitment of new members and for electoral support. 
The WP/VP voiced the demands for equality, justice, and democracy for the millions 
of urban poor whom have been badly affected by the globalisation process. The 
growing income disparity, unemployment and deepened poverty, long-term high 
inflation, sharp decline in the income of the millions of wage and salary earners, 
decline of the state welfare provisions, etc., have been the most defining 
characteristics of the last two decades in Turkey. 
As observed, global capitalism has significantly eroded the functions and the borders 
of the nation states. As a result national -level governance has become ineffective. 342 
This process has inescapably weakened the functions of the governments and political 
parties once they are in office. It has been observed that international corporations 
have been increasingly taking over the nation states' space by pushing them out of the 
economic and political sphere as well. Today many of them are more powerful than 
many of the nation states and forcing their will upon the governments, dictate policies 
like taxation, privatisation, flexible labour market that most suit their interests. There 
are international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank and WTO that also 
pressurise governments for similar reasons. 
Since the 1980s neoliberal policies took over the World in the form of global 
capitalism and has created inequality, injustice, poverty and misery for millions, as 
well as dissent and dissatisfaction among them. As a result the majority of urban poor 
become hopeless and turn away from politics. 
However my findings suggest a different story. As the neoliberal restructuring 
policies obliterated everything in their way the urban poor of the gecekondu 
341 The WP/VP as argued in chapter 2 and 3 is the only modern mass based political party and opposed 
the neoliberal economy policies. It has proposed a kind of social democratic economy policies called as 
Adil Düzen (Just Order). Also sec Özbudun, 2000, p. 88. 
342 See Hirst and Thompson, 1996, pp. 175-195; see also Hague, Rat al 1998, pp. 36-37. 
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(shantytowns) areas became increasingly politicised and raised their voice against this 
process. By voting, supporting the WP/VP or becoming a party activist, the urban 
poor actually made a strong statement in fighting opposition to global capitalism. The 
gecekondu (urban poor) communities display their dissatisfaction with the whole 
process and show their intentions for an alternative politics by throwing their own 
leaders in to political arena and uniting around the WP/VP that has been opposed to 
this process by offering a kind of `third way'343 economic model that called Adil 
Dilzen (Just Order). Erbakan argued that just economic order (JEO) is a complete and 
fantastic order. He says that the JEO consists of the useful, functional aspects of 
capitalism and communism but the harmful sides of both has been left out (Quoted in 
cakir, R 1994, p. 133-34). According to Özbudun (2000, p. 88) the WP's Adil Düzen 
"just order" was an Islamic-inspired economic policy that it conceives as a third way. 
But it lacked a coherent theoretical bass and depicted party's confusion over 
economic policies. The party declared that just order is the "true private enterprise 
regime" its implementation would require a heavy state control. The WP has shifted 
its economic policies from statist, protectionist position that was adopted by its 
predecessor the NSP to a free market economy (Ozbudun, E, p. 88). . 
However as 
evidence from the policies of JEO this shift has not been clearly reflected As 
discussed in chapter 3 that the NSP was the party of petit bourgeoisie; small town 
merchants, tradesmen and shopkeepers in the 1970s but from the early 1980s there 
emerged a significant Muslim bourgeois. They often called as the Anatolian tigers 
represented by MOSIAD (the Organisation of Muslim Businessmen and 
Industrialists). Obviously this development made the WP much more susceptible to 
the interests of the big business. It can be said that at the centre of this confusion as 
mentioned above over the just order lays this economic shift that Muslim bourgeoisie 
undergone. On the one hand this new Muslim bourgeoisie class made the WP to 
defend its interests while important proportion of its traditional support bases became 
more vulnerable because of the restructuring policies of neoliberalism. 
343 Although the term "third way" has been revitalized by Giddens in the late I990s, various political 
movements and various political persuations have long used the idea of `third way' as a political 
ideology. In this sense the Islamist leader N. Erbakan coined his economic policies as `Adil Diizen' 
(Just Order) and claimed that it benefited from good sides of communism and capitalism and left their 
undesired sides out. There are some parallels between the "third way" as Giddens (see 1998,2000) 
described and WP'sAdil Diizen as Erbakan formulated. But the differences are definitely more than 
similarities. Erbakan's Add Duzen indicated a confusun and had a very little chance to be implemented. 
The reader may wish to consult Giddens, A 1998 and 2000 for "third way" and Akgül, A 1997a; 1997b 
and cakºr, R 1994, pp. 131-149 forAdil Dozen (Just Order) and its critique. 
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To avoid the repetition I must remained my reader that I have elaborated the term adrl 
düzen (just order) in chapter 3, however it can be shortly reiterated that the concept of 
"just order" was used rather in rhetorical terms, it was not defined by the party nor 
debated properly neither it had any change to be implemented while the WP was in 
government. It can shortly be said that its full content and meaning was never clear. 
Nevertheless it was crown jewellery in the WP's program and attracted attention, and 
voter support. Perhaps it owes its success to its complexity as well as offering 
something to everyone. 
As argued earlier neoliberal-restructuring policies speeded of the migration of 
millions of rural population to the periphery of the major urban centres. There they 
were further disappointed and disillusioned with the mainstream political 
establishment. So this dissatisfaction of the urban masses, due to economic and 
political instability, changed the voting pattern of the pre -1980s. It is known that at 
times of crisis, especially among those newcomers, there is a tendency to turn to 
extremes, both on the right and the left. 344 The urban lower middle and lower classes 
of the gecekondus sought an alternative to the incompetent, corrupted, elite of 
mainstream politics. 
What has been seen is that the Islamist WP/VP emerged as the party of social justice 
and prosperity as its name implies. Its policy of Adil Düzen (Just Society) filled the 
gap left by the decline of the centre-left RPP due to its privatisation programme in the 
power (1991-1995). The VP strengthened its position amongst the urban poor and 
disadvantaged masses by expressing their grievances, concerns and identity problems. 
The VP's social policies supported by massive and very active grassroots organisation 
which are in action not only at election time but all year around. As one of my 
informant said: "we are not 'seasonal workers' like the other parties' activists. "We are 
permanent workers in our neighbourhoods". 
344 Shmuelevitz, 1996, p. 168. 
360 
Since the Social Democratic party, the RPP, like many in Europe, lost its belief in its 
core ideology of freedom, equality and social justice and failed to put forward an 
alternative ideology against the rising new right but rather became a bad imitation of 
it, it has lost its traditional working class support. In return the Islamist WP/VP will 
continue to enjoy the support of the urban poor. In fact the mass support that the 
WP/VP attracts can in many ways be classified as an urban squatter movement unique 
in its mobilisation strategies under the VP's flag. 
What the analysis of the role of the party organisations and grassroots activists has 
shown is that it was the profound role of the grassroots activists rather than religious 
fundamentalism that led to the ascendancy of political Islam into power in the 1990s. 
It has been shown that the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism has been defeated by 
the achievement of the grassroots activism. What has resulted through grassroots 
activism shows that the WP/VP as a modern mass party made its way to the 
government not by simply being Islamic fundamentalist or exploiting the religious 
values and rhetoric, but by winning the hearts and minds of millions of voters with its 
very effective and efficient election campaigns, carried out by its local party 
organisations. It has been observed throughout this study that party organisations and 
grassroots activists are highly influential in increasing the party's electoral fortunes. 
Finally, what the lesson of the WP/VP shows is that party decline and the apparent 
political impasse in Turkish politics could have been prevented by the adoption of 
mass party system by other mainstream political parties in Turkey. Given the current 
trend of party decline, declining party attachment and party identification among 
citizens in Western Europe and North America, the mass party strategy might be a 
viable alternative there as well. 
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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire will be used for interviews with grassroots activists of the Virtue 
Party in its local branches. Its aim is to investigate the ways in which local party 
organizations organizes themselves and carry out their political activities in two 
different sub-districts of Ankara; Mamak and Keciören. The findings of this field 
research will be used for a Doctorate dissertation that I have been doing in the 
University of Kent at Canterbury, United Kingdom. Many thanks for your help in 
advance. 
1- Where were you born? 
2- How long have you been living in Ankara? 
3- Marital Status? 
I[] Single 2[] Married 3[] Divorced 4[ ] widow 5[] Other 
4- The last school that you have finished? 
5- Sex 
I[] Male 2 [) Female 
6- How old are you? 
3[] Other 
7- What is your occupation? 
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8- What is your income per month? 
9- When you think the day that you first join the Refah (Welfare) Party (WP) / 
Fazilet (Virtue) Party (VP), did you approach the party for membership or did they 
approach you? 
10- When did you join the party'? 
11- Can you tell me what was the most important reason for you to become a 
member of the party? 
l i- As a grassroots activist how often do you get contact with the people who are 
the supporter of the WP/VP or would become one in your local area? 
12- Can you tell me about these meetings and contacts with your constituencies, 
what are the most commonly discussed issues, themes and demands from you? 
13- What is your present position within the Virtue Party's local branch, e. g. 
president of this branch, deputy of president, treasury, secretary etc.? 
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14- Approximately how many hours do you spent for party activities in a month? 
15- Apart from you is there any one in your family or close kin who are member 
of the WP/VP? e. g. are/where your parents /used to be/ member and vote for 
WP/VP? 
16- Are you member of any other association, trade union, vakif (trust) etc.,? 
17- Can you describe me the organizational structure of this local party 
organization? 
18- It 'l ask, how would you describe your relation with the party? 
a) As a sympathizer of the Virtue Party 
b) As a supporter of the VP 
c) As a voter of the VP 







19- What do you think about the effects of grassroots activists, like yourself', on WP/VP's electoral performance in the elections? 
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20- How, do you think, the grassroots activists contributes for the electoral success 
of the WP/VP? 
21- As is known that the Refah (Welfare) Party's share of votes had been rising 
since 1991. It become the biggest party in the 1994 and won more seats then any other 
parties in the parliament in the 1995 general elections. What do you think the most 
important reason was for the WP's victory? 
22- How can you define, on the below scale, the place of the Virtue Party within 
the Turkish politics? 
L-----+-----+-----+-----+-----C-----+-----+-----+-----+----- R 
23- Why do you think the people votes and supports the WP/VP? 
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24- What is your opinion about the WP's governmental performance? 
25- Do you believe that newly founded Virtue party will successfully replace the 
Welfare party? 
26- In what sense, do you think, the Virtue party is different from the Welfare 
party? What are the new strategies, policies and ideas that developed with the 
foundation of the Virtue party? 
27- It has been widely acknowledged that until its closure the WP had an efficient 
and very well organized local party organization. Do you think that the Virtue party 
have succeeded to set up the similar grassroots organizations? 
28- Could you, shortly, tell me what kind of activities have been carried out by the 
grassroots activists? 
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29- If you were asked to scale the significance of the grassroots activism on the 
party's electoral performance, how would you scale it? 
I[] Very important 2[] Important 3[] Not so important 
4[J Insignificant 5[] Other ................................. 
30- Can you tell me how do you approach to the people in your area and what are 
the similarities in between you and the people that you talk with? 
31- Where do you, usually, meet with potential voters to canvass? 
32- What is your opinion regarding the place of religion within the politics? 
33- What is your opinion on the separation of religion from the state, do you think 
that state and religion can be separate from each other? 
34- What is it, in your opinion that distinguishes Virtue party from the rest of the 
political parties in Turkey? 
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35- Is there any thing that you wanted to ask me or add to? 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX II: THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
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APPENDIX VI: TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES, 1983- 
2001 
1 THE CENTRE-RIGHT PARTIES 
1.1 The Motherland Party (MP) (1983-) 
The Motherland party (MP) was found by Turgut Özal and thirty of his friends in 30 
May 1983. Özal before establishing the MP had close ties to financial circles in the 
West especially the IMF and the World Bank. For this reason he had been consulted 
by the military elite and appointed as `economic supremo' in the military government. 
Before establishing the MP he worked as a technocrat in various governments 
including that of S. Demirel. In many ways he was the key actor and main 
implementer of the IMF program that was virtually directed by Washington (Ahmad, 
F 1993: 183). 
The Motherland Party has led an attempt to create a new sort of world. Its 
appeal at the top is to internationally minded, market oriented industrialsists 
and businismen. At the lower levels the party appeals to small businessmen, 
particularly to those in this class, and they are many , who are conservative in 
social and religious matters. ... 
To a marked extent the party is not apparently 
a successor to the Justice Party, even though some 38 per cent of its provincial 
and district leaders had served in local organisations of the Justice Party, 
... 
(Dodd, C. H. 1990: 115-16). 
Üstün Ergtider (1991: 153) too emphasizes that the MP is not the reincarnation of any 
of the pre-1980 parties. Instead of the NDP (National Democracy Party), Özal's MP 
as a centre-right, moderate force, has served to draw back into the mainstream 
supporters of those pre- 1980 parties of the right (National Salvation Party, National 
Action Party) who were formally engaged in anti-system protest. Statistical analysis 
indicates that MP created a new cleavage in Turkish politics which had cut across the 
old cleavages of the right and perhaps extending into the centre-left. 
It is true that the MP was not born as the continuation of any of those pre-1980 
parties. But because of its place in the centre-right and its ideology it was in fact the 
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carrier of the DP and JP traditions. At the beginning Özal and his friends needed to 
make it explicit time and time again that their party was not the continuation of any 
pre-1980 parties. This was purely a legal requirement because the 1982 constitution, 
like subsequent ones bans the establishment of any party which is a continuation of a 
banned political party. So if they admitted that they were representing the JP the court 
would have closed down the MP. 
Also the specific conditions of an after coup period made the MP take its initial path. 
It did appeal and indeed managed to gather support from three different wings of 
political spectrum; from liberals, nationalists and Islamists until the late 1980s. This 
combination of different ideologies gave an enormous electoral advantage to the MP 
because until 1987 the nationalists that were represented by the NAP and Islamists by 
the NSP had no choice but support the MP until their own parties were allowed to 
enter the elections. 
1.2 The True Path Party (TTP) (1983) 
Like many of these 17 parties the True Path Party was also established in 1983 by a 
close friend of Süleyman Dernirel. The TPP was the second major party on the centre- 
of-right and as opposed to the MP it made no secret of the fact that it was the 
continuation of the DP and JP mission (See Acar, F 1991: 188; Dodd, C. H. 1990: 
116). 
The TPP takes a liberal attitude towards economics, and is fiercely opposed to any 
military intervention in politics. The party stresses democracy and respect for 
electoral outcomes. The TPP still seems to see itself, as representative the periphery 
against the state elites. In fact its electoral profile in the 1987 showed it to represent, 
rather, the small towns and villages in the countryside, a rather narrower definition of 
the periphery than intended (Dodd, C. H 1990: 116-117). The social bases of the TPP, 
however, have changed over time and the MP and TPP have converged a lot. 
Literally they became the same parties Under different names and leadership. This 
situation is not just limited to the centre right parties but applies to those on the centre 
left too. It can be said that the duplication of the political parties in the centre-right 
and centre-left (the RPP and DLP) has emerged as an unintended consequence of the 
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military coup of 1980. They are the same parties in terms of their social bases, 
ideologies, policies and organisational structures. 
When the political ban on the pre-1980 leaders was lifted, many among Demirel's 
followers and sympathizers, as well as those in the state bureaucracy and private 
sector, expected that Demirel would play a major role in Turkish politics. Clearly this 
high expectation encouraged further and facilitated the maintenance of an active party 
network (Acar, F 1991: 189). 
2 The Welfare Party WP (1983-1998) 
When the generals decided to allow the establishment of new political parties the old 
cadres of the NSP decided to found the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) under the 
leadership of Ali Turkmen, a lawyer and ex advocate of N. Erbakan, and 33 founding 
members on July 19,1983. Due to N. Erbakan's prison sentence and ten years 
prohibition from the politics Ahmet Tekdal, a close aide of Erbakan, became its first 
leader. The WP had to find survival strategies under the military's scrutiny. It could 
not say it was a totally new party, but an open admission could have jeopardized its 
survival too. So given these conditions the WP highlighted the slogans like Milli 
Görii (National View) and Milli $uur (National Conscious) to send out the message 
that it was the continuation of the tradition of NOP and NSP (cakir, R 1994: 24). 
Because the constitution bans (article 163) any political party from `exploiting' 
religion for political purposes and prohibits any closed party from reopening with the 
same or a different name, the leaders of the Milli Göriic (national view) had to 
manage a survival strategy by keeping a distance from the NSP at the same time 
finding some cunning tactics to send the right message to their traditional grassroots. 
The choice of the name for the new party "Refah" literally means welfare or 
prosperity signalled the continuity between the NOP/NSP and this new party. 
It is true that the WP inherited the NSP's political heritage but its theory, rhetoric and 
social basses has significantly changed ($en, S 1995: 8-9). Similarly, Hakan Yavuz 
(1997) argued that the political idiom, organizational structure, social bases of the WP 
couldn't be truly grasped without the knowledge of the NSP. 
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"The NS [NSP] represented those who were not fully integrated culturally and 
economically into the "modernist" centre. It stressed Islamic mores as a cure 
for social problems, and its goal was to return to traditional social and cultural 
life. The WP, in contrast, modernizes traditional norms and institutions by 
breathing new life into them. Moreover, the expansions of modern conditions 
and economic growth, instead of undermining traditional networks and belief 
systems, have infused religious institutions and belief systems with new 
meanings. " (Ibid: 70). 
It is obvious that the WP established as a continuity of what used to be called the NSP 
the only representative of the political Islam in Turkey. However, the WP took the 
NSP forward by modernizing its structure, ideology and main policies. The changes 
are gradual in some areas like attitude of secularism, foreign policy etc., but radical in 
eras like organizational structure and campaigning methods. 
It can be argued that the most distinctive characteristic of the WP is its ability to 
harness the traditional with the modern in terms of policies, organizational structure 
and campaigning methods. In addition to that, because the WP is the only mass 
political party, and maintains a very large, well organized, highly committed and 
highly active grassroots organizations it has played very important and distinctive role 
in Turkish politics since its establishment. 
In their study Katz, R and Mair, P (1995: 2-28) identified four models of political 
parties. They are the elite (cadre), mass, catchall, and cartel parties. According to 
Özbudun, E (2000: 86) "Most Turkish parties combine some characteristics of cadre 
and catchall parties, with some elements of cartel parties. " He pointed out that except 
for the WP none of the Turkish parties have gone through a mass party phase. 
Organizationally, the WP is the only Turkish party that comes close to the 
model of a mass party, or a party of social integration. But the WP lacks one 
of the characteristics of the mass party that is the intra party democracy that is 
usually associated with mass parties (ibid: 92). 
Despite its shortcomings in terms of intra party democracy, the WP managed distance 
itself from other mainstream parties and moved towards mass party, which was a 
positive development, a good example for the improvement of Turkish democracy. 
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It is the continuation of the WP that was closed down by the court. Before 
its closure 
the WP was the largest party in parliament with 21.4 percent of vote and 158 MPs in 
the parliament. As the WP closed all of its MPs and mayors all around the country 
joined the VP. So it became the largest party within one year of its foundation. 
I examined the continuities and changes from the WP to VP in chapter 6. The VP 
represents the same electorate group as the WP but there are discontinuities, new 
approaches, and policies that will be discussed later in chapter six. 
3 THE CENTER-LEFT PARTIES 
3.1 The Populist Party (PP), 1983-1985 
There were two centre left parties when the ban on politics was lifted: the SDPP and 
the PP. But because the SDPPs candidates were vetoed by the NSC it was effectively 
prevented taking part in the elections. The Populist Party was established on May 20 
1983 under the leadership of Necdet Calp. The PP goals are to promote social justice 
and social welfare, to raise the standard of living of the workers. It gave a special 
emphasis on etatism and free parliamentary democracy. 345 The PP wanted to fill the 
vacuum on the left side of the spectrum. 
3.2. The Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP) 1983-1995 
The Social Democratic People's Party was established on 31 July 1983 by a group 
calling themselves the `Social Democratic Force'. They were all ex-mayors from the 
RPP. It was headed by Erdal Inönü a respected scientist and son of Ismet 1116nii, tile 
charismatic leader of the RPP from 1938 to 1972. Two years later on 14 November 
1985 Bulent Ecevit, veteran leader of the RPP founded another party in the centre-left 
called Democratic Left Party. 346 According to Andrew Mango the SDPP stands in 
345 See Geyikdagi, M. Y 1984: 151. 
346 After nearly two decades of its establishment the DLP won an unexpected landslide victory at the 
last general elections (in 1999), received 21 percent of the votes. It is now senior partner of the three 
party coalition. Ecevit himself is now the prime minister of Turkey. 
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direct line of decent from the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was closed 
down after the military takeover. The Turkish social democratic parties are different 
in some aspects from their sister parties in Europe. As he (1991) argued, the biggest 
difference between European social democratic parties and the SDPP in Turkey is the 
European SDP's were established as parties of opposition, of a radical sometimes 
violent opposition at least at the beginning but the SDPP was born as the party of the 
old establishment (pp. 170-171). Actually these paradox that Mango highlights 
explains why the parties of the centre left in Turkey SDPP/PP/DLP/RPP never 
became Social Democratic parties like their counterparts in the many West European 
countries. From the outset the RPP was the party of the establishment and remained 
so until the 1970s. In the 1970s it changed its rhetoric by adopting Social Democratic 
policies but its elitist party structure remained. It can be said that SDPP has never 
developed large grassroots organisations to get organised at the local level. The SDPP 
had the characteristics of both a cadre and an elitist party. 
As Dodd, C. H. (1990: 117) argued the SDPP's economic policies were a mixture of 
both the free market economy on the one hand and a planned statist, closed economic 
model on the other. It defended the State Economic Enterprises, economic growth, 
and social justice. (lbid: 117). As happened in many developing countries this 
confusion over the economic policies proved costly for the SDPP. It lost a great deal 
of its public support especially among its traditional bases throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. The more the SDPP moved towards the neolibcral economic policies the less it 
appealed to the lower classes. 
In 1985 both parties, the SDPP and PP, united under the name of Social Democratic 
Populist Party shortly known as SHP. Sonic writers prefer to use the full acronym 
SDPP. This unification obviously gave the centre -left it boost and they benefited 
from this in the following elections. 
3.3. The Republican Peoples Party (RPP) 1992 
The RPP was originally founded by M. Kemal himself in 1919. After twelve years of 
closure the RPP reopened on 19 June 1992. Those who were around the RPP hoped 
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to catch the glamour and success that the pre 1980s RPP enjoyed. 
But this was an 
optimistic expectation. It entered a very crowded political arena, were already 
containing two centre-left parties: the SHP, and DLP. 
To prevent further 
fragmentation and have a chance of wining the elections the two parties (the 
SDDP 
and RPP) decided to merge. They did so, in 1995 the SHP dissolved 
itself and joined 
the RPP. 
3.4 The Democratic Left Party (DLP) 1985 
Rah§an Ecevit established the DLP on 14 November 1985. According to Ecevit, 
apparently the leader and the architect of the DLP, its origins go back to 1960s 
(Ecevit, B 1999). When the DLP was founded there were already two other parties on 
the centre-left, the SDPP, and the PP, which later merged with the SDPP. There is no 
substantial ideological difference between the SDPP and DLP, even though Ecevit 
would strongly argue the opposite. Perhaps the most visible difference has been the 
relation with the RPP. Unlike the SDPP, the DLP does not claim to be a continuation 
of the RPP. Ecevit characterized the RPP as elitist and too keen to do everything 
from above- "for the people but against the people". (Özbudun E 2000: 97). Apart 
from these minor differences the two parties share similar policies. 
Until the beginning of the 1990s the DLP did not win any significant electoral 
listening. But its fortunes turned at the 1999 elections. It received 8.5 percent 
vote in 1987,10.6 percent in 1991,14.7 percent in 1995 and became the largest 
party by receiving 22.1 percent vote in 1999 elections. 347 At present, the DLP is 
the senior partner of three party coalition government with the NAP another 
surprising front-runner of the 1999 elections. 
4 THE SMALLER PARTIES 
4.1 The Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) 
The third party to take part in the 1983 general elections was the Nationalist 
Democracy party, established in 16 May 1983 by retired general Turgut Sunalp. It 
347 Statistics 
taken from Ecevit, B 1999. 
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was a centre-right, `state party' and clearly the party of the military elite. -as At that 
time the military elite was extremely worried and distrustful of the political parties. 
For this reason the NDP was set up by the military to have a horse in the race to 
control the politics. But it did not work out very well. At the first general elections in 
1983 the DP emerged as the smallest of all, receiving 17.7 per cent of the votes. Soon 
it disappeared from the Turkish political scene all together. The Motherland Party 
government under Özal's leadership was the dominating political force of the 1980s. 
4.2 The National Action Party (NAP) 
The NAP is also the continuation of the pre-1980 NAP, the ultra nationalist party. 
Until the elections of 1999, the NAP was one of the smaller parties and never 
exceeded the 10 percent national threshold in the elections. But this dramatically 
changed in the 1999 election when the NAP doubled its vote from 8.2 per cent in 
1995 to 18.1 per cent. It is an ultra nationalist party. In the last couple of years it has 
increased its share of votes. For many commentators this is due to the intensified 
Kurdish issue combined with general incompetence of the mainstream parties for last 
two decades. 
4.3 The People's Democracy Party (PDP) 
The DPP is a predominantly Kurdish party. It defends the cultural rights of the 
Kurdish minority mainly in South East Turkey where it has between 40 to 50 per cent 
of electoral support. However so far it has not been able to exceed 5 percent of the 
total votes at national level. Also there are other smaller parties of the socialist 
tendencies, some of them are following Marxist-Leninist ideology such as Özgürlük 
ve Demokrasi Partisi (Freedom and Democracy Party (FDP), Emegin Partisi (EMEP) 
(Labour's Party). The EMEP is a leftist/Marxist, small but very vocal party of Turkish 
working class. On the extreme right there is Bilyük Birlik Partisi BBP (Great Unity 
Party (GUP) and others. 
348 See Alimad, F 1993: 188; and Tosun, T, 1999: 156-160. 
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